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ABSTRACT
The endogenous money theory states that the money supply responds 
endogenously to the demand for credit. The money supply is not exogenously 
determined by the central bank. The endogenous theory is associated with the 
Post Keynesian school. It has been tested extensively for developed countries, 
where it was found that the modern credit-driven world is characterised by an 
endogenous money supply.
The contribution of the present study is to extend this analysis to developing 
countries, specifically twelve countries in the SADC region. To examine the 
applicability of the endogenous money theory to developing countries, the thesis 
begins with an overview of the views of the different schools of thought on the 
role of money. The areas of consensus and disagreement within the Post 
Keynesian school are discussed. The theoretical basis of the thesis is the 
‘structuralist’ Post Keynesian view that money cannot be endogenous if the 
financial system in a country has not reached the final stages of development.
The ‘structuralist’ hypothesis is tested for the SADC countries by examining the 
demand and supply of credit money in each country. It was found that 
households do not generally have full access to formal credit markets. Changes 
in the money supply are not determined by changes in private sector credit in 
many of the countries. The analysis was then extended to the institutional 
environment in each country. A financial institutional index was developed to
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facilitate comparison between the SADC countries. It was shown that South 
Africa is the only country in the SADC area that has a financial system that can 
be classified as ‘largely developed’. It is also the only country where changes in 
the supply of money are predominantly credit-driven.
Post Keynesians maintain that the money supply is endogenous and interest 
rates are exogenous. Interest rate mark-ups and spreads are assumed stable 
over the business cycle. This notion is challenged by the ‘structuralist’ Post 
Keynesians. To test the theory of stable interest rate mark-ups and spreads, data 
for each individual country were examined. Neither interest rate spreads, nor 
interest rate mark-ups were found to be stable. Interest rate spreads are 
generally higher in developing countries than in developed countries. No clear 
pro- or counter-cyclical variation in spreads was found.
Finally, an econometric model was developed and the links between financial 
development and growth were examined. By looking at 49 developed and 
developing countries, it was found that financial development is strongly linked to 
economic growth. Financial repression and high interest rate spreads cause 
growth to be depressed. Financial development and increased competition in the 
banking sector will lead to higher real economic growth rates. In an environment 
where the financial system has not reached the stage where money is 
endogenous, the lack of financial institutional development stifles economic 
growth.
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OPSOMMING
Die teorie van ‘n endogene geldvoorraad aanvaar dat die aanbod van geld 
endogeen reageerop die vraag na krediet. Die geldvoorraad word nie eksogeen 
bepaal deurdie sentrale bank nie. Die endogene gedvoorraad teorie word 
geassosieer met die Post Keynesiaanse skool. Dit is reeds getoets vir 
ontwikkelde lande, waar die bevinding was dat ‘n endogene geldvoorraad ‘n 
eienskap is van ‘n moderne kredietgedrewe wereld.
Hierdie tesis maak ‘n bydrae deur die analise uit te brei na ontwikkelende lande, 
spesifiek twaalf lande in die SADC streek. Om die toepasbaarheid van die 
endogene geldvoorraad vir ontwikkelende lande te toets, begin die tesis met ‘n 
oorsig van die verskillende denkskole se sienings oor die rol van geld. Die areas 
waar Post Keynesiane ooreenstem en verskil word bespreek. Die teoretiese 
basis van die tesis is die ‘strukturalistiese’ Post Keynesiaanse siening dat die 
geldvoorraad nie endogeen kan wees indien die finansiele sisteem in ‘n land nog 
nie die finale ontwikkelingstadia bereik het nie.
Hierdie hipotese van die ‘strukturaliste’ word getoets vir die SADC lande deur te 
kyk na die vraag na en aanbod van krediet in elke land. Daar is bevind dat 
huishoudings oor die algemeen nie volledige toegang het tot formele 
kredietmarkte nie. Veranderinge in die geldvoorraad word nie in al die lande 
veroorsaak deur veranderinge in privaat sektor kredietverlening nie. Hierdie 
analise word dan uitgebrei na die institusionele omgewing in elke land, ‘n
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Finansiele institusionele indeks is ontwikkel om vergelyking tussen die SADC 
lande moontlik te maak. Daar is bevind dat Suid Afrika die enigste land is met 'n 
finansiele sisteem wat geklassifiseer kan word as ‘grotendeels ontwikkeld’. Dit is 
ook die enigste land waardie geldvoorraad beduidend kredietgedrewe is.
Post Keynesiane glo dat die geldvoorraad endogeen is en rentekoerse 
eksogeen. Rentekoersmarges word gesien as stabiel oor die konjunktuursiklus. 
Hierdie aanname word bevraagteken deur die ‘strukturalistiese’ Post 
Keynesiane. Die teorie van stabiele rentekoersmarges word getoets deur te kyk 
na data vir elke individuele land. Die bevinding is dat rentekoersmarges nie 
stabiel is nie. Marges is oor die algemeen hoer in ontwikkelende lande as in 
ontwikkelde lande. Daar is geen duidelike pro- of kontrasikliese variasies in 
rentekoersmarges gevind nie.
Laastens is ‘n ekonometriese model ontwikkel om die skakels tussen finansiele 
ontwikkeling en groei te ondersoek. Deur te kyk na 49 ontwikkelde en 
onontwikkelde lande, is daar bevind dat finansiele ontwikkeling en groei ‘n sterk 
verband toon. Finansiele onderdrukking en hoe rentekoersmarges lei tot laer 
ekonomiese groei. Finansiele ontwikkeling en groter mededinging in die bank 
sektor sal lei tot hoer reele ekonomiese groeikoerse. In ‘n omgewing waar die 
finansiele sisteem nog nie die stadium bereik het waar geld endogeen is nie, sal 
die gebrek aan finansiele institusionele ontwikkeling ekonomiese groei benadeel.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
When I began to write my Treatise on Money I was still moving along the 
traditional lines of regarding the influence of money as something so to speak 
separate from the general theory of supply and demand. When I finished it, I 
had made some progress towards pushing monetary theory back to becoming 
a theory of output as a whole (John Maynard Keynes, 1936).
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The nature and meaning of money have changed dramatically over time. In a 
world of commodity money where its value is backed by another item such as 
gold, the monetary authorities have the power to determine the money supply. 
When the supply of money is determined independently of the demand for it, it 
is regarded as exogenous. An exogenous variable is one which is determined 
outside of the system under consideration. In orthodox monetary theory the 
high-powered monetary base is considered to be under the control of the 
monetary authorities. This idea of an exogenous money supply still forms the 
basis of the theoretical framework most economists use today. Yet the reality 
of the credit-driven world we live in implies that the money supply is 
endogenously determined by the demand for credit.
1
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Commodity money must be distinguished from credit money or fiat money.
The endogenous money supply theory acknowledges that the modern world is 
characterised by credit money and liability management practices of 
commercial banks. In the endogenous theory, reserves and deposits do not 
create loans, but are rather created by loans. In today’s world banks first 
extend credit as demanded, creating deposits in the process, and then look 
for the reserves later. If this is a correct description of reality, it has serious 
implications for both monetary policy and nominal variables, such as interest 
rates and inflation.
The endogenous money supply theory has been examined extensively for 
developed countries. Research, on the money supply processes in developed 
countries found the money supply to be credit driven. There are strong 
correlations between private sector credit and the money supply. Firms and 
households have access to credit and credit lines are drawn down as needed. 
The role of the central bank is to ensure financial stability and liquidity. It has 
no choice but to accommodate the demand for credit. The money supply in 
industrialised countries respond endogenously to the financing needs of the 
economy.
It has not been shown conclusively that the same applies to developing 
countries. The institutional realities of developing countries differ from those of 
developed economies. Capital markets are undeveloped and firms and 
households typically do not have overdraft facilities. Credit rationing is 
prevalent in these markets and financial innovation is limited. This has certain
2
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implications for the money supply process and the conduct of monetary 
policy. While the money supply is not strictly exogenous, in the sense of 
controlled by the central bank, it is also not fully endogenous. Credit is not 
supplied on demand. This thesis examines the money supply process in 
selected developing countries.
1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
Endogenous money theory is examined within the developing country context. 
The question addressed is how the money supply process operates in less 
developed countries. In the case of an exogenous money supply, the central 
bank has full control over the money supply, and the stock of money is fixed. 
The demand for money in turn sets the interest rate. This is the classical 
textbook case of exogenous money and endogenous interest rates. The 
money supply is determined by the central bank, and market forces of supply 
and demand endogenously determine interest rates. In the endogenous case 
the money supply is determined by the financial system, and the central bank 
sets the price at which it supplies money. The interest rate becomes 
exogenous and policy-determined.
To examine the endogenous money supply theory in developing countries, 
the nature of their financial systems must be examined. The demand and 
supply of money will be investigated to determine whether all credit 
demanded is supplied. The question of whether interest rates are exogenous 
or endogenous will also be considered. There are different schools of thought
3
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within the broad category of Post Keynesian economists. ‘Accommodationists’ 
regard interest rates as fully exogenous, while ‘Structuralists’ regard them as 
both exogenous and endogenous. Interest rates vary over the business cycle 
to reflect variations in risk. Interest rate movements in different countries will 
therefore be examined.
The rationale for the investigation is the importance of monetary policy for 
economic stability and economic development. There is convincing evidence 
of a strong relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
Most countries in the current study experienced low average growth over the 
last two decades. Most of these countries also have undeveloped financial 
systems. It will be argued that the money supply becomes increasingly 
endogenous as financial systems develop. When agents are subject to 
arbitrary credit rationing, and the money supply process is not endogenous, 
economic growth is adversely affected. The implications of an endogenous 
money supply are important not only for monetary policy, but also for 
economic growth.
The study is structured as follows:
In the remainder of this introductory chapter a brief overview is given of the 
SADC countries that are examined in subsequent chapters.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with theoretical monetary concepts. The ‘role of money’ 
is discussed in chapter 2, and an overview is given of different schools of
4
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thought in monetary economics. The issue of money neutrality is examined 
and the views of different schools of thought regarding the role of money in 
the economy are described. Chapter 3 gives a detailed overview of the work 
of Post Keynesian authors and their individual contributions to the 
endogenous money theory, while there is not complete consensus on the 
degree of money supply endogeneity, Post Keynesians agree on the basic 
notion of an endogenously determined money supply.
In chapter 4 the demand for money is distinguished from the demand for 
credit. Keynes’s finance motive is explored in order to get a proper demand 
side focus. The composition of the demand for credit in selected developing 
countries is examined. Chapter 5 deals with the supply of credit money. It is 
argued that New Keynesian concepts such as credit rationing are compatible 
with the Post Keynesian idea of endogenous money. The relationship 
between private sector credit and the money supply is examined for individual 
developing countries to determine the extent that the money supply is credit 
driven.
In the Post Keynesian view the monetary transmission mechanism does not 
originate with changes in the money supply by the central bank. The central 
bank does not control the money supply, and this has certain implications for 
understanding the monetary transmission mechanism. Chapter 6 gives an 
overview of the monetary transmission mechanism in selected developing 
countries.
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Chapter 7 deals with the institutional environment. The institutional realities in 
developing countries have certain implications for the money supply process. 
Different aspects of the institutional environment are discussed and combined 
to develop an index of financial development. This index can also be 
interpreted as a measure of the degree of endogeneity of the money supply.
The issue of exogenous interest rates is discussed in chapter 8. The 
differences in the views of the ‘structuralist’ and ‘accommodationist’ Post 
Keyensians are highlighted. Stable mark-ups are an important part of the 
accommodationist endogenous money supply theory. The stability of mark­
ups over the business cycle is examined using a vector autoregression (var) 
model. Where ‘accommodationists’ argue that mark-ups are stable, 
‘structuralists’ focus on the behaviour of interest rate spreads as indication of 
liquidity preference of banks. Interest rate spreads are examined using a var 
model. Interest rate spreads are generally higher in developing countries than 
in industrialised countries. To provide some insight into the reasons for high 
average levels of interest rate spreads, data was obtained from 76 individual 
banks in 9 SADC countries. The determinants of interest rate spreads on a 
micro-level are explored using an ordinary least squares (OLS) cross- 
sectional model.
The evidence on financial development (chapter 7) and interest rate spreads 
(chapter 8) are combined in a econometric model in chapter 9. This model is 
used to examine the links between financial development, levels of interest 
rate spreads and economic growth.
6
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The purpose of this thesis is to test the endogenous money supply theory for 
developing countries. To facilitate this, it was decided to focus on a specific 
group of developing countries. The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) was chosen for this purpose. SADC currently has 14 
member states. Two of these, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Seychelles, have joined since the current study was initiated. The study 
therefore includes 12 SADC countries, which will be discussed briefly.
Angola is a very poor, under-developed country. It has been plagued by a 
severe civil war for the past three decades. In 2000 it had a population of 12.9 
million, but a very low per capita GDP of $ 433. Only 40% of the population is 
literate and 26% are urbanized. Its main contributors to economic activity are 
primary products, diamonds, oil and gas (SADC,2000).
Botswana is one of the SADC countries with a remarkable growth record. Of 
the 49 countries used in the econometric model in chapter 9, only three 
countries achieved average per capita growth rates above 4% over the period 
1980-1999. Botswana was one of these (Ireland and Cyprus were the others). 
Botswana is a large country (582 000m2), with a small population of 1.6 
million. Per capita GDP in 2000, was $ 3117 (SADC,2000).
Lesotho is a small country (2.1 million people) with per capita income of
1.3 COUNTRIES EXAMINED IN THE STUDY.
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$ 437 in 2000. Malawi is one of the poorer underdeveloped SADC countries. 
In 2000, it had 10 million inhabitants with a low per capita GDP, $ 182. Only 
40% of the population are literate and 13% urbanized. Mauritius is a small 
island economy (1.18 million people), with a relatively high per capita GDP 
(2000) of $ 3 582. It is an important tourist destination and has a relatively 
advanced financial sector. Mozambique is a very poor country with per capita 
GDP in 2000, of $ 242. In 2000 it had 16.8 million people of which only 28% 
are literate.
(SADC,2000).
Namibia is a large country (824 269 m2), with only 1.77 million people, in 
2000. It became independent from South Africa in 1990 and economic data 
are usually only available from 1992. South Africa is by far the largest 
economy in the area, with a highly developed financial system and per capita 
income of $3 044 (SADC,2000).
Swaziland is one of South Africa’s small neighbouring countries, with a 
population of less than 1 million people and per capita GDP of $ 2 255, in 
2000. Tanzania has a large population (32 million), but low per capita GDP of 
$ 243 in 2000. Zambia is also a poor country with per capita GDP of $ 302. In 
2000, there were 10.4 million people with an average life expectancy of 46 
years. Copper and zinc are the main contributors to economic growth. 
Zimbabwe has a population of 13.1 million people. Per capita GDP is $ 278. 
The country has experienced severe economic problems over the past few 
years (SADC,2000).
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In the final chapter, the analysis is extended to 49 countries (25 developed 
and 24 developing).
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROLE OF MONEY
Any fool with a high enough IQ can produce an 
analytical model in which money is irrelevant, but what has that to do with money’s 
role in the real world ? (David Laidler,1994)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
There are different views as to what constitutes money. Money is usually defined as 
a means of payment. It also provides a method of transferring purchasing power 
through time, allowing one to purchase today and to pay later. Wray defines money 
(1990:15) as “the unit of account, as a balance sheet entry, as a promise to pay". 
Some Post Keynesian authors believe that the money supply has always been 
endogenous (e.g. Wray), while others (e.g. Chick, Dow and Niggle) consider 
endogenous money to be a characteristic of the modern credit-driven world. The 
nature of money has changed over time. Different views on the role of money will be 
discussed in this chapter, by examining the different schools of thought in monetary 
economics.
2.2 EXOGENOUS MONEY
Exogenous money can be traced back to the initial formulation of the Quantity Theory 
of Money by David Hume. Hume used the illustration of an influx of gold, which
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initially causes output to rise, and eventually causes an increase in prices. In such a 
world, money was fully backed by gold, and the level of the money stock had a direct 
influence on the price level. Once a banking system is introduced, the picture 
becomes more complex. If banks find it profitable to extend more loans, they will do 
so. Banks are able to raise the ratio of credit to the cash base at their own initiative, 
through innovations such as liability management.
Desai (1987:137) uses the concept of ‘fiat money’ to explain the exogenous nature of 
money. Fiat money is paper money printed as the state’s liability or, in his 
terminology, ‘outside money’. Since the monetary authorities are the sole suppliers of 
fiat money, the money supply is exogenous, i.e. quantity-constrained by the central 
bank. This exogeneity of the money supply could be guaranteed through enforceable 
reserve requirements. In this story banks are passive. They are always fully loaned 
up, given their reserve requirements. The monetary authorities control the high 
powered base - consisting of currency in circulation and central bank reserves -  and 
thus determine the money supply.
An exogenous money supply also seems to have been accepted by Keynes in the 
General Theory. Apparently he subscribed to the conventional view and accepted the 
classical quantity theory of money. Post Keynesian writers argue that Keynes’s views 
on the exogeneity or endogeneity of money should not be judged solely by looking at 
the General Theory. In his earlier writings, e.g. The Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) 
and The Treatise on Money (1930), money was treated as endogenous. In the 
General Theory he wanted to meet the classical economists on their own grounds 
and therefore concentrated on his ideas of effective demand and involuntary
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unemployment, while keeping the money supply exogenous and firmly in the 
background. Moore (1988:172) describes it as follows:
Although in the General Theory Keynes did choose to regard the money stock 
as being exogenously controlled by the monetary authorities, in the Treatise 
he did not. There is ample evidence from his earlier writings that Keynes had 
in fact fully recognized the endogeneity of a credit money system, in which the 
money supply is driven by the demand for bank credit to finance increases in 
business working capital requirements.
If money is considered solely as a medium of exchange, it has a minimal role to play 
in economic relations. This view also implies that money is neutral and does not 
affect the productive side of the economy. This was the position of the Classical 
economists. It is only when money is also recognised as a store of value that it loses 
its neutrality. Keynes argued that people choose between holding money or other 
financial instruments, because money is also a store of value as well as a unit of 
account. Since the money supply is also influenced by the real side of the economy 
and is no longer exogenous.
Orthodox monetary theory maintains that the monetary authorities can directly control 
the monetary base by manipulating the quantity of reserve assets. The stock of 
money is some multiple of the reserve assets as defined by the monetary authorities. 
The standard textbook model then explains how the money multiplier works to create 
more money through subsequent rounds of money creation. But the origin of this 
process always remains the exogenous determination of the monetary base by the 
monetary authorities.
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This view of an exogenous money supply goes hand in hand with the idea of the 
neutrality of money. The extreme classical view sees money as simply a veil, behind 
which the real economy operates. Changes in the amount of money supplied to the 
economy (under the control of the central bank), will have no real effects on the 
economy. This belief was later challenged by Keynesian economists, who argued 
that money enters into the picture through the speculative demand for money.
The classical economists believed in the neutrality of money. The neutrality 
proposition states that there is a clear dichotomy between real and monetary 
phenomena. A change in the money supply has no effect on any real variables, it can 
influence only nominal variables. In a barter economy all that is produced will be used 
to pay for all that is demanded. Money is regarded as a device for facilitating 
transactions. Nobody would be interested in holding money other than for transaction 
purposes and therefore money was neutral. Monetary theory was reduced to a price 
theory, with no real influence on macroeconomic factors such as employment and 
economic growth.
2.3 LOANABLE FUNDS
The classical idea of the demand for money was embodied in the Quantity Theory of 
Money. Money was only demanded for transaction purposes. Holding money for any 
other reason would be irrational. Individuals or firms would not hold more money than 
needed for transactions, since to do so would be to sacrifice the income which could 
be earned by lending money out at interest. Therefore all current savings would be
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available as funds available for loans, either as bonds or stocks or as deposits at 
banks. The classical theory of loanable funds, stated that an investment project 
would be undertaken if the interaction between the demand and supply of loanable 
funds resulted in an interest rate that made the project viable. The interest rate was 
the crucial variable. It served as the equilibrating mechanism between saving and 
investment, always ensuring that there would be a sufficient demand for the 
aggregate output of the economy at the prevailing interest rate. This was the 
mechanism that ensured that the economy would always return to full employment 
equilibrium after a disturbance. The interest rate was seen as a real phenomenon. 
Money was only a veil, which had to be pierced to examine the real world behind the 
veil. Saving could not exceed investment as both were determined by the interest 
rate and interest rate movements ensured equilibrium.
If money is neutral, its only influence is on the price level. The interest rate 
mechanism would prevent any increase in aggregate demand to cause inflation. All 
income was either consumed or invested, and no deficiency of aggregate demand 
could arise. Inflation was caused by supplying too much money to the economy, i.e. 
more than is needed to facilitate transactions at the current level of output. This idea 
was embodied in the classical Quantity Theory of Money. According to this theory, 
the money supply (M) is assumed to be exogenously determined by the monetary 
authorities, the velocity of money (V) is assumed to be institutionally determined and 
constant in the short run. The price level (P) is the general price level and Y is the 
level of output, which is assumed to be fixed at the level of full employment outcome 
in the short run.
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If V and Y are assumed to be constant in the short run, and if M is exogenous, it 
follows that the level of prices is determined by the money supply. Changes in M will 
cause proportionate changes in P. This can be written in the form of an identity:
MV = PY
This Fisherian version of the quantity theory concluded that P was determined by the 
amount of money in circulation in the economy.
Another version of the quantity theory was the so-called Cambridge / Cash-balance 
version. This version stated that the price level equated the demand for money with 
the supply of money. Demand for real money balances was a fraction (k) of the level 
of real output (Y) which was assumed to be fixed at full employment in the short run. 
Therefore P is once again proportional to the money supply and the identity 
becomes:
M =kPY
It is clear from this equation that money is neutral. It has no real influence on the 
economy. When the supply of money doubles, people are holding more money than 
they wish to hold or need to support their current level of transactions. Because the 
classical view ignored the idea of money as a store of value, the logical step for 
people holding more money than they intended was to spend excess money on 
additional goods and services. This would cause the price level (P) to rise, because Y 
is assumed fixed at the full employment level and k is a constant. The only effect of a
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doubling of the money supply is a doubling of prices. There are no effects on the real 
side of the economy.
This cash-balance version of the Quantity Theory rests on the assumption of a stable 
demand for real-money balances: any increase in the nominal amount of money in 
circulation would in equilibrium simply lead to an increase in prices sufficient to 
restore the level of real money balances to their original level, re-establishing 
equilibrium in the monetary sector. The demand for money was only explained by the 
use of money for facilitating transactions. No consideration was given to the idea that 
money also serves as a store of value.
This theory of a stable money demand function was later revived by Friedman and 
Scwartz in their monumental work, A Monetary History of the United States (1963). 
Money was reduced to a theory of the price level. In classical theory the real wage 
and the level of employment are determined in the labour market. Equilibrium in the 
labour market determines the level of output via the production function. The interest 
rate is determined by equilibrium between savings and investment. Money 
determines only the price level. This separation between money and real variables 
has become known as the classical dichotomy.
2.4 KEYNES AND THE NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONEY.
The classical view of money as a price theory offers no real policy prescriptions 
regarding full employment and economic growth. This is exactly the shortcoming that 
Keynes tried to address. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
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(1936) he aimed to explain how money enters into this model as an essential element 
and not only as an afterthought. He wanted to provide an answer to the widespread 
unemployment of the 1930s by understanding what determined national income and 
expenditure. He aimed to provide an answer by linking the monetary and the real 
sectors of the economy, and not focussing, as his predecessors did, only on the real 
sector. In The General Theory Keynes demonstrated that aggregate output 
depended on the volume of employment and that economies did not automatically 
adjust to full employment equilibrium. The central proposition of his book was the 
principle of effective demand. Keynes reversed Say’s law and argued that demand 
creates its own supply.
Keynes had a different view of the demand for money than the classical economists. 
The demand for money was seen as determined by the speculative, transaction and 
precautionary motives. These three motives determine an individual’s demand for 
money or his “liquidity preference”. The speculative motive was seen as the most 
important one. His equation for the demand for money (MD) was:
Md = kPY + L(r),
where P is the price level, Y is the level of real income or output, r is the interest rate 
and L is liquidity preference.
The money demand therefore has two parts, the first term kPY embodies both the 
transactions demand and the precautionary demand. Both are a fraction (k) of PY 
and in this aspect resembles the cash-balance version of the Quantity Theory. The
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speculative demand is denoted by the term L(r), being a function of the interest rate. 
As this was Keynes major extension to the classical theory, this was seen as the 
most important motivation for holding money. Keynes’s theory of money is a theory of 
the determination of the interest rate, based on his analysis of the demand for 
money. The speculative demand L is an inverse function of the interest rate (r). 
Keynes assumed that the level of money income (PY) was given. The demand for 
and the supply of money then determine the interest rate.
It is clear in Keynes’s earlier work, A Treatise on Money, that he did not believe the 
money supply was exogenously controlled by the central bank:
...it is evident that that there is no limit to the amount of bank-money which the 
banks can safely create, provided that they move forward in step. The words 
italicised are the clue to the behaviour of the system. Every movement forward 
by an individual bank weakens it; so that if they all move forward together, no 
one is weakened on balance. Thus the behaviour of each bank, though it 
cannot afford to move forward more than a step in advance of the others, will 
be governed by the average behaviour of the banks as a whole -  to which 
average, however, it is able to contribute its quota small or large. Each Bank 
Chairman sitting in his parlour may regard himself as the passive instrument of 
outside forces over which he has no control; yet the “outside forces” may be 
nothing but himself and his fellow-chairmen, and certainly not his depositors 
(1935:26-27).
Keynes based his idea of an endogenous money supply on his concept of ‘bank 
money’, money that is created by the modern banking system:
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There can be no doubt that, in the most convenient use of language, all 
deposits are “created” by the bank holding them. It is certainly not the case 
that banks are limited to that kind of deposit, for the creation of which it is 
necessary that depositors should come on their own initiative bringing cash or 
cheques (1935:30).
In Keynes’s model money is not neutral. An outside disturbance, e.g. an increase in 
the money supply, can stimulate aggregate spending via an increase in investment, 
which in turn will increase aggregate output. If the transmission mechanism could 
operate in this way, then the central bank could stimulate the economy by increasing 
the money supply. Keynes, however, warned of two circumstances under which this 
transmission mechanism would fail. The first was his so-called liquidity trap, where 
the LM curve becomes horizontal, the interest rate becoming so low that everybody 
expects it to rise. The other was an interest inelastic investment function (a vertical IS 
curve). If one or both of these prevailed, then monetary theory would be ineffective. 
Keynes believed that these circumstances are often present.
Keynes argued in The General Theory that even if wages and prices were flexible (as 
in the classical case), full employment would not be established automatically. If 
money wages are too high and they do fall, then the reductions in money wages led 
to reductions in costs and eventually prices. The result of this is that the real wage is 
not reduced sufficiently to directly equilibrate the labour market at full employment. 
Full employment could be restored later through the indirect effect of the fall in prices 
on the demand for money and interest rates, i.e. the ‘Keynes wealth effect’. This led 
Keynes to conclude that wage cuts were not the best policy to achieve full
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employment, because interest rates could be lowered directly through monetary 
policy by the monetary authorities.
This is why Keynes advocated a strong role for the state. He showed that a flexible 
wage policy was not a solution to unemployment; that monetary policy is often 
ineffective, and the only option left is fiscal policy. An increase in government 
spending (G) or a decrease in taxes (T) will increase aggregate demand, illustrated 
by a shift of the IS curve to the right and stimulate investment and economic activity. 
If the central bank increased the money supply, the monetary transmission 
mechanism will be prevented from working properly by either a horizontal LM curve 
or a vertical IS curve or both. The central bank should set the interest rate at a level 
conducive to economic growth.
Keynes’s policy prescriptions were intended to move the economy towards full 
employment equilibrium. Anywhere below such a point, an increase in any variable, 
e.g. the money supply, will have an effect on both output and prices. If the economy 
reaches full employment, then expansionary policy will not cause output to increase 
but only prices to rise, i.e. the classical case. But Keynes believed that this classical 
case was in fact a special one. He described his theory as a general theory that 
incorporated the classical theory only as a special case. In contrast, Johnson 
(1958:240) later described Keynes’s theory as a special case of the classical theory. 
Hicks (1937:133) in his seminal article “Mr Keynes and the Classics” concluded that: 
’’the General Theory is something appreciably more orthodox”.
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2.5 THE NEUTRALITY PROPOSITION AND THE NEO-CLASSICAL 
SYNTHESIS.
In his 1937 article, Hicks argued that before The General Theory of Keynes, no 
formal model existed of the classical theory. He wanted to prove that after the 
formulation of both, they are closer than Keynes would have thought. Hicks's 
argument and his derivation of the well-known IS-LM diagram formed the basis of the 
neo-classical synthesis. Hicks (1937:62) had stated: “.. the General Theory of 
Employment is the Economics of Depression”. He believed that the Keynesian 
arguments were applicable to times of depression, but in normal times the classical 
theory was sufficient and would provide the correct policy measures.
Hicks’s IS-LM diagram reflected the close inter-relationship between the goods and 
money markets of the Keynesian analysis. Consumption (C) was determined by 
income (Y) and not by the interest rate (r). Therefore, saving (S) was also determined 
by income (Y) and was no longer dependent on the interest rate. Interest was the 
reward for abstaining from present liquidity. The level of investment (I) was 
determined by the marginal efficiency of capital. Two measures could be used to 
determine investment, i.e. the internal rate of return and the present-value method. 
(Morgan,1978:26).
Hicks argued that The General Theory was Mr Keynes’s special theory. He said that 
Keynes, like the classical economists, believed that the demand for money was not 
determined only by the interest rate. The dependence of the demand for money on 
the interest rate was only a qualification of the old dependence of the demand for
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money on income (Y). Keynes also included the transactions motive and was 
therefore not radically different from the classicals. The IS-LM diagram determines r 
and Y together, just as the classical theory simultaneously determined Q and P.
Despite these criticisms, Keynes made a huge contribution to monetary theory by 
providing the link between the nominal and real sectors. Although the idea of an 
endogenous money supply can be derived from the work of Keynes, it remained in 
the background. It was rather his fiscal policy recommendations that would become 
the focus of policy makers in the period after the Second World War. The (real or 
perceived) success of Keynesian fiscal policy was unprecedented. It was not until the 
early 1970s that the phenomenon of stagflation dethroned Keynesian demand 
management policies.
The widespread acceptance of Keynesian fiscal policy recommendations actually 
diminished the contribution of his work in the monetary field. His theory was reduced 
to the four-quadrant general equilibrium model by Hicks, as explained above. 
Although this was a very elegant exposition, monetary theory was reduced to a single 
quadrant. This reduced the understanding of the effect of money on the whole 
economy. Most monetary economists found themselves working within the 
constraints of this one quadrant, estimating money demand functions, while 
neglecting the overall effects of monetary policy.
Keynesian monetary policy became part of the neo-classical synthesis in a reduced 
form, as a special case of the classical model. This did not do justice to Keynes’s 
contribution. Under the neo-classical synthesis, Keynesian monetary policy became
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associated with the idea that “money doesn’t matter”. Money was again neutral, 
exogenously determined and unimportant as a policy variable. Changes in the money 
stock were viewed as largely impotent, since they could be completely offset by 
changes in velocity. This initially resulted in the implementation of “cheap money” 
policies. If money exerts only a slight influence on aggregate demand, because 
changes in M are likely to be offset by changes in V, the preferred policy approach 
would be to keep money in plentiful supply in order to keep interest rates low and 
thus reduce the burden of financing private and public debt. However, the money 
supply was not as impotent a policy variable as this view suggested. Demand 
management policies led to the stagflation of the 1970s. This provided fertile ground 
for criticism of the Keynesian approach, which first came from the Monetarist school.
2.6 FRIEDMAN AND THE ROLE OF MONEY
Monetarism is the belief in the importance of money. Friedman wrote in his Monetary 
History of the United States, written with Anna Schwartz:
Money played an important role in economic and political developments in the 
United States during the period we cover -  as it so often has in other periods 
and other places (1963:3).
Monetarism renewed interest in the classical quantity theory of money and reaffirmed 
the neutrality of money, by arguing that changes in the money supply did not 
influence the real side of the economy in the long run:
Money is a veil. The “real forces” are the capacities of the people, their 
industry and ingenuity, the resources they command, their mode of economic 
and political organization, and the like (Friedman&Schwartz, 1963:696).
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Based on his monetary history of the United States, Friedman concluded that the 
money supply was exogenous:
The close relation between changes in the stock of money and changes in 
other economic variables, alone, tells nothing about the origin of either the 
direction or influence. The monetary changes might be dancing to the tune 
called by independently originating changes in the other economic variables; 
the changes in income and prices might be dancing to the tune called by 
independently originating monetary changes; the two might be interacting, 
each having some elements of independence; or both might be dancing to the 
common tune of still a third set of influences. A great merit of the examination 
of a wide range of qualitative evidence, so essential in a monetary history, is 
that it provides a basis for discriminating between these possible explanations 
of the observed statistical covariation...One thing is abundantly clear from our 
narrative. Monetary changes have in fact often been independent, in the 
sense that they have often not been an immediate or necessary consequence 
of contemporaneous changes in business conditions 
(Friedman&Schwartz, 1963:686).
Where Keynes focussed on the speculative demand for money, Monetarists saw the 
demand for money as dominated by income, not current measured income but a 
longer-term concept of permanent income. A discrepancy between the demand for 
and supply of money can only be reconciled by variations in permanent income and 
not by interest rate changes. This view caused Monetarists to view interest rates with 
suspicion, preferring to focus only on the money supply. They acknowledged that 
interest rates are an indication of the desire to hold financial assets. Since they
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included a broader range of capital assets and expenditures in wealth portfolios, the 
interest rate was no longer a key variable. The implications of the Monetarist analysis 
are that the stability of the income velocity of money was the key relationship in 
macroeconomics and that the money supply was the crucial policy variable.
The Monetarists were suspicious of any activist stabilisation policy by government. 
They believed that changes in the money stock were the predominant factor 
explaining changes in money income. The economy is inherently stable and will 
automatically attain long-run equilibrium at some natural rate of unemployment. All 
that was necessary to ensure this was a stable growth in the money stock 
approximating the growth in output. The monetary authorities should ensure such 
stable growth of the money supply, by keeping to some monetary rule.
If it can be shown that the supply of money is not determined exogenously by the 
monetary authorities, but endogenously, then one of the main assumptions on which 
the Monetarist view is based, is refuted. This alternative view of the money supply will 
be dealt with in detail below. But it is necessary to realise at this point the implications 
of such a finding for the Monetarist view. If banks accommodate all demand for 
increased finances at a given interest rate, then the banks endogenously expand the 
money supply. This supply response of the banks is then accommodated by the 
monetary authorities who for debt-management reasons do not want the rise in credit 
demand to lead to a sharp rise in interest rates. The demand for and supply of money 
are not strictly independent and Friedmans’ key insight into how the discrepancy 
between demand and supply manifests itself in changes in nominal income is 
erroneous.
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The Monetarist idea of minimal government intervention differed greatly from the 
activist demand management policies of the Keynesian school. This was well 
summarised by Modigliani in 1977: “Nonmonetarists accept what I regard to be the 
fundamental practical message of The General Theory: that a private enterprise 
economy using an intangible money needs to be stabilized, can be stabilized, and 
therefore should be stabilized by appropriate monetary and fiscal policies.
Monetarists by contrast take the view that there is no serious need to stabilize the 
economy; that even if there were a need, it could not be done, for stabilization 
policies would be more likely to increase than decrease instability”. (Snowdon et 
al., 1994:170).
2.7 OTHER VIEWS ON MONEY NEUTRALITY
The New Classical school had their roots in the Monetarist counterattack on 
Keynesian analysis, but with rather more extreme policy implications. As the name 
suggests, they advocated an economic system similar to that of the Classical 
economists. Central to their theory were the concepts, rational expectations, 
continuous market clearing and the policy ineffectiveness proposition. The rational 
expectations revolution evolved during the 1970s and is usually associated with the 
work of Robert Lucas (like Friedman, from the University of Chicago). Sargent, Barro 
and Wallace have also written in this tradition.
The assumption of continuously clearing markets, is a highly controversial element of 
the New Classical analysis. It is also the one linking them to the Classical school.
Like the classical economists, they believe that all prices are flexible and adjust
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immediately to disturbances. In the Keynesian model prices adjust slowly and 
sometimes not at all, without some help from the government. Prices are slightly 
quicker to adjust in the Monetarist view, but there are also important rigidities 
present. In the New Classical view, economic agents may be wrong with their 
forecasts, but they adjust so quickly to the new information that becomes available 
that the aggregate supply curve is vertical. Supply curves are upward sloping only in 
the “very short-run”. Equilibrium is reached almost immediately and therefore the 
supply curve is vertical. “Rational expectations is the hypothesis that such errors are 
discovered with almost no delay”(Hoover,1988:13).
These dual hypotheses of rational expectations and continuous market clearing have 
strong policy implications. One implication is that there can be never any involuntary 
unemployment. Persistent unemployment is explained by an intertemporal labour 
supply function, i.e. voluntarily choosing to take more leisure now and do more work 
later when real wages may be higher. But the most striking policy recommendations 
lie in the monetary field. Like the classical economists, New Classical economists 
believe that money is neutral. Lucas argued that monetary policy could still be 
effective in the short run, similar to the Monetarist argument, but the agents will adapt 
their expectations faster. Sargent and Wallace extended Lucas’s model to develop 
the ‘policy ineffectiveness proposition’. Only unanticipated monetary policy could 
have an effect by raising output and employment temporarily above their long run 
equilibrium levels, because of temporary errors in inflation expectations. They differ 
from the Monetarists who prescribed a monetary rule of stable money growth. 
According to the policy ineffectiveness proposition, rational agents will incorporate
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the rule in their forecasts and monetary policy will have no effect on real variables. 
Only unanticipated changes have an effect.
Wray describes these views as follows:
The rational expectations debate over the effectiveness of monetary policy can 
be taken as a final example of the use of an exogenous money supply (in the 
control sense) (1990:77).
These ideas made the New Classicals critical of any stabilisation policy, both 
monetary and fiscal. According to them, monetary and inflation policies have no 
effect at all. The implication is that if the public believes the monetary authorities, 
then inflation could be diminished without any real effects, like higher unemployment.
Real business cycle theory was an attempt to make the new classical analysis more 
relevant to real world problems and fluctuations in the economic cycle. All that the 
new classical theory could offer was the explanation that fluctuations were caused by 
unanticipated variations in the money supply. This policy ineffectiveness proposition 
proved to be theoretically and empirically invalid by the early 1980s. “The proposition 
that anticipated money was neutral did not prove to be robust” (Snowdon et 
al, 1994:236). Therefore, some New Classical economists, notably Finn Kydland, 
Edward Prescott, Charles Plosser and Robert Barro, tried to extend the original 
theory to a more appropriate model. They developed the real business cycle theory.
This theory viewed monetary policy in a poor light. By 1980 Sims published some 
results on the causal role of money in which he argued that the direction of causality
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runs from output to money and not from money to output. This new development 
raised further question marks with respect to monetary explanations of the business 
cycle. This shifted the focus to non-monetary explanations, i.e. to real factors. 
Random shocks, such as unanticipated changes in money supply, were now 
replaced by supply-shocks in the form of random changes in technology. This led to 
the conclusion that monetary policy is irrelevant, having no influence on real 
variables. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the super-neutrality of 
money, to distinguish it from the possible short-run effects that unanticipated money 
shocks could have in the New Classical models.
In real business cycle theory, money is always neutral. In a world characterised by 
rational expectations, perfect price flexibility, full information regarding the money 
supply and intertemporal substitution of labour, money has no real influence. This 
view, developed during the 1980s, was radically different from all the other 
macroeconomic schools. Although there were serious differences between 
Keynesians and Monetarists on exactly how monetary change affected real output, 
all agreed that the rate of growth of the money supply had serious effects on the real 
side of the economy (at least in the short run). The work of the Monetarists was seen 
to confirm the view that changes in the money supply had some effect on changes in 
output and therefore causality was running from money to output.
Real business cycle theorists argued (based on the work of Sims), that the money 
supply was endogenous. Rather than money influencing output, the direction of 
causation ran from output to money. During an upswing of the business cycle, firms 
have high expectations and therefore a higher demand for money. The monetary
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authorities then accommodate this higher demand with an increase in the money 
supply. The money supply responds to changes in real activity, rather than the 
inverse.
But this fact of an endogenous money supply, caused the real business cycle 
theorists to argue that money should be disregarded altogether. If money only 
reacted to real changes in output, then it could safely be ignored. King and Plosser 
(1984) concluded that money was endogenous, reflecting real activity and can 
therefore be omitted from the model. They explained that as financial services can be 
produced more rapidly than the final product, it is clear the former is likely to occur 
before the expansion in output.
These results of an endogenous money supply are very similar to the Post Keynesian 
view of the money supply. But the policy implications of the Post Keynesian school 
are radically different. Where endogenous money caused the real business cycle 
economists to conclude that money has no role and can be ignored altogether, the 
Post Keynesian school view money and monetary policy as very important. As will be 
shown below, an endogenous money supply is central to Post Keynesian theory.
Rigid prices and wages are central to New Keynesian theory. Phelps and Taylor 
(1977:166) remarked: “In the ancient and honorable tradition of Keynesians past, we 
take it for granted that there are disadvantages from too-frequent or too-precipitate 
revisions of price lists and wage schedules". The original work on rigidities did not 
include rational expectations. Later Akerlof introduced the term near-rationality. This 
had interesting implications for monetary policy, as it implied that imperfectly
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competitive firms may not fully optimise by adjusting prices in response to exogenous 
shocks. Therefore, monetary policy can be effective, especially in the short run.
The explanation of rigid prices and wages is used to show that at the individual level 
there are small lags where prices adjust slowly to wage changes. These small lags 
have a large cumulative effect on the economy as a whole. Even if individuals adjust 
their prices rather quickly, then the much slower vertical and horizontal interactions 
between price decisions will lead to slow aggregate price adjustment. Price and wage 
rigidity are thus explained by looking at nominal rigidity at the individual level, which 
is then translated cumulatively to the aggregate level (Blanchard,1991).
What are the implications for monetary policy? Monetary policy has an effect on the 
real side of the economy, and not only on the price level. Nominal prices and wages 
are rigid throughout the economy and these rigidities can have large real effects like 
unemployment. There is another strand of New Keynesian literature (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1993) that argues that even with perfectly flexible prices and wages, small 
disturbances can still have large effects. Fluctuations in economic activity are not 
only the result of rigidities, but price flexibility could actually contribute to 
macroeconomic fluctuations and unemployment. Increased flexibility can exacerbate 
a downturn, by amplifying the shocks and causing the effects to be of a permanent 
nature. Such market failures might occur because of informational imperfections such 
as imperfect indexing or incomplete contracts. But the implication of flexible prices for 
monetary policy is the same as with rigidities. Monetary policy has real effects even 
when wages and prices are flexible. In both the cases of flexible and rigid prices, 
monetary policy has a place and this led the New Keynesians to reject the policy
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ineffectiveness proposition of the New Classical school. Although the New 
Keynesians see a role for monetary policy, they limit it to the short run and believe 
that money remains neutral in the long run.
New Keynesians believe that the non-neutrality of money is consistent with the 
stylized fact that money is procyclical and a leading indicator in the business cycle. 
This is similar to the Monetarist position based on the empirical work of Friedman and 
Schwartz. However, New Keynesians do not believe in the rules approach of the 
Monetarist and New Classical schools. New Keynesian economists believe that it is 
virtually impossible to design rules that are appropriate in the face of a rapidly 
changing economy. The Monetarists and New Classicals plead for minimum 
government intervention and stable rules. But the New Keynesians believe that 
shocks to the economy would persist, because of rigidities in the system, creating a 
need for discretionary policy intervention.
2.8 A POST KEYNESIAN INTERPRETATION
The traditional view of the money supply is that the monetary authority has the power 
to control the quantity and the rate of growth of the high-powered base, the cash 
reserves and the total deposits of the banking system. The banks are then limited by 
their minimum reserve ratios and the price of additional finance from the monetary 
authority, in the amount that they can lend to the non-bank sector. This is also the 
assumption that the Monetarist case is built on, as explained above. The problem 
with this traditional view is that no distinction is made between a commodity and 
credit-money economy. The traditional view operates within a commodity money
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world. The endogenous money supply theory acknowledges the changed world that 
we live in, characterised by credit and the liability management practices of banks. 
The endogenous theory does not see deposits as creating loans, but rather loans as 
creating deposits. It is believed that in today’s world, banks extend credit, creating 
deposits in the process and looking for the reserves later. According to Wray 
(1990:13): “In any economy in which creditor-debtor relations exist, money cannot be 
neutral”.
When banks accommodate all demand for increased finance, the money supply is 
endogenously determined. It is determined by the demand for credit. If a firm wants 
to increase its output, it has to raise finance for new capital equipment and 
employment of more workers. It obtains this from the banks. Higher wage bills 
therefore translate into an increase in the money supply through the credit markets. 
Wray (1990:16) describes this process as follows:
Thus, by focussing on money, I focus on the process of debt creation, which is 
an important part of the capitalist production process. In contrast, orthodox 
quantity theory begins with a fixed quantity of money and focuses on the use 
of money as a medium of exchange, while the portfolio balance approach 
takes an exogenously given supply and analyzes the effects of changes in 
asset prices on portfolios. Neither of these orthodox approaches concentrates 
on the process by which money is endogenously created as assets and 
liabilities are produced and purchased in a capitalist economy.
This reverse causation is central to the Post Keynesian interpretation. If desired 
spending rises, which requires finance and if the financial institutions accommodate
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this increased demand for finance, then the money supply increases as spending 
rises. Economic growth requires net deficit spending, which can only be financed by 
credit creation. Moore (1988:230) estimated for South Africa that: ”On an annual 
basis the change in the nongovernment wage bill alone explains more than 90 
percent of the observed variation in bank credit”.
This provides a different view of the role of banks in a credit money economy. Banks 
are considered to be price setters and quantity takers in retail loan and deposit 
markets. They set a lending rate to creditworthy borrowers, and then accommodate 
all demand at this price. The rate they set is some mark-up over the bank rate. In the 
short run, business loan demand is extremely insensitive to changes in interest costs. 
The most important determinant of private sector demand for bank credit is the wage 
bill. This effect works through both the household and business sectors. The growing 
wage bill of a firm will create the need for additional working capital and at the same 
time the increases in the level of labour income can serve as collateral for more 
loans.
Central banks accommodate these loan activities by allowing the nominal supply of 
credit money to accommodate changes in the demand for bank credit. The money 
supply is credit-driven. The only decision for the monetary authority is the price at 
which they supply liquidity to the banking system.
2.9 SAVING AND INVESTMENT
The prevailing assumption of the classical world was the idea based on the work of 
the French economist Jean Baptiste Say, who formulated what became known as
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Say’s law. This law stated that supply would create its own demand. Aggregate 
demand would always equal aggregate income, i.e. all saving would find investment 
outlets. Both consumption (C) and investment (I) were jointly determined by the 
interest rate (r)
Expenditure (E) is equal to aggregate output (Y) (by definition).
E = C(r) + l(r) = Y
Households are responsible for consumption and firms for investment expenditure. 
But the income that households do not use for consumption, they save. Therefore 
savings are also determined by the interest rate.
Y -  C(r) = S(r)
From the previous two equations it follows that saving is equal to investment.
S(r) = l(r)
This idea that saving would always equal investment and supply would always equal 
demand, was universally held by economists from John Stuart Mill to Alfred Marshall. 
Only Malthus claimed that a general glut of commodities was possible. This belief in 
the superiority of the invisible hand led the classical economists to believe that the 
system would always return to full employment equilibrium.
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In the Keynesian model output is determined by expenditure by households (C) and 
firms (I). In the classical model consumption and saving are determined by the 
interest rate. In the Keynesian model they are both a function of income. Keynes 
explained his consumption function by referring to some “psychological law”, where 
consumption increases as income increases but by some fraction, the so-called 
marginal propensity to consume. Investment is determined by expected profitability 
which Keynes termed the “marginal efficiency of capital”. This fluctuated much as the 
future was uncertain and it was difficult to calculate the return from an investment 
decision. Keynes used the term “animal spirits” to indicate that business confidence 
was crucial to the level of investment and that it was not determined solely by interest 
rates as in the classical theory. The effect of a change in investment on output would 
be greater than the initial change, because of the multiplier.
Keynes rejected the loanable funds theory. He argued that investment determines 
saving through changes in income:
The initial novelty lies in my maintaining that it is not the rate of interest, but 
the level of incomes which ensures the equality between saving and 
investment (Keynes, 1937:250).
Saving was seen as a withdrawal from the income stream and there was not some 
interest rate that would ensure equality between saving and investment. Saving was 
determined by income, like consumption. All income that is not consumed is saved. If 
people save more, then they consume less and this will actually lower income and 
employment.
36
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
No amount of actual investment, however great, can exhaust and exceed the 
actual supply of savings, which will always exactly keep pace 
(Keynes, 1937:248).
This view of Keynes is one of the central aspects of an endogenous money supply 
theory. Wray sees the ex post equality of saving and investment as a logical 
conclusion of the endogenous money argument:
Thus, the true order of events shows that orthodoxy clearly has reversed the 
process through which investment is funded. Banks do not begin as 
intermediaries which accept deposits of ‘savers’ and then make loans to 
‘investors’...Just as the logic of a capitalist system requires that it cannot be 
constrained by commodity money, its logic also requires that it cannot be 
constrained by saving (1990:58).
Moore argues that saving is the accounting record of investment:
Since actual saving is the accounting record of investment, if a reduction in 
interest rates increases investment, it must necessarily also increase saving. If 
investment expenditure rises due to a reduction in interest rates, this will lead 
to an increased demand for bank loans, to finance producers’ increased 
working capital needs. The resulting increase in the money supply provides 
the nonvolitional saving by all units whose money balances have increased 
over the period. Investment can thus never be constrained by a lack of saving 
(Moore,2000:21).
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Keynes found it astonishing that this equality between saving and investment was not 
as clear to everyone:
Some people find it a paradox, that, up to the point of full employment, no 
amount of actual investment, however great, can exhaust and exceed the 
supply of savings, which will always exactly keep pace (Keynes,1973:210).
In this view, investment actually causes saving. If an economy functions below its full 
employment level of output, then it is probably demand constrained in the Keynesian 
view, and the problem cannot be a lack of saving since investment creates the saving 
necessary to finance itself. But investment is determined by the interest rate, and this 
view of saving as the accounting record of investment then has serious policy 
implications for the way the monetary authorities view interest rates.
2.10 EXOGENOUS INTEREST RATES
Keynes rejected the classical idea that real forces, represented by the supply and 
demand for loanable funds, determine the interest rate. In the General Theory the 
interest rate was determined by the liquidity preference (demand for money) and the 
supply of money. The determination of the interest rate was a monetary and not a 
real phenomenon, as in the classical case. Inequality between saving and investment 
is addressed by quantity adjustments rather than interest rate adjustments that could 
ensure full employment equilibrium. In the General Theory Keynes assumed that the 
supply of money was determined exogenously by the monetary authorities.
Keynes introduced the interest rate as an important factor into the money market.
The interest rate was essential to the speculative demand for money. The speculative
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motive was based on an idea of a normal rate of interest. When the interest rate is 
low (relative to the normal rate), investors expect it to rise in future, causing bond 
prices to fall and therefore the demand for speculative balances is high. The 
transactions and precautionary demand for money determine the position of the 
money demand function, while the speculative demand determines the slope. In the 
Neo-classical synthesis, the money supply was fixed exogenously by the monetary 
authorities. The money supply and the money demand functions determine the LM 
curve. The LM curve has a positive slope and depicts different levels of Y and r at 
which the money market clears. Macroeconomic equilibrium is determined by adding 
the IS curve. To determine equilibrium in the money market, the interest rate is 
necessary and to determine equilibrium in the goods market, Y needs to be known. Y 
and r can be determined simultaneously where the two curves intersect.
In Keynes’s analysis the investment function illustrated the negative relationship 
between I and r. In the classical case, the investment function is also negatively 
sloped, but investment and saving together determine the interest rate. Keynes 
believed that the interest rate is necessary to determine I and can not be determined 
in the goods market as a function of savings and investment. Where the classical 
school thought that the interest rate would adjust to ensure equilibrium, Keynes 
believed that there are different levels of equilibrium output associated with different 
levels of the interest rate. These combinations of output (Y) and the interest rate (r) 
give equilibrium in the goods market and together they form the IS curve, which has a 
negative slope. The slope of the IS curve is determined by consumption and saving 
and the marginal efficiency of capital.
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There are different views about interest rate determination in a world with endogeous 
money. Moore (1988) believes in a simple mark-up approach. Since the money 
supply is horizontal at a given rate of interest, the interest rate is simply a mark-up 
over the wholesale price of funds. This means that all the monetary authorities need 
to do to reduce unemployment is simply to lower interest rates (which becomes 
exogenous in this model). According to Moore:
...in modern overdraft economies, the level of short term interest rates has 
now become exogenous. Monetary authorities administer the interest rate as 
their chief policy instrument to induce the rate of growth of the money supply 
and aggregate demand, in their attempt to guide the economy towards their 
stabilization targets (2000:1).
This implies that:
Classical loanable funds and Keynesian liquidity preference theories of 
interest rate determination, AD-AS and IS-LM theories of income 
determination, and any long-run growth model, are all fatally flawed 
(Moore,2000:5).
Other Post Keynesians (e.g. Wray) believe that liquidity preference theory is perfectly 
compatible with an endogenous money supply. Banks have some liquidity 
preference, which determines the loan rate of interest. The money supply is 
endogenous. But as more loans are extended, the interest rate must rise to 
compensate for the increased riskiness of the loan portfolio.
Thus, the discount rate cannot be exogenously set, and cannot exogenously 
determine short term interest rates. Indeed, it makes no more sense to argue
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that interest rates are exogenous than it does to argue that the money supply 
is exogenous.
These different views will be further dealt with in Chapter 4 when the demand for 
money is discussed.
2.11 THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
The Keynesian transmission mechanism operates as follows: If the central bank 
wants to increase the money supply, then it does so by buying bonds. Households 
have more money, which they use to buy financial assets that are seen as a good 
substitute for holding money. Bond prices rise and the interest rate falls. Businesses 
will issue more bonds at the higher price, they will use this money to purchase capital 
goods, i.e. to invest. This will cause the supply price of capital goods to increase and 
production will increase. This higher production will work through the multiplier effect 
to increase expenditure through higher consumer demand. This provided the link 
between the monetary and the real sectors that was absent in the classical view.
The monetarist transmission mechanism differs substantially from that of the 
Keynesian school in its policy prescriptions. It starts in the same way as above. A 
higher money supply causes a portfolio imbalance. But now there are more options 
than only substituting money with other financial assets as in the Keynesian case. 
Households can also buy other assets, e.g. durable consumer goods. Households 
buy bonds, prices rise, interest rates fall and this causes higher investment by firms 
but now higher consumer spending on household assets also causes higher demand 
and higher prices for all goods, not only capital goods and financial assets. This is
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why the Monetarist school saw interest rates as too narrow an indicator of whether 
monetary policy is tight or easy. They considered the rate of change in the money 
supply as the correct instrument to control inflation.
This view was based on the assumption that the supply of money is determined 
exogenously by the monetary authorities. Therefore, in order for the existing stock of 
money to be willingly held, the demand for money must change whenever the money 
supply is altered by the authorities. Empirical work done by Monetarists showed that 
changes in the money stock are followed by changes in money income, but by a lag 
(on average) of sixteen months. Because these lags were both long and variable, 
attempts to “fine tune” the economy in the short run were seen to be ineffective or 
even destabilising. Therefore the Monetarist policy prescription was that the 
monetary authorities should avoid any drastic policy changes and should rather 
commit themselves to attaining a steady growth rate of the money supply, roughly 
equal to the growth in GDP. Discretionary fiscal policies should be avoided because 
of their crowding-out effect on private expenditure.
The question of how the monetary transmission mechanism works in a world with an 
endogenous money supply will be further explored in Chapter 6. The different 
transmission mechanisms in the literature and especially the credit channel of 
transmission will be looked at, as well as its relevance to less developed countries.
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2.12 LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)
The discussion above showed that there are different views within the endogenous 
money school on whether the money supply has always been endogenous. Authors 
such as Moore, Wray, Dow and Chick, believe that endogenous money is a feature of 
the modern credit-driven world. This idea seems to have been recognised already by 
Keynes in his classification of different types of money in the Treatise:
The proportionate importance of State-Money and Member Bank-Money, 
created as above, in making up the aggregate of Current Money varies widely 
at different periods and in different countries, according to the stage which 
have been reached in the evolution of monetary practice (Keynes,1935:31). 
Wray seems to be the only Post Keynesian author who believes that the money 
supply has always been endogenous.
Wray acknowledges that the situation might be quite different in a less developed 
country (LDC). The ability of the central bank in a LDC to supply credit money on 
demand may be constrained by international capital flows.
In this case, the money supply of the LDC cannot be endogenously increased 
because high ‘liquidity preference’ (that is, preference for DC debts) prevents 
creation of LDC money...For this reason, it is not at all clear that financial 
development in the LDCs can proceed along the path 
outlined.. .(Wray, 1990:63).
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The aim of this thesis is to look at the specific characteristics of LDCs today and to 
test whether, given the institutional environment, money can be endogenously 
created by the economic system.
2.13 CONCLUSION
In this chapter the role that money plays in an economy was looked at. It was seen 
that money was neutral in the classical analysis. Money was a veil, behind which the 
real economy functioned. Interest rates were determined in the goods market through 
the interaction between saving and investment. This was the classical theory of 
loanable funds. The money supply was considered exogenous and under the control 
of the monetary authorities.
Keynes rejected the loanable funds theory. In his analysis money was not neutral. 
The demand for money was not only influenced by transactions demand, but also by 
its property as a store of value. The interest rate is therefore a money market price 
and this determines the level of investment. This provided the link between the 
monetary and the real sectors that was missing in the classical analysis. In Keynes’s 
A Treatise on Money he used a concept of endogenous money, where banks can 
supply money on demand, so-called ‘bank money’.
The importance of Keynes’s work in the monetary field was overshadowed by his 
fiscal policy recommendations. In the Neo-Classical synthesis, Keynes’s emphasis 
on money was reduced to one of the quadrants of Hicks’ IS-LM model.
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Monetarism revived the old quantity theory of money. The money supply was viewed 
as exogenous, and determined by the monetary authorities. If the money supply grew 
by more than the targeted growth rate, this was due to a lack of ‘moral fibre’ of the 
monetary authorities. Money was not regraded as neutral in the short run, but was 
neutral over longer time periods. Monetarists concluded that the money supply 
should be kept at a stable rate of growth, more or less equal to the natural growth 
rate of the economy.
This idea of long-run monetary neutrality is also shared by the rational expectations 
school, the real business cycle theorists and even the New Keynesian school. Money 
is exogenous. Even when it is endogenous as in the
real business cycle analysis, the implications are that money is not important and can 
be disregarded altogether.
Against this background of exogenous and neutral money, it was shown that the Post 
Keynesian school offers important new insights into the role of money in a modern 
economy. In an overdraft economy the money supply is not under the control of the 
central bank. The demand for money or finance is automatically accommodated by 
banks who are price setters and quantity takers in their retail loan markets. This has 
dramatic implications for monetary policy. Saving is then always equal to investment 
-  according to Moore, saving is the accounting record of investment. An economy 
can never be constrained by a lack of saving. An endogenous money supply 
process, causes the interest rate to become exogenous, fully under the control of the 
monetary authorities. The interest rate is simply a stable mark-up over the bank rate.
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This also has further implications for the way that the monetary transmission 
mechanism works.
Finally, the question was raised whether this Post Keynesian view of the role of 
money in a credit world, is also applicable to LDCs. Do the same theory and policy 
implications apply to a country that has not yet developed all the financial institutions 
associated with a modern, sophisticated financial system? This question will be 
addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENDOGENOUS MONEY
In a world of banks and insurance companies, money markets and stock exchanges, 
money is a quite different thing from what it was before these institutions came into
being (Moore,1988).
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter two, the period immediately after the Second World War 
witnessed a powerful consensus in the field of economics. Keynes’s fiscal policy 
recommendations and the principle of ‘effective demand’ appeared to be very 
successful in creating a vibrant post-war economy. World War II was the beginning of 
government spending on a big scale. This continued with very little inflationary 
pressure until the 1970s. The neo-classical synthesis reigned supreme. This was 
generally a model of a world where markets returned to equilibrium, where agents 
had perfect information and where periods of prolonged involuntary unemployment 
were extraordinary. The aggregate supply curve had an upward sloping part when 
the economy was below the point of full employment equilibrium, but would soon 
return to the vertical part of the curve at full employment, where markets were 
clearing, i.e. the classical case with not much need for government intervention. This 
neo-classical synthesis became the basis of most economists’ training, largely as a 
result of the influential textbook written by Paul Samuelson.
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In the United Kingdom, some of Keynes’s former colleagues continued their research 
in the original Keynesian tradition. They argued that the Neo-Classical synthesis, 
developed mostly in the United States of America, was not true to the original ideas 
of Keynes. As argued above, Keynesian policy prescriptions were reduced to fiscal 
stimulation packages, and due to interest inelasticity pessimism, monetary policy was 
regarded as less powerful. The critique of British economists is well summarised in 
the following remarks of Joan Robinson :
The doctrines of the new era have been attributed to Keynes, but the dominant 
economic theory of the time in North America and spreading from there over 
the world, is what I have called the ‘Bastard Keynesian doctrine’. I do not use 
the term just as abuse. It has a definite meaning. The old orthodoxy against 
which the Keynesian revolution was raised was based on Say’s Law, there 
cannot be deficiency of demand. The Bastard Keynesian doctrine has allowed 
all the old doctrines to creep back in again. Keynes was diagnosing a defect 
inherent in capitalism. But the Bastard Keynesians turned the argument back 
into a defense of laissez-faire.(Davidson, 1991:23).
The neo-classical consensus began to disintegrate with the events of the 1970s. The 
oil-shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the resulting phenomenon of stagflation dealt a 
severe blow to the once powerful consensus. The stable trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment (the Phillips curve) was no longer an accurate description of 
reality. The search was on for a new all-encompassing doctrine. The newer schools 
of thought have been discussed above, the Monetarist school which emphasised 
monetary policy and monetary phenomena, the New Classical school with rational 
expectations and the New Keynesian school with their desire to revive some of
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Keynes’s ideas of inflexible prices and coordination problems. The Post-Keynesian 
school has been criticised for their negative critique of the existing models and beliefs 
without offering any positive alternatives in the place of the old. Philip Arestis 
(1996:111) argued in a paper entitled ‘Post-Keynesian economics: towards 
coherence’ that this was not exactly true: “...post-Keynesian economics has passed 
through the important initial stage of mounting a concerted critique of mainstream 
economics.” However, Dornbusch and Fischer in their macroeconomics textbook 
view Post-Keynesians in a rather different light:
Post-Keynesians are a diverse group of economists who share the belief that 
modern macroeconomics leaves aside or explicitly assumes away many of the 
most central elements of Keynes’s General Theory....Post-Keynesian 
economics remains an eclectic collection of ideas, not a systematic challenge 
as, for example, the rational expectations hypothesis.
(Dornbusch&Fischer, 1992,687-688).
Post-Keynesians argue that the view of critics like Dornbusch and Fischer was 
incorrect. Post Keynesian economics originated in the continuation of Keynes’s work 
by some of his former colleagues at Cambridge, England, primarily Nicholas Kaldor, 
Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn.
Palley (1996:8) has argued that:
Post Keynesian economics...has steadily coalesced over the last fifteen years 
into a coherent body of thought that is distinguished by its own theoretical 
perspectives.
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He summarises the main propositions of Post Keynesian economics in his book Post 
Keynesian Economics -  Debt, Distribution and the Macro Economy (1996). These 
are the idea of effective demand (built on Keynes’s original idea), the view that wage 
deflation is not a solution for unemployment, the insight that nominal wages are 
determined by wage bargaining and that the money supply is endogenous. This last 
proposition of the endogeneity of money is central to the Post Keynesian view of the 
world we live in. This chapter gives an overview of this doctrine.
3.2 ENDOGENOUS M O N EY-A  DEFINITION.
In Keynes’s analysis money mattered a lot. But this view had to take a backseat to 
his fiscal policy recommendations under the neo-classical synthesis. Fiscal policy 
remained the focus throughout the post-war years up to the 1970s when Monetarists 
revived the original quantity theory of money. Friedman argued that too much money 
was the cause of rising prices, i.e. ‘too much money chasing too few goods’. The 
Post Keynesian school reversed the idea of money determining prices. Instead they 
argue that although money and prices move together, money does not determine 
prices. Both are determined by other factors. In an uncertain environment 
entrepreneurs use their “animal spirits” to determine whether an investment project 
should be undertaken or not. If they decide to invest, they need working capital. This 
capital is obtained in a modern credit world from commercial banks in the form of new 
loans and the utilisation of existing credit lines. Thus, instead of the traditional view of 
bank intermediation whereby deposits create loans, loans are now seen as creating 
deposits. The direction of causation runs from loans to deposits, not the other way 
around. The central bank must accommodate all demand for extra funds, in its role of
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supplier of system liquidity, and normal functioning of the banking system.1 This 
endogenous view of the money creation process is based on the idea of an overdraft 
economy where firms and households have outstanding credit facilities provided by 
commercial banks. Although it is assumed that modern financial innovation is crucial 
to endogenous money, the formulation of this view can be traced back to the 
previous century. French writers trace the idea of endogenous money back to an 
influential essay by Le Bourva, a French economist. The article appeared in the 
Revue Economique in 1959. Le Bourva explained the endogenous money concept, 
showing that the direction of causation was from prices to money rather than the 
other way around. In his own words: “Given that banks exist only in so far as 
entrepreneurs are indebted to them, the quantity of money can always be reduced by 
repaying loans without borrowing anew; in other words, only desired money can 
exist’’ (Lavoie, 1999:108). Moss (1997:368) argues that the historic origin of the 
approach may go back further. He refers to a Professor Neil T. Skaggs who argued 
that Henry Dunnings Macleod, an eccentric English barrister (1821-1902), “may have 
been the first to understand completely how the quantity of money or its changes can 
be endogenously determined by the level of production but at the same time the level 
of production can be constrained by the lack of available credit and financial 
intermediation.”
In his 1990 book Money and Credit in Capitalist Economies -  The Endogenous 
Money Approach, Wray argues that the supply of money has always been 
endogenous, even in a commodity money world. Nonetheless, the endogenous view
' There is some debate among Post Keynesians whether commercial banks passively accommodate all demand 
for finance. Moore argues that the supply of money is horizontal in interest-money space, i.e. all demand is 
accommodated at a certain price. “Modern commercial banks are price setters and quantity takers in both their 
retail deposit and loan markets. As a result at every moment in time the money supply should be viewed as 
horizontal.”(Moore,1988:xii). Wray on the other hand (1990) argues that the money supply is a step-function.
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of money is usually associated with the development of the modern banking system. 
Arestis (1996:121) argues that the capacity of banks to create credit depends 
crucially on their stage of evolution. Innovations in the banking system make it 
possible for banks to operate more independently of their reserve requirements, 
making the supply of credit, and of money, more responsive to demand. This view 
sees the money supply as becoming increasingly endogenous as the banking system 
develops.2
The commodity money view, with money determined exogenously by the monetary 
authorities, is not an accurate description of the world we live in. Developments in 
financial markets during the past decade have dramatically changed the way banks 
do business. A multitude of new financial instruments have been developed, such as 
credit cards, charge cards, money market funds, electronic cash transfers, smart 
cards, etc. Commercial banks respond endogenously to the demand for credit, 
supplying all creditworthy borrowers with the necessary funds, at a given price. In the 
exogenous view, central banks can control the money supply by enforcing reserve 
requirements. But because of financial innovation, commercial banks are no longer 
narrowly constrained by reserve requirements. Even if the central bank wanted to 
control the monetary base, they could not do so. The central bank has the role of 
ensuring the smooth functioning of the financial system in a fiat money world. The 
consequence of not accommodating the demand for money would be disastrous, as 
confidence in the banking system could be destroyed rapidly. The central bank has
2 This issue will be analysed further in later chapters when the endogenous money supply theory will be tested for 
developing countries.
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no choice it has to accommodate all demand for money. The supply of money 
therefore becomes demand-determined and endogenous.
3.3 ENDOGENOUS MONEY -  A DIVERSITY OF IDEAS
As stated above, some writers had traced the origins of the theory of endogenous 
money back to the nineteenth century and a certain British barrister, Henry Dunnings 
Macleod. A more recent exposition is that of Le Bourva in 1959. But most Post 
Keynesians believe that Keynes was indeed a supporter of the endogenous money 
theory as is evident from his earlier works the Tract on Monetary Reform (1925) and 
The Treatise on Money (1935). Although the General Theory is regarded as an 
improvement on his earlier work and indeed a replacement of it, Post Keynesians 
argue that his main ideas on monetary theory are embodied in the Treatise on 
Money. Rochon (1999:3) describes Keynes’s views in the following way:
From the Treatise on Money to his articles in the Economic Journal (1937- 
1939) and through the General Theory, Keynes’s intellectual development and 
his attempt at building the foundations of a monetary economy of production 
slowly progressed toward the recognition of credit-money as the central 
institution of modern capitalism.
The earlier debate on the nature of money was overshadowed by the post-war 
emphasis on fiscal policy. The emergence of the Neo-Classical synthesis further 
reduced the importance of monetary policy. During the 1960s and 1970s Milton 
Friedman and the Monetarist school re-emphasised the importance of monetary 
policy. They argued that the amount of money in circulation directly influences the
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price level, with causation running directly from money to prices. This led them to 
recommend the use of money supply growth rules, as the response lags of prices to 
money were long and variable.
During the 1960s in Britain, there was a different view on the efficiency of monetary 
policy. This was clear from the report published in 1959 by the British Committee on 
the Working of the Monetary System (known as the Radcliffe Committee). The 
Committee was directed to launch a full enquiry into the role of monetary policy. This 
was done against the background of the reduced significance of monetary policy 
during the Neo-Classical synthesis era. As Kaldor reported in 1982 in his influential 
book The Scourge of Monetarism:
For those chiefly instrumental in the decision to set up the Committee, the 
Report must have come as something of an anticlimax (1982:5).
The reason for this was that the Committee under Lord Radcliffe concluded:
...we envisage the use of monetary measures as not in ordinary times playing 
other than a subordinate part in guiding the development of the 
economy...when all has been said on the possibility of monetary action and of 
its likely efficacy, our conclusion is that monetary measures cannot alone be 
relied upon to keep in nice balance an economy subject to major strains from 
both without and within. Monetary measures can help, but that is all 
(Kaldor,1982:6).
Across the Atlantic Ocean, Monetarism was gaining ground very rapidly in the United 
States. Kaldor compared the proponents of the new doctrine to “a band of 
enthusiasts, combining the fervour of early Christians with the suavity and selling
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power of a Madison Avenue executive” (1970:1). The rapid rise of Monetarism made 
it essential for Keynesian economists to reformulate their views on the importance of 
monetary policy. The Radcliffe committee had questioned the importance of targeting 
the money supply and argued that the focus of monetary policy should rather be on 
the regulation of interest rates.
Though we do not regard the supply of money as an unimportant quantity, we 
view it as only a part of a wider structure of liquidity in the economy ...It is the 
whole liquidity position that is relevant to spending decisions and our interest 
in the supply of money is due to its significance in the whole money liquidity 
picture.. .(Kaldor,1982:8).
The Radcliffe committee unfortunately came to be associated with the idea that 
money is not very important. The basic idea seemed to be that changes in the 
velocity of money would offset changes in the money supply. The money supply 
could be allowed to grow rapidly, and this would lower interest rates. The resulting 
‘easy money’ policies of the 1970s seemed to prove them wrong. Stagflation was 
rising and Keynesian demand management policies received most of the blame. This 
was a welcome development for Monetarism. Both the United States and Britain 
soon embarked on Monetarist experiments. On 6 October 1979, Mr Volckerthe 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board announced the implementation of Monetarist 
policy measures, aiming for a steady growth of the monetary aggregates M1 and M2. 
In Britain, when Mrs Thatcher came to power in May 1979, the new government soon 
announced the adoption of Monetarist policy measures (Kaldor,1982).
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Both these Monetarist experiments failed. The money supply grew by much more 
than the targeted rates while both interest and inflation rates soared. Kaldor 
(1982:xiv) notes that Friedman admitted publicly in 1982 that the American 
Monetarist experiment was a terrible failure. The fault was supposed to lie with the 
authorities, who did not implement the policy efficiently. The Bank of England fared 
even worse than the Federal Reserve: “Friedman has admitted that, as far as the 
United Kingdom is concerned, the money supply is not exogenously determined by 
the monetary authorities, but he attributed this to the ‘gross incompetence’ of the 
Bank of England...If the Bank of England is so incompetent that it cannot do so, how 
can we be sure that the Bank of Chile or of Argentina or Mexico -  to take only the 
highly inflationary countries -  are so competent, or rather so competently 
incompetent, as to make it possible to assert that the inflation of these countries was 
the consequence of the deliberate action of their central banks flooding these 
countries with money” (Kaldor, 1982:xvi).
The Radcliffe report became an important statement on the practice of money supply 
targeting. The report had questioned the impact of the money supply on the price 
level, as advocated by the original Quantity Theory as well as by the Monetarist 
school. But the report mainly criticised existing monetary policy in the United 
Kingdom at the end of the 1950s. It had few positive policy recommendations to offer. 
This was regrettable as the report was used by policy makers to justify the spending 
policies of the 1970s, which resulted in high inflation. Unfortunately the Monetarist 
experiments of the late 1970s and early 1980s did not offer a much better alternative. 
By the 1980s the search was again on for a new paradigm. This led to renewed 
interest into the nature of money. The Post Keynesian School emerged with their
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view of the supply of credit money as endogenous, demand-determined and credit- 
driven.
An earlier statement of the Post Keynesian view was by James Tobin. He wrote an 
influential article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1970, entitled: ‘Money and 
Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc’. Tobin attempted to refute the idea of Friedman 
that a correlation between the quantity of money and prices implied one-way 
causation running from money to prices. In this paper Tobin constructed two models, 
one that he called an “ultra-Keynesian” model and the other a Friedman model. In the 
ultra-Keynesian model changes in the money supply respond passively to changes in 
income, which in turn were generated by autonomous investment and government 
expenditure. Banks accommodate the demand for credit, aided by the monetary 
authorities who supply the necessary liquidity. “The monetary system responds to the 
‘needs of trade’” (Tobin, 1970:305). This model explicitly assumes endogenous 
money. But its aim was to show that with the ultra-Keynesian model in which money 
plays no causal role, results are obtained that would imply monetary causality, even 
more so than in the Friedman model. Tobin (1970:303) used these models to argue 
that: “I do think, nevertheless, that the exercise points up the dangers of accepting 
timing evidence as empirical proof of propositions about causation”. Although he 
used the endogenous money theory to criticise Friedman’s model, he also pointed 
out in his article that he did not believe the ultra-Keynesian model was truly 
descriptive of the world.
The earlier proponents of the endogenous money theory were Paul Davidson in the 
United States and Nicholas Kaldor in the UK. Moore (1988) describes Kaldor as the
57
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
first prominent Keynesian to fully embrace the concept of monetary endogeneity. This 
is clear from Kaldor’s Radcliffe Lectures, delivered at the University of Warwick in 
1981. In the second lecture he stated clearly: “Now, in the case of credit money the 
proper representation should be a horizontal ‘supply curve’ of money not a vertical 
one. Monetary policy is represented not by a given quantity of money stock but by a 
given rate of interest; and the amount of money in existence will be demand- 
determined” (Kaldor,1982:24). As early as 1970, Kaldor had written a critique of 
Monetarism in the Lloyds Bank Review. In this article he showed that in a credit 
money economy, the money supply could not be controlled exogenously by the 
central bank. He refuted the Monetarist idea by stating that: “The explanation, in 
other words, for all the empirical findings on the “stable money function” is that the 
“money supply” is “endogenous”, not “exogenous. This, of course, is the crux of the 
issue, and it is vehemently denied by the Monetarist school”(Kaldor,1970:9). These 
ideas of Kaldor, especially the idea of a horizontal money supply curve was later 
further developed by Moore in his influential 1988 book, Horizontalists and 
Verticalists. This will be discussed in detail below.
Paul Davidson on the other hand never fully subscribed to the idea of the money 
supply as horizontal.
Thus, as early as 1972 Post Keynesian monetary theory had not limited itself 
to the concept of an endogenous money supply -  much less to a fully 
accommodating money supply. Moreover, the Davidson-Weintraub article 
(1973) explicitly recognized a) that observed increases in the money supply 
could be either exogenous or endogenous (cause or effect) and even when 
endogenous, need not be fully accommodating...Thus, as far as I am
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concerned, there has never been anything in Post-Keynesian monetary theory 
which required a fully accommodating system (Davidson, 1978:489).
It is important at this stage to remember that the members of the real business cycle 
school also support the idea of endogenous money. King and Plosser (1984), 
explained in detail how higher output could cause a higher volume of transaction 
services demanded by households and firms. This clearly implies that the direction of 
causality is also the reverse of the mainstream view of changes in money causing 
changes in income and prices. But the similarity between this school and the Post 
Keynesian analysis ends at this point. Snowdon et al. (1994:254) describe this in the 
following terms: “In an unholy alliance, both Post-Keynesians and real business cycle 
theorists appear to agree with Robinson that the quantity theory equation (MV=PY) 
should be read in causal terms from right to left.” The reason why it is described as 
an unholy alliance is that the policy implications are vastly different. The real 
business cycle economists use the endogenous theory of money to prove that only 
real forces matter. Monetary policy is irrelevant with no influence on real variables, 
i.e. money is neutral. This is definitely not the Post Keynesian view. Post Keynesians 
see an important role for monetary policy, because the money supply is endogenous. 
In the rest of the study, the focus will be on the Post Keynesian idea of endogenous 
money and its implications for monetary policy.
3.4 MOORE : HORIZONTALISTS AND VERTICALISTS
In his 1988 book Horizontalists and Verticalists, Moore argued that in a credit money 
world the money supply is endogenous. Like Kaldor, he clearly distinguishes
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between a world using commodity money and today’s world of credit money. The 
orthodox theory and the quantity theory of money are only valid for a world with 
commodity or fiat money. In a world characterised by credit money, the money supply 
becomes endogenous. Moore uses the term “verticalists” to describe the economists 
who believe in an exogenous money supply. They see the money supply curve as 
vertical in interest-money space, as in the standard IS-LM analysis.
In the modern credit world, loans make deposits and not the other way around. Bank 
assets consist of bank loans. These loans are not marketable as they are 
heterogeneous, and the risk associated with each individual loan is costly to 
calculate. Most businesses and private individuals have unutilised credit lines. 
Rousseas (1988:476) argues that these unutilised credit lines are normally not where 
they are most needed and would therefore most probably not be utilised. “It is quite 
possible that a great part of unused overdrafts remain just that -  unusecf’. But if there 
are outstanding credit facilities, the total amount of credit money cannot be controlled 
by the central bank. The nominal money supply is therefore never quantity 
constrained by central banks.
The role of the central bank as the ultimate supplier of system liquidity, is to set the 
price of credit. The central bank cannot not accommodate the demand for money, as 
their role is to ensure the smooth functioning of the financial system. “All that central 
banks can do is set the price and terms at which they supply fiat money on demand 
to the financial system” (Moore, 1988:xii). The supply of credit money responds 
endogenously to changes in the demand for bank credit. This higher demand can be 
explained by changes in the wage bill, which could be indicative of entrepreneurs’
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future expectations of demand. The high-powered base is no longer tied to any 
exogenous gold stock. The price of credit is set, either by the central bank in the form 
of the bank rate or by commercial banks as some mark-up over the bank rate. But 
the quantity of credit money is demand-determined. Central banks cannot increase or 
reduce the money supply or the monetary base by open market operations so long 
as they are targeting the interest rate. But how can they reduce the supply of credit 
money when most businesses have access to unutilised lines of credit? Liability 
management practices by banks have developed in such a way that pre-arranged 
lines of credit are arranged between the borrowers and the banks. The utilisation of 
such credit lines obviously is at the discretion of the borrowers, not the banks. Moore 
& Smit report (1986:86) that “In the U.S. and the U.K. the utilization ratio of these 
overdraft facilities typically varies between 50 and 60 per cent, and unutilized credit 
lines are broadly equal to loans granted.”
Commercial banks actively sell credit. They set the price at which they are willing to 
supply credit, and accommodate all creditworthy demand at this price. Moore 
describes modern commercial banks as price setters and quantity takers in both their 
retail deposit and loan markets. That leads to the conclusion that the total quantity of 
money is demand-determined and credit-driven. The supply curve of money is 
horizontal at the price set by the central bank.
Moore differs from Wray in his treatment of the demand for nominal money. Wray 
argues that the supply of money has always been endogenous, even in a world 
without credit money. His argument is based on the view that money is only needed
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for paying taxes, otherwise it would have no value. Anything could fulfil this function, 
e.g. “beaver pelts” (Wray, 1998:4).
There is disagreement in the literature about strong vs. weak endogeneity of credit 
money. But if the demand for credit money has any influence at all on the supply of 
credit money, then the supply cannot be considered an exogenous variable. Money, 
by its very nature, can never be in excess supply. The demand for money will always 
equal the quantity of money supplied. Post Keynesians therefore have a view of 
reverse causality. The quantity of credit money supplied responds to changes in the 
demand for bank credit. The demand for credit is simply the demand by borrowers for 
additional money balances. This higher demand is a reflection of the increased need 
of businesses for working capital, mainly to finance wages during a cyclical 
expansion. Money wage growth then becomes the exogenous variable, rather than 
the stock of money.
Moore criticises the Monetarist idea of an independent supply and demand for money 
function. He argues that this view is not applicable to a credit money economy. 
Demand and supply functions are not identifiable, as they are interdependent. In the 
Monetarist view, an excess supply of money causes an excess demand for goods 
and services. But the endogenous view is that there is no independent supply of 
money function existing independently of the demand for money. There can be no 
excess supply, as all money supplied is always demanded. The money supply has 
already been influenced by a higher demand for goods and services. It cannot be the 
cause of this higher demand. The supply of credit money is therefore credit-driven, 
the money supply responds to changes in the demand for bank credit.
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Moore emphasises that the raison d ’etre of commercial banks is to grant short-term 
loans to credit-worthy customers. These loans are made at the initiative of the 
borrower. The problem is that these loans are not marketable. If commercial banks 
held only marketable securities as assets, then it could theoretically be possible for 
the central bank to control the money supply. Banks would sell these marketable 
securities if they experience a deficiency of reserves, until the desired reserve ratio is 
established again. But in reality banks cannot sell their assets consisting of non- 
marketable loans, because of their heterogeneous nature.3 The development of 
liability management practices and marketable certificates of deposits have changed 
the nature of the banking business. It has also caused the banking system to be 
much more risky. A risky and illiquid asset base is increasingly supported by a more 
liquid and unstable liability structure. These developments actually add to the 
importance of the central bank’s role as supplier of liquidity to the banking system, 
requiring an endogenous supply response. “The liquidity of the banking system as a 
whole was seen to depend on the preparedness of the central bank to provide 
unlimited support in times of crisis, and not on banks’ aggregate holdings of cash and 
reserves” (Moore, 1988:32).
In the Post Keynesian view, modern commercial banks are price setters and quantity 
takers of loans and deposits. Moore specifies that this view is applicable to 
economies with sophisticated financial markets, so-called overdraft economies. He 
questions whether the endogenous view is also applicable to developing countries 
where financial technology is not well developed, markets are thin and banking
3 The only way they can restore the reserve ratio is by increasing their reserves. These are always supplied by the 
central bank, but at a price set by the monetary authorities.
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systems are frequently publicly owned. It might be possible under such conditions for 
the central bank to restrain the rate of expansion of bank credit directly by imposing 
quantitative ceilings on the expansion of bank loans. Arestis (1996) also argues that 
as the banking system develops, the nature of money and the degree of credit 
money endogeneity change. He calls this the 'stages of banking’ approach and 
argues that in the early stages (probably some of today’s developing countries), the 
money supply could still be exogenous. But as the banking system develops and 
becomes more sophisticated, the money supply becomes endogenous. He also 
predicts that the globalisation of financial markets will increasingly cause money to 
become endogenous. These issues and their applicability for developing countries 
will be dealt with below.
Moore argues that most central bankers accept the endogenous view. Central banks 
have no choice but to accommodate the demand for money: “In the short run all the 
Bundesbank can do is specify in which way and at what price it will satisfy this 
demand” (Moore, 1988:88). That is why commercial banks can extend as much credit 
as they like, creating deposits and looking for the reserves later. Moore also asks 
why there are such wide fluctuations in the rate of growth of monetary aggregates if 
they can be controlled by the Federal Reserve. He says that if the Federal Reserve 
tried to maintain a rigid monetary growth rate, the result will be widely fluctuating 
interest rates. The evidence that Kaldor gives in The Scourge of Monetarism 
supports this view. He describes the implementation of Monetarist policies in the USA 
in 1979. The stated aim of monetary policy was to secure a steady growth in the 
money supply, not a steady rate of interest. This would be achieved through open 
market operations, irrespective of the accompanying movements in interest rates.
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The results were money supply figures that failed to grow at a steady rate, but even 
worse, inflation and interest rates that both soared to levels not seen in the United 
States since the Civil War (Kaldor,1982:xiii).
The statistical evidence in Moore’s analysis shows that changes in the monetary 
base explain at the most forty per cent of the observed variation in the monetary 
aggregates. Open market operations also have no statistical significance in 
explaining changes in bank reserves. He argues that if money is credit-driven, then it 
should be possible to explain movements in the money stock by movements in the 
amount of bank credit. He concludes that changes in wages offer the best 
explanation for changes in the monetary base. Regarding the targeting of money 
supply figures, Moore has the following to say: “The great virtue of “intermediate 
monetary targeting”, with its high rhetoric of “reserve restraint”, is that it enables the 
Fed to shed all visible responsibility for interest rates” (Moore, 1988:137). In the Post 
Keynesian view the rate of interest is the control instrument of monetary policy and 
should be set by the central bank.
3.5 ENDOGENOUS MONEY : WRAY’S INTERPRETATION
In his 1990 book Money and Credit in Capitalist Economies, Wray argues that the 
money supply in a modern capitalist economy is determined endogenously by the 
system. Money demand and money supply are interdependent and the factors that 
determine the money demand also determine the money supply.
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Wray denies that the existence of the endogenous theory rests upon the modern 
credit-driven world that we live in. Where Moore (1988) argues, as shown above, that 
the money supply could be exogenous in a world with commodity money, Wray 
argues that the money supply has always been endogenous, even prior to the 
development of modern financial institutions and credit facilities. Moore argues that 
the endogenous theory is specific to an overdraft economy and therefore more 
relevant and realistic than the orthodox version of an exogenous money supply.
Another aspect of Wray’s exposition of the endogenous theory is his distinction 
between endogeneity in the control sense and statistical endogeneity. He shows that 
the money supply can not be exogenous statistically. If the money supply should be 
statistically exogenous, then the central bank shouldn’t respond to anything that 
influences the demand for money or the demand for credit. “Those who use an 
exogenous money supply in empirical work must provide a theoretical justification for 
the absence of responsive monetary policy” (1990:81)
Wray explains that even if statistical exogeneity of the money supply is ruled out, 
then one can still use a normative argument to prove that it could be exogenous in 
the control sense. With this terminology he indicates that the money supply is 
controlled by the central bank. In explaining why it is not so, he follows closely the 
argument of Moore (1988:144-146). Banks cannot decrease reserves. When banks 
need extra reserves and cannot get it privately they have to turn to the central bank.
If the central bank pursues a strict monetary policy and does not want to supply the 
necessary reserves, then the commercial banks can either call in loans or begin to 
liquidate assets. Calling in loans will lead to financial instability. Selling assets to
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increase reserves, can lead to price deflation. The central bank has no other option 
but to accommodate the higher demand. It can raise the cost of finance by raising the 
bank rate. But it is also limited in this. As the price of credit rises, the rate of money 
supply growth can be expected to fall as customers decide to postpone taking out 
loans. But when interest rates rise, banks can get into trouble if their assets are worth 
less than their liabilities, the typical example being that of a savings and loans 
institution which has long-term fixed rate mortgages financed through issues of 
shorter-term time deposits. If the central bank raises the interest rate so high that it 
might cause a run to liquidity and threaten the stability of the whole financial sector, 
then it might have to supply the necessary liquidity and increase the money supply, 
reversing its tight monetary policy. Wray uses the high interest rates of the 1980s in 
the USA as an example of such an experiment that threatened the stability of the 
financial system “thus...the Fed is ultimately not free to refuse to provide reserves 
through loans at the discount window or through open market operations”
(Wray, 1990:85).
Commercial banks have several options for finding reserves after loans have been 
granted. They can use asset and liability management, inter-bank loans, international 
sources of liquidity or the discount window of the central bank. Loans create deposits 
and reserves are found later. Wray says that: "While the Fed can influence the rate of 
growth of the money supply, bank behaviour usually enables banks to escape Fed 
constraints. When a Fed constraint actually becomes operative, the Fed is eventually 
forced to abandon the constraint and accommodate the demand for 
money”(1990:83).
67
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
Wray quotes Moore’s idea of an asymmetry in the ability of the central banks to 
initiate changes in the base. The central bank can not reduce reserves, but Moore 
believes that: ’’Central banks always possess the ability to increase the base, so as to 
support any increased nominal volume of bank intermediation” (Moore, 1988:15). 
Although Wray seems to support this idea of the ability of the central bank to increase 
reserves, he remarks later in a note to chapter three that Moore has overstated the 
Fed’s ability to increase the money stock: “The money supply will only increase if the 
banks are faced with prospective loans. Otherwise excess reserves merely 
increase”(Wray, 1990:97). This is in contrast to the idea (supported by Wray) that 
banks want to maximize profits and actively seek borrowers. Wray statistically shows 
that excess reserves vary greatly over time. He also uses this to oppose Moore’s 
horizontal money supply curve. If the central bank passively supplies reserves at a 
certain price (as Moore argues) then the ratio of reserves to loans should be stable. 
Wray also shows that the ratio of reserves supplied by the Fed to total required 
reserves fluctuates widely as the Fed changes its policy. Wray uses this to prove his 
upward sloping money supply curve.
Wray believes that the money supply is not horizontal, but is an upward sloping step 
function. Kaldor and Moore believe that banks can never be quantity constrained with 
regards to the amount of loans they can make, because the central bank always 
accommodates the demand for reserves. The money supply is horizontal at the going 
rate of interest, which is set by the central bank. Wray argues that this is an 
oversimplification, labelling Moore’s approach the “endogenous money exogenous 
interest rate” theory. He says that the insights of Minsky should be added to this 
oversimplistic view. Minsky uses an institutional analysis incorporating leverage ratios
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of banks. As banks face a greater demand for loans, they use innovation to expand 
loans and business activity without an expansion of bank reserves, e.g. using the 
federal funds market or repurchase agreements. But they soon reach a point where 
leverage ratios increase so much that more loans become very risky and they 
therefore increase the cost of borrowing by raising the interest rate.
This is the argument behind Wray's money supply step function. There may be times 
when the money supply is horizontal. When the central bank raises interest rates 
banks want to take advantage of profit opportunities and find new ways of meeting 
loan demand without increasing reserves. But after a while a point is reached where 
banks can’t stretch reserves further and they have to raise the interest rate to 
compensate for higher risk. At this point the money supply becomes vertical and then 
horizontal again at the new rate of interest.
3.6 AN ONGOING DEBATE
3.6.1 Accommodationists and Structuralists
Palley is another Post Keynesian author who argues that ‘loan demand’ should be 
incorporated into endogenous money theory. Palley argues in his book, Post 
Keynesian Economics, Debt, Distribution and the Macro Economy (1996), that the 
principal limitations of the orthodox model of exogenous money are its : suppression 
of (a) the market for bank loans and (b) bank asset and liability management. Palley 
differentiates between the so-called “accommodationist” approach (associated with 
Moore) and the “structuralist” view, which he advocates. He sees the
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accommodationist view as incorporating the market for bank loans, but ignoring bank 
asset and liability management. The structuralist position is seen as superior as it 
includes loan demand and the banking sector balance sheet constraint. It argues that 
if the central bank buys assets from the private banks, then balance sheets will be 
transformed. Private banks then have to decide which assets to sell, and when they 
sell them, they will have an incentive to alter their liability positions, which are cross- 
linked to asset holdings. Palley believes that the accommodationist view is “nested” 
within his structuralist view (Palley,1998:172).
The main difference then between the accommodationist and structuralist views is 
the choice that banks have about the composition of their assets and liabilities. The 
structuralist view argues that accommodation can be only partial and that the loan 
supply schedule is positively sloped. If bank loans are fully accommodated, as 
argued by Moore, then the money supply schedule becomes horizontal. Moore sees 
the accommodationist approach as a good explanation of what happens in the 
immediate current market period. (Moore,1998:175). During this brief time span, the 
interest rate is set exogenously by the central bank and the money supply function is 
horizontal. Palley agrees with this position for the market period. Since we cannot 
predict the short- or long-run money supply relationship beyond the market period, 
we can accept the money supply as endogenous. Moore says that: ”ln the real world, 
the central bank always fully accommodates the bank demand for reserves, in its role 
as residual supplier of system liquidity” (1998:176). Therefore, partial or complete 
accommodation becomes irrelevant as in the market period the central bank always 
accommodates all bank credit demanded and the money supply and monetary base 
are therefore perfectly endogenous. Moore rejects Palley’s upward-sloping reserve
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supply function. Over the immediate market period the money supply is endogenous 
and perfectly elastic. In a nonergodic world, no short- or long-run money supply 
relationships extending beyond the market period can be specified ex ante.
3.6.2 Circuitists
‘Circuitists’ is a term used to describe an alternative view of endogenous money. This 
view is built on the work of a few French and Italian economists who also accept the 
money supply as endogenous. Their work has been influenced by Keynes 
(specifically his Treatise and post -General Theory articles) as well as by Michael 
Kalecki, Knut Wicksell and Karl Marx. Rochon (1999:2) claims that the endogenous 
theory developed by Paul Davidson and Nicholas Kaldor was largely a response to 
Friedman’s monetarism. But the continental Circuitists have developed a different 
aspect of Keynes, seeing him as more radical than most Post Keynesians would care 
to admit.
The circuitist theory is one way of solving the debate about an independent demand 
for money. Rather than seeing money based on the demand for money balances, 
circuitists emphasise the monetary circuit, with banks at the centre of the credit 
creation process. Money is created by banks and profits are necessary to extinguish 
all debt -  ‘the ultimate destruction of money’. Where Post Keynesian authors like 
Arestis and Howells emphasise the liquidity preferences and portfolio decisions of 
economic agents, the focus in the circuitist approach is on the flow of endogenous 
credit. Money endogeneity is unrelated to the role of the central bank. Commercial 
banks create credit money. This endogenous creation of money is part of the
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production process, i.e. money is endogenous because of production not because of 
the accommodative role of the central bank. In the words of Lavoie, another French 
circuitist: “Accommodation or the lack of it, liability or the lack of it and financial 
innovation or the lack of it are second-order phenomena to the crucial causal story 
that goes from debt to the supply of the means of payment” (Rochon,1999:2).
The circuitists also emphasise, like Moore, the special characteristics of money. 
Before entrepreneurs decide to carry out planned investments, they already consider 
the credit money they will need. Money can therefore not be added later to a 
production theory. Money enters into the picture right from the beginning. Money is a 
‘non-commodity in a universe of commodities’. Money is part of the production 
process and is therefore endogenous. The distinction between money and credit is 
also vital in the circuitists approach. Credit is an asset of banks, while money is a 
liability. Credit creates money. “With respect to production, credit precedes 
production, while money is created during the process of production, as the 
entrepreneur draws down his or her bank account to pay for wages or to purchase 
other raw materials” (Rochon, 1999:3).
Some of the prominent Circuitist authors are Graziani, Lavoie, Parguez,and Rochon. 
They are sometimes also called neo-Post Keynesians as they feel that Post 
Keynesian monetary theory does not constitute a clear enough alternative to 
orthodox monetary thought. Circuitists believe that because of the interdependence 
of supply and demand, it is not possible to use the standard supply and demand 
analysis. They believe, like Moore, that supply increases with demand and therefore 
they are one and the same. The circuitists successfully incorporate the Arestis &
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Howells critique by distinguishing clearly between the demand for credit money and 
the demand for money. “Since credit is not money, and similarly money is not credit, 
the demand for credit arises at the beginning of the circuit, whereas the demand for 
money becomes equivalent to hoarded savings. The demand for money is the 
households’ liquidity preference” (Rochon,1999:16).
3.6.3 Institutionalists
Some economists explain the endogenous money theory within an institutional 
framework. The stages of banking approach of Victoria Chick has been mentioned 
above. In her view, the capacity of banks to create credit depends crucially on their 
stage of evolution. As the banking system develops within a country, banks become 
more independent of reserve requirements because of new innovations. The supply 
of credit becomes more responsive to demand and therefore more endogenous. 
Niggle is another author that uses the institutional approach. He argues (1991) that it 
is important to look at the specific institutional characteristics of a specific monetary- 
financial system to be able to determine if the money supply is endogenous or 
exogenous. According to Niggle (1991:138): “Actual monetary-financial systems are 
situated along a spectrum from the purely exogenous to the purely endogenous, with 
most systems characterized as at least partially endogenous”.
Niggle explains the disagreement between participants in the debate over monetary 
endogeneity, as stemming from their ignorance of some important institutional 
characteristics of the monetary-financial system. Under certain circumstances
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(historical stages), the money supply might be exogenous. But under current 
arrangements the money supply is endogenous to the financial system.
Niggle (1990) emphasises that monetary theory cannot be developed in isolation, it 
has to reflect the realities of the world we live in. Various forms of money (commodity, 
fiat or credit money) are associated with various banking institutions. “The ‘correct’ 
theory is that which responds most closely to the actual behaviour of the specific 
monetary-financial system under analysis” (1990:444). He describes the following 
stages of development of financial systems and the corresponding degree of 
endogeneity or exogeneity.
Stage one is an economy with commodity money or convertible paper currency 
backed by gold. The quantity of money is determined exogenously by factors such as 
trade flows, foreign investment or gold production. During the second stage the 
money supply becomes “somewhat endogenous -  determined within the banking 
system” (1990:446). There is fractional reserve banking with the use of bank notes as 
a common medium of exchange, but most deposits are held as relatively liquid forms 
of savings by their owners with little interbank lending. There are no legal reserve 
requirements.
In stage three, a central bank enforces reserve requirements on the banks and the 
quantity of money is again exogenously determined. But after this stage, during 
stages four and five the money supply becomes endogenous. Innovations in the form 
of liability and asset management are largely responsible for an endogenous money 
supply during stage four. The issuing of credit lines also increases endogeneity
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during this stage. During the last stage, the central bank assumes the role of lender 
of last resort and has to supply liquidity to the financial system and the money supply 
is fully endogenous. This leads to the conclusion that the money supply is largely 
endogenously determined in our current financial system.
3.7 CONCLUSION
Lavoie says that the differences of opinion among Post Keynesian economists are: 
“more apparent than real, and that the discussions reflect differences of opinion or 
emphasis over what factors should be considered of primary rather than secondary 
importance” (1999:103). There seems to be a general consensus on the main 
elements of Post Keynesian monetary theory. There might be lively debates on the 
demand for endogenous money, on whether the supply curve should be horizontal or 
upward sloping, but this does not alter the fundamental view among Post Keynesians 
that money in a modern world is indeed endogenous. Institutionalists like Niggle, 
have clearly shown that in a world where the central bank acts as lender of last 
resort, the money supply is endogenous. Wray differs in his approach, arguing that 
the money supply has always been endogenous, even in a commodity money world. 
Most Post Keynesians, however, accept that endogenous money is characteristic of 
the modern credit-driven world that we live in.
Some Post Keynesian authors have argued that causality runs from income to the 
supply of money. Rousseas (1988) has argued that the rise in money supply 
responds to an increase in the demand for money which in turn is a result of higher 
nominal income. But this is not necessarily true. As the circuitists have shown, money
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is created ex nihilo by commercial banks. Credit is part of the production process. 
Firms obtain credit before they start production. Davidson (1988) shows that the 
money supply increases before income rises. This is exactly the point of departure 
from the Monetarist approach. It may be true that a rise in the money stock precedes 
a rise in income, but the Post Keynesian argument is that the direction of causality is 
reversed. Deposits do not create loans, but loans create deposits.
As shown above, there is considerable disagreement among Post Keynesians on the 
slope of the money supply curve. Moore and Kaldor seem to be the only “true” 
horizontalists. The view of Dow, Palley and Wray is that banks also have a liquidity 
preference. Banks incur rising costs from borrowing at the discount window and will 
pass these higher costs on to borrowers. Wray advocates an upward sloping step 
function. Banks try to accommodate all demand for credit at a certain cost, by 
stretching their reserves, but at a certain stage they have to raise their rates and the 
money supply curve starts sloping upwards. Dow believes that the money supply 
curve is mostly horizontal during normal times. But during a downturn in the business 
cycle, banks’ liquidity preference increase and the money supply function has a 
positive slope.
Arestis and Howells also see a rising supply curve, but for different reasons. They 
believe that there might be insufficient demand for the money created by the increase 
in endogenous credit. They show that the liquidity preference of the non-bank public 
should be incorporated in the endogenous money approach. The Circuitists seem to 
be closer to Moore. They do not see the supply curve as always horizontal, but 
accepts this as a “second-best” solution. They see the demand and supply of money 
as interdependent and therefore not suitable for standard supply and demand
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analysis. But they consider the demand for nominal money, i.e. money created during 
the endogenous supply process, as determined by liquidity preference. Moore also 
holds the view that the demand for nominal money is determined by income and the 
interest rate, as in the standard theory. The difference is that the demand for credit 
money determines the supply of credit money and therefore the two are one and the 
same.
There is a growing consensus in Post Keynesian monetary theory. Money is 
endogenous, whether the supply curve is fully or only partially horizontal. The 
demand for bank credit is generally accommodated by lenders -  at least in the short 
run -  because of bank practices such as overdraft facilities and prearranged lines of 
credit. The central bank generally accommodates all demand for reserves by banks. 
The central bank does not control the quantity of reserves, but it sets the price of 
reserves. New innovations in the banking business, such as liability and asset 
management, make expansion of bank lending possible, even when reserve growth 
is being constrained.
The demand for credit determines the growth of bank credit, the growth of reserves 
and the growth of the money stock. The deposits that are created in the process are 
willingly held. The liquidity preference of the non-bank public might influence relative 
interest rates. But during the current market period, interest rates remain at the level 
set by the central bank or some markup above that rate. As the demand for credit 
determines the supply of credit, they are interdependent and money is endogenous.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DEMAND FOR MONEY vs. THE DEMAND FOR CREDIT
The total demand falls into two parts: 
the inactive demand due to the state of confidence and expectation on the 
part of the owners of wealth, and the active demand due to the level of activity 
established by the decisions of the entrepreneurs. (Keynes, 1937)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters the theory of an exogenous money supply, where 
money is neutral, was contrasted to an endogenous money supply. Post 
Keynesian authors believe that the modern credit-driven world is 
characterised by an endogenous demand-determined money supply.
This raises the question of what determines the demand for money and credit. 
The demand for money has not been a central area of research in Post 
Keynesian economics. Yet, the demand for money is one of the most 
controversial topics in macroeconomics. In the wake of Monetarism, many 
economists spent their time estimating money demand functions to determine 
money demand stability (a central aspect of Monetarist theory). The demand 
for money has received little attention in the work of most Post Keynesians. 
According to Post Keynesian theory, money supply is determined by money
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demand. The nature of money is such that it can never be in excess supply 
(Moore, 1988). As a result, the flow demand of money is not independent of 
the flow supply of money. Other Post Keynesian writers (e.g. Wray, Dow and 
Arestis) have argued that liquidity preference is compatible with an 
endogenous money supply.
This chapter provides an overview of the work on money and credit demand 
by Post Keynesian authors. To put the debate in perspective, the analysis 
starts with a brief overview of Keynes’s finance motive. The interpretation of 
this 'fourth motive’ by later authors is then discussed. To test these various 
money and credit demand theories, data from developing countries are used 
to reach some conclusions about the demand for credit in less developed 
countries.
4.2 KEYNES’S FINANCE MOTIVE
In any analysis of the demand for money that purports to be based on 
Keynesian analysis, it is appropriate to start by looking at Keynes’s own 
theory of money demand. As explained in Chapter 2, the demand for money 
in the classical world constituted only the transactions demand, derived from 
the need to conduct transactions in a common unit of account. No one outside 
of a lunatic asylum would hold money for any other reason. In the General 
Theory, Keynes introduced other reasons to hold money, his so-called 
liquidity preference theory. In his post-Genera/ Theory correspondence, in a
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letter to D.H. Robertson, Keynes explained what he meant by liquidity 
preference:
In my terminology liquidity preference relates to the total demand for 
money for all purposes and not merely to the demand for inactive 
balances. Quite often one needs to distinguish the demand for active 
balances from the demand for inactive balances (Keynes,1973:223), 
(Emphasis in the original).
The demand for inactive balances refers to what he calls in the General 
Theory, the demand for hoards. “If we mean by ‘hoarding’ the holding of idle 
balances, then my theory of the rate of interest might be expressed by saying 
that the rate of interest serves to equate the demand and supply of hoards -  
i.e. it must be sufficiently high to offset an increased propensity to hoard 
relatively to the supply of idle balances available” (Keynes,1973:213), 
(Emphasis in the original). Hoarding is the holding of idle balances. People 
prefer to hold money (or hoards), rather than financial assets, because of their 
expectations about future economic activity and interest rates. A rise in 
liquidity preference means that people want to increase their supply of 
‘hoards’. This might have an effect on the interest rate, which is the return on 
financial assets. But Keynes did not reject the transactions demand for 
holding money. Although his focus was on the speculative demand for money 
(liquidity preference theory), he recognised income as a determinant in the 
transactions and precautionary motives.
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One of his main goals was to refute the classical loanable funds theory. 
Keynes criticised Ohlin for reducing the central ideas of the General Theory to 
nothing more than the original classical theory:
The net supply of credit, thus defined, is exactly the same thing as the 
quantity of saving; and the conclusion is exactly the same as the 
classical doctrine over again, to the effect that the quantity of saving 
depends on the rate of interest (1973:205), (Emphasis in the original). 
And later in the same article:
Thus we are completely back at the classical doctrine which Professor 
Ohlin has just repudiated -  namely, that the rate of interest is fixed at 
the level where the supply of credit, in the shape of saving, is equal to 
the demand for credit, in the shape of investment (1973:206).
In trying to clarify his approach, in addition to the transactions, precautionary 
and speculative motives, Keynes introduced a fourth motive for holding 
money in his post -General Theory articles. Saving is always equal to 
investment (not through the interest rate mechanism), but by definition. But 
Keynes used a situation where investment occurs before the corresponding 
saving has been ‘created’:
Planned investment -  i.e. investment ex ante -  may have to secure its 
‘financial provision’ before the investment takes place; that is to say, 
before the corresponding saving has taken place (1937:207).
This demand for funds by entrepreneurs who want to invest, before saving 
has taken place, is Keynes’s finance motive:
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This service may be provided either by the new issue market or by 
banks; - which it is makes no difference...let us call this advance 
provision for cash ‘finance’ required by the current decisions to 
invest...I should (I now think) have done well to have emphasised it 
when I analysed the various sources of the demand for money. It may 
be regarded as lying half-way, so to speak, between the active and 
inactive balances (1937:208).
The supply and demand of money are not equalised by the interest rate. 
Interest rates are determined in the money market as a result of liquidity 
preference. But, the demand for finance, or rather the demand for credit, can 
have an influence on the interest rate:
Now, a pressure to secure more finance than usual may easily affect 
the rate of interest through its influence on the demand for money 
(Keynes,1973:209).
4.3 THE POST KEYNESIAN DEBATE
Following the work of Keynes, the idea that saving is always equal to 
investment, is central to Post Keynesian analysis. The interest rate is not 
determined by an interaction between saving and investment. There are two 
different views on interest rate determination in the Post Keynesian literature; 
the mark-up approach and the liquidity preference approach. The first denies 
that the demand for money has any influence on the interest rate, which 
becomes a fully exogenous variable. The liquidity preference theory uses
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Keynes's demand for money principle to argue that changes in liquidity 
preference influence the interest rate. The implications for interest rate 
determination will be more fully dealt with in Chapter 8.
Seccareccia summarised the debate on the demand for money:
Keynesian liquidity preference theory has sometimes been perceived 
as a source of embarrassment for Post Keynesians since, by overly 
emphasising the stock demand for money, it loses sight of the circular 
nature of credit (1997:135).
But Keynes also recognised this point when he said that:
It is possible, then, that confusion has arisen between credit in the 
sense of ‘finance’, credit in the sense of 'bank loans’ and credit in the 
sense of ‘saving’(1973:209).
Keynes argued that savings are a stock, but finance is a flow. This is his idea 
of a revolving fund, which is sufficient to meet all demand for finance. As 
explained above, his finance motive is not incompatible with his liquidity 
preference theory; the two should rather be seen as complementary. The 
finance motive also affects the interest rate (like liquidity preference).
The finance motive has been incorporated into Post Keynesian literature in 
different ways. Moore (1999:14,) argues that: “Credit or finance does not 
constitute a separate motive to demand money, an addition to Keynes’s ‘pool’ 
of transactions, precautionary, and speculative demands. As a result finance 
cannot be regarded as a fourth motive for demanding money, as Keynes in 
his 1937 articles initially mistakenly envisioned.” Moore sees the finance
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motive as an imperfect solution to Keynes’s struggle to escape from 
exogenous money: “Rather than view the ‘finance motive’ as a further 
refinement of the General Theory’s liquidity preference theory of interest, it is 
alternatively possible to view Keynes’s recognition of the importance of 
finance in these 1937 article as further steps in his ’long struggle of escape’ 
from orthodoxy” (Moore, 1999:16).
Another Post Keynesian author, Natke (1998), showed that the finance motive 
might be relevant in developing economies by testing the theory for Brazil.
The argument is that the finance motive might be more important, due to 
restricted access to well-developed financial markets by firms in developing 
countries. Such firms might be dependent on costly bank credit and be forced 
to rely on internal funding.
Rochon (1998:6) argued that the finance motive is compatible with an 
endogenous money supply theory: “There is nothing incompatible between 
the finance motive and horizontalism, and horizontalists have made the 
finance motive an important component of their approach to endogenous 
money.”
4.4 CONVENIENCE LENDING
Moore has argued that any increase in the supply of money creates its own 
demand in the form of an increase in convenience lending of fiat money to the 
banking system (Moore, 1988b). This is due to the special nature of money.
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Post Keynesian monetary theory states that loans create deposits. But as 
Marc Lavoie (1999:103) puts it:
In an economy where money deposits are created whenever banks 
grant advances to agents requiring bank loans, how can we be sure 
that the quantity of money deposits so created is equal to the demand 
for money of agents?
The problem is that the demand for bank lending, because of higher wage 
bills or new production plans, originates with one set of economic agents. The 
deposits that are created by this lending have to be held by another set of 
economic agents. Therefore it is important to consider the demand for money 
of this latter group. Arestis and Howells (1996) argue that the liquidity 
preference of the ‘non-bank’ public should be included in an endogenous 
money model. They argue that the money supply curve may or may not be 
horizontal. It depends on the interaction between the supply curve and the 
demand curve. The money supply curve is upward sloping and determined by 
the behaviour of the banking system, (as also argued by Palley and Dow). But 
there is also an independent demand for money function, determined by the 
community’s willingness to hold the deposits created by the endogenous 
supply. This demand for money curve moves continuously as nominal income 
changes. The supply curve shifts continually to the right as the money supply 
responds to the needs of trade. The interaction of the demand and supply 
curves gives a locus that may be horizontal, but does not need to be.
Arestis and Howells (1996:543) state the central difficulty as: “How does a 
flow of bank lending get turned into a stock of money which is willingly held?”
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(Emphasis in the original). The interactions between the demand and supply 
curves give different equilibrium positions between a shifting liquidity 
preference schedule and a shifting money supply curve. There must be some 
equilibrating mechanism between these two. Arestis and Howells believe that 
this is the movement of relative interest rates. It is therefore impossible to 
depict the money supply curve as horizontal at one specific interest rate, be it 
the discount rate or some mark-up rate.
Moore’s ‘convenience lending’ principle is based on the passive acceptance 
of new deposits. The new deposits act like a windfall, individuals may hold 
them only as long as it takes to decide on future investment and consumption 
patterns, but in the aggregate, convenience lending is a long-term 
phenomenon. Arestis and Howells have a different view. They agree that the 
newly created deposits “have a certain windfall quality about them. Their 
accumulation requires no sacrifice of consumption. But it does not follow from 
this that agents require no inducement to continue holding them” (1996:546). 
The holders of these deposits must have some liquidity preference. They 
must have a preference for e.g. holding bonds instead of other assets. The 
demand for money cannot be ignored. The liquidity preference of the non­
bank public should be incorporated into the endogenous theory as they adjust 
their portfolio when relative interest rates change.
Arestis and Howells are unhappy with Moore’s analysis which apparently 
“tries to eliminate consideration of the demand for money entirely but which 
seems to us to be merely a restatement of the most conventional demand for
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money function without recognising it” (1996:549). Their view is that demand 
for money (based on liquidity preferences) should be incorporated in the 
endogenous money model. Relative interest rates provide a mechanism 
whereby discrepancies between the growth rate of advances and desired 
deposits could be eliminated.
Lavoie (1999) agrees that the supply of bank deposits could exceed the 
demand for deposits. The demand for loans drives the supply of money. But 
the money stock is not demand-determined. Therefore there could well be an 
excess supply of money. The conclusion that the money stock is demand- 
determined confuses the demand for money with the demand for credit. There 
should be a separate money demand theory and some equilibrating 
mechanism between the demand and supply of money.
Moore reacts to the above critique in the following way: “There is no separate 
and independent demand for money that must somehow be ‘reconciled’ with 
the demand for credit. We do not have to worry about what will happen if, ‘net 
new lending (I) exceeds the rate at which the demand for deposits (d) is 
expanding, so that (l>d)’. The 'demand for money’ is always and necessarily 
identical to the ‘supply of money’, because it is in fact simply the supply of 
money already in existence” (1997:425).
Earlier Moore stated that money supply and demand functions are “in no 
sense identical” (1988b). The quantity of money supplied and demanded are 
identical, but not the individual functions. In his earlier analysis, Moore stated
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that the demand for nominal money is the same as in the neoclassical 
analysis, a function of income and interest rates. But the demand for credit 
money is identical to the supply of credit money, because all money is always 
demanded and willingly held. The Arestis and Howells critique states that the 
demand for the money created by the deposits is nominal money, not credit 
money and has a demand function that is determined by liquidity preferences 
of the non-bank public.
Some Post Keynesian authors argue that the demand for money should 
receive more attention. Most of them view the approach of Kaldor and Moore 
as insufficient, as it does not have a proper money demand theory (Goodhart 
1989:33). Rousseas argues that the endogenous money theory inverts Say's 
law. He says that Moore’s idea of the demand for money determining the 
supply, can be stated as: ‘demand fully creates its own supply’.
(Rousseas,1988:475). This further implies that the demand and supply 
schedules of money must be identical. The economy moves from one 
equilibrium point to the next as the supply and demand change, but the two 
functions are identical. Rousseas believes Moore is wrong in his treatment of 
the demand for money. Rousseas sees the money supply as being neither 
perfectly inelastic (exogenous), nor perfectly elastic (endogenous). The 
money supply is partly endogenous: “Demand does create, to a greater or 
lesser extent but never entirely so, its own supply. The degree to which the 
money supply is positively sloped depends on the discretionary policies of the 
Federal Reserve and the fervor with which they are applied in the misguided
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belief that the money supply is exogenous and thus within the power of the 
central bank to control” (Rousseas,1988:478).
Moore argues that the correct conclusion is that the supply and demand for 
money are interdependent. The total quantity of money demanded is always 
identical to the total quantity of money supplied, but the two functions are not 
identical. He criticizes Rousseas’ interpretation as the “...most common 
popular misinterpretation of endogenous money. Endogeneity is understood 
as implying that the money supply is determined by the demand for money, 
rather than the demand for credit” (Moore,1988b:483). Say’s law is not 
inverted, for money supply creates its own demand. Moore believes that any 
increase in the supply of money creates its own demand, in the form of an 
increase in convenience lending of fiat money to the banking system. He 
maintains his position that the short-run supply of money is horizontal. The 
supply curve’s slope is not determined by the monetary authorities. Because 
they always accommodate, it has to be horizontal. A long-run supply function 
of money does not exist independently of demand forces and the state of the 
economy. Since the future is uncertain, no such function can be identified.
Goodhart (1989) accuses Moore of becoming “too horizontal”. He says that 
Moore overstates the passive reaction of banks to borrowers’ demand for 
loans. “In effect, Moore completely suppresses any independent demand for 
money. I believe that he should not do so. It is in this context that Moore, both 
here and in his book Horizontalists and Verticalists, has become too 
horizontal” (1989:33).
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4.5 THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN LDCs
The endogenous supply of money is central to the Post Keynesian analysis.
In the words of Trautwein (1997:11):
The general argument is that the supply of credit money cannot come 
into existence without the corresponding demand for loans, i.e., the 
spending decisions of borrowers.
To understand the nature of the demand for credit in LDCs, it is necessary to 
look at the demand for loans and the spending decisions of consumers.
In Post Keynesian monetary theory the emphasis is on the demand and 
supply of credit money, not commodity money.
Post Keynesians de-emphasize the stock demand for money, reject the 
assumption of money-supply exogeneity (which is so central to much of 
contemporary neoclassical monetary economics), and instead stress 
the concept of an endogenous flow of credit-money 
(Seccareccia, 1997:135).
In Moore’s work the demand for ‘commodity money’ has the usual 
neoclassical determinants, interest rates and income. But the demand for 
‘credit money’ does not have a separate function. The supply of credit money 
creates its own demand through convenience lending. The interest rate is not 
affected by the demand for credit money.
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The Post Keynesian money supply is determined by the demand for credit / 
finance, a flow concept. The question is whether the transactions and 
precautionary demand for holding money can be safely ignored in the case of 
LDCs. They function more like cash economies than credit economies (as will 
be shown in Chapter 7). Therefore, the transactions motive might be more 
important than in developed credit economies. Wray (1992:160) seems to 
recognise this point:
Furthermore, planned shifts of spending from one component to 
another might increase transactions demand for money even in the 
absence of an increase in aggregate demand. For example, if 
consumers have lower access to credit than do firms, a planned shift 
from investment spending to consumption spending would increase the 
need for transactions balances. If transactions demand for money rises 
and banks are unwilling to satisfy the additional demand, interest rates 
will rise.
This is a different world from a pure credit economy in an industrialised 
country:
In an economy with developed financial institutions, with deposit 
insurance, and with a central bank which is willing to enter as a lender 
of last resort, hoards of cash or narrow money are relatively 
unimportant. Furthermore, lines of credit or overdraft facilities can 
satisfy the ‘finance motive’ without requiring cash hoards. Thus, 
Keynes’s notion that the interest rate is determined by the supply and
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demand of hoards does not strictly apply to our economy 
(Wray,1990:164).
This argument may be more relevant in the case of LDCs. Liquidity 
preference is about the desire to hold short-term liquid assets versus long­
term assets. These assets refer to financial assets, typical of an advanced 
credit economy. Do agents in LDCs continuously exercise a choice between 
holding liquid and illiquid financial assets, given the rudimentary nature of 
equity and bond markets? Or is the choice rather between holding real assets 
(land, cattle) and holding money? Empirical demand for money studies in 
LDCs found that in countries where there was not a broad range of financial 
assets to act as substitutes for money, the inflation rate became a significant 
explanatory variable (Ghatak,1995:60).
Interest rates are usually administered rather than market related in the 
organised financial markets in LDCs. The effects of normal operations of the 
laws of demand and supply will not be fully reflected in the observed interest 
rates. In the unorganised markets, the interest rate may be determined by 
both economic and institutional variables. The determination of the rural rate 
of interest is usually viewed from the supply side, because of the paucity of 
data on the demand side. There must be a risk premium in the supply side of 
the interest rate, which is closer to Wray’s idea of the liquidity preference of 
banks and a step-shaped money supply curve. The implications of 
undeveloped financial markets for the demand and supply of credit, and the 
associated institutional arrangements in LDCs will be addressed in Chapter 7.
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4.6 DETERMINANTS OF THE DEMAND FOR CREDIT
Most of the studies dealing with the demand for money in LDCs, look at the 
demand for nominal money. Only a limited amount of studies look at the 
components of the demand for credit in LDCs. In order to test the hypothesis 
that credit is supplied upon demand, the demand for credit has to be clearly 
distinguished from the demand for money. Confusing these two distinct 
concepts has led to many incorrect conclusions regarding the endogenous 
money supply process. This is emphasised by Rochon (1998:4): “Rather than 
seeing credit as a component of the demand for money, it is better to view it 
as separate. Credit is not money, and neither is money credit. Credit creates 
money. Credit only becomes money when it is used to pay wages and 
purchase capital goods. If an entrepreneur is given a line of credit, money is 
not created until it is drawn down”.
In the endogenous money literature, the emphasis is on liquidity preference 
(especially the liquidity preference of commercial banks) and more importantly 
on the need for finance. This need for finance is a characteristic of a credit 
economy. Production takes time and inputs have to be paid before the 
monetary proceeds from production can be realised. As explained above, this 
constitutes Keynes’s finance motive and is the essence of Post Keynesian 
monetary theory:
...Keynes’s finance is not required by the purchasers of capital goods
and, if necessary, by consumers, but by firms (entrepreneurs) who
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wish to implement their production plans. Finance denotes the amount 
of liquid funds needed ‘to finance the production of capital goods or the 
production of consumption goods’. The firms use it to advance money 
wages to workers and, if needs be, to purchase other inputs not 
available in their stocks but necessary to start current production 
(Messori,1997:44).
Moore’s empirical studies confirmed that the main determinant of the demand 
for credit (and therefore also of the supply) was the wage bill of firms 
(Moore, 1988). His econometric studies will be reproduced below to test this 
hypothesis for developing countries.
The wage bill of firms is the main component of the demand for credit. The 
demand for credit originates with firms’ demand for finance in advance of the 
proceeds received from the finished production. There is a passage of time 
between the moment when factors of production are hired, and when the 
proceeds of their production are received. This is the source of the demand 
for finance / credit. This is the essence of the endogenous money theory. 
There is not a separate demand for finance or a ‘finance motive’, in addition to 
a transactions or precautionary motive. There is no need for a separate 
explanation for holding money. The demand for finance is the main 
determinant of the demand for credit. As Moore (1999:2) explains: “Keynes’s 
finance motive should not be viewed as an additional motive for holding 
money. Instead it represents the demand for bank credit, and is consistent
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with Keynes’s early recognition that credit money is endogenous, and driven 
by the demand for bank loans”.
According to Moore’s view increases in planned investment spending (and 
consequent increases in the wage bill of firms), are the main sources of 
increases in credit money. The increased demand for production or 
consumption goods is reflected in higher investment spending by firms, and 
the finance necessary for this investment is supplied upon demand. The 
supply of endogenous credit money responds to the ‘state of trade’, i.e. the 
supply of credit money follows changes in GDP. Money supply is demand- 
determined.
The emphasis is on the demand for working capital by firms. The finance 
motive is not acknowledged as a separate motive for holding money, but 
becomes the basis upon which the whole endogenous theory rests. Firms 
need credit to finance production. This credit is supplied either in the financial 
markets or by the banks. If financial markets are not well developed (as will be 
argued in Chapter 7), firms are more dependent on banks to obtain finance. It 
is clear from the quotation from Messori that the finance motive or demand for 
credit is restricted to the need of firms to produce. No recognition is given to 
the fact that other sectors of the economy also need credit. In the empirical 
work done by Post Keynesians to test the finance motive and the demand for 
credit, the focus was solely on the demand for credit by firms. The 
composition of credit, i.e. the relative shares of households and firms in 
private sector credit will be examined below.
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4.7 COMPOSITION OF THE DEMAND FOR CREDIT
As seen above, in the endogenous money view the main determinant of the 
demand for credit is the wage bills of firms. Credit is continuously demanded 
by firms as their expectations of increased output lead to higher demands for 
working capital. This demand is automatically accommodated by the banks.
During recent years, the composition of credit has changed in many countries. 
All types of spending require credit. Credit is not the exclusive right of firms. In 
industrialised countries, households have gained an increasing share in total 
credit to the private sector while the share of firms has decreased (Arestis & 
Howells, 1996).
Bank credit is an important source of finance to the private sector in most 
countries, but the development of sophisticated financial products and highly 
efficient financial markets have reduced the share of corporate borrowing in 
total bank credit to the private sector. The corporate sector’s dependence on 
bank credit has been diminishing relative to that of the household sector.
Firms are increasingly relying on non-bank sources of finance. Households’ 
demand for credit is reported as being more interest rate elastic. As the share 
of households in total credit is increasing, it is reasonable to ask whether the 
money supply responds in the same way to the needs of the economy: 
“However, in the UK in the 1980s there was a substantial change in the 
composition of bank lending, the personal sector replacing ICCs as the
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dominant borrowers. The personal sector may be more sensitive to interest 
rate changes (Arestis & Howells, 1996:540).”
Howells and Hussein (1999) initiated a new line of research when they 
developed a model where total holdings of bank credit is the dependent 
variable, not just credit to industrial and commercial corporations (ICCs). They 
argue that this model is closer to the real world, recognising the importance of 
households in bank credit portfolios: “First, following our work on the demand 
for money, we would argue that credit is required to finance all types of 
spending. There is no more reason to suppose that credit is required only for 
the purchase of newly finished output than is money. Second, in the 1980s 
there was a major shift in the components of credit demand, as personal- 
sector borrowing overtook borrowing by firms. The Post Keynesian 
preoccupation with the ‘state of trade’ has led the existing literature to focus 
on firms as the source of credit demand (and new money), a focus which may 
well be incorrect and may, in turn, give unwarranted emphasis to the 
behaviour of GDP” (1999:442). It is not only the expectations of entrepreneurs 
that are important, but also those of households.
This is true for industrialised countries where firms have access to alternative 
sources of finance, e.g. money and capital markets. Households have 
become increasingly important in bank lending portfolios. The findings of 
Arestis and Howells (1996) that the personal sector has replaced the 
corporate sector as the dominant borrowers in the UK, is confirmed by recent 
figures from the Bank of England. These are shown in table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. Composition of credit in the United Kingdom
Total credit to 
private sector 
(£ millions)
Households 
(£ millions)
Firms 
(£ millions)
Households
(%)
Firms
(%)
2000 Q3 982 062 594 876 387 186 60 40
Q4 1 003 371 610715 392 656 61 39
2001 Q1 1 033 904 619 481 414 423 60 40
Q2 1 051 691 634 889 416 802 60 40
Q3 1 067 571 649 106 418 465 61 39
Q4 1 076 316 664 226 412 090 62 38
2002 Q1 1 102 774 677 749 425 025 61 39
Q2 1 129 097 695 970 433 127 62 38
Q3 1 164 158 719 876 444 282 62 38
Source: Bank of England, data on private sector credit, 2002
Households hold on average approximately 60% of private sector credit in the 
UK, while firms hold approximately 40%. This is different from the situation in 
less developed countries.
Comparable data on credit composition are shown below for selected SADC 
countries. In some cases recent data were obtained from individual central 
banks, but in other cases the only data available were from the most recent 
IMF Staff Country Reports. Individual data are given below for each country.
Table 4.2 shows the composition of credit for the SADC countries in the 
sample, for the years 1997 and 2000 (where available).
Table 4.2 Composition of private sector credit -  comparison of selected SADC
countries.
Country 1997 20 30
Households
(%)
Firms
(%)
Households
(%)
Firms
(%)
South Africa 58 41 48 51
Botswana 51 49 51 49
Lesotho 32 68 - -
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Mauritius 21 79 - -
Namibia 65 35 71 29
Swaziland 26 74 - -
Zambia 6 94 10 90
Source: IMF Staff country reports & individual central banks.
South Africa and Botswana are the only countries where households and 
firms have roughly equal shares in private sector credit. In the case of South 
Africa, the share of firms was slightly higher than that of households (2000), 
while the opposite is true for Botswana. In the rest of the SADC countries, 
with the exception of Namibia, the share of household credit is much lower 
than the share of firms. Namibia had a very high percentage of household 
credit -  65% in 1997, increasing to 71% in 2000.
Table 4.3 shows that the share of household credit has been decreasing in 
South Africa, while the share of firms has been increasing during the period 
1995-2001. Table 4.4 shows that households have become the main 
recipients of credit in Botswana (55% in 2001). This is a significant change 
from the situation in 1993 when household credit amounted to 40% and firms’ 
share was 60%.
The composition of private sector credit in Namibia has remained stable over 
the period 1996-2001. In all the other countries shown below, i.e. Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and Zambia, there has been an increase in households’ 
share of private sector credit, but their share is still significantly lower than the 
share of firms. In Zambia the share of households has increased from only 
5% (1996) to 16% (2001), still a very low share.
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Table 4.3 Private sector credit in SA -  1995-2001
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
(R millions)
Households 
(R millions)
Firms 
(R millions)
Households
(% )
Firms
(% )
1995 316709 186709 130000 58.95 41.05
1996 367213 215662 151551 58.73 41.27
1997 420091 244177 175914 58.12 41.88
1998 490109 255337 234772 52.10 47.90
1999 532723 262149 270574 49.21 50.79
2000 590089 286826 303263 48.61 51.39
2001 673615 315071 358544 46.77 53.23
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, various years.
Table 4.4 Private sector credit in Botswana -  1993- 2001
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
(Pula 
millions)
Households
(Pula
millions)
Firms
(Pula
millions)
Households
(% )
Firms
(% )
1993 1516.6 603.5 913.1 40 60
1994 1784.0 646.6 1137.4 36 64
1995 1727.1 781.8 945.3 45 55
1996 1758.9 849.5 909.4 48 52
1997 1839.6 943.0 896.6 51 49
1998 2872.6 1379.9 1492.7 48 52
1999 4095.8 1995.0 2100.8 49 51
2000 4788.2 2429.6 2368.6 51 49
2001 5366.0 2947.9 2418.1 55 45
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/132; Bank of Botswana, 2002
Table 4.5 Private sector credit in Lesotho -  1992-1997
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
(Maloti 
millions)
Households
(Maloti
millions)
Firms
(Maloti
millions)
Households
(% )
Firms
(% )
1992 332.6 68.2 264.4 20 80
1993 372.8 78.3 294.5 21 79
1994 529.2 166.1 363.1 31 69
1995 568.2 184.1 384.1 32 68
1996 632.2 198.7 433.5 31 69
1997 690.4 222.1 468.3 32 68
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/29
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Table 4.6 Private sector credit in Mauritius -  1993-1997
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
(Rupees 
millions)
Households
(Rupees
millions)
Firms
(Rupees
millions)
Households
(%)
Firms
(%)
1993 20387 3082 17305 15 85
1994 26463 4981 21482 19 81
1995 30474 6217 24250 20 80
1996 32055 7008 25047 22 78
1997 37208 7973 29235 21 79
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/75
Table 4.7 Private sector credit in Namibia -  1996-2001
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
($Nam 
millions)
Households
($Nam
millions)
Firms
($Nam
millions)
Households
(%)
Firms
(%)
1996 7016.0 4702.1 2313.9 67 33
1997 7960.1 5210.3 2745.8 65 35
1998 8752.8 5662.2 3090.7 65 35
1999 9233.6 6469.3 2764.3 70 30
2000 10791.7 7,630.9 3160.9 71 29
2001 12614.2 8,163.5 4450.7 65 35
Source: Bank of Namibia, 2002
Table 4.8 Private sector credit in Swaziland -  1993-1998
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
(emalangeni 
millions)
Households
(emalangeni
millions)
Firms
(emalangeni
millions)
House
holds
(%)
Firms
(%)
1993 702 155 547 22 78
1994 775 189 586 24 76
1995 807 217 590 27 73
1996 872 217 655 25 75
1997 947 242 705 26 74
1998 971 282 689 29 71
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/13
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Table 4.9 Private sector credit in Zambia -  1996-2001
Total credit 
to private 
sector 
(millions of 
Kwacha)
Households
(millions of 
Kwacha)
Firms
(millions of 
Kwacha)
House
holds
(%)
Firms
(%)
1996 375072.5 17958.68 357113.8 5 95
1997 413788.6 24000.41 389788.1 6 94
1998 421002.7 82594.94 338407.7 20 80
1999 552429.1 111667.1 440762 20 80
2000 857781.8 86504.61 771277.2 10 90
2001 943975.3 153115.2 790860 16 84
Source Bank of Zambia, 2002
Post Keynesian authors like Arestis and Howells (1996), argue that as the 
share of firms in private sector credit declines, the relative importance of firms’ 
demand for credit decreases. In empirical work by Moore (1988) it was found 
that changes in the components of firms’ demand for credit (working capital) 
explain changes in private sector credit well. In industrialised countries, firms 
have gained access to capital markets and other sources of finance and are 
no longer bank-dependent.
The tables above show that this is not true for less developed countries. 
Namibia is the only SADC country where the share of households in private 
sector credit is significantly higher than the share of firms. In South Africa the 
shares of households and firms are roughly equal. In 2001, firms had the 
larger share (53%) and households the smaller share (47%). Namibia and 
South Africa are also the more developed SADC countries. Botswana is the 
other SADC country where households and firms each have around 50% of 
private sector credit. Botswana is one SADC country that has been growing 
rapidly over the past decade. In the process, households have gained more 
access to formal credit markets, as shown in table 4.4.
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In all the other less developed SADC countries, the shares of households 
have increased over the period, but remain significantly lower than the shares 
of firms. Firms are still the main recipients of bank credit in the SADC 
countries. The demand for credit by firms should therefore explain changes in 
private sector credit well. Data on the components of firms’ demand for credit 
were not available for the other SADC countries (except for South Africa). In 
the next section the demand for credit in South Africa will be discussed in 
detail, with some general conclusions made that have certain implications for 
the other countries in the SADC region.
4.8 DEMAND FOR WORKING CAPITAL
It was argued above that in the Post Keynesian approach, demand for credit 
originates with the demand for working capital by firms. In an article by Moore 
and Smit (1986), the authors found a high correlation between the 
components of the demand for working capital of firms, interest rates and 
growth in private sector credit in South Africa. Econometric tests performed 
for the South African economy between 1967 and 1984 by Moore and Smit, 
showed that there was a strong correlation between changes in bank credit to 
the private sector and changes in M2. (This will be examined in Chapter 5).
There was also a correlation between changes in bank credit to the private 
sector and the non-government wage bill (as representative of the working
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capital needs of firms). These relationships have been re-estimated for the 
period 1970 -  2000 (using annual data). The results are reported below.
Table 4.10 Demand for credit -  working capital of firms.
Dependent variable: Growth in private sector credit.
Period Constant Change in 
non­
government 
wage bill
Change in 
inventories
3-month
Bankers’
Acceptanc
es
R2 Adjusted
R2
Durbin
Watson
1970-2000 -3.00
(3.70)
0.53
13-70)
0.00
(3.20)
0.18
(4.51)
0.80 0.76 2.16
t-statistics in parentheses
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, various years.
The following table shows the results obtained by Moore and Smit (1986): 
Table 4.11 Demand for credit
Dependent variable: Change in bank credit to the private sector
Period Constant Change in 
non­
government 
wage bill
Change in 
inventories
3-month
Bankers’
Accepta
nces
Rz DW RHO
1967-1984 -0,3568
(2,00)
1,0439 
(15,02)
0,933 2,105
1967-1984 -0,3746
(2,25)
1,0112
(15,00)
0,1356
(1,79)
0,942 1,907
1967-1984 -0,4036 
(277) _
1,0293 
(11,49)
0,2114
(2,44)
-0,0654
(1,40)
0,901 1,8977 0,297
t-statistics in parentheses
Source: Moore and Smit (1986)
Using annual data for 1967-1984, Moore and Smit found that the three 
variables explain more that 90% of the change in bank credit to the private 
sector. On a quarterly basis, the same variables explained more than 80 per 
cent of the change in bank credit to the private sector (Moore and Smit, 
1986:88). Using the same method as Moore and Smit, the results above show 
that for the period 1970-2000, changes in the non-government wage bill, 
changes in inventories, and interest rates explain more than 75% of the
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change in private sector credit. The DW-statistic is acceptable, the t-statistics 
are all relevant, but the sign of the interest rate (BA3) is positive. A positive 
coefficient on the interest rate is not supported by economic theory, which 
presumes a negative relationship between the interest rate and bank credit. 
This result was, however, also reported in an earlier internal study of the 
SARB, conducted in 1985. In this study it was found that the bank credit 
equation (using quarterly data) had a significant but positive coefficient on the 
change in the interest rate used (prime rate). The authors therefore concluded 
that the first quarter impact of a rise in interest rates was perverse (Moore & 
Smit, 1986:90): “As may be seen, the level of nominal or real interest rates 
typically enters with an insignificant coefficient in bank lending equations, 
suggesting perhaps a positive expectations effect, plus the misspecification 
inherent in a single-equation framework. None the less the empirical results 
suggest conclusively that the demand for short-term bank credit is 
exceedingly interest-inelastic" (Moore & Smit,1986:89). The low interest 
elasticity of the demand for bank credit may also contribute to this finding.
This might seem surprising, but has also been found in some of empirical 
work by Post Keynesians. Howells and Hussein (1999:451) found a weak 
interest rate effect in a recent study: “What is more interesting, interest rates 
(domestic and overseas) appear to have no significant influence on the flow of 
bank lending. This may be a priori surprising, but is consistent with the earlier 
work of Moore and Threadgold (1980, 1985) and with Post Keynesian theory, 
where the demand for loans was dependent entirely on elements of firms’ 
production volumes and costs".
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This low interest-elasticity is a well known result. The research of Arestis and 
Howells (1996) and Arestis, Mariscal and Biefgang-Fris (1995), suggests that 
the increasing share of households in total credit, has given rise to higher 
interest rate elasticity. This could not be proved from the regressions for 
South Africa. The interest elasticity of the demand for credit also depends on 
the degree of competition in the market for credit. It is reported that corporate 
borrowing by banks in the United States is more interest elastic than in the 
UK: “This is due to the fact that alternative financial institutions have existed in 
the United States that enable corporations to seek funding outside the 
commercial banking sector. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, alternatives 
have not existed, especially in the past. Given also the commercial bank 
cartel in the United Kingdom, which for many years stipulated interest rate 
changes, the situation is very different" (Arestis, Mariscal & Biefang- 
Fris,1995:551). In South Africa, competition in the market for credit is limited. 
This might be a contributing factor to the low interest rate elasticity reported 
above. Research on the informal credit markets in South Africa, also reports 
very low interest elasticities (Ebony Consulting International,2000).
Figure 4.1 shows that South Africa has had positive real interest rates since 
the late 1980s. Over the shaded period, the general trend in growth in private 
sector credit is downward (showing a negative relationship with interest rates). 
This was however not clear from the regression above.
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Figure 4.1 Growth in private sector credit and the real prime rate
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Source: SARB, various years.
Data were not available for the other SADC countries to repeat the same 
regressions. In the case of SA, the variables used by Moore and Smit (1986) 
still explain changes in private sector credit well. Credit to businesses made 
up 53% of private sector credit in 2001. It makes sense that the components 
of firms’ demand for credit explain changes in private sector credit.
In the majority of the other SADC countries discussed above, the share of 
firms in private sector credit was larger than the share of households. The 
share of households has been increasing, indicating better access to formal 
credit for individuals, but absolute figures are still low. Due to a lack of 
sophisticated capital markets, firms are dependent on banks for their credit 
needs (in contrast to developed countries). Firms may also not qualify 
automatically for credit, as credit rationing might be present in these countries.
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Households, lacking a credit history, probably have even a smaller chance of 
obtaining finance in formal credit markets. This will be further explored in 
Chapter 5.
Another problem in less developed countries is the share of government credit 
in total domestic credit. Figure 4.2 below shows that this ratio has been high 
in most of the SADC countries. South Africa is the only exception. The high 
share of government in total credit can lead to crowding-out effects, as 
households and firms’ access to credit is perversely affected.
Figure 4.2 Government share of credit in selected SADC countries (average 
value 1980-1999).
Source: IFS, various years.
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4.9 COMPOSITION OF CREDIT IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa has a relatively well-developed financial sector, nevertheless a 
large part of the population is still excluded from formal credit markets. A large 
informal market for micro credit has evolved over the past few years in South 
Africa, providing short-term finance for a large part of the population. The 
formal market for private sector credit can be broken down into categories by 
financial instruments. These categories and the shares of households and 
firms in each will be discussed below.
Table 4.12 Total credit to the private sector (composition)
Bills Instalment Leasing finance Credit cards Mortgage loans Other loans
discounted Sales credit and
advances
(% of total) (% of total) (% of total) (% of total) (% of total) (% of total)
1978 4.1 9.0 8.6 - 44.8 33.5
1979 5.2 10.9 9.2 - 44.6 30.1
1980 6.6 13.5 9.8 - 43.7 26.5
1981 5.7 17.7 10.3 - 40.0 26.3
1982 6.7 18.8 11.0 - 36.7 26.8
1983 2.7 18.8 11.3 - 37.8 29.5
1984 2.4 19.9 10.7 - 34.6 32.3
1985 3.7 17.6 8.8 - 35.2 34.8
1986 3.9 15.4 7.3 - 37.2 36.2
1987 4.6 12.3 6.0 - 39.6 37.4
1988 5.5 11.9 6.7 - 39.3 36.6
1989 5.1 12.3 7.2 - 38.3 37.2
1990 5.9 12.2 7.4 - 37.6 36.9
1991 6.9 11.2 7.7 1.8 38.6 33.9
1992 6.7 10.4 7.7 1.9 41.7 31.6
1993 3.7 10.9 7.3 1.7 43.8 32.5
1994 3.0 12.0 6.8 2.0 44.9 31.4
1995 2.5 12.8 6.6 2.4 44.6 31.0
1996 1.6 12.8 6.4 2.5 42.8 33.9
1997 1.5 12.0 5.3 2.3 42.9 36.0
1998 1.4 10.7 4.6 2.2 40.5 40.6
1999 1.1 10.0 4.2 2.2 39.0 43.2
2000 1.4 10.1 4.3 2.2 40.1 42.0
Source: SARB DI-900 returns, various years.
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From table 4.12 it can be seen that the largest portion of bank credit to the 
private sector consists of ‘other loans and advances’ followed by ‘mortgage 
loans’. In 2000 these two categories accounted for 82% of total credit to the 
private sector. This is different from the situation in 1978, when ‘mortgage 
loans’ exceeded ‘other loans and advances’ by a significant margin. There 
was a dramatic decline in ‘bills discounted’ since 1992, falling to a figure of 
1,4% in 2000. This is a result of a change in statutory requirements, where the 
liquid asset status of bankers’ acceptances was terminated in terms of the 
Banks Act. Bankers’ acceptances lost their status as collateral for overnight 
loans at the discount window from May 1993 (Van der Walt,1997:3). 
‘Instalment sales credit’ and ‘leasing finance’ together constituted 14,4% of 
total private sector credit in 2000. ‘Mortgages’ remained relatively stable over 
the period. Van der Walt (1997:7), explains that firms borrow mainly through 
the category ‘other loans and advances’. “Households were the main 
recipients of bank loans in the form of mortgage advances: more than 90 per 
cent of this type of bank credit is allocated to households. Companies on the 
other hand, mainly borrowed in the form of “other” loans and advances, 
including overdrafts and factoring. The corporate sector accounted for about 
two-thirds of this type of bank credit”. ‘Other loans and advances’ increased 
over the above period from 33,5% (1978) to 42% (2000). “This type of credit 
consists largely of overdrafts and is mainly used as working capital by 
businesses”(Van der Walt,1997:6).
In order to get a better picture of the demand for financial instruments of firms 
and households, DI-900 forms were used. The commercial banks report their 
individual data to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Using these
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disaggregated statistics, it was possible to break the categories ‘overdrafts’, 
‘other loans and advances’, ‘credit cards’ and ‘mortgages’ down into their 
individual components. The figures show the composition for December 1993 
and December 2000, for each category. Data for the whole period are shown 
in the tables.
Overdrafts are a component of the category ‘other loans and advances’. It is 
clear from figure 4.3 that the share of businesses in overdrafts has increased 
relative to households. The share of individuals has experienced a dramatic 
decline from 37% to 18% of total overdrafts.
Figure 4.3: Composition of overdrafts (1993 and 2000)
Dec-93
NProfit
institutions
1%
Overdrafts: Overdrafts:
Individuals / \Companies and
37% ( a J cc's
_ y  49%
Overdrafts:
Unincorporated
businesses
13%
NProfiP60'00
institutions
1%
Overdrafts:
Individuals
18% U -
Overdrafts: P\
Unincorporated
businesses \_ /  Overdrafts:
11% ^ Companies and
cc's
70%
Source: DI-900 forms, various years
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Table 4.13 -  Composition of overdrafts
Overdrafts: 
Companies and 
closed 
corporations
(R’000)
Overdrafts:
Unincorporated
businesses
(R’000)
Overdrafts:
Individuals
(R’000)
Overdrafts:
Non-Profit
institutions
(R’000)
TOTAL
OVERDRAFTS
(R’000)
Dec-93
Dec-94
Dec-95
Dec-96
Dec-97
Dec-98
Dec-99
Dec-00
16624560
19946635
23749732
28123457
34578728
46292056
48222649
51863692
4417499
5160128
5914169
7143060
7711037
8365553
7988220
8597746
12396462
9901976
13666150
15313221
16961503
14823653
12437479
13616771
182254
316809
292834
368134
852418
766975
763800
754382
33620775
35325548
43622885
50947872
60103686
70248237
69412148
74832591
Source: DI-900 forms, various years
Table 4.13 shows that individual overdrafts have increased in absolute
figures, but their relative share has declined.
Figure 4.4 Other loans and advances (1993 and 2000)
Dec-93
Nprofit
institutions
Individuals 0%
21%
Unincorporated
businesses
1% V J
Other loans and
advances:
Companies and
cc's
78%
Nprofit
institutions
1%
Individuals 
16% \
Unincorporated
businesses
3%
Dec-00
Other loans and 
advances: 
Companies and 
cc's 
80%
Source: DI-900 forms, various years.
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Table 4.14 Composition of other loans and advances.
Other loans 
and advances: 
Companies and 
closed 
corporations 
(R’OOO)
Unincorporated
businesses
(R'000)
Individuals
(R’OOO)
Non-profit
institutions
(R’OOO)
TOTAL
PRIVATE
SECTOR
LOANS
(R’OOO)
Dec-93
Dec-94
Dec-95
Dec-96
Dec-97
Dec-98
Dec-99
Dec-00
28274545
30681468
32058793
34535683
48632657
75925813
94249291
1.05E+08
465585
657174
692522
1007101
1268898
1425026
4137800
4350732
7575657
9472360
9871966
10463724
13696119
15016955
20401155
21198179
120241
425361
402779
1579670
933769
1436430
732392
968579
70494731
77211338
87780560
99789700
126008613
165352456
190743698
208198774
Source: DI-900 forms, various years.
The same picture emerges when the category ‘other loans and advances’ is 
considered. The share of businesses increased from 79% to 83%, while the 
share of individuals decreased from 21% to 16%. Table 4.14 shows that loans 
and advances to individuals have increased in absolute terms, but their 
relative share has decreased.
Figure 4.5 Credit card composition
Dec-93
Companies and 
close 
corporations 
N Profit 2%
Individuals
97%
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Dec-00
Companies and 
close 
corporations
NProfit 5%
Organisations
Individuals
94%
Source: DI-900 forms, various years.
Credit card debtors consist mainly of individuals. In 1993, 97% of all credit 
card debtors were individuals. The share of households as a percentage of 
credit card debt is shown in figure 4.5. Households accounted for the biggest 
share of credit cards, 94% in 2000, and also of mortgage loans, 75% in 2000. 
The share of credit cards in total private sector credit remains negligibly small 
(2,2% in 2000). Table 4.15 shows the absolute figures over the period.
Table 4.15. Composition of credit cards.
Credit cards: 
Companies and 
close
corporations
(R’000)
Credit cards: 
Individuals
(R’000)
Credit cards:
Non-Profit
Organisations
(R’000)
TOTAL
(R’000)
Dec-93 62902 3533724 46935 3643561
Dec-94 156892 4598555 38859 4794306
Dec-95 205207 6724084 97098 7026389
Dec-96 192681 8533957 107248 8833886
Dec-97 218336 9197703 107854 9523893
Dec-98 324551 9881351 151333 10357235
Dec-99 502103 10878271 66483 11446857
Dec-00 612219 11224645 178530 12015394
Source: DI-900 forms, various years.
Where the household sector is the biggest user of mortgage finance and 
credit cards, companies obtain bank credit mainly by means of overdrafts and
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other loans and advances. This is in line with international trends, as seen in 
the work of Arestis and Howells (1996) for the UK.
Figure 4.6 shows that the share of individuals in mortgage loans decreased 
between 1993 (89%) and 2000 (75%). Yet, it remains the largest share of 
mortgage finance.
Figure 4.6 Composition of mortgage loans (1993 and 2000).
115
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
Table 4.16. Composition of mortgage loans.
Other
companies and 
cc's
Unincorporated
businesses
Individuals TOTAL
MORTGAGES
Dec-93
Dec-94
Dec-95
Dec-96
Dec-97
Dec-98
Dec-99
Dec-00
6653034
8460972
12788175
17426339
19352235
28181462
35091445
40657219
3501770
4433808
6333172
8421921
9123906
11224795
11974107
12761213
79821798
94294616
108211933
122964982
138490330
144791595
144173998
160250838
92036076
110166001
132005722
154850510
172755041
189780482
196064498
219250602
Source: DI-900 forms, various years.
Table 4.16 shows that the absolute figure of mortgage loans to households 
has increased between 1993 and 2000. Borrowers in South Africa 
increasingly use mortgage loans to finance other expenditure not related to 
real estate transactions. Banks actively encourage this behaviour, because of 
the lower risk of this type of loan. Van der Walt (1997:6) found the same 
results in a study on the credit composition in South Africa: “Since 1991, 
mortgage advances have been increasing at a surprisingly stable rate...The 
introduction of flexible mortgage loans improved the attractiveness of this type 
of credit and enabled borrowers to use mortgage facilities for purposes other 
than the financing of real-estate transactions. The attractiveness of mortgage 
borrowing was enhanced further by the relatively low cost of this type of 
financing. From the supply side, banks actively encouraged the use of 
mortgages on account of lower capital-risk weight that this type of asset 
attracts, as well as the supposedly lower risk of such loans for the lender.” As 
a result, the growth in annual mortgage payouts has exceeded the value of 
annual real-estate transactions since 1992. The following figure shows the 
large divergence between mortgages and real estate transactions for South 
Africa.
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Figure 4.7 Relationship between mortgages and real estate transactions.
Real estate transactions —♦ —Mortgages |
4.10 THE MARKET FOR MICRO-FINANCE (SOUTH AFRICA).
South Africa has recently seen exponential growth in the market for small 
loans. This happened as a result of a change in the law governing the micro­
finance sector. In 1992, the Exemption to the Usury Act removed interest rate 
ceilings on small loans under R 6 000. Before that there were few official 
options available to people who wanted access to micro-finance.
Pawnbrokers or other informal credit agents, such as stokvels and burial 
societies, were the only available options, since commercial banks did not 
offer micro-credit (Ebony Consulting International,2000:21).
The industry has expanded significantly over the last 9 years. Unfortunately 
there are little data available. A few ad hoc studies have been done to
117
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
estimate the size of this sector. There has been a rapid growth in the demand 
for finance and banking services by the lower income groups in South Africa, 
due to a variety of reasons, such as low access to formal banking services by 
the poor, increased income of low income groups, urbanisation and growth of 
the SMME sector (small, medium and micro enterprises). This increase in 
demand has been met by the rapid rise of the micro-lending market. 
Commercial banks have been reluctant to enter this growing market, due to 
perceived high risks.
A survey done by the University of Pretoria in the peri-urban areas of 
Pietersburg in the Northern Province, showed that the demand for micro­
credit originated from the following needs:
Table 4.17 Demand for micro-credit.
Instalments 27,8%
School fees 38,9%
Household needs 22,2%
Agriculture 5,6%
Small Business 5,6%
Source: Ebony Consulting International (2000:22)
These figures imply that these loans are mainly used for consumption and not 
for productive uses. This was also found for Madagascar: “The informal 
sector, however, frequently serves consumption needs. Here, 759 out of
1 214 loans are used for consumption, mostly for food and to a lesser extent 
to finance expenses related to education, health and social events.”
(Zeller, 1994:1897)
Data from the South African Micro Finance Regulatory Council show that the 
amount of gross loans outstanding during the period 1/12/2001-28/02/2002,
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was R 14,9 billion. A study done for the Department of Trade and Industry 
(Ebony Consulting International, 2000), estimated the total size of the 
outstanding portfolio of the micro-finance industry as R13 billion in 2000. Their 
calculations showed that the effective demand, on an annual turnover basis, 
was about R 25 billion. This is clearly an industry where demand for credit 
exceeds the supply of credit. Demand for credit in this industry is a function of 
the cost of the services, the availability of the services (especially in the rural 
areas) and awareness of the services. The interest elasticity of demand for a 
small loan seems to be very low. The immediate utility of the loan is probably 
more important than the cost of the loan: “A recent survey of rural borrowers 
revealed that only 8.9 percent of the borrowers knew the interest rate. By 
contrast, all of them knew the amount they had to repay and the cash flow to 
do so”(Ebony Consulting International, 2000:24).
4.11 CONCLUSION
In Post Keynesian monetary theory, credit is supplied on demand. All 
creditworthy demand for loans is met by the banking sector. Little attention is 
given to the composition of the demand for credit. It was argued in this 
chapter that the composition of the demand for credit is important in the 
developing country context.
In industrialised countries, households have replaced firms as the dominant 
borrowers. In the SADC countries, the share of households has been 
increasing relative to that of firms, but it remains low. Botswana, Namibia and
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South Africa are the only SADC countries where households’ share of private 
sector credit exceeds 40% (compared to 62% in the UK). Firms rely on banks 
as a source of credit, due to lack of deep capital markets. Households also 
rely on banks, but their share is much lower, reflecting the restricted access of 
households to formal credit in these LDCs.
By examining balance sheet data for South Africa, businesses were shown to 
borrow mainly in the form of overdrafts and ‘other loans and advances’. These 
are forms of credit that can be accessed on demand. Household have the 
biggest shares of mortgage loans and credit cards. Credit cards in South 
Africa constitute only 2% of total private sector credit. It can be argued that 
only households with access to credit cards (a small percentage of the 
population) and owners of real estate can obtain credit on demand. The 
components of the demand for business credit explained changes in private 
sector credit well, since business credit is an important component of total 
private sector credit in South Africa.
Firms constitute the largest component of private sector credit in most of the 
SADC countries (all except Namibia and Botswana). In these countries firms 
do not have access to alternative sources of finance. Many borrowers (both 
firms and households) do not have automatic access to credit facilities. Credit 
is supplied on demand to creditworthy borrowers. Given the low share of 
households in private sector credit, most individuals are not considered 
creditworthy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
As liquidity preference rises, banks become increasingly unwilling to meet the 
demand for credit, so that credit rationing replaces accommodating behavior.
(Wray, 1990)
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters gave an overview of the Post Keynesian theory of an 
accommodating central bank. The supply of money is demand determined and 
in financially developed economies, all creditworthy demand for funds is met. The 
demand for money was then examined in a developing country perspective. It 
was argued for LDCs that the transactions demand for money is more important 
than the finance demand. This chapter will look at the supply of finance, from the 
point of view of a developing country.
In a seminal article on credit rationing, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that 
credit rationing implies an excess demand for loanable funds. This is a classic 
case of market failure. Markets do not necessarily clear and government 
intervention is needed. Credit rationing is a theory firmly rooted in the Keynesian 
tradition -  there are some features in an economy that prevent markets from 
efficiently allocating resources. The concepts of coordination failure, asymmetric
THE SUPPLY OF CREDIT: CREDIT RATIONING
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information, and credit rationing have become associated with the New 
Keynesian school and have been elaborated by New Keynesian authors such as 
Stiglitz, Greenwaldt, Romer and Mankiw. But fundamental uncertainty is a Post 
Keynesian theory, and plays a central role in the work of Post Keynesian authors. 
The central Post Keynesian idea is that the future is unknowable, and the world is 
characterised by fundamental uncertainty. It will be explained in this chapter how 
the ideas of asymmetric information and credit rationing illuminate Post 
Keynesian money supply theory, and how this can be applied to the developing 
country analysis.
5.2 CREDIT RATIONING -  SOME DEFINITIONS.
Economists writing in the neo-classical tradition regard market failure phenomena 
like credit rationing as a short-term problem. Coordination failure is possible in 
the short run, but in the long run markets tend to equilibrium. New Keynesian 
literature on credit rationing argues the opposite: in equilibrium loan markets may 
be characterized by credit rationing. This is explained by concepts such as 
‘adverse selection’ and ‘incentive effects’.
Adverse selection assumes that different borrowers have different probabilities of 
repaying their loans. Those willing to pay higher interest rates may be worse 
risks. As interest rates increase, only those who are less risk averse will demand 
credit, since they consider their probability of servicing the debt to be low. Banks
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ration the total supply of credit rather than raise interest rates. The same principle 
applies to collateral requirements. The returns to the banks will decrease as 
collateral or equity requirements are increased, since less risk averse borrowers 
are selected (Stiglitz & Weiss,1981:394).
The incentive effect refers to the fact that the actions of banks affect the actions 
of borrowers. Credit is not a commodity like beef or potatoes, where anybody 
who is willing to pay the market price can acquire the goods. The seller (lender) 
has to be sure that he sells the product to a specific buyer (borrower). In the 
credit market, the price of the product influences the pool of borrowers.
Increasing interest rates affect the riskiness of average loans made by the banks. 
At the higher interest rate, the expected return is lower, since only projects with a 
high expected return (more risky) are undertaken. This is the incentive effect, 
where more risky projects are undertaken as a direct result of the behaviour of 
the banks. Once again, this causes banks to ration credit rather than raise 
interest rates. The same problem exists for banks who consider lowering their 
interest rate. If a client is a good credit risk, his bank will most likely match the 
lower interest rates. If he is a bad credit risk, there will be an incentive for him to 
accept the lowest interest rate available. The bank with the lowest interest rate 
will tend to draw higher risk borrowers due to adverse selection.
Credit rationing therefore describes a situation where:
...either (a) among loan applicants who appear to be identical some
receive a loan and others do not, and the rejected applicants would not
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receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; or (b) there 
are identifiable groups of individuals in the population who, with a given 
supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even 
though with a larger supply of credit, they would (Stiglitz &
Weiss,1981:395).
In credit markets the interest rate that maximizes the return of the bank, does not 
clear the market, in the sense that there perpetually exists an excess demand for 
credit at this interest rate. Banks see the expected return on a loan as a 
decreasing function of the riskiness of the loan.
In the presence of credit rationing, credit money is not simply supplied upon 
demand. Some creditworthy borrowers are unable to obtain credit, because of 
adverse selection and incentive effects. If there were a bigger supply of credit, 
more borrowers will be accommodated. But the supply of credit is always 
restricted on risk grounds. This is also due to institutional limits on credit, in 
addition to the adverse selection effects. As Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993:32) 
argue:
And in the credit rationing regime, it is the supply of loans which is critical; 
firms are limited in their investment activities, and possibly even in their 
production activities (if they rely on bank credit for working capital) by the 
lack of credit.
This describes a situation where there is a general shortage of credit. Firms who 
are credit constrained by banks will find it difficult to raise money from non-bank
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sources for the same reasons. Equity is not a viable alternative, as adverse 
selection is also prevalent. Firms who know that their shares are overvalued by 
the market will be the most eager to issue new shares to diversify their risk. The 
market will treat the issuing of new equity as a negative signal, and this avenue is 
thus limited as a source of new finance. For firms in developing countries where 
financial markets are thin, obtaining finance through equity issues is frequently 
not an option. Other sources of funds are even less informed about credit 
worthiness. Banks are experts in developing screening devices and building long 
term relationships to determine the credit risk of their clients: “Adverse selection 
works to exacerbate other sources of credit, too; the firms that avail themselves 
of these alternative supplies are those in dire straits” (Greenwald &
Stiglitz,1993:32).1 Credit is rationed, either by the market or by the government 
through credit laws. Credit is not supplied on demand to any creditworthy 
borrower.
5.3 CREDIT RATIONING FROM A POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE
Credit rationing is not a description of banking practices where higher risk 
individuals pay higher interest rates. It is the phenomenon that loans are denied 
to borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from those who do receive 
loans. Banks ration the total number of loans, rather than limiting the size of each 
loan. Banks do not increase the interest rate charged, as an increasing function 
of the expected riskiness of the loan (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).
' This is why there has been such a growth in informal micro-lending in most developing countries over the past decade.
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It is sometimes argued that the idea of credit rationing is incompatible with the 
Post Keynesian theory of an endogenous money supply:
In a Post Keynesian demand-determined system of endogenous credit- 
money, neoclassical scarcity cannot hold sway. Consequently interest 
rates emerge as a non-market conventional phenomenon 
(Seccareccia, 1997:135).
A limited supply of credit, or credit rationing, is not possible in a world where all 
demand for credit is accommodated. Moore and Kaldor emphasise that banks 
will only make loans to borrowers who they deem creditworthy. As explained by 
Wray (1990:158), lack of finance is indeed possible in a Post Keynesian world: 
“Keynes went on to argue that while investment can never be constrained by lack 
of saving, it can be constrained by lack of finance." The structuralist Post 
Keynesians have incorporated the concept of credit rationing into their work and 
obtained results closely related to New Keynesian capital market theory.
Dow is one Post Keynesian author who has advocated the extension of 
endogenous money to include liquidity preference. She argues that it is important 
to consider the liquidity preference of commercial banks. Their increased liquidity 
preference in a downward phase of the business cycle will encourage credit 
rationing. This leads to a money supply function that is upward sloping at times, 
similar to Wray’s step-wise money supply function. Dow (1996:497) notes that: “It
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can be argued that this extension of liquidity preference theory to bank behaviour 
is not compatible with Kaldor’s and Moore’s overall stance”.
Nevertheless, Dow acknowledges that neither Kaldor nor Moore argues that all 
demand for credit is accommodated. Moore explicitly states that only creditworthy 
demand for credit is accommodated. Banks have specific criteria that must be 
met by all prospective borrowers. Dow has argued that different stages of the 
business cycle have different effects on the credit extension of commercial 
banks. Through much of the business cycle, the supply of credit is close to 
horizontal. But during a downturn, when banks have a higher liquidity preference, 
the supply function has a positive slope. It might even become vertical in extreme 
cases, if banks put an absolute ceiling on credit supply, placing free reserves 
instead in investments as better providers of liquidity. Dow argues that as the 
“moods” of financial institutions are likely to follow a pro-cyclical pattern, so too 
will the availability of credit.
This seems to be compatible with the New Keynesian view, with its emphasis on 
asymmetric information and the behaviour of commercial banks. As noted by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981:394):
It is not our argument that credit rationing will always characterize capital 
markets, but rather that it may occur under not implausible assumptions 
concerning borrower and lender behavior.
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The difference between the Post Keynesian and New Keynesian approaches is a 
different emphasis on the supply and the demand side. In the Post Keynesian 
view, credit is demand determined. A shortage of creditworthy borrowers may 
exist, but all creditworthy demand is met. In the New Keynesian view, the credit- 
driven nature of the modern economy is recognized, but the emphasis throughout 
is on the supply side. Both agree that credit rationing causes an excess demand 
for credit in equilibrium.
Wolfson (1996) argues that the Post Keynesian institutional approach should be 
applied to the concept of credit rationing. The credit rationing literature can be 
enriched by incorporating Post Keynesian concepts such as uncertainty, time and 
expectations formation. Asymmetric information in the New Keynesian view 
implies that the borrower has more information regarding the outcome of a 
certain project than the lender. In a Post Keynesian world, both borrower and 
lender face an uncertain future, their expectations differ not solely because one 
knows more than the other, but rather because the world is characterized by 
fundamental uncertainty. Banks have expertise developed over years such as 
specialized screening mechanisms and long-term relationships with clients.
Some borrowers may be able to borrow from banks, but are unable to borrow 
from other sources, or only at an increased cost. Anything that disrupts normal 
banking activity can reduce the supply of credit to borrowers dependent on 
banks. This is the essence of the credit view. In developing countries with 
underdeveloped financial sectors and large underbanked parts of the population,
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credit is a scarce commodity. In the Treatise, Keynes used the concept of a 
“fringe of unsatisfied borrowers” (1935:212). This is a reference to credit 
rationing, where the relationship that an individual has with his bank determines 
the amount lent and interest rate charged, with some borrowers left unsatisfied. 
Banks influence the size and composition of this unsatisfied fringe. This is the 
main explanation why observationally indistinguishable borrowers appear to be 
treated differently.
The research of Wolfson confirms the Keynesian idea of an unsatisfied fringe of 
borrowers. He examined the loan practices of commercial banks in the USA and 
found that banks assign borrowers to particular risk categories. About 20 percent 
of respondents used a statistically based credit model to assign borrowers to risk 
categories, but usually risk evaluation was done on a judgmental basis 
(1996:456). This confirms the importance of long-term relationships in banking 
practices and the supply of credit. Both price and non-price terms are varied 
according to the creditworthiness of a borrower. “Price” terms refer to the spread 
of loan rates over some base rate. “Non-price” terms refer to requirements such 
as collateral, and the size of credit lines. Credit lines are an important part of loan 
negotiations in developed countries. Most large business loans use money 
market rates as a reference rate, rather than the prime rate. Prime rate is used 
for individual and smaller business loans.
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Wolfson argued that in the USA credit lines are different from credit 
commitments:
Lines are relatively informal arrangements under which banks agree that 
on demand they will quote a price on a fixed-rate loan for a particular 
amount and maturity (usually under a year) selected by the borrower, 
within specified limits. Banks typically set the price of such loans by 
marking up a reference rate for the same maturity as the loan -  for 
example, the rate on 30-day certificates of deposit for a 30-day loan...By 
widening or narrowing their markups, banks can affect the quantity of 
these loans outstanding.
Unlike lines, loan commitments require fees, which are paid on the unused 
credit available under the arrangement. Commitments oblige banks to lend 
up to agreed-upon amounts as long as borrowers meet loan covenants 
included in the contract...borrowers draw down credit up to specified limits 
at pre-established spreads over reference rates (Wolfson,1996:457).
Three types of lending may be distinguished. In the first case, the bank 
determines the prime rate, and the spread over the prime rate. The borrower has 
little or no negotiating power about price. The second case is that of credit lines. 
The borrower is able to determine within specific limits how much he wants to 
borrow, but the interest rate is determined by the bank. The bank can influence 
the amount of credit demanded by varying the spread over the reference rate. In 
the third case, with loan commitments, the borrower has greater discretion. He
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determines both the size of the amount borrowed, and the price, where both are 
subject to the agreement reached between the bank and the borrower. This last 
case is one of the essential arguments of the Post Keynesian endogenous 
money supply theory. When credit is rationed, this last group is hardly affected. 
Credit rationing mainly applies to the first and second groups. Moore found for 
the US that by the late 1980s, 70 percent of all commercial and industrial loans 
were made under prearranged loan commitments, and consumer loans made 
under credit card arrangements became increasingly important in bank portfolios 
(1988:25). The conclusion from this is then that since most bank loans are made 
under previous commitments, the total volume of bank lending is largely 
determined by loan demand.
An important criticism of this view is from Rousseas (1988:476): “Nor does it 
follow that to the degree that unused overdrafts exist, they exist where they are 
most needed, or that they can be instantaneously transferred to those points of 
need. It is quite possible that a great part of unused overdrafts remain just that -  
unusecf'(Emphasis in the original). In the UK, the equivalent of credit lines is 
overdraft facilities. Dow reported that the proportion of loans made under 
overdraft facilities in Britain decreased substantially from 22% in 1984 to only 
14% in 1992. For the US it was found in a 1990 survey that 73% of small firms 
did not have a credit commitment, compared with 40% of medium-sized firms 
(Dow, 1996:506). Only large companies qualify for loan commitments where they 
can draw down funds, as they need them. In developing countries, most
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individuals and small companies do not qualify for credit facilities. They are 
credit-rationed by banks. Credit rationing is borne by borrowers without loan 
commitments, and is more prevalent in developing countries. This is confirmed 
by Wray (1990:63):
...credit rationing by banks is the norm. The disadvantage of a system 
based on deposit banking rather than on small local banks may be that 
small borrowers do not receive credit. This would tend to hinder the 
development of small scale industry and agriculture. In fact, this does 
seem to be a characteristic typical of the LDC.
The New Keynesian idea of credit rationing has been adopted by the so-called 
structuralist Post Keynesians, such as Wray, Dow and Dymski. Liquidity 
preference essentially has the same foundations as credit rationing. The 
difference between the mark-up approach and the liquidity preference approach 
was explained in the previous chapter. The markup theory is primarily concerned 
with the endogenous creation of money by banks. The liquidity preference or 
structuralist school takes the allocation of financial assets into account and 
therefore focuses on the lending practices of commercial banks, similar to the 
New Keynesian approach. Both are directed at an analysis of bank behaviour 
and credit markets. Both are interested in understanding bank credit extending 
practices. Pigay (1999:266), summarizes this common focus as follows:
But such a complementarity cannot be envisaged within a single coherent 
theoretical structure. In particular, a monetary production economy cannot
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be confused with an exchange economy; furthermore, radical uncertainty 
cannot be reduced to probabilistic risk. The two approaches do, however, 
share a common objective, and the results of both approaches may be 
valuable despite their derivation from different theoretical foundations.
The emphasis of structuralist Post Keynesians on banking behaviour is 
important. Their consideration of the institutional aspects of money creation 
reinforces the concept of endogenous money. It does not contradict the 
endogenous nature of money, but contributes to our understanding of the 
processes that cause money to become endogenous. The theory of endogenous 
money cannot be considered without also looking at the institutional environment: 
It seems then, that the two analyses are more complementary than 
exclusive as the new considerations about liquidity preference are 
explicitly based on the notion of the endogeneity of money. Their purpose 
is indeed to reinforce Post Keynesian monetary theory, taking into account 
the complexity of the operations performed by banks, in order not to 
weaken it on theoretical grounds (Pigay, 1999:277).
The structuralist Post Keynesian school, in their emphasis on the allocation of 
financial assets, sees banks essentially as portfolio managers operating in 
financial markets. This approach has been called by different names: the 
structuralist view, the liquidity preference approach, the neo-Banking school and 
the ‘new view’ or portfolio choice approach. This new view is an extension of the
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original work of Gurley and Shaw (1955), which emphasized the role of financial 
intermediation in economic development. According to the new view, financial 
institutions are important, and the level of development of financial markets has 
definite effects on the productive side of the economy. The maturity of the 
financial structure governs the pace of economic growth. Firms and households 
must make portfolio choices, but this is hampered by the high degree of 
uncertainty. Banks develop special screening mechanisms over time, but this is 
difficult in a world characterised by fundamental uncertainty. This problem may 
be exacerbated by shallow financial markets in developing countries, contributing 
to the use of credit rationing. As explained by Dymski (1992:315):
For example, suppose many potential borrowers are unable to access 
credit markets directly due to informational problems rooted in their size, 
inexperience, ethnicity, and/or lack of collateral or net worth. Suppose that 
banks too are unable to ascertain all relevant information about these 
potential borrowers’ credit-worthiness, and hence ration credit to them. 
Suppose that those denied credit must operate at reduced activity levels, 
hiring fewer workers and buying less goods than if they had received bank 
credit. Finally, suppose the workers not hired by these firms have no other 
job options. Then, one may infer that the macroeconomy is operating 
below full employment. (Emphasis in the original).
In a Post Keynesian world characterized by fundamental uncertainty, banks face 
more than the problem of asymmetric information. Banks must absorb default
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and liquidity risks in financial markets and these are subject to fundamental 
uncertainty. This Post Keynesian emphasis on uncertainty furthers our 
understanding of why banks are unwilling to absorb liquidity risks. In well- 
developed financial markets banks have some notion of the average default rate, 
and the cost of liabilities. If banks can quantify their risks, they will be more willing 
to create credit by increasing their own exposure to default and liquidity risks. If 
banks are not willing to carry these risks because of a highly volatile 
environment, then credit markets will be shallow and may resemble a world 
without financial intermediaries. Credit rationing is indeed possible in a Post 
Keynesian world of endogenous money. Both schools have developed valuable 
insights and can learn from their common Keynesian foundations:
Post Keynesian models have either suggested that credit rationing does 
not occur (the neo-Banking school), or have not explicitly addressed the 
matter. New Keynesians have not seriously considered the impact of 
uncertainty. The middle ground between these two Keynesian approaches 
may lead to a more complete model of banking. Intuitively, New and Post 
Keynesian elements would interact because Keynesian uncertainty can 
force adjustments with ratchet effects on credit supply (up or down) in a 
rationed market for bank credit (Dymski, 1992:318).
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5.4 POST KEYNESIAN CRITICISM
Some Post Keynesians have criticised the apparent eagerness of other members 
of the school to find common ground with New Keynesians. Rochon (1999:233) 
argues that although Post and New Keynesians are perhaps closer than most 
New Keynesians are willing to admit, they remain nonetheless far apart “based 
on their respective intent.” He believes that New Keynesian theory is not 
Keynesian at all. The emphasis of Keynes’s work is on the demand side of the 
economy, while New Keynesians emphasize the supply side. The driving force of 
monetary policy is the supply of loanable funds. The problem here is that Post 
Keynesian theory, having rejected the classical theory of loanable funds, has little 
to offer on the supply side. According to the accommodationist view, credit that is 
demanded by creditworthy borrowers will be supplied. The theory of supply is 
therefore the same as the theory of demand, those factors which determine the 
demand for credit automatically also determine the supply of credit. Because of 
weaknesses in the Post Keynesian theory, it is useful to look at the supply-side 
theory of the New Keynesians for valuable new insights.
Another point of criticism is that: “First, Post Keynesians, such as Dymski and 
others who are proponents of such reconciliation, fail to correctly assess the New 
Keynesian literature. Second, if these authors believe that a reconciliation is 
possible, it is because their own model can be reconciled with the orthodox 
multiplier model where causality runs from deposits to loans”(Rochon, 1999:232).
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In the usual textbook money multiplier model, banks are restricted in their lending 
activities by the amount of required reserves. In the New Keynesian literature, 
loans are rationed because banks cannot lend more than their deposits and 
reserves. Some borrowers receive loans while others are rationed. Although this 
reflects the liquidity preference of banks, rather than an exogenous credit 
constraint, more borrowers could be accommodated with a larger supply of 
credit.
There is an element of neoclassical scarcity in this analysis, based on some 
notion of a traditional money multiplier: “...New Keynesians adopt a theory of 
credit rationing because of the general limited supply of loans. In this sense, 
since the demand for loans is greater than the supply, rationing must occur. This 
intuitive argument runs counter to the overall post-Keynesian framework” 
(Rochon,1999:235). The shortage of funds exists because of the characteristics 
of the Post Keynesian world, i.e. fundamental uncertainty. Banks are unwilling to 
bear too much risk in an uncertain world. This is why credit is rationed. Even if 
the central bank were fully accommodating, banks would still ration credit and 
rather choose to buy securities with any excess supply of funds, because of 
liquidity preference.
Rochon (1999:239) mentions another point: “They do not explain how banks 
finally decide on how to divide the available supply -  that is who among the 
potential borrowers receive credit. Ex post, New Keynesians admit that the
137
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
distribution of credit may not be the most optimal one, yet they cannot explain 
how ex ante, banks divide the available supply if bank borrowers are identical. 
Moreover, New Keynesians do not offer any criteria used to determine which 
borrowers received loans”. But this criticism does not seem to be valid. The New 
Keynesian microeconomic models focus on factors that determine 
creditworthiness, such as cash flows, collateral, etc. Even though these criteria 
might be based on some subjective judgement, they do exist.
Asymmetric information is not accepted by all Post Keynesians. Banks have 
evolved in such a way that their sophisticated screening mechanisms have 
overcome this problem of asymmetric information. They have developed 
expertise and technical skills which neutralize the possible asymmetric 
information effects. Banks make sure that asymmetric information does not exist. 
While this may be true of banks in developed countries, it cannot be said of 
banks in developing countries, where borrowers do not have a credit history, and 
information is a scarce commodity.
The main difference then between the two schools is the focus on the demand 
versus the supply side. According to the Post Keynesian Horizontalists, the 
reason why banks do not supply all demand for credit may be because there is a 
limited supply of creditworthy borrowers. The shortage is on the demand side 
rather than on the supply side. In the New Keynesian analysis, there are always 
some borrowers whose demand for credit is not met. There is an excess demand
138
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
for funds in equilibrium, and the equilibrium interest rate does not clear the 
market. Some borrowers are rationed, even though they may be indistinguishable 
from those who do receive credit. There is a general shortage of credit money. In 
Post Keynesian analysis this is not possible. The emphasis on liquidity 
preference by structuralist Post Keynesians shows that banks ration credit as 
part of their portfolio decisions. This view is also held by Fazzari (1994:367): 
“Economists in the Post Keynesian tradition have long known...the importance of 
information for economic activity. Recent theoretical work on asymmetric 
information, even though it may strictly fall outside of what is usually considered 
the Post Keynesian sphere, supports and adds insights to the theory of 
investment and its links to finance”. Credit rationing is compatible with Post 
Keynesian monetary theory. This emphasis appears to be closer to the realities 
of less developed countries.
5.5 CREDIT RATIONING AND LDCs
As explained in the previous chapter, there is a difference between the demand 
for money and the demand for credit. The demand for finance (‘active balances’) 
determines the supply of credit or finance. Money is created ‘ex nihilo’. But this is 
not always the case during the earlier stages of development that a country 
passes through. Structuralist Post Keynesians argue that endogeneity is the 
result of central bank accommodation, financial innovation and the stages of 
evolution of the banking system in a specific country. When the money supply is
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fully endogenous, then the direction of causality runs from the demand for credit 
to the quantity of credit supplied.
In Post Keynesian research on credit lines in developed countries it was found 
that total bank lending is ordinarily less than 60 per cent of total lines of credit 
previously committed: “This means that in the short run banks have little control 
over an individual bank’s supply of funds, it must change its net demand for 
wholesale funds, change its base and deposit rates, and/or alter the degree to 
which it rations credit” (Moore & Threadgold, 1985:67). Since credit lines have 
been granted (and they form a large part of loan negotiations in most developed 
countries), the scope for credit rationing is rather limited. The central bank has to 
supply the funds needed by the banks. The existence of a central bank as lender 
of last resort ensures that the supply of money responds to the needs of the 
economy.
It was argued above that in developing countries there may be a general 
shortage of credit. The general credit supply may be limited and most borrowers 
are unable to obtain the loans they desire, at any interest rate. The implication is 
therefore that with a larger supply of credit, more people would receive loans.
The problem is not due to a lack of demand (the Post Keynesian argument), but 
may be the result of limited supply. In order to test this hypothesis, the nature of 
credit in the SADC countries will be examined more closely, with specific 
emphasis on South Africa.
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5.6 CREDIT EXTENSION IN THE SADC COUNTRIES.
Data on credit extension and credit lines are virtually non-existent for the SADC 
countries. In most cases the only data available is aggregate private sector 
credit. The most comprehensive data are for South Africa. Although a developing 
country, South Africa has a well-developed financial sector. The South African 
case is much closer to developed countries in terms of the endogenous nature of 
the money supply.
5.6.1 CREDIT ACCOMMODATION
Endogenous money supply theory argues that demand for credit is 
accommodated by the central bank. The demand for credit was discussed in 
Chapter 4. Most studies on the accommodation of credit demand concentrate on 
the relationship between a measure of the broad money stock (M2 or M3), and 
private sector credit. A study by Moore and Smit (1986) found that on an annual 
basis for the period 1966 to 1984, more than 95 per cent of the variation in M2 
was explained by changes in bank credit. They warn, however, that these figures 
should be interpreted with care: “Credit to the private sector is the largest single 
component of bank total assets, and total deposits which comprise M2 are 
similarly the largest single component of total bank liabilities” (1986:87). 
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that the high levels of correlation are
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evidence of an endogenous money supply: “The case for M2 being credit driven 
rests both on the very high observed correlation between changes in M2 and 
total credit, particularly over periods of one year, plus the recognition that 
changes in total credit are largely non-discretionary and thus an exogenous 
variable from the view-point of individual commercial banks and the Reserve 
Bank, determined as they are largely by borrower rather than lender decisions.” 
(1986:87) (Emphasis in the original).
The regressions of Moore and Smit (1986) are reproduced below for South 
Africa, as well as some of the other SADC countries.
Table 5.1 Changes in M2 and bank credit to the private sector in South Africa 
(1966-1984).
Dependent variable: Change in M2
Time period Time unit Constant Change in credit to the private 
sector
R" Durbin
Watson
Lag (-1) Lag (-2)
1967-84 Annual -0.0337
(0.23)
0.9293
(21.03)
0.963 1.655
1966.1-84.4 Quarterly 0.0136
(0.49)
0.8914
(12.21)
0.895 1.928
1965.4-84.12 Monthly 0.0402
(277)
0.6751
(13.85)
0.447 2.057
1965.4-84.12 Monthly 0.0181
(1.21)
0.4710
(7.16)
0.1727
(7.96)
0.1825
(2.59)
0.498 1.984
t-stats in parentheses
Source: Moore & Smit (1986)
The regressions above were re-estimated for South Africa, for the period 1970- 
2000. The regression results (table 5.2) show the relationship between M2, M3 
and private sector credit (on an annual basis).
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Table 5.2 Changes in M2 and M3 and Bank credit to the private sector in South
Africa (1970-2000), (annual data).
Time period Time unit Constant Change in credit to the private 
sector
Durbin
Watson
Dependent variable: M2 growth
1970-2000 Annual -0.69 1.05 0.70 2.22
(-0.32) (8.30)
Dependent variable: M3 growth
1970-2000 Annual 2.90 0.74 0.66 1.69
(1.76) (7.59)
t-stats in parentheses
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, various years.
As shown, the results are less confirming to the endogenous money theory than 
those of Moore and Smit, who found extremely high correlations (R2=0.963) 
between M2 and bank credit, for the period 1967-1984 (annual data). As shown 
in table 5.2, the R2 drops to 0.70 between 1970-2000. A somewhat lower (R2 
=0.665) is found for the relationship between M3 and private sector credit.
When these relationships are looked at on a quarterly basis,there is still a 
positive correlation, but the R2 is much lower. Moore and Smit found a high 
correlation (R2 =0.895) on a quarterly basis. Regression results using quarterly 
data, are shown in table 5.3. Data from other SADC countries were only available 
from 1980. Quarterly data were therefore used to examine the relationship 
between growth in M2 and growth in private sector credit in 10 SADC countries.
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Table 5.3 Change in M2 and change in private sector credit in selected SADC
countries (1980-2000) (quarterly data).
Dependent variable: change in M2 (quarterly data)
Country Time
period
Number 
of obser­
vations
Con 
Stant +
Change in private 
sector credit +
R2 F-stat
++
Durbin
Watson
Lag(- i  i
Botswana 1980.2-
2000.4
83 5.10
(4.44)
-0.06
(-0.48)
0.002 0.23
(0.63)
2.18
1980.3-
2000.4
82 5.19
(3.81)
-0.02
(-0.16)
-0.07
(-0.55)
0.004 0.17
(0.83)
2.18
Lesotho 1980.2-
2000.4
83 2.44
(4.61)
0.22
(4.21)***
0.18 17.8
(0.00)
2.42
1980.3-
2000.4
82 2.43
(4.12)
0.22
(4.17)***
0.01
(0.20)
0.18 8.74
(0.00)
2.37
Malawi 1980.2-
2000.4
83 6.81
(3.77)
-0.02
(-0.16)
0.00 0.02
(0.86)
2.06
1980.3-
2000.4
82 4.04
(2.28)
-0.07
(-0.51)
0.60
(4.02)***
0.17 8.11
(0.00)
2.12
Mauritius 1980.2-
2000.4
83 3.15
(5.85)
0.24
(2.77)***
0.08 7.72
(0.00)
2.46
1980.3-
2000.4
82 2.57
(3.60)
0.27
(3.14)***
0.07
(0.86)
0.11 5.01
(0.00)
2.50
Namibia 1993.2-
2000.4
31 3.42
(2.06)
0.28
(0.92)
0.02 0.85
(0.36)
2.49
1993.3-
2000.4
30 4.16
(2.15)
0.33
(1.03)
-0.26
(-0.79)
0.04 0.64
(0.53)
2.44
South Africa 1980.2-
2000.3
78 1.56
(3.27)
0.49
(4.71)***
0.22 22.26
(0.00)
2.00
1980.3-
2000.3
76 0.92
(1.61)
0.41
(3.71)***
0.24
(2.26)**
0.26 13.02
(0.00)
2.01
Swaziland 1980.2-
2000.4
83 3.09
(3.74)
0.18
(2.64)***
0.07 6.98
(0.00
2.35
1980.3-
2000.4
82 2.55
(2.87)
0.20
(2.88)***
0.11
(1.60)
0.10 4.68
(0.01)
2.32
Tanzania 1980.2-
2000.4
60 5.11
(6.00)
-0.009
(-0.68)
0.007 0.46
(0.49)
2.24
1980.3-
2000.4
58 4.90
(5.35)
-0.009
(-0.63)
0.003
(0.21)
0.008 0.23
(0.79)
2.29
Zambia 1980.2-
2000.4
58 5.87
(5.40)
0.32
(3.50)***
0.18 12.29
(0.00)
1.72
1980.3-
2000.4
56 4.78
(3.95)
0.29
(3.24)***
0.19
(2.06)**
0.23 8.07
(0.00)
1.70
Zimbabwe 1982.2-
2000.4
73 5.67
(4.58)
0.06
(0.52)
0.003 0.16
(0.85)
2.11
1982.3-
2000.4
70 5.70
(3.71)
0.07
(0.56)
-0.01
(-0.09)
0.004 0.27
(0.60)
2.11
+ t-stats in parentheses
++ p-value in parentheses
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
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Table 5.2 shows that although the R2 is much lower, there are still highly 
significant relations between growth in M2 and M3 and growth in private sector 
credit on an annual basis in South Africa. This is shown graphically in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Change in M3 and Change in private sector credit -  South Africa 
(1977-2000) (Annual data)
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Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, various issues
The relationship is much weaker using quarterly data, as shown in
Table 5.3. Two sets of results are shown for each country, one with no lagged
values and another where one lag is included. Including more lags did not alter
the results. In most of the countries no strong relationship between M2 and
private sector credit was found. An R2 =0.89 was found by Moore and Smit for
SA (1986) on a quarterly basis (table 5.1). The highest R2 obtained in table 5.3 is
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0.26 (for South Africa). This is probably still a significant value, as the quarterly 
observations are assumed to have a lower correlation than the annual data. The 
t-statistics for SA are both significant and including a lagged value improves the 
R2 from 0.22 to 0.26. The only other countries in the sample with R2 values 
above 0.1 were Lesotho (0.18) and Zambia (0.23). They also have significant t- 
statistics. For Malawi, the inclusion of a lagged value increases the R2 value from 
0.00 to 0.17, with a significant t-statistic for the lagged value of private sector 
credit. Mauritius has an R2 Of 0.11, with significant t-statistics. Swaziland has a 
R2 value of 0.10 with significant t-statistics. Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe show no significant correlation between growth in M2 and growth in 
private sector credit. The F-test for overall significance confirms the R2 results in 
each case.
High correlations between changes in M2 and changes in private sector credit 
provide evidence of an endogenous money supply. In the above sample, South 
Africa was the only country that exhibited a strong and significant correlation. 
Some of the other countries also had positive correlations, but the relationships 
were much weaker. With the possible exception of South Africa, it is therefore not 
possible to conclude, from the evidence in table 5.3, that the money supply is 
endogenous (M2 is credit driven) in these countries. Some of the figures showing 
the relationships are given below. Botswana is an example of a country where 
there was no significant relationship. South Africa is then shown (figure 5.3), 
where the correlation was the most significant.
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
Figure 5.3 % change in M2 and private sector credit in South Africa -  quarterly 
data.
Figure 5.2 % change in M2 and private sector credit in Botswana -  quarterly 
data.
30-,-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----% change in private sector credit
-----% change in M2 ___________
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
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The regressions reported in table 5.3 were re-estimated using annual data and 
the results are shown in table 5.4. The results confirm the findings of the 
regressions in table 5.3 based on quarterly data. Using quarterly data, the only 
SADC countries with significant relationships between M2 and private sector 
credit were Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia. In 
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, no significant 
relationships were found. Out of the ten countries, five show a significant 
endogenous relationship and, five do not. Using annual data, only three countries 
show a significant relationship, i.e. Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa. 
Swaziland does not have a significant relationship and there are not enough 
observations for Zambia to make any conclusions. The number of countries with 
a significant relationship between M2 and private sector has decreased when 
annual rather than quarterly data were used. The relationships for Mauritius, 
Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi are also shown graphically in Figures 5.4 - 5.7.
Table 5.4 Change in M2 and change in private sector credit for selected SADC 
countries (1980-2000) (annual data)
Dependen f variable: change in M2 (annual data
Country Time period Number of 
observations
Con
stant
Change in 
private 
sector credit
Durbin
Watson
Botswana 1981-2000 20 23.62
(2 .9 7 )
-0.13
(-0.49)
0.01 2.27
Lesotho 1981-2000 20 10.17
(4.04)
0.20
(2.46)**
0.25 2.07
Malawi 1981-2000 20 23.30
(4.80)
0.13
(0 .9 7 )
0.04 1.99
Mauritius 1981-2000 20 9.33
(2.02)
0.41
(1.93)*
0.17 1.65
South
Africa
1981-2000 16 3.84
(1.28)
0.67
(4.16)***
0.55 1.26
Swaziland 1981-2000 20 14.76
(4.41)
0.02
( 0 . 13 )
0.00 1.59
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Tanzania 1981-2000 20 22.48
(7.31)
0.11
(1.39)
0.09 0.67
Zambia 1981-1997 10 37.65
(4.19)
-0.11
(-0.62)
0.04 1.00
Zimbabwe 1981-2000 20 19.78
(2.84)
0.16
(0.89)
0.04 1.49
t-stats in parentheses
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
Figure 5.4 % change in M2 and private sector credit in Mauritius - annual data
—-  % change in private sector credit 
..... % change in M2
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
Figure 5.5 % change in M2 and private sector credit in Botswana - annual data
-----% change in M2
% change in private sector credit
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
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Figure 5.6 % change in M2 and private sector credit in Lesotho - annual data
-----% change in private sector credit
-----% change in M2
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
Figure 5.7 % change in M2 and private sector credit in Malawi - annual data
-----% change in M2
—- % change in private sector credit
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years.
South Africa, Lesotho and Mauritius are the only SADC countries where the 
relationships between M2 and private sector credit are stable and significant,
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using both annual and quarterly data. A central aspect of an endogenous money 
supply is the existence of credit lines and overdraft facilities. This is one of the 
most central assumptions of the endogenous money theory. In spite of repeated 
requests to the monetary authorities in these SADC countries, no data were 
available on the existence or utilization of credit lines and overdrafts. It is highly 
unlikely that credit lines play a role in these countries. The situation in South 
Africa (where more data were available) will be discussed in some detail below, 
and inferences drawn for the other SADC countries.
5.6.2 CREDIT LINES AND OVERDRAFT FACILITIES -  South Africa
The Post Keynesian theory of an endogenous money supply is based on the 
existence of credit lines. In the original work of Moore (1988), 70% of all 
commercial and industrial loans (in the USA) were made under prearranged loan 
commitments. Consumer loans made under credit card arrangements were 
increasingly important in bank portfolios. Dow (1996) found that in the UK there 
has been a drastic reduction in the amount of loans made under commitments. 
Similar figures for the USA showed that 73% of small firms did not have a 
commitment, compared to 40% of medium-sized firms. The lack of overdraft 
facilities appears to characterize developing economies: “While there is no 
explicit evidence that relatively lower use of commitments by small and medium­
sized firms is due to supply constraints, it is nevertheless reasonable to presume 
that such is the case. In other words, significant rationing of small firms may well 
occur at the stage of application to banks for commitments” (Dow, 1996:506).
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Moore (1985) estimated that the utilization ratio of overdraft facilities typically 
varies around 50 per cent. Unutilised credit lines are broadly equal to loans 
granted, i.e. the initiative lies with the borrowers to almost double the amount of 
outstanding loans. Data calculated for South Africa showed that the ratio of total 
unutilised overdraft facilities to total advances for commercial banks similarly 
varied around 50 per cent for the period 1965 - 1985 (Moore & Smit, 1986:86).
These ratios were re-estimated with more comprehensive and recent data, 
released by the South African Reserve Bank since 1993. The percentage of bank 
loans in existence at any time, was roughly equal to 50 per cent of committed 
overdraft facilities (see table 5.5). The equivalent of credit lines in South Africa is 
overdraft facilities (similar to the UK). The figure is close to the earlier results of 
Moore (about 50 per cent).
Table 5.5 Credit card and overdraft utilisation ratios in SA (1993-2000)
Year Credit card 
utilisation ratio (%)
Overdraft utilisation 
Ratio (%)
1993 28.1 55.5
1994 23.3 42.8
1995 41.2 51.9
1996 41.9 52.0
1997 40.5 54.5
1998 40.0 61.0
1999 35.5 59.2
2000 32.9 58.0
Source: SARB, TOTAL DI-900, various years
The average credit card utilisation ratio is rather low (below 42%). But credit 
cards are relatively unimportant in total bank credit to the private sector. This
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confirms Rousseas’s point that unused overdrafts and credit facilities do not 
necessarily exist where they are most needed. It was shown in Chapter 4 that 
credit cards constitute less than 2.5% of total private sector credit in South Africa. 
This is in contrast to the findings of Moore (1988) for the US, that consumer loans 
made under credit card arrangements have become increasingly important in 
bank portfolios.
The overall utilisation ratio of South Africa confirms the endogenous money view. 
Nevertheless the financial sector in South Africa consists of a relatively small 
formal sector, and a large informal sector. The data below show that credit lines, 
overdraft facilities and credit cards are available only to a very small proportion of 
the population, highly concentrated among the high-income groups.
Chapter 4 showed that households’ share in private sector credit has increased 
relative to that of firms (in both developed and developing economies). 
Households in South Africa borrow mainly in the form of mortgage loans and 
credit cards, while companies use overdrafts and ‘other loans and advances’ for 
their credit requirements. Chapter 4 showed that households’ share of mortgage 
loans was 75% in December 2000. Households’ share of credit card finance was 
94% in the same period. Figure 5.8, using data from the All Media and Products 
Survey (2000) shows that few people have access to mortgage finance. The 
AMPS data use language categories that give a valuable indication of the 
distribution of banking products across the South African population. In total,
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2 776 000 mortgages are registered. Given an adult population (above 14 years), 
of 28 113 421 in 1999, only 9,87% of the adult population have mortgage bonds. 
Afrikaans-speaking South Africans have the biggest share (35%), with the share 
of the English-speaking group at 33%. The other two groups represent the 
majority of the South African population. The Nguni group includes Zulu, Xhosa, 
Swazi and Ndebele speakers. The Sotho group includes North Sotho, South 
Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga and Venda. Yet, these groups make up only 18% and 
14% respectively of total mortgages. In absolute numbers, the number of Sotho 
speakers with mortgages were 380 000 and Nguni, 513 000 (Amps, 2000).
When one looks at the figures on home ownership, it tells a different story. Total 
home ownership for 1999 was 18 783 000, 66% of the adult population. Yet, only 
9.78% of the adult population have mortgage loans. This implies that most 
houses are informal dwellings, for which no mortgage is registered. South Africa 
is a country with a huge informal sector, where most people are excluded from 
formal financing methods.
Credit rationing is especially important in the mortgage market. Information is a 
very important part of a loan contract. Mortgage markets may be a special case 
of asymmetric information. The borrower knows what the value of the house is, 
but the lender does not have full information. In order to get the necessary 
information, banks typically use a professional appraiser. This person looks at the 
average of house prices recently sold in the area. The ‘mortgage value’ of the
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house is calculated as the lesser of the sale price or the appraised value 
(Nakamura,1993:5).
These methods are not applicable to informal settlements or run-down 
neighbourhoods. In areas where the re-sale price is expected to be lower than 
the sale price, banks are unwilling to finance the mortgage. These areas have 
become ‘redline’ areas, where the banks withdraw from the real estate market 
because of high perceived risk. Evidence on redlining has been found by 
Nakamura (1993) and Dymski (1993), for the US. Dymski found that in the Los 
Angeles mortgage market, the neighbourhood racial composition and the race of 
the individual applicant, were significant determinants of loan supply: 
“...developers reported that the racial composition of the area surrounding a 
planned project is one important determinant of credit availability”
(Dymski, 1993:50). It seems from this research that race is used as a signal of 
creditworthiness, in a world characterised by asymmetric information. Banks try 
to minimise their default risk and attempt to find as many indicators of 
creditworthiness as possible. Data on redlining is non-existent In the South 
African case. But there are obvious areas where banks perceive the risks as so 
high that they are unwilling to grant any mortgages in these areas.
In SA, mortgage finance is available only to a small part of the population. It was 
shown in Chapter 4 that banks actively encourage the use of mortgage loans for 
purposes other than the financing of real-estate transactions. This was confirmed 
by the divergence between growth rates in mortgage pay-outs and annual real-
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estate transactions (specifically since 1992). Households mainly use mortgage 
finance as a source of credit. As shown by Figure 5.8, the distribution of 
mortgages is heavily skewed towards Afrikaans and English speakers.
Figure 5.8. Distribution of mortgage financing in South Africa (1999)
33%
Afrikaans (% of total) M English (% of total) □  Nguni/ Other (% of total) □  Sotho/Other (%  of total)
Source: AMPS, 2000
Credit cards, the other main form of household financing, tell the same story. 
Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of the 3.1% of the total population who have 
credit cards.
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Figure 5.9 Distribution of credit cards in SA (1999).
□  A frikaa n s (%  o f total) ■  English (%  of to tal) □  N guni (%  of to tal) □  S o th o  (%  o f to tal)
Source: AMPS, 2000
In absolute numbers, only 68 000 Nguni’s and 40 000 Sotho’s had credit cards in 
1999. This also confirms the data in chapter 4, where it was shown that credit 
cards represent only 2.2% of total private sector credit. Table 5.6 shows the 
limited use of credit cards in many SADC countries:
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Table 5.6 Credit Cards in SADC countries
Angola Among the non-cash payment instruments, cheques are used 
most often, representing about 75% of the number of items 
cleared daily. Very few businesses, mainly hotels and restaurants 
accept payments by means of credit cards. Banking institutions 
do not issue credit cards to customers, for use either locally or 
internationally.
Botswana Only one of the four banks issues credit cards. The cards are 
affiliated to a major credit card institution abroad (South African) 
and are used both locally and internationally.
Lesotho Credit cards are issued to those people who fall into a certain 
salary bracket. Credit cards are used widely to make all types of 
payments and are widely accepted.
Malawi Credit card facilities are not yet available in Malawi. Hotels accept 
foreign credit cards.
Mauritius Credit and debit cards are an integral part of the Mauritian retail 
payments system.
Mozambique There are no credit cards.
Namibia Credit cards are widely used, most cards issued by card divisions 
of SA parent banks. None issued by Namibian banks.
South Africa All major credit cards are available.
Swaziland Credit cards are used in Swaziland.
Tanzania No credit cards.
Zambia One non-bank financial institution issues a credit card to its 
customers which is used in selected outlets. Customers are given 
a time limit within which to settle the bill.
Zimbabwe All major credit cards.
Source: IMF Staff Country Reports, various years.
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Figure 5.10 shows the distribution of language groups using different financial 
products. Most Nguni and Sotho groups use ATM bank cards and savings 
accounts, rather than cheque accounts. The absolute numbers are not very high, 
similar to the Afrikaans group, which is a small minority in terms of percentage of 
the total South African population. Table 5.7 gives the number of customers of 
the individual banks. In total about the same number of Afrikaans and Nguni 
speakers use a bank (Afrikaans: 3 295 000; and Nguni: 3 389 000). English and 
Sotho speakers both have 2.7 million users of banking services. The total figure 
(12 227 000) represents 28.55% of the total South African population. The net 
figure is lower, as some people have accounts with more than one bank 
(AMPS,2000).
In general the black language groups (Nguni and Sotho) are underbanked. Those 
who do use formal banking services, have mainly savings accounts and ATM 
cards. These facilities do not qualify for overdrafts. Nguni’s held only 5.8% of total 
cheque accounts and Sotho’s only 4.5% in 1999. Most such people have no 
access to credit lines or overdraft facilities, which are offered normally only on 
cheque accounts.
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Figure 5.10 -  Distribution of financial products in SA (1999)
3 00 0 0 00
2500000
Cheque accounts Savings accounts ATM cards
□  Afrikaans ■  English □  Nguni □  Sotho
Source: AMPS, 2000
Table 5.7 Commercial banking distribution in SA (1999).
ABSA BOE FNB NBS Ned
bank
People's
Bank
Perman
ent
Bank
Post
Office
Saam
bou
Standard
Bank
Other Total
Afrikaans 1470000 97000 527000 37000 156000 36000 47000 27000 89000 648000 133000 3295000
Enqiish 785000 22000 520000 108000 274000 32000 103000 8000 17000 730000 149000 2783000
Nquni 636000 11000 912000 111000 107000 112000 81000 90000 23000 989000 208000 3389000
Sotho 601000 17000 595000 29000 85000 102000 50000 164000 19000 889000 140000 2760000
TOTAL 3492000 147000 2554000 285000 622000 282000 281000 289000 148000 3256000 630000 12227000
Source: AMPS, 2000
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5.6.3 CREDIT AVAILABILITY
Another important point made by Dow is the observed phenomenon that: “Since 
the ‘moods' of financial institutions are likely to follow a pro-cyclical pattern, so 
too will availability of credit” (Dow,1996:499). The availability of credit is assumed 
to fall during an economic downturn, reflecting the lower assessment of 
borrowers’ creditworthiness. This idea is also expressed by Wolfson (1996:455): 
“Thus, there is likely to be a consistent increase in credit rationing as the peak of 
the business-cycle expansion approaches; the degree of credit rationing depends 
at least in part upon the stage of the business cycle (and of course the increase 
in credit rationing also contributes to the ending of the business-cycle expansion 
and the beginning of the recess\on)."(Emphasis in the original).
The cyclical hypothesis was tested for the USA by Berger and Udell (1992). They 
argue that the fraction of new loans made under commitment will rise when credit 
markets are tight (high interest rates), since non-commitment borrowers are 
rationed and commitment borrowers are not. They could not find sufficient 
evidence of credit rationing. In fact, they found that the commitment ratio 
decreases when credit markets are tight.
In the US data on credit extension are available in the Federal Reserve Survey 
on Bank Lending Practices. Such data are not available for South Africa. South 
African banks need not disclose the terms or conditions of their loan portfolios.
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They must only report information on their 10 largest credit exposures to the 
Bank Supervision division of the SARB. This information is highly classified. The 
only information available was the total amount of credit card and overdraft 
utilisation figures, as shown in table 5.5.
Figure 5.11: Ratios of total credit commitments (CC) to GDP in SA (1993-2000).
Source: SARB, TOTAL DI-900 Returns, various issues.
Figure 5.11 shows the behaviour of the ratio of total credit commitments to GDP 
in SA from 1993 (the data are only available from 1993). Credit commitments are 
the sum of total overdraft limits, revolving credit accounts and credit card limits. 
The ratio of total credit commitments to GDP has remained relatively stable over 
the period (between 70% and 80%).
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Figure 5.12 shows the relationship between growth in private sector credit (left- 
hand scale) and GDP growth (right-hand scale) for SA. From 1976 to 1998, total 
private sector credit moved pro-cyclically. After 1998, this relationship appeared 
to change.
Figure 5.12 Growth in private sector credit and GDP in SA (1976-2000).
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
% change
■■■grow th in private sector credit —♦ —GDP growth
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, various years.
Data on the growth in GDP and growth in money supply ratios (change in M2/ 
change in GDP) for other SADC countries are presented in Appendix 5.1. As 
seen, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa are the only countries where a broad 
relationship between the movements in GDP and M2/GDP is evident.
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Figure 5.13 Credit card and overdraft utilisation ratios in South Africa (1993- 
2000 ).
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0 
10.0 
0.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
■  G D P  growth credit ca rd utilisation ratio —  O verdraft utilisation
Source: SARB, Quarterly Bulletin and DI-900 forms, various years.
Figure 5.13 shows credit card utilisation and overdraft utilisation ratios (right-hand 
scale) with GDP growth (left-handscale) for SA. Both ratios move in the same 
direction, and both show a decline since 1998. GDP growth declined dramatically 
in 1998 and was followed by a reduction in credit card and overdraft utilization 
ratios. Consumers respond to changes in economic growth by increasing their 
credit utilization during an upswing and curbing it during a downswing. This has 
implications for interest rates as predicted by the structuralist Post Keynesians. 
Banks raise interest rate spreads during an upswing, to reflect increasing risk 
levels of their loan portfolios. This aspect of the structuralist version of Post 
Keynesian monetary theory is further explored in Chapter 8.
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The above data confirm the structuralist Post-Keynesian view that credit 
availability follows a pro-cyclical pattern. The period is unfortunately short (1993-
2000), but similar data were not available before 1993. In general though, it 
seems to confirm the assumption that credit rationing is compatible with a Post 
Keynesian endogenous money supply. Wolfson argues: “If bankers create money 
by accommodating the credit demands of bank borrowers, how can bankers also 
refuse to accommodate these demands by rationing credit? The answer is simply 
that bankers accommodate all creditworthy demands for credit, and ration all 
those demands not deemed creditworthy" (1996:455). It was shown earlier that 
both Kaldor and Moore argued that only creditworthy demand for funds is met. 
“The door has thus been opened for considering the possibility of credit-rationing, 
although neither Kaldor nor Moore follows up the significance of the possibility” 
(Dow,1996:499).
Much of the research on credit rationing has focussed on the different treatment 
of small and large firms. The problem of asymmetric information is especially 
pronounced in the case of small businesses. There is not sufficent information 
and therefore no trust in the abilities of small businesses to service their debts. It 
was already mentioned that in the US 73% of small firms did not have credit 
commitments. This situation is aggravated during the business cycle. During a 
downturn, credit availability is reduced. Dow argues that this is partly due to a 
revaluation of collateral: “...there is systematic bank rationing of credit. This is 
evident in the cyclical pattern of valuation of collateral for potential bank
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borrowers and in the somewhat lagged cyclical evaluation of banks’ own credit­
worthiness. Both serve to constrain credit availability during cyclical downturns. It 
has also been argued that particular classes of borrowers experience systematic 
credit rationing: notably small businesses’l l 996:506).
Figure 5.14 Growth in credit to small and large businesses in SA (1993-2000)
Source: SARB, DI-900 forms, various years.
Figure 5.14 appears to confirm this point. Although there are large fluctuations in 
the growth in credit to small and large businesses (left-hand scale), credit to 
small businesses seems to be more severely affected during periods of 
increasing interest rates. In South Africa, most banks and credit agencies (such 
as the large chain stores), use a credit scoring model. The Information Trust
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Corporation (ITC) is the biggest supplier of data on credit users, with 16,7 million 
active credit users. This number is higher than the figure of bank customers (12,2 
million), and probably show many people use credit facilities at e.g. furniture 
stores, who do not have access to bank credit. There are 120 subscribers which 
use the credit scoring model developed by the ITC and most of the banks have 
developed their own models. There is little discretion for a bank officer in 
supplying loans. In a developing country where information is scarce, this is 
another reason why credit is systematically rationed (Ann Daley, ITC,2001).
The above evidence suggests that credit rationing occurs over the business 
cycle. Credit is not simply supplied upon demand. Small classes of borrowers are 
more affected by this phenomenon. In a developing country context where most 
businesses are informal and small, the supply of credit is likely to be severely 
rationed by lack of information and downturns in the business cycle.
5.6.4 MICRO-FINANCE AND CREDIT RATIONING
In the work of Wolfson (1996) the New Keynesian idea of asymmetric information 
is transformed into a Post Keynesian concept called ‘asymmetric expectations’. 
Many borrowers are rationed due to fundamental uncertainty. Banks have a 
certain expectation about the ability of a borrower to repay a loan, and the 
borrower has his own separate expectation. The problem lies in the divergence 
between the two. The lender is probably more risk averse than the borrower,
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giving rise to credit rationing. In the Wolfson model there is also a change in non­
price terms of loans as the economy moves through the business cycle. Wolfson 
found that interest-rate spreads, non-price standards and credit rationing 
increase together during economic downturns (1996:461).
This is not the Stiglitz-Weiss form of pure credit rationing, where interest rates do 
not rise to reflect higher risk, and credit is rationed. In the Post Keynesian model, 
an increase in non-price terms might mean that the size of credit lines is reduced, 
and new and small firms are not granted credit lines. In the research on non-price 
terms for the US Wolfson (1996), found that judgements about the riskiness of 
borrowers were always almost made by loan officers. In the US about 20 per cent 
of banks use a credit scoring model. This figure is higher for SA where the 
majority of banks use such a model. During an economic downturn the riskiness 
of most borrowers increases (due to devaluation in the value of collateral and 
future income streams). This automatically assigns them to a higher risk 
category, and their applications are more likely to be rejected.
As stated, in the SADC countries credit lines are almost non-existent and data on 
non-price terms are difficult to obtain. In these countries, most people have 
access only to informal credit markets, and do not qualify for formal sector loans. 
It was shown above that only a minority of South Africans qualifies for mortgages 
and credit cards, and borrowers are very interest inelastic. Since credit is 
rationed (in the formal loan markets), there are huge divergences between
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informal and formal interest rates. Limited competition between formal and 
informal lenders is an important determinant of this divergence.
In a study of informal credit markets in Madagascar, Zeller (1994) found that 
there are large divergences between interest rates charged within the informal 
sector: “Mean interest rates paid by the poorest one-third of households are, on 
average: 103.6% to other informal lenders, 30.5% to friends and relatives, and 
17.2% to formal lenders. These observed informal interest rate differentials 
between rich and poor borrowers could be explained by differences in the 
perceived risk of loan default, in the lender’s transaction cost per unit of money 
lent, and in monopoly profits” (Zeller, 1994:1899).
In SA, there has been an exponential growth in the market for small loans since 
the Exemption to the Usury Act (1992) removed interest rate ceilings on small 
loans under R 6 000. This has led to the growth of a viable Micro finance 
industry. Since interest rates were not regulated, they must reflect the excess 
demand for finance which exists, especially amongst the poorer households. A 
study by Ebony Consulting International in 2000 found interest rates to be 
excessively high: “Provident Fund did a survey of its clients in South Africa, which 
revealed that 96 per cent of their loans were used for productive activities with 
interest rates ranging between 109.99% and 277% (Ebony Consulting 
International,2000:22). This is evidence of an industry where demand exceeds
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supply and credit rationing is prevalent. Legislation has since been passed 
(1999) setting interest rate limits of between 24% and 27% (MFRC,2002).
Although there is a serious commitment from the SA government to increase 
regulation of this sector, micro finance clients pay almost any amount to borrow a 
sum of money which they desperately need. The study by Ebony Consulting 
International (2000:24) found that: “The typical clients for microloans are 
relatively unsophisticated. A recent survey of rural borrowers revealed that only 9 
per cent of borrowers knew the interest rate. By contrast, all knew the amount 
that they had to repay and the cash flow to do so”. There are a large number of 
micro finance firms, which registered since the legislation was passed in 1992. In 
February 2000 there were 3 873 registered formal micro lending firms. There has 
been some consolidation in the industry over the past two years, yet the number 
of clients has remained constant or increased somewhat. The total number of 
registered firms decreased substantially to 1 354 in February 2002, as a result of 
the regulation of the industry (Ebony Consulting International,2000:25).
The Micro Finance Regulatory Council (MFRC) is a non-profit organization, which 
has been approved by the Minister of Trade and Industry to ensure compliance 
with the Usury Act Exemption Notice. In terms of this Notice, the MFRC has been 
appointed as an official regulator of the micro-lending industry, and its mandate 
covers:
• the promotion of the micro-lending industry
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• encouragement of sustainable growth in the industry
• lending credibility to the industry
• serve unserved credit needs of South Africans who may not have access 
to credit by formal banks
• protection of consumers against unfair business practices by lenders
• to educate consumers and lenders about their rights and obligations
All money lenders who wish to operate within the scope of the Usury Act 
(Exemption of 1 June 1999) are required by law to register with the MFRC. In 
other words, if a lender wishes to charge more interest than the interest limit set 
in the Usury Act (which is between 24 and 27% annually), that lender must 
register with the MFRC (MFRC,2000).
If a lender does not register with the MFRC he must comply with the provisions of 
the Usury Act itself. All moneylenders that are not registered with the MFRC are 
required to lend in accordance with the Usury Act, which provides a limitation of 
23% per year on amounts below R10 000 and 20% per year on amounts above 
R10 000. Any unregistered lender who does not lend according to the limitation 
set above is acting unlawfully and is guilty of an offense, and liable on conviction 
to a fine or imprisonment or both. (MFRC,2002)
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Data on the micro-lending industry are available for South Africa since 
registration with the MFRC became compulsory. The following data from the 
MFRC give the latest available statistics on loan sizes and number of clients.
Table 5.8 -  Micro finance statistics for SA (December 2001 -  February 2002)
Loan Statistics
Gross loans 
outstanding
% of Industry by 
value
Number of Loan 
Clients
Average loan 
size
Industry R 14 905 268 729 100% 4 915 448 R 1 292
Banks R 8 097 702 519 54% 2 041 016 R 1 642
Public
Companies R 255 079 331 2% 78 827 R 900
Private
Companies R 5 960 924 520 40% 2 297 577 R 1 768
Close
Corporations R 292 255 134 2% 370 596 R 621
Trusts R 32 680 466 0.2% 32 194 R 540
Co-operatives R 217 860 213 1% 55 192 R 2 554
Section 21 
Companies R 48 766 546 0.3% 40 046 R 1 491
Source: MFRC, 2002.
Table 5.8 shows that nearly 5 million people are served by the micro finance 
industry in South Africa, less than half the total amount served by the formal 
banking industry (12 million). Increased regulation has reduced the number of 
firms in this market, and interest rates are now capped. There remains a large 
number of informal, unregistered micro lenders who serve a large portion of the 
market.
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Figure 5.15 shows the average size of the loans. Banks are reluctant to lend 
large amounts to these borrowers and the average size of these loans is 
relatively small (R 1 642). These loans are used mostly as bridging finance, 
rather than for productive uses and business capital.
Figure 5.15 South African Micro-lending: Average Loan Size (2000)
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5.7 CONCLUSION
R 2,554
R 1,491
Co-operatives Section 21
Companies
This chapter examined one of the central aspects of Post Keynesian monetary 
theory, i.e. accommodation of the demand for money by the central bank.
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Endogenous money theory assumes that there is a strong relationship between 
changes in private sector credit and changes in the money supply (M2). South 
Africa was the only country where a significant relationship was found.
It was shown that there exists substantial credit rationing in South Africa, and by 
implication more in the less developed countries of the SADC region. Credit 
rationing is synonymous with asymmetric information and also, as shown by 
Wolfson, asymmetric expectations. Credit rationing is widely believed to be more 
severe in developing countries, as a result of greater risk and more severe 
information failure.
One of the central aspects of an endogenous money theory, the existence of 
credit lines, was examined. It was found that in South Africa only a small 
privileged minority has access to such facilities. The wide divergences between 
formal and informal interest rates were evidence of excess demand for credit and 
credit rationing among poorer borrowers.
There is consensus in the literature that financial market frictions are more 
severe in developing countries. It can be expected that credit rationing falls as an 
economy develops. This explains why credit appears to be so highly rationed in 
the SADC countries.
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APPENDIX 5.1 -  CHANGE IN M2/GDP AND GDP GROWTH (IFS DATA)
Figure 5.1.1 Botswana
♦ —change in GDP — change M2/change nominal GDP
Figure 5.1.2 Malawi
«— change GDP —♦— change M2/change nominal GDP
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Figure 5.1.3 Mauritius
■m— change GDP —♦— change M2/change nominal GDP
Figure 5.1.4 Mozambique
■•— change GDP —♦— change M2/change nominal GDP
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Figure 5.1.5 South Africa
• — change GDP —♦— change M2/change nominal GDP
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Figure 5.1.7 Zambia
* —change GDP —♦— change M2/change nominal GDP
Figure 5.1.8 Zimbabwe
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CHAPTER SIX
THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Recent experience, however, has prompted renewed attention to the role of the 
credit channel in the transmission process. Both at the peak and at the trough of 
the economic cycle, there can be situations in which bank credit exerts a vital 
impact on economic conditions and in which adjustments in interest rate 
conditions seem incapable of affecting the course of the economy (Van’t Dack,
2001)
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Interest in the monetary transmission mechanism became especially pronounced 
during the years of the Great Depression of the 1930s. During these turbulent 
times the realisation grew that there was some link between the nominal and the 
real sides of the economy. Economists like Fischer argued that the weakened 
financial sector was propagating the economic downturn. The classical 
dichotomy could not shed any light on this observed phenomenon. The time was 
ripe for the Keynesian revolution.
Through the theory of liquidity preference, Keynes provided the vital link between 
the monetary and the real sectors of the economy. The interest rate was
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determined in the money market, and monetary changes were transmitted to the 
productive side of the economy through movements in the interest rate. This was 
the Keynesian transmission mechanism. As explained in earlier chapters, the 
emphasis of Keynes’s work (and later also that of the Neoclassical synthesis), 
was on the fiscal side. The economy could best be stimulated by direct fiscal 
measures, such as an increase in government expenditure, as apparently shown 
by the post-war boom of the 1950s and 1960s. Monetary theory -  and the 
interest rate mechanism -  was reduced to a single quadrant of the IS-LM 
analysis.
The interest in the monetary transmission mechanism was revived with the 
seminal work of Friedman and Schwartz in the early 1960s. They argued, based 
on empirical evidence for the United States, that monetary actions predicted 
output movements. The conclusion of their argument was, however, that the 
response lags of the real side of the economy to monetary changes were long 
and variable. Monetary policy could destabilise the economy and the best policy 
prescription would be a simple monetary rule.
Much research has been devoted to developing the central ideas of Keynes (the 
interest rate channel) and Friedman (the money channel). Yet, there is still no 
consensus among economists about how monetary policy affects the economy. 
Studies about the various channels of monetary transmission have focussed on 
four basic channels, which will be discussed below.
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The aim of this chapter is to review briefly the four different channels of monetary 
transmission found in the literature. An understanding of the transmission 
process is essential to the appropriate design and implementation of monetary 
policy. Understanding the specific channel of monetary transmission helps in 
choosing the correct operative variable, be it the money supply, nominal interest 
rate, exchange rate or inflation rate. It will be argued below that the credit 
channel of monetary transmission is more important in developing countries and 
specifically in the SADC countries. The traditional emphasis in these countries on 
the interest rate channel is misplaced, with detrimental consequences for the 
efficiency and understanding of monetary policy in these economies.
6.2 TRADITIONAL MONETARY TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 
6.2.1 THE INTEREST RATE CHANNEL
This is the traditional channel of monetary transmission, developed by Keynes in 
the 1930s. The Keynesian transmission mechanism starts with an exogenous 
change, e.g. an increase, in the money supply by the central bank. Households 
have more money, which they use to buy financial assets that are seen as good 
substitutes for holding money. Bond prices rise and interest rates fall. Businesses 
issue more bonds at the higher price, using this money to purchase capital 
goods, i.e. to invest. This causes the supply price of capital goods to increase,
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together with the increase in production. Higher production works through the 
multiplier to increase expenditure through higher consumer demand. This 
provided a link between the monetary and the real sectors, which was absent in 
the classical view.
The distinguishing feature of this conventional model is that the choice is 
confined to two assets: money and ‘bonds’. This is the liquidity preference theory 
that determines the demand for money in the textbook IS-LM model. Although 
there is no consensus among economists as to the correct channel of monetary 
transmission, there is agreement that the direct interest rate channel of the Neo- 
Classical synthesis is too narrow to describe the real world operation of modern 
monetary systems. Real interest rates, both short- and long-term, are also 
important. Rational agents take decisions based on the real return they receive 
on their deposits or the real cost of a loan. The nominal interest rate is less 
important. The monetary authorities target some specific short-term interest rate 
(usually an overnight interbank rate). The propagation of changes in interest 
rates along the term structure of interest rates is also important. The efficiency of 
this propagation mechanism depends on the structure and level of development 
of the financial markets in an economy, as will be argued below.
The realisation that the interest rate model is too simple a description of the real 
world has led to the development of new theories that include a whole range of
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financial assets. More attention is now also given to structural factors and credit 
availability.
6.2.2 THE ASSET PRICE CHANNEL
Friedman and Schwartz, in their monumental monetary history of the United 
States, found a strong relationship between money and real variables. They 
believed the real trend path of the economy remained stable, and that inflation 
was always a monetary phenomenon. Today, there is near-unanimity among 
economists and policy-makers that monetary policy does not affect the long-term 
growth of the economy (Kamin, et al., 1998:6). But, monetary changes do have an 
effect on real activity in the short and medium term. The Monetarists describe the 
monetary transmission mechanism by incorporating a broader range of financial 
assets than only bonds.
The Monetarist transmission mechanism differs substantially from that of the 
Keynesian school in terms of its policy prescriptions. The Monetarist transmission 
mechanism’s initial stimulus is similar to the Keynesian model. A higher money 
supply causes portfolio imbalance. But there are more options than only 
substituting with financial assets as in the Keynesian case. Households can also 
buy other assets, primarily bonds, equities and real estate. Households buy 
bonds, prices rise, interest rates fall and this causes higher investment by firms. 
But higher consumer spending on household assets causes higher demand and
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higher prices for all goods, not only capital goods and financial assets. This is 
why the Monetarist school saw interest rates as too narrow an indicator of 
whether monetary policy is tight or easy. They considered the rate of change in 
the money supply as the correct instrument to control inflation.
Another way in which asset prices can change following a change in the 
monetary stance is by affecting the price of equities. Equity prices rise when 
interest rates are low (reflecting an expansionary monetary policy). This 
increases the market price of firms relative to the replacement cost of their 
capital. Newly issued equity can command higher prices and therefore lowers the 
cost of capital. This leads to higher investment and economic growth. The net 
worth of households (equity holders and real estate owners) increases during an 
upswing phase, causing households to adjust consumption patterns. Lower 
mortgage rates lead to higher demand for real estate, and an appreciation of real 
estate values. This may have a considerable wealth effect as houses are a major 
component of personal wealth and houses are used as collateral for loans, 
making it easier to obtain money when real estate values are high.
This view was based on the assumption that the supply of money is determined 
exogenously by the monetary authorities. In order for the existing stock of money 
to be willingly held, the quantity of money demanded must change whenever the 
money supply is altered by the authorities. Empirical work done by Monetarists 
showed that changes in the money stock are followed by changes in money
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income, but with an average lag of sixteen months. Because these lags were 
both long and variable, attempts to “fine tune” the economy in the short run were 
believed to be ineffective and even destabilising. The Monetarist policy 
prescription was that the monetary authorities should avoid any drastic policy 
changes and should rather commit themselves to attaining a steady growth rate 
of the money supply, roughly equal to the growth in real GDP. Because of their 
crowding-out effect on private expenditure, discretionary fiscal policies should be 
avoided.
Modern Monetarists have tried to answer some of the initial puzzles raised by the 
original work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). In doing this, they have tried to 
answer the allegation that the monetary transmission mechanism in the 
Monetarist model is not well defined, the so-called ‘black box’. In Monetarist 
analysis, the interest rate is only one of many relative prices in the transmission 
process.
Meltzer has strongly defended the Monetarist view of the transmission 
mechanism. For Monetarists, the effects of a monetary impulse is neutral in the 
long run, there are only short-run effects. But even in the short run, households 
and firms misjudge the outcome of a monetary policy impulse. Information is 
costly and time is required to distinguish between permanent and transitory 
impulses. According to Meltzer (1995:50): “Contracting in nominal terms is one
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response to these uncertainties.” Monetarists advocate rules that reduce the cost 
of acquiring information.
Unanticipated changes in the money supply affect relative prices and real 
variables. It is not only a single price, i.e. a short-term interest rate, that is 
affected. A change in the money supply changes the marginal utility of money 
relative to the marginal product of other assets. Agents have to decide whether 
this change is temporary or permanent.
All these assets (money, bonds, equities and real estate) are substitutes. The 
transmission process begins in the asset markets. An exogenous increase in the 
money supply lowers the interest rate and asset prices rise. The demand for 
money is a negative function of the interest rate and therefore more money is 
willingly held after a reduction in interest rates. But the demand for money is also 
a positive function of income. With the increase in asset prices, the price of new 
production falls, investment increases and consumers spend more, through the 
wealth effect.
The policy implications of such a view are therefore that monetary policy should 
be rules-based, to reduce information costs. Meltzer lists five reasons why rules 
are superior to discretion (which requires too much information):
• Predictions are difficult, neither the central bank nor private forecasters 
can predict changes accurately in order to limit fluctuations.
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• Lags are variable.
• The response of particular relative prices varies over different business 
cycles.
• Unanticipated policy exacerbates instability.
• Rules reduce the cost of information gathering. (Meltzer, 1995:69)
The use of a monetary policy rule has become synonymous with the work of 
John Taylor. Taylor advocated a financial price framework, which is an extension 
of the Monetarist transmission mechanism. He summarised the new research in 
this field as follows: "How have models of the monetary transmission mechanism 
-  progressed in the 25 years since Friedman and his critics wrote? It appears to 
me that the progress has been substantial. First, the framework has been 
internationalized: changes in exchange rates are now a key part of the monetary 
transmission mechanism...Second, through the use of rational expectations, the 
financial market price framework distinguishes quantitatively between real 
interest rates and market interest rates” (Taylor, 1995:24).
In Taylor’s monetary transmission framework, the emphasis is on financial 
market prices, rather than quantities. He argues that measurement problems 
make quantities (e.g. monetary aggregates) difficult to choose. These 
measurement problems have forced econometric modellers away from the 
quantity of credit toward the price of credit (Taylor,1995:12).
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Financial prices in this model include exchange rates, short- and long-term 
interest rates. It is difficult to decide which interest rate to use in such a model. 
Usually some representative short-term interest rate is chosen. It is then 
assumed that the long-term interest rate is given by the expected weighted 
average of future short rates. Although there might be many other factors that 
could potentially influence long-term rates, it remains true that changes in short 
rates are empirically significant in determining long rates: “The expectations 
model of the term structure explains why changes in nominal short-term interest 
rates would affect nominal long-term rates” (Taylor, 1995:18). Long-term interest 
rates are assumed to be more important for long-term decisions, e.g. buying a 
house or investing in a factory or productive plant. This means that the monetary 
transmission mechanism depends on how monetary policy affects the long-term 
interest rate.
Short-term interest rates affect long-term interest rates and nominal exchange 
rates. Given temporary rigidities in the prices of goods and services, real rates 
also change, albeit only for a time. This has a short-run effect on exports, 
consumption, investment and GDP. In the long run, however, when wages and 
prices adjust, real GDP returns to normal and real interest and exchange rates 
return to fundamental levels. But this is not the end. In the Taylor model, the 
central bank has the power to set the interest rate directly (which corresponds to 
the Post Keynesian view). To understand the monetary transmission process, the 
reaction function or policy rule of the central bank has to be included: “I have
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proposed a simple interest rate rule in which the federal funds rate reacts to two 
variables: the deviation of inflation from a target rate of inflation; and the 
percentage deviation for real GDP from potential GDP, with the reaction 
coefficient being one-half for each variable” (Taylor, 1995:15). The Federal funds 
rate thus reacts to deviations in inflation from the target, and deviation of real 
GDP from potential GDP.
6.2.3 THE EXCHANGE RATE CHANNEL
The exchange rate channel is more important than the asset price channel in a 
developing country context. In most developing countries the financial structure is 
characterised by rudimentary bond and equity markets. A tightening of monetary 
policy, with a floating exchange rate, will lead to an increase in interest rates, 
raising the demand for domestic securities. This will lead to an appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate.
Capital flows have a major influence on exchange rates. The world is 
characterised today by high levels of financial capital mobility. The exchange rate 
responds quickly to changes in monetary policy and interest rates. The interest 
rate differential between any two countries is equal to the expected rate of 
change in the exchange rate between those two countries (Taylor,1995:15). This 
is the so-called ‘interest rate parity relationship’. Raising interest rates (tight 
monetary policy) causes the exchange rate to appreciate. There is a positive
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relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential. The 
argument for the propagation of the change in the nominal exchange rate to the 
real exchange rate is the same as in the asset price model. A change in nominal 
interest rates causes a change in nominal exchange rates and because of price 
rigidities this also influences the real exchange rate, at least in the short term. In 
the long term the monetary change is neutral. The price level is higher by the 
same amount of the initial change in the money supply, but real GDP and the 
exchange rate return to their base line levels.
There are two ways in which the change in the exchange rate (nominal and real) 
feeds through to spending decisions. The first is through the relative price effect. 
An appreciation of the exchange rate makes domestic goods more expensive 
relative to foreign goods. This leads to a reduction in demand for domestic goods 
and a reduction in production, with an adverse effect on GDP in the short term: 
“There is substantial empirical evidence from many countries that a change in the 
real exchange rate affects the demand for real exports and real imports...The 
inverse relationship between the exchange rate and net exports is one of the 
more robust in empirical economics. The United States went through a vivid 
illustration of the relationship in the mid-1980s when the real exchange rate 
peaked at about the same time as net exports reached a trough”
(Taylor, 1995:17).
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The other propagation mechanism is the balance-sheet effect. Changes in the 
exchange rate will affect the holders of foreign currency debt. This is an important 
factor in developing countries where domestic residents are often net debtors to 
the rest of the world. Changes in the exchange rate affect their net worth or 
balance sheet position: “A large depreciation of the exchange rate may lead to an 
improved balance-sheet position that may give rise to a marked expansion of 
domestic demand. Thus this balance-sheet effect tends to offset -  and in some 
cases may even dominate -  the relative price effect” (Kamin et al., 1998:12).
Another reason why the exchange rate channel is so important in the developing 
country context, is that it does not only affect the demand side, but influences the 
supply side as well. In countries with a history of high inflation and where most 
capital goods are imported, a depreciation of the exchange rate will lead to higher 
inflation expectations. Firms will raise their domestic producer prices, even in the 
absence of higher domestic demand. This will put upward pressure on wage and 
price structures throughout the economy.
6.2.4 CREDIT RATIONING AND THE CREDIT CHANNEL
The fourth channel of monetary transmission is the credit availability channel.
This is a new development and is sometimes described in the literature as an 
enhancement mechanism, which propagates the conventional interest rate 
effects of the interest channel, rather than a separate channel. The existence of
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this channel strongly relies on the presence of credit rationing (explained in the 
previous chapter). This makes it more important for developing countries than the 
other three channels described above: “In countries where private markets for 
credit either are poorly developed or are prevented by government regulation 
from operating freely, monetary policy is likely to affect aggregate demand more 
by altering the quantity or availability of credit than through the direct or indirect 
effects of changes in the price of credit” (Kamin et al., 1998:13). The emphasis is 
on asymmetric information and the effects of credit rationing on the real side of 
the economy.
The idea that Monetary policy works through changes in the quantity or 
availability of credit, rather than through changes in the price of credit can be 
traced back to the original paper of Akerlof (1970) about the ‘lemons problem’ of 
asymmetric information. This was developed further into a formal theory of credit 
rationing in the seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In the traditional 
interest rate channel, an increase in the interest rate will cause lower spending 
and investment. But, in a world characterised by credit rationing, asymmetric 
information and contract enforcement problems, contractionary monetary policy 
will lead to tightening of both price and non-price means by banks. The adverse 
selection effect (explained in chapter 5) will make banks wary of increasing the 
riskiness of their loan portfolio, by increasing interest rates. Because of imperfect 
information, even creditworthy borrowers are also affected, since banks may not 
be able to distinguish fully between borrowers who have been adversely affected
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and those who have not. Credit rationing in this way affects specifically small 
borrowers, because of the high cost of gathering information about them.
This idea of a reduction in the availability of credit during times of tight monetary 
policy is associated with the work of Bernanke. He has emphasised the role of 
the bank loan market as part of the transmission process. He developed the idea 
of the credit channel and described two mechanisms through which monetary 
changes are transmitted to the real economy. These are called the ‘bank lending 
channel’ and the ‘balance sheet channel’. According to Bernanke, the distinction 
between the ‘money view’ and the ‘credit view’ of monetary transmission, does 
not define the issue correctly: “Unfortunately, this terminology has created a great 
deal of confusion...A better distinction is between the view represented in the 
standard IS-LM model and what might be termed the capital-markets- 
imperfection approach. The capital-market-imperfections approach is based on 
the premise that the same informational and agency problems that explain many 
aspects of financial structure (for example, the existence of financial 
intermediaries) also play a role in monetary transmission” (Bernanke, 1995:130).
In an important paper by Bernanke and Gertler, “Inside the Black Box: The Credit 
Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission “(1995), more light is shed on the 
propagation of monetary policy through the credit channel. This paper will be 
discussed in some detail as it gives a comprehensive account of the balance 
sheet and bank lending channels.
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The authors argue that most of the empirical research dealing with the interest 
rate elasticity of the components of aggregate spending found relatively weak 
cost-of-capital effects. The other problem with the conventional story is that since 
the central bank can control some short-term interest rate (like the federal funds 
rate), monetary policy should have its strongest influence through short-term 
rates. Yet, the empirical evidence shows that the effect of a monetary policy 
change is greater on long-term assets (e.g. housing and production equipment), 
which should rather respond to long-term interest rates, if there is significant 
interest rate elasticity. But the response to real long rates should presumably be 
weaker than the response to short rates. Therefore, the focus should be on credit 
availability, imperfect information and “friction” in credit markets, to explain the 
potency of monetary policy.
The credit channel is an enhancement mechanism: “We don’t think of the credit 
channel as a distinct, free-standing alternative to the traditional monetary 
transmission mechanism, but rather as a set of factors that amplify and 
propagate conventional interest rate effects” (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995:28). This 
channel works through what is known in the literature as the ‘external finance 
premium’. This is the difference between funds raised externally (through loans 
or issuing equity or debt), and funds generated internally (retained earnings).
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Bernanke and Gertler find the following effects of a monetary policy change (a
positive interest rate shock). They argue that the magnitude and timing of these
effects are not adequately explained by the traditional monetary transmission
mechanisms:
The empirical observations are:
1. Monetary tightening is followed by sustained declines in real GDP and the 
price level. Real GDP starts bottoming out after about 24 months and 
returns to its base levels after about 40 months.
2. Final demand responds quickly, then production (with a lag). Inventories 
rise first and then decline.
3. The earliest and sharpest declines in final demand are in residential 
investment and consumer goods (durables and non-durables).
4. Fixed business investment declines, but it lags behind housing, consumer 
durables and production.
The puzzling facts are the composition of the spending effects:
• the real economy is powerfully affected by monetary policy that induces 
relatively small movements in interest rates (especially in the light of the 
weak cost-of-capital effects mentioned above).
• the timing is different than expected from neoclassical models.
• residential expenditure is more affected than business investment.
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These empirical facts are better explained by the credit channel. The central 
idea is that monetary policy not only affects the general level of interest rates, 
but also the size of the external finance premium.
a. THE BALANCE SHEET CHANNEL
This channel relies on the difference between raising funds externally and 
internally -  the ‘external finance premium’. The greater the borrower’s net worth, 
the lower the external finance premium. Changes in monetary policy affect the 
financial position of firms and households. Higher interest rates increase debt 
repayments and borrowers are in a worse position. But, simultaneously the tight 
monetary policy reduces asset prices and therefore the value of the borrower’s 
collateral. This was one of the factors that propagated the recession in Japan in 
the late 1980s. Asset price deflation reduced the creditworthiness and collateral 
of many Japanese corporations and banks.
b. THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL
In this channel monetary policy also affects the supply of loans. The premise 
here is that a reduction in bank reserves by the central bank reduces bank 
deposits and, hence, banks’ loanable funds. Many borrowers (especially 
individuals and small firms) are bank-dependent. Banks are the main source of 
credit in most countries and banks also specialise in overcoming the asymmetric
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information problem. When there is a reduction in the supply of loans (as a result 
of open market operations), the decline in bank credit can have significant effects 
on bank-dependent borrowers and their spending patterns. They will face a 
higher external finance premium and this will reduce real economic activity.
An important criticism of this view is that institutional innovations such as asset 
and liability management have reduced the importance of the bank lending 
channel. Banks can replace lost deposits with other sources of funds, such as 
negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs) and new equity issues. Reserve 
requirements have been reduced or eliminated in most industrialised countries. 
However, these institutional features are not an accurate description of financial 
systems in developing economies. The bank lending channel may be especially 
important in countries where most businesses do not have access to deep capital 
markets and are primarily dependent on bank loans for finance.
Whatever the relative importance of these two channels the work on the credit 
channel has greatly increased our understanding of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, especially in less developed countries: “It is extremely difficult to 
carry out an empirical test that would conclusively separate the bank lending 
channel from the balance sheet channel. For this reason, we are more confident 
in the existence of a credit channel in general than we are in our ability to 
distinguish sharply between the two mechanisms of the credit channel”
(Bernanke & Gertler,1995:42).
197
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
6.3 WHICH CHANNEL?
In the Monetarist model changes in monetary policy are transmitted throughout 
the economy by a range of financial market and asset prices. The interest rate is 
only one of many relative prices in the transmission process. Monetarists argue 
that the Monetarist analysis applies to developing countries as well: 
“...monetarist analysis applies both to countries with and without developed 
financial markets. Monetary impulses have transitional effects on output and 
lasting effects on prices even where commercial paper, long-term bonds and 
even Treasury bills do not exist” (Meltzer, 1995:59). It will be argued below that 
the traditional interest rate channel is not an adequate description of the 
monetary transmission process in developing countries. Shallow financial 
markets fail to transmit the interest rate signals sufficiently and timely. The 
Monetarist model is more applicable to developing economies, since the channel 
works through effects on durables and real estate spending, in addition to 
financial market prices.
Although the Monetarist channel is more applicable to developing countries than 
the interest rate channel, some of the important insights of the bank lending 
channel are not dealt with in the asset price channel. There are some points in 
common, but the credit view offers a better description of the transmission 
mechanism in developing countries with rudimentary credit markets,
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characterised by credit rationing: “The monetarist and lending views agree that 
activity in lending or credit markets is an important part of the transmission 
process that is neglected in alternative frameworks. The two differ in important 
respects, however. The lending view emphasizes shifts in the distribution of loans 
and a composite consisting of securities and real capital. The Monetarist 
transmission process focuses on relative prices and distinguishes money, loans 
and securities, and real capital” (Meltzer, 1995:64).
The four transmission channels discussed above are the main transmission 
mechanisms found in the literature. The credit view is a later development and 
although very important, especially in the developing country context, has not 
explicitly been included in the macro-models of the major industrialised 
economies. In the United Kingdom, the transmission mechanism is assumed to 
work through the more traditional channels, i.e. market interest rates, asset 
prices and exchange rates. The following graph shows the different channels 
used in the UK model:
199
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
Official
rate
Figure 6.1: The UK transmission mechanism
Source: Bank of England (1999)
The figure illustrates the economic thinking behind the macro-model used by the 
Bank of England. The official rate, set directly by the bank, affects other market 
rates by varying degrees. The interest rate movements also reflect the monetary 
policy stance of the authorities and therefore have an influence on the 
expectations and levels of confidence of businesses and households. Monetary 
aggregates are not considered important in this model. Asset prices move in 
reaction to changes in the official rate and finally the exchange rate responds, 
which affects imports and exports. The main effect of monetary policy is on the 
demand side of the economy. It has little effect on the supply side, which is
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determined by long-run structural factors. In the long run, monetary policy 
determines only the general price level i.e. inflation. The real effects are only over 
the short to medium term. The macro-econometric model of the Bank of England 
works with a time horizon of up to two years: “...official interest rate decisions 
have their fullest effect on output with a lag of around one year, and their fullest 
effect on inflation with a lag of around two years” (Bank of England, 1999:3).
The model of the Federal Reserve Bank is based on similar premises. The model 
also works with the three traditional channels of monetary transmission 
discussed above. A fourth channel used is called ‘anticipated nonfinancial 
responses’ (Reifschneider et al.,1999:8). Some consideration is given to the 
credit channel in the macro-econometric model of the Federal Reserve:
“Although it is difficult to incorporate fully the effects of such credit market 
imperfections into a macroeconomic model like the FRB/US, in two spending 
categories allowance is made for such effects...More generally, household 
spending is estimated to be more procyclical than standard theory would imply, 
perhaps because of the effects of the credit channel” (Reifschneider et 
al.,1999:3). In the FRB/US model the initial effects of a 1 percentage point cut in 
the federal funds rate are initially small. Rational agents first expect the change to 
be temporary and only begin to respond to the change once they come to believe 
that it is permanent (the argument for a monetary rule like the Taylor rule). Two 
years after the easing of monetary policy, the level of real GDP has risen to about 
1,75 per cent above its baseline level. (Reifschneider et al.,1999:6).
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Although there is some evidence of the credit channel in the US model, it is not 
explicitly included in the UK model. The transmission mechanism works primarily 
through the three traditional channels, the exchange rate channel lagging behind 
the other two, having a greater effect in the second year after the monetary policy 
adjustment.
6.4 ENDOGENOUS MONEY AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Research about the transmission mechanism is aimed at establishing how 
changes in monetary policy are transmitted through the economy, and to 
explaining the timing of these reactions. Much research has been done on these 
important issues. The point of departure of all the textbook monetary 
transmission models is some interference in the market by the monetary 
authorities, always through open market operations, i.e. a change in the money 
supply.
Monetarists argue that their model is applicable to both industrialised and 
developing countries. In both the asset price channel and the interest rate 
channel, open market operations trigger reactions in the financial and real 
sectors of the economy. In both cases these effects are transitory: Meltzer 
(1995:70) describes the ‘basic insight’ of Monetarism as: ’’monetary impulses set
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off a transmission process that changes many relative prices and real variables 
until neutrality is (eventually) restored”.
The implied causality of these two traditional channels -  changing the money 
supply through open market operations which changes the interest rate -  is 
contrary to the Post Keynesian model. The monetary authorities in a Post 
Keynesian world have the power to set the interest rate. The interest rate 
becomes the exogenous variable and the money supply responds endogenously 
to the needs of the economy (the real side of the economy). At a first glance it 
seems that the transmission models discussed above are therefore irrelevant to a 
Post Keynesian world. But it will be argued that the credit channel can be 
reconciled with a Post Keynesian theory of endogenous money.
In the FRB/US macro-econometric model (referred to above), the transmission 
mechanism is firmly based upon the Monetarist model. As explained by the 
economists working with the US model: “In fact, the Federal Reserve does not 
directly control the federal funds rate; instead, the funds rate is a market rate 
determined by the supply and demand for reserves. The Federal Reserve uses 
open market transactions -  buying and selling Treasury securities -  to expand or 
contract the supply of reserves. By choosing the right supply of reserves to the 
banking system, the Federal Reserve can effectively keep the funds rate near its 
desired level” (Reifschneider et al.,1999:4). This is the traditional view of 
monetary policy with the money supply as an intermediate target.
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The opposite seems to be the case in the UK, given their focus on inflation 
targeting: “The money supply does play an important role in the transmission 
mechanism but it is not, under the United Kingdom’s monetary arrangements, a 
policy instrument. It could be a target of policy, but it need not be so. In the 
United Kingdom it is not, as we have an inflation target, and so monetary 
aggregates are indicators only...In the current policy framework, where the 
official interest rate is the policy instrument, both the money stock and 
inflation are jointly caused by other variables” (Bank of England, 1999:11). In the 
UK there seems to be a realisation that the exogenous variable (under the control 
of the Bank of England), is the official short-term rate. The money supply 
responds to the ‘needs of trade’: “So the change in spending by individuals and 
firms that results from a monetary policy change will also be accompanied by a 
change in both bank lending and bank deposits. Increases in retail sales are also 
likely to be associated with an increased demand for notes and coin in 
circulation...the relationship between the monetary aggregates and nominal GDP 
in the United Kingdom appears to be insufficiently stable (partly owing to financial 
innovation) for monetary aggregates to provide a robust indicator of future 
inflation developments in the near term...In other words, money matters, but not 
in such a precise way as to provide a reliable quantitative guide for monetary 
policy in the short to medium term” (Bank of England,1999:11).
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Where the US model is essentially a Monetarist one (with an emphasis on rules), 
the UK model is Keynesian in nature. The Monetarist model is not applicable to a 
Post Keynesian world of endogenous credit money. The credit channel, based on 
New Keynesian concepts such as credit rationing and asymmetric information, 
could be incorporated into an endogenous money model. In the UK, there is 
some recognition that the operative variable is the interest rate. The inclusion of 
the credit channel, both the balance sheet and bank lending channel, increases 
our understanding of the transmission mechanism in developing countries.
Meltzer (1995:68) confirmed this: “The lending view is closely related to earlier 
work on credit rationing. Although credit rationing is not a necessary condition for 
the lending view, a finding of significant credit rationing would support the lending 
view.” Chapter 5 cited some evidence on the existence of credit rationing in 
developing countries. It will be argued below that based on the existence of credit 
rationing, the credit channel is important in developing economies without well- 
developed capital and financial markets.
The work of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) on the credit channel can be used as 
support for the endogenous credit view. The effect of a monetary tightening was 
traced through the economy by looking at the effects of an increase in the federal 
funds rate on the unemployment rate and bank balance sheets. The increase had 
an immediate effect on the balance sheets through a fall in securities. Loans 
hardly move, which is explained by the fact that loans are quasi-contractual 
commitments whose stock is difficult to change quickly. In the longer run,
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however, the primary effect of the monetary tightening is on loans. After two 
years, securities have returned to base levels, while the fall in loans reaches its 
maximum. Even more interesting is the phenomenon that the unemployment rate 
also starts to respond after about nine months and reaches its peak after about 
two years, before declining back to zero. The timing of the fall in loans 
corresponds to that of the rise in unemployment. This could yield support for the 
endogenous money view, i.e. loan supply responds to real factors, in this case 
higher unemployment. The supply of credit responds to the ‘state of trade’.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992:920) see this timing as evidence that the credit 
channel is important: “The fact that the timing of the responses of loans and 
unemployment to monetary-policy innovations are so similar is circumstantial 
evidence that this channel is operative, even though loans do not Granger-cause 
unemployment.” This may not necessarily be a correct interpretation, as the work 
of Moore has shown that causality runs from the wage bill to loan demand. This 
alternative interpretation of the Bernanke and Blinder (1992) results are also 
mentioned by Ramey (1993:8): “The obvious alternative interpretation of the 
results is that the decline in output, brought about through the money channel, is 
‘causing’ the decline in bank loans”. Loan volume responds endogenously to real 
factors, rather than monetary factors. But, this does not neutralise the effects of 
the bank lending channel and the adverse effects for small borrowers. The 
transmission mechanism is not defined in the traditional way, starting with open 
market operations and the money supply under the control of the central bank.
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There is acknowledgement of the fact that the supply of loans responds to the 
real side of the economy. However, given the evidence on credit rationing in the 
previous chapter, the bank lending channel remains important, especially in 
developing economies. It will be argued in the next section that particularly small 
borrowers are affected by a monetary tightening.
6.5 EXISTENCE OF THE CREDIT CHANNEL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
It has been argued above that the two most important transmission channels for 
developing countries are the exchange rate and credit availability channels. The 
traditional interest rate and money channels are less important for several 
reasons that will be explained below.
In the literature, the existence of the credit channel is closely linked to the 
existence of credit rationing. Several studies have looked at the different effects 
of tight monetary policy on small versus large firms. Some also focussed on the 
behaviour of small versus big banks. These studies found that small banks 
reduce lending following a monetary tightening more than large banks do. This 
may be explained by the fact that smaller banks do not have easy access to 
alternative sources of funds, such as NCDs. (Bernanke,1995). Several other 
studies found that the bank loans of small firms fall relative to the bank loans of 
large firms after a monetary tightening. According to Ramey (1993:7): “The panel 
study results and the small- versus large-firm results are very compelling
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evidence in favor of the hypothesis that there are credit market imperfections, 
and that their effects are particularly important during periods of monetary 
tightening.”
The graph below shows that the same seems to be true for SA. SA was the only 
country for which data were available on loans to small versus large firms (and 
only since 1993). It is clear from figure 6.2 that the loans of small firms are more 
affected than those of large firms. The real prime rate is shown on the right-hand 
scale, while the changes in loans to small and large businesses are shown on the 
left-hand scale. The quarterly changes in loans the small businesses (between 
March 1993 and December 2000) are much more volatile, than changes in loans 
to large businesses for the corresponding period.
Figure 6.2 -  Changes in loans to small and large businesses.
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Source: SARB DI-900 forms, various years.
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6.6 TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN THE SADC COUNTRIES
The arguments above showed that the two important transmission mechanisms 
for developing countries are the exchange rate channel and the credit-availability 
channel. The evidence on credit rationing and the supply of loans to small vs. 
large firms seem to support the credit channel. This was also shown to be 
applicable to SA (the only SADC country where disaggregated data were 
available).
In most of the SADC countries, the emphasis is on the traditional interest rate 
channel. The understanding of monetary policy is still based on the standard IS- 
LM textbook model. The central bank is assumed to have control over the 
exogenous money supply. Changes in monetary policy are primarily transmitted 
through interest rate effects.
“Recent experience, however, has prompted renewed attention to the role of the 
credit channel in the transmission process. Both at the peak and at the trough of 
the economic cycle, there can be situations in which bank credit exerts a vital 
impact on economic conditions and in which adjustments in interest rate 
conditions seem to be incapable of affecting the course of the economy” (Van’t 
Dack,2001:6).
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In Botswana, the main instruments of monetary policy are the Bank rate and 
Bank of Botswana certificates. The operation of monetary policy focuses mainly 
on open market operations with three objectives, to mop up excess liquidity, 
achieve positive real interest rates and contribute to price stability. The Bank 
Rate is then influenced by these open market operations: “Thus its use is in line 
with the textbook prescription of a reduction in the rate to indicate a loosening of 
monetary policy and, vice versa, an increase to indicate that economic conditions 
require an increase in general interest rates" (Masalila & Phetwe,2001:11).
The following graph depicts the channels of monetary transmission in the 
Botswana economy:
Figure 6.3 Transmission mechanism in Botswana
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Source: Masalila & Phetwe (2001:12).
In Malawi, there has been a period of substantial financial liberalisation as part of 
an IMF supported structural adjustment program that was launched in 1988. The
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Malawi kwacha started floating against other currencies since 1994. This was 
reversed again during 1995-1997 when the kwacha was fixed again and 
exchange controls were not further relaxed. But since 1998, the kwacha has 
been floating freely and interest rates are market determined. Yet, as in the 
Botswana case, reserve money is the operational target of monetary policy. 
(Sato,2001).
The Reserve Bank of Malawi’s (RBM) aim is to influence the money supply by 
controlling the M2 monetary aggregate: “The main instruments available to the 
Bank include statutory liquidity reserve requirement (LRR), Open market 
operations, and the Inter-bank rate. Reserve requirements are applicable to all 
financial institutions licensed under the Banking Act (1989)” (Sato,2001:9). The 
Reserve Bank Act states that the objectives of monetary policy are varied, i.e. 
economic growth, employment, price stability and external balance. Yet, there 
has been an increasing awareness that the chief responsibility of the RBM is 
price stability. In order to achieve this goal, an annual inflation rate target is 
announced by the RBM (Sato,2001).
An inflation targeting regime is underscored by the idea that monetary 
aggregates are not a sufficient intermediary target. Yet, even though Malawi has 
an explicit inflation target, they still work with monetary aggregates as 
intermediate targets: “In order to achieve the prime objective, the Bank exerts 
stricter controls over reserve money (high powered money) and employing for
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this purpose a quarterly growth target (usually agreed with the Fund under the 
Fund supported programmes). While more emphasis was initially put on growth 
in the M2 aggregate, recent developments have indicated that M2 can better be 
influenced by monitoring growth in reserve money rather than the broad measure 
of money supply” (Sato,2001:12). This is done through standard open market 
operations.
In the South African case, formal inflation targeting was introduced in 2000, as a 
result of a disappointing experience with intermediate monetary targets. Although 
South Africa succeeded in bringing down the inflation rate to single digit levels, 
the monetary targets were seldom achieved. This resulted in an inflation targeting 
regime with the single operative variable the short term interest rate (in this case 
the repo rate): ‘The task of a central bank operating an independent monetary 
policy is in a sense a limited task, not least because it effectively has only one 
important instrument -  its control over short-term interest rates”
(Casteleijn,2001).
The research of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) finds (similarly to the 
evidence from the UK and the US), that a change in the official short-term rate 
takes about one year to have its peak influence on demand and production. The 
full effect on the inflation rate takes another year (i.e. two years after the initial 
change). In terms of this model, the focus of the SARB has been on the 
transmission of changes in short-term rates to nominal and real long-term rates:
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“After introducing the inflation-targeting monetary policy framework, the Bank 
increasingly focused its research on the relative roles of interest rates and of the 
exchange rate in the transmission of monetary policy”(Casteleijn,2001:18). The 
focus is again on the two traditional channels. These are important in the South 
African case, yet there is no consideration of the effects of the credit channel. It 
was shown in the previous section (and chapter 5), that the differential treatment 
of small and large firms, makes this channel important. Some consideration 
should be given to this by the SARB.
The monetary transmission mechanism and monetary control instruments are 
severely limited in the case of South Africa’s neighbours, who are members of 
the Common Monetary Area (CMA). In Swaziland, the rand lost its status as 
legal tender in 1985, making the Swazi lilangeni the only acceptable means of 
payment. The lilangeni is pegged at par to the rand. Swaziland’s membership of 
the currency union (CMA) with a fixed exchange rate effectively means that it has 
no monetary policy independence. The Central Bank of Swaziland has only 
limited powers to influence monetary policy. A recent article on monetary policy in 
Swaziland mentions the traditional monetary policy instruments, such as open 
market operation, reserve requirements and liquidity requirements. Yet, the rand 
still continues to circulate freely in Swaziland, making control of the money supply 
through open market operations impossible for the Swazi monetary authorities. 
The interest rate also closely tracks South African rates and financial markets are 
small and shallow (Central Bank of Swaziland,2001).
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The same is true for Namibia, another member of the CMA. The SA rand has 
legal tender status in Namibia: “As a member of a currency board arrangement, 
Namibia does not engage in any active discretionary monetary policy. This is 
primarily subordinated to South Africa’s conduct of monetary policy” 
(Kalenga,2001:1). The Bank of Namibia uses none of the traditional instruments 
of monetary policy (interest rates, reserve requirements, etc.). Monetary stability 
is rather attained by pegging the Namibian dollar to the rand. This has obvious 
implications for the independence of the central bank, but the benefits seem to 
outweigh the costs at this stage. Namibia has seen a reduction in its inflation 
rate, similar to the South African experience during the late 1990s.
In both the Namibian and Swazi experiences the traditional monetary policy 
instruments are not available to the monetary authorities. Both the exchange 
rates and the short-term interest rates are determined outside these countries (in 
SA). It is difficult to measure the response of economic agents to these outside 
changes. It does not seem that the interest rate or exchange rate channels can 
be extremely important in such a scenario. The credit channel may also be more 
applicable to the case of members of a currency union.
In Tanzania, one of the aims of the central bank is to take the necessary steps to 
deepen financial markets. It is recognised that the low level of development of the 
financial markets causes the transmission mechanism to be very weak.
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(Masawe,2001). This is true for most of the SADC countries, as will be argued in 
chapter 7. In Zambia, monetary policy is practiced in the standard text-book 
manner, with the emphasis on reserve money targets, open market operations 
and reserve requirements. Direct control measures were generally abolished 
during the 1990s. Interest rate ceilings were only abolished in 1993. In the same 
year, a Treasury Bill was introduced and by 1994 the exchange rate was fully 
liberalised and the Lusaka Stock Exchange was established. The undeveloped 
nature of the money and capital markets hampers the effects of monetary policy. 
The transmission mechanism cannot function properly in such an environment. 
Interest rates do not react sufficiently to open market operations: “Money market 
imperfections can also be cited as a challenge for monetary policy in Zambia. 
This is clear from the volatility of overnight inter-bank lending rates, sticky market 
lending interest rates and a segmented market...The financial system is not only 
shallow, but the range of financial instruments and services offered is quite 
narrow with Treasury Bills and Government bonds being the main financial 
instruments available on the market. The stock exchange has yet to grow” 
(Kalyalya,2001:20).
6.7 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY 
POLICY IN THE SADC COUNTRIES
Research on the monetary transmission mechanism in industrialised countries 
has focused increasingly on the interest rate channel, asset price channel and
215
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
the exchange rate channel. This is a result of increasing deregulation, trade 
reforms and international globalisation. In such sophisticated systems, 
characterised by high degrees of competition, the role of bank credit has lost 
some of its importance as markets move rapidly to allocate credit. This is 
recognised by many economists working in these developed nations: “...because 
of financial deregulation and innovation, the importance of the traditional bank 
lending channel has most likely diminished over time. While we believe this 
channel is still empirically relevant, obtaining sharp measurements of its potency 
is a challenging task. In any case, however, this framework may still be of value 
for interpreting historical data, for assessing the impact of institutional changes 
on the transmission of monetary policy and for comparing monetary transmission 
mechanisms across countries” (Bernanke 1995:42).
It was seen from the discussion on monetary transmission channels in the SADC 
countries, that most central banks still work within the framework of the interest 
channel. In order to test the relevance of this channel, interest rate movements 
over time have to be examined. If lending rates do not respond to changes in 
bank rates, then the traditional interest rate channel is not the correct analytical 
framework for these developing countries. Data on interest rate mark-ups and 
spreads will be used in Chapter 8, when exogenous interest rates are discussed. 
It will be clear from the evidence presented in Chapter 8 that lending rates do not 
respond timeously to changes in bank rates. Interest rates are sticky and both 
mark-ups and spreads have high variances over the business cycle.
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In countries where credit and financial markets are poorly developed, changes in 
the quantity or availability of credit are more important than changes in the price 
of credit. The evidence confirms the importance of the credit channel in 
developing countries. Undeveloped financial markets hinder the monetary 
transmission process. There are several factors that are characteristic of 
undeveloped financial markets. Factors such as the degree of government 
intervention, concentration levels in the banking sector, depth of money and 
capital markets, stock exchange activity, etc. all influence the working of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Some of these factors will be discussed 
below.
6.7.1 Government intervention -  direct controls and reserve requirements
The proper functioning of the interest rate channel requires the transmission of 
official interest rate intervention (through control of some short-term interest rate 
and reserve requirement) to those variables that affect the real side of the 
economy, e.g. loan rates, deposit rates, asset prices and the exchange rate. This 
transmission depends on the structure of the financial sector. The structure has 
changed rapidly over the past decade in most of the SADC countries. The 
majority of these countries embarked upon structural adjustment programmes 
which led to the liberalisation of their financial sectors. Government intervention 
has declined and there was a move away from direct controls (e.g. interest rate 
ceilings) to more market related measures such as open market operations.
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Interest rates have been liberalised in all the SADC countries. Reserve 
requirements are still used with different degrees of emphasis. The following 
table shows the reserve requirements applicable in some of the SADC countries.
Table 6.1: Reserve requirements in selected SADC countries.
COUNTRY RESERVE REQUIREMENT
Angola 30%
Botswana 3,25%
Lesotho 3,0%
Malawi 30%
Mauritius 5,5%
Mozambique 11,5%
Namibia 1%
South Africa 2,5%
Swaziland 4%
Tanzania 10%
Zambia 12,5%
Zimbabwe 30-50%
Source: IMF Country Reports, various years; Kovanen (2002)
It is clear from table 6.1 that most SADC countries still have relatively high 
reserve requirements as their institutional environments have not developed to 
the same extent as developed countries. Most of the SADC countries still use a 
system of fractional reserve banking, with strong emphasis on reserve 
requirements. In more advanced monetary systems the reserve requirement has 
lost most of its importance: “The bank of England gave up reserve ratios as an 
instrument of monetary control in 1981 in recognition of the inapplicability of the 
reserve ratio as an instrument of monetary control in the context of contemporary 
British banking...Actual reserve ratios in 1991 varied across the EU from 3.8 
percent (United Kingdom) to 32 percent (Portugal)” (Chick & Dow,1996:521). 
Some of the reserve requirements in industrialized countries are shown below.
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Table 6.2: Reserve requirements in some industrialised countries:
1980 1998
United States 3.0-12.0 3.0-10.0
Japan 0.125-2.5 0.05-1 .3
Germany 4.15-12.1 1.5 -  2.0
United Kingdom 0.45 0.35
Source: Kamin, Turner & Van’t Dack (1998).
6.7.2 Government intervention in credit markets
Despite deregulation and liberalisation, the government still plays an important 
part in the credit markets of some of the SADC countries. Although interest rate 
ceilings are no longer used, government ownership of banks means that interest 
rates are not fully market determined. In some SADC countries, such as 
Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, the financial system was entirely state- 
owned (Mowatt,2001). Although there have been structural adjustment 
programmes, which included financial liberalisation, the state still plays a role as 
can be seen from table 6.3 below. In most of the countries there are some form 
of credit extension at favourable terms to certain priority sectors such as the 
agricultural sectors. Government-aided programmes to provide micro-finance at 
favourable rates, are also widespread in the SADC countries. The following table 
shows countries in which there is state ownership of commercial banks (including 
partial ownership / minority share) and where credit allocation is not purely 
market determined.
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Table 6.3: State ownership of commercial banks in SADC countries.
State ownership Government intervention in the 
allocation of credit
Angola ✓ y/
Botswana X X
Lesotho ✓ X
Malawi ✓ X
Mauritius X X
Mozambique X ✓
Namibia X X
South Africa X X
Swaziland ✓ X
Tanzania ✓ X
Zambia X X
Zimbabwe ✓ X
* Yes 
X No
Source: Mowatt,2001
6.7.3 Concentration levels in the banking sector
As mentioned above, it is important that changes in government controlled short­
term interest rates lead to timely and efficient changes in other short- and long­
term rates. This can be hampered by the presence of state-owned banks that do 
not have a strong profit motive. Another factor that could diminish the 
responsiveness of loan and deposit rates to monetary policy is a lack of 
competitiveness in the banking sector. If this sector is controlled by four or five 
large banks, then the incentive for oligopoly pricing is high. If there is competition 
from foreign banks, the situation is different. There are no limits on foreign 
ownership of banks in the SADC countries.
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The trend, however, is for foreign banks to concentrate on the market for 
corporate lending and to leave the retail segment to the local banks. Several 
South African banks have spread their networks to SADC countries, in order to 
benefit from increased liberalisation. Standard Bank has the largest presence in 
the region and has also focused mainly on the corporate sector, providing trade 
and investment finance (Mowatt,2001).
Most of the SADC countries have only a few commercial banks in the financial 
sector. This implies high levels of concentration and some tacit collusion and 
price fixing may be present in such circumstances. This reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, as changes in monetary policy are not fully 
transmitted. Two concentration indices were calculated for nine SADC countries. 
Data for individual banks were obtained from the KMPG Banking Survey -  Africa, 
2001. The first concentration measure is the so-called CR3, where the sum of the 
assets of the three largest banks is expressed as a percentage of total assets. 
The second concentration index is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, which uses 
the following formula:
HHI = 'YjSi2, where Si is the market share of each bank.
/'=1 ,...n
The HHI gives a good indication of the level of concentration in the banking 
sector as well as the distribution of market shares. It measures the relative 
distribution of power, where the CR3 considers only the three largest banks.
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Both indices are shown below, in figure 6.3. It is clear that all the countries have 
concentrated banking industries, as measured by both concentration indices. 
South Africa has the lowest value for both the CR3 and HHI. Any HHI above 
1800 is considered highly concentrated, which means South Africa also has a 
concentrated banking sector.
Figure 6.3 CR3 and HHI for selected SADC countries.
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6.7.4 Stock exchanges
The importance of the bank lending channel is reduced in developed economies 
where financial innovations have increased the ability of banks to provide credit 
on demand. The development of a vibrant stock exchange has in most cases 
reduced the dependency of firms on banks. More firms choose to raise funds 
through the issuing of debt or some other alternative, than borrowing from the 
banks. Yet, in the absence of a well developed stock exchange, firms remain 
dependent on banks for credit and credit rationing might be present, 
strengthening the effects of the bank lending channel: “Nevertheless, stock 
exchanges in the region are small and illiquid, with the obvious exception of the 
JSE Securities Exchange in South Africa. They are also extremely volatile” 
(Mowatt,2001:16). Some even have restrictions on foreign ownership of shares, 
e.g. Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
Table 6.4 Stock Exchange data -  SADC (1999).
STOCK EXCHANGE DATA Botswana Malawi Mauritius Namibia South
Africa
Swazi
land
Tan
zania
Zambia Zim
babwe
Market capitalisation 
(USDm)
723.40 7910.2 1643.3 27199 262606 85.2 236.4 301.0 953.6
Number of listed 
companies
23 7 48 40 668 5 2 8 70
Volume of shares traded 52.10 50.58 77.8 107.2 43097 11.4 0.3 3.7 1110
Value of shares traded 
(USDm)
65.10 6.60 85.266 187.22 73391 n/a 0.31 157.86 105.30
Liquidity (value traded as 
a % of market 
capitalisation)
9.00 0.08 5.19 0.688 27.947 1.10 0.14 52.45 11.04
Market capitalisation 
(%GDP)
12.71 8.75 44.03 875.11 128.00 7.04 2.99 8.98 16.14
Source: Trade and Industry Policy Secretariat, www.tips.ora.za
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Data in table 6.4 is for 1999 (in some cases 1998 data were used, as 1999 data 
were incomplete). It is clear that South Africa has the dominant market share in 
stock exchanges in the SADC region. It is the only country with a well functioning, 
liquid stock exchange. The ratio of stock market capitalization as % of GDP, is 
128%. Namibia also has a high ratio, but only 40 companies are listed on its 
stock exchange. Most countries have only a few listed companies and low levels 
of liquidity (total value traded on the stock market as a % of market 
capitalization).
6.7.5 Depth of money and capital markets
If money and capital markets are not well developed, interest rate changes are 
not properly transmitted through the economy. It is usually costly to adjust loan 
and deposit rates in response to money market rates in developing countries. 
There might be various reasons for this phenomenon, e.g. administrative 
difficulty, keeping customers satisfied, etc. Especially if changes in money market 
rates are perceived as highly variable and easily reversible, other interest rates 
will be slow to respond.
All the SADC countries have money markets, but they are at different levels of 
development. South Africa is the only SADC country with a fully developed 
money market, using a wide range of instruments such as bankers’ acceptances, 
negotiable certificates of deposit and commercial paper. For the rest of the SADC
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countries, the main (and often only) money market instrument is usually a 
marketable treasury bill. Many of the SADC countries do not yet have interbank 
money markets. These structural factors severely constrain the operation of the 
interest rate channel.
The same is true for bond markets that are similarly underdeveloped. South 
Africa is once again the only SADC country with a well-developed bond market 
that attracts significant foreign investment. The only other SADC countries with 
bond markets are Botswana, Zambia and Namibia. Government bonds have 
been issued by Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The other SADC countries have little 
or no experience with long-term debt markets (Mowatt, 2001:41). This is not only 
the case in the SADC countries: “Although they have grown over time, bond 
markets in many developing countries indeed remain shallow and volatile. In the 
early stages of capital market development, therefore, the transmission of 
monetary policy measures may be particularly uncertain (Kamin et al.,1998:30).
6.7.6 Capital flows and exchange rates
Under a regime of fully liberalised exchange rates, domestic and foreign assets 
are supposed to be perfect substitutes. In the absence of exchange controls, 
capital moves to equalise the return on assets through movements in the 
exchange rate. The exchange rate channel is therefore important, as explained 
above. A tight monetary policy, that raises the interest rate, increases the
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demand for domestic assets and leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate 
(at least in the short term). When there are exchange controls and fixed 
exchange rates, the exchange rate channel cannot function properly. This is the 
case in many of the SADC countries. Namibia and Swaziland maintain fixed 
exchange rates, with the Swazi lilangeni and the Namibian dollar pegged at par 
to the South African rand.
Angola and Mozambique have exchange controls on their current accounts. All 
the other countries have liberalised their current accounts. It will be shown in 
chapter 7 that Angola and Mozambique have undeveloped financial systems. 
Most of the SADC countries have exchange controls on their capital accounts. 
The only exceptions are Botswana, Mauritius and Zambia (Mowatt,2001).
6.8 CONCLUSION
It was argued in this chapter that the focus on the interest rate channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism in developing countries is misplaced. The 
price of credit is not the important variable, if a country has an undeveloped 
financial system. In developing countries where institutions are inefficient and not 
competitive, the availability of credit is more important than the price of credit. In 
such cases, the bank lending and credit channels are the most important 
components of the monetary transmission mechanism.
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This theory was tested for the SADC countries by examining the different factors 
that influence the monetary transmission mechanism. It was found that 
government intervention is prevalent in most economies, with direct credit 
controls still present in the less developed countries and a heavy reliance on 
reserve requirements in most countries. High levels of concentration in the 
banking sector probably indicate that banks do not allocate credit efficiently. 
Stock exchanges are undeveloped (except in South Africa), with only a limited 
number of listed companies and low volumes of shares traded. Money and 
capital markets are shallow and undeveloped. These institutional factors 
contribute to the understanding of the monetary transmission process in the 
SADC countries.
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CHAPTER 7
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
We must continue to expand upon the work of Keynes as we explain what we 
mean by ‘endogenous money’ and ‘liquidity preference’ through institutional 
analysis of the economy (Wray, 1995).
Actual monetary-financial systems are situated along a spectrum from the purely 
exogenous to the purely endogenous, with most systems characterized as at 
least partially endogenous (Niggle,1991)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters it was argued that the money supply is not necessarily 
endogenous in developing economies. This may be due to a variety of factors 
that determine the monetary systems of these economies. As explained in 
Chapter 3, there is an ongoing debate amongst Post Keynesian economists on 
the degree of money supply endogeneity. Post Keynesian authors like Moore 
and Kaldor (‘accommodationists’) argue that the money supply is fully 
endogenous and can be represented by a horizontal supply curve. They 
distinguish clearly between a world using commodity money and today’s world of 
credit money. Other Post Keynesian authors (‘structuralists’) differ and argue that
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while the money supply might be endogenous during normal times, the money 
supply curve has a positive slope at certain times (e.g. Wray, Pollin, Chick, Dow).
In this chapter, the 'stages of banking’ approach of Victoria Chick will be 
combined with the 'financial instability hypothesis’ of Minsky in an attempt to put 
the endogenous money debate in its proper historical context. The question that 
will be addressed in this chapter is whether there are certain preconditions for the 
existence of endogenous money. What about countries which are in different 
stages of development? Is the money supply always fully endogenous, or does 
an endogenous money supply require the existence of a sophisticated financial 
sector and wholesale money market? It will be argued that the capacity of banks 
to create credit depends crucially on their stage of evolution. The validity of the 
Post Keynesian endogenous money theory cannot be considered without 
considering the institutional context. In this chapter an institutional approach will 
be used to supplement the analysis of the previous chapters, to develop some 
criteria for testing the existence of endogenous money in developing countries. 
This institutional view regards the money supply as becoming increasingly 
endogenous as the banking system develops.
The focus will be on the institutional environment of the SADC countries. Using 
the ideas of Chick and Niggle, it is expected that the money supply becomes 
increasingly endogenous as a country develops. In the early stages of 
development when the financial system is rudimentary, the money supply is
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largely exogenous, represented by a vertical money supply curve. As the banking 
system develops and banks create money through fractional reserve banking, 
the money supply becomes increasingly endogenous. In the final stages of 
financial development, characterized by innovations such as securitisation and 
off-balance sheet activities, the money supply becomes completely endogenous. 
Most developing countries have not yet reached the final stage of development.
7.2 MINSKY AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
It will be argued below that the ‘stages of banking’ approach can be combined 
with the work of Hyman Minsky, which provides valuable insight into the 
investment-finance link in modern capitalist economies. It was shown in previous 
chapters that the theories of asymmetric information and credit rationing are 
indeed compatible with an endogenous money supply. The credit channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism also confirmed the view that firms may be 
constrained by a lack of finance. In Minsky’s work there is a strong emphasis on 
the link between finance and investment. During booms, firms increase their 
leverage ratios, and finance is easily obtainable. The availability of finance drives 
the business cycle.
The state of the economy influences the availability of credit. As the economy 
moves along the business cycle, there are endogenous processes that cause 
instability to fluctuate. Endogenous money theory states that the supply of money
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is fully demand-determined. But during the upward phase of a business cycle, 
instability increases. This necessitates the consideration of institutional factors. 
As speculative finance increases during economic expansions, expectations 
become euphoric, as both banks and their borrowers become increasingly 
optimistic about future returns. All creditworthy demand for credit is 
accommodated, and the central bank supplies the reserves as ultimate supplier 
of system liquidity. As banks take on more borrowers, increasingly risky credit 
causes the system to become more unstable. There is a limited amount of credit­
worthy borrowers, and as expectations become more optimistic, speculative 
financing increases. This might lead to a financial crisis. Banks will be slow to 
extend credit in the aftermath of the crisis. Borrowers who are adversely affected 
by the crisis are also now increasingly wary of speculative investment.
Minsky emphasized the inherent financial instability in today’s modem credit 
economies. He developed the “financial instability hypothesis” or the “Wall Street 
paradigm”. In this theory he showed how the money supply is endogenous and 
how cycles of booms and busts are inherent to a capitalist economy. Downward 
phases of the business cycle are necessary to deflate expectations and reduce 
leverage ratios. Minsky argued that the introduction of the central bank as lender 
of last resort and government deficit financing diminishes the instability of the 
system.
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Minsky focussed on the institutional environment and how it changes over time. 
The cause of instability lies in the financing needs of industrializing economies.
As production becomes more capital intensive, instability may be exacerbated as 
the relative cost of investment goods increase. It all depends on the financing 
structure, whether firms use internal or external funds. Firms finance investments 
in capital assets by a combination of equity and debt. Minsky identified three 
types of financing positions in the financial structure of a capitalist system: 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance.
1) Hedge units are those whose expected cash flows from operations exceed 
expected cash commitments at all points in the future. A hedge unit 
always carries positive present value. The risk is relatively low, as even 
low levels of cash flow will be sufficient to meet cash commitments.
2) Speculative units are those for which at some point in the future, cash 
commitments will exceed cash flows. Unlike hedge units, these firms 
depend on the normal functioning of the financial system to meet their 
future commitments. If short-term interest rates should rise more than 
expected, the present value of capital investments might become 
negative, and the firm will become insolvent.
3) Ponzi units are the most risky. Cash commitments are greater than 
expected cash flows at most points in time. These firms have to borrow to 
pay interest as well as principal, in the hope of larger profits at some future 
date. In general, the higher the proportion of speculative and Ponzi
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financial units, the greater the fragility of the financial system 
(Minsky, 1986:206).
Minsky described the path of the economy by referring to these different 
financing methods. When the financial system is dominated by hedge finance, 
the system is relatively stable. Short-term interest rates are lower than long-term 
interest rates. Profit opportunities are taken up by investors using speculative 
finance. Asset values are bid up by the increase in demand, and capital gains are 
realised. In this favourable environment characterized by optimistic expectations 
about future profit opportunities, speculative and Ponzi financing increase. It is 
therefore the profit opportunities within a capitalist economy that cause the shift 
from a stable to a fragile financial system. This is an endogenous process, and 
may lead to a financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, investors who were 
adversely affected move away from speculative and Ponzi finance. There is a 
general move towards hedge financing. As expectations gradually become more 
favourable, the cycle is renewed. Minsky emphasized the financing needs of a 
capitalist economy. Banks normally accommodate this demand for credit, 
especially when expectations are very optimistic at the height of the business 
cycle. The money supply is therefore endogenous, but this depends on 
institutional factors. The central bank may decide to restrict reserve growth, 
forcing private banks to innovate to get the necessary reserves. They can borrow 
from each other in the money markets, or they can use innovations such as asset 
and liability management to stretch current reserves. But there may be a limit to
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the credit that the money markets can supply. At some stage, banks are no 
longer willing to extend credit, as their reserves are over stretched. A liquidity 
shortage might emerge, which could detonate a financial crisis. Even if banks 
accommodate higher demand for loans, interest rates may rise. The increased 
loan riskiness associated with rising cash commitments relative to cash flows 
puts upward pressure on interest rates (Pollin,1997).
Minsky’s theory emphasizes the necessity of looking at the institutional 
environment. While the money supply is endogenous, there might not always be 
a fully adequate supply of loanable funds. Banks will try to stretch their reserves 
up to a point. But as financial fragility increases they will no longer be willing to 
extend credit to speculative units. This scenario might be more common in 
developing countries, where there is a limited supply of creditworthy borrowers 
and where credit markets are characterised by imperfect and asymmetric 
information.
7.3 FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND THE STAGES OF BANKING
The financial instability hypothesis can be combined with the stages of banking 
approach (associated with the work of Victoria Chick) to develop a 
comprehensive institutional theory of endogenous money, where the capacity of 
banks to create credit depends on their stage of evolution. As banks develop, the 
money supply becomes increasingly endogenous. New innovations like the
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securitisation of loans make it possible for commercial banks to avoid reserve 
requirements and capital adequacy ratios. They can accommodate increased 
demand for loans. But this is also the crux of the problem. As banks increase 
their ability to create more credit, the instability of the financial system increases 
and banks and firms become more vulnerable to adverse credit conditions. The 
stages of banking approach argues that the money supply might not always be 
endogenous, but might rather be exogenous in the early stages of financial 
development.
One of the main contributions of the endogenous money theory is its integration 
of bank loans with asset and liability management. If institutional factors are 
included, it is necessary to look at the balance sheet constraint of banks. The 
development of asset and liability management allows banks to switch to 
cheaper funds when the central bank raises the bank rate. Increased inter-bank 
lending causes the wholesale cost of funds to rise. Banks also have liquidity 
preferences, which increase in times of financial instability. Banks can obtain 
liquidity through liability transformations in their own balance sheets: “Methods of 
raising liquidity include (i) sales of secondary reserves by banks, (ii) raising 
interest rates on time and other checkable deposits, so as to induce substitutions 
out of currency and demand deposits, and (iii) decreasing excess reserves, and 
increasing borrowed reserves” (Palley, 1996:127).
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7.4 THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING
The ‘stages of banking’ approach focuses on the historical context of the 
exogenous vs. endogenous debate. In her description of endogenous money, 
Chick emphasizes that there was a time in the development of banking when the 
classical view of reserves creating deposits was true. The endogenous theory is 
dependent on the banking system having reached a certain stage of 
development. Where savings are necessary to finance investment, i.e. when 
banks are in the early stages of development, money cannot be created 
endogenously. The banking system must reach the stage where it can create 
loans “by the stroke of the pen” independently of saving (Chick, 1997:535).
The first stage in Chick’s analysis corresponds to the neo-classical view of banks 
as financial intermediaries. There are deficit units and surplus units, and the role 
of banks is to facilitate the exchange between these different role players. Saving 
must take place prior to investment. Surplus units deposit their savings with the 
banks, but claims on banks are not yet commonly used in transactions. The 
lending capacity of banks is constrained by their deposits. The interest rate is the 
price that equates the demand and supply of loanable funds. If entrepreneurs are 
willing to invest, because of positive expectations, they will bid up the price of 
funds, i.e. the interest rate. This will attract more deposits that in turn will 
generate additional saving. The greater availability of funds will probably lower
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the interest rate and stimulate new investments. But this process of investment 
and growth is slow, as investment is still largely constrained by saving.
During stage two, claims on the banks are used as a means of payment. Bank 
liabilities become money, and the redeposit ratio rises. Reserves, rather than 
saving become the constraint. Banks adhere to reserve requirements, and lend 
out some multiple of the reserve requirement, the classic fractional reserve 
banking. Banks are not willing to lend out more than their reserve requirement 
allows. Their willingness might depend on their market share or the level of 
decentralization of the banking system. Banks can create credit, but not on 
demand. Investment can continue without prior saving, due to the credit creating 
ability of banks.
During the third and fourth stages, a central bank which acts as lender of last 
resort is added to the picture. Another development is a market for inter-bank 
lending. Banks are now willing to lend more than their reserve requirements 
prescribe, knowing that they can acquire the required funds if necessary. The 
increase in investment finance stimulates economic growth. The central bank 
acts as lender of last resort, allowing the banks to expand credit collectively, 
without risk of being caught short of reserves. As the central bank increasingly 
accepts its role as the ultimate supplier of liquidity, the money supply becomes 
endogenous. The volume of bank loans becomes fully demand determined and 
the supply of deposits simply follows.
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The fifth stage is characterized by financial innovations, particularly liability 
management. Most loan requests that are considered creditworthy are met, 
irrespective of the monetary stance of the central bank. The availability of 
finance, for investment or other purposes, becomes a market phenomenon.
It is during this fifth stage that financial instability increases as described by 
Minsky’s hypothesis. Banks have an almost unlimited power to extend credit. As 
long as expectations are optimistic, they will accommodate all loan demand. This 
might lead banks to increase speculative and Ponzi finance, contributing to 
increased instability. (Chick, 1988:233).
Chick later distinguished a sixth stage, which includes securitisation of loans and 
off-balance-sheet activity. These innovations are a response to the increasing 
fragility of the financial sector, as the money supply becomes increasingly 
endogenous. Securitisation of loans is introduced to reduce the endogenous 
financial instability of a modern credit economy. Chick describes how changes in 
banking practices, e.g. off-balance-sheet activities and securitised lending, have 
changed the institutional environment once again. Firms tend to rely more on 
internal financing or if they use external finance, they prefer the markets to the 
banks. Banks finance a smaller percentage of investment. It is necessary to look 
at what they are financing: consumer loans, property deals, takeovers or other 
speculative financial transactions (Chick,1997:540).
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Niggle is another Post Keynesian who argues that the endogenous theory of 
money must be firmly grounded in institutional reality. He emphasizes that 
economic models must reflect the actual institutional characteristics of the 
economies they represent. The degree to which the money supply is determined 
by market forces is: “a function of a complex set of institutional factors, including 
the forms of money in circulation, banking practices, exchange rate systems, the 
organization of financial markets, and central bank objectives, techniques and 
operating targets” (Niggle,1991:138).
Niggle explains the disagreement between participants in the debate over 
monetary endogeneity as stemming from their ignorance of important institutional 
characteristics of the monetary-financial system. Under certain circumstances 
(historical stages), the money supply might be exogenous. But under current 
arrangements the money supply is endogenous to the financial system.
Niggle (1990) emphasised that monetary theory cannot be developed in isolation. 
It has to reflect the institutional realities of the world in which we live. Various 
forms of money (commodity, fiat or credit money) are associated with various 
banking institutions: “The ‘correct’ theory is that which responds most closely to 
the actual behaviour of the specific monetary-financial system under analysis” 
(1990:444). Niggle describes the following stages of development of financial 
systems and the corresponding degree of endogeneity or exogeneity. His
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analysis is based on the experience of the United States, and his stages 
correspond closely to those of Chick described above.
Stage one is an economy with commodity money or convertible paper currency 
backed by gold. The quantity of money is determined exogenously by factors 
such as trade flows, foreign investment or gold production. During the second 
stage, the money supply becomes "somewhat endogenous -  determined within 
the banking system” (1990:446). There is fractional reserve banking with the use 
of bank notes as a common medium of exchange, but most deposits are held as 
relatively liquid forms of savings by their owners, with little inter-bank lending. 
There are no legal reserve requirements.
In stage three, a central bank enforces reserve requirements on the banks, so 
the quantity of money is exogenously determined. But after this stage, during 
stages four and five, the money supply becomes increasingly endogenous. 
Innovations in the form of liability and asset management are largely responsible 
for an endogenous money supply during stage four. The issuing of credit lines 
also increases endogeneity during this stage. During the last stage, the central 
bank assumes the role of lender of last resort and has to supply liquidity to the 
financial system and the money supply is fully endogenous. This leads to the 
conclusion that the money supply is largely endogenously determined in the 
current financial system.
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7.5 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
As an economy moves through different stages of development, it is 
characterized by different degrees of endogeneity of the money supply. It is 
therefore important to look at the different factors that determine the degree of 
endogeneity. As shown by Chick and Niggle, in their stages of banking theories, 
one cannot look at monetary policy independent of the institutional framework. As 
Niggle(1991:138) put it: “..an abstract monetary theory, assuming a priori that the 
money supply is either endogenous or exogenous, cannot be applied 
mechanically to all economies without being misleading in many cases”.
It was argued in Chapter 5 that the availability of credit is especially important in 
the case of developing countries. In countries with either poorly developed or 
tightly controlled financial systems, interest rates may not move to clear the 
market. Aggregate demand is often influenced by the quantity of credit rather 
than the price. In such countries, where private markets for credit are not well 
developed or where they are prevented from operating freely by government 
regulation, the availability of credit might have a large influence on the state of 
the economy. Several major developing countries have controls or guidelines on 
the quantity of credit. Minsky’s financial instability theory is especially relevant in 
these circumstances.
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It is important to note that in the argument of Niggle (1990), the final stages of 
financial development, characterised by a fully endogenous money supply, were 
only reached in the US during the 1970s and 1980s. These innovations include 
asset and liability management techniques, financial instruments such as 
negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs), EuroCDs and repurchase agreements 
and later securitisation of loans. The ability to match maturities on assets and 
liabilities depends on the access to long term securities via the financial markets. 
The absence of a deep government bond market can act as a handicap to banks 
with a pressing need for liquidity, reducing the degree of money endogeneity. 
Another important feature is an active market for inter-bank lending.
In order to test whether these innovations are present in developing countries, 
the institutional environment and settlement arrangements must be examined. 
These include arrangements such as the percentage of state owned banks, 
reserve and capital adequacy requirements, deposit protection schemes, etc. A 
crude indicator that can be used to determine whether a country has reached an 
advanced state of financial development is the ratio of cash to demand deposits. 
If this ratio is relatively high, then the economy is still functioning as a cash 
economy, and the role of credit is less important.
In modern financial systems the most important aspects of an endogenous 
money supply are central bank targeting interest rates (banks are price-takers 
and quantity-setters and interest rate spreads are stable), the existence of credit
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lines or overdrafts, and financial innovations in response to changes in monetary 
policy. The Post Keynesian structuralists see the money supply as only partially 
endogenous. The elasticity of credit supply with respect to the rate of interest is 
neither infinite nor zero, but lies somewhere in between, i.e. the credit supply 
curve has a positive slope.
For the money supply to be fully endogenous in developing countries, these 
central aspects of an endogenous theory must be present. If small firms do not 
have sufficient access to credit (as argued by the structuralist approach), then 
there will be credit rationing. If credit lines are not normally available (due to a 
lack of information or a sufficient track record) then firms cannot simply obtain 
credit on demand. As argued in Chapter 5, whether or not the supply of credit is 
quantity constrained is another question. If a country has reached the final stages 
of financial development, the money supply will be endogenous, despite the 
existence of credit rationing. But if the amount of loanable funds is still 
constrained by saving, then the supply of money may be exogenous. This will 
imply the conventional direction of causality, with changes in monetary policy 
determining changes in the money supply, which in turn determine changes in 
the level of nominal GDP. An overview of the institutional arrangements in 
individual SADC countries is provided in appendix 7.1.
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7.6 A FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX.
A composite index was compiled to compare the levels of financial institutional 
development across the countries in the sample more formally. A total of 10 
indices were used to compile the index. All of them reflect the level of 
development in either the banking sector or the financial sector as a whole. Data 
were available for eight SADC countries, i.e. Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The indices are 
measured on a 0-100 scale. This was used to group countries into four broad 
categories, depending on the quartile in which the overall index falls (following 
the approach of Gelbard & Leite, 1999). The four categories of financial 
institutional development used, were ‘undeveloped’, ‘minimally developed’, 
‘somewhat developed’, and ‘largely developed’.
To construct the index, the figures for an individual country (e.g. share of non­
performing loans) was converted to a 0-100 scale based on the range of values 
of the whole sample. The conversion of the values was carried out according to 
the following formula:
dij = \(kjj — min , = /c,y) / (max , = i,...„k ij-  min , = 1 f kij)\ x 100............. (7.1)
where / indicates the n countries for which information is available (8 countries in 
this sample),;' indicates the m attributes being measured, k/j is the value of
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attribute j  for country /', and dij is the measurement within the 0-100 scale of that 
attribute. The higher the value of the index, the higher the level of financial 
institutional development in a country.
The index was constructed as a simple average of the values associated with 
each attribute:
Index, = [ £ /,, = d 9] l m,  ........... (7.2)
For indices for which a higher figure is associated with a less desirable feature of 
the financial system (e.g. CR3, share of non-performing loans, interest rate 
spread, etc.) the following formula was used:
djj— [(kij -  max j = 1t.. n k ij) I (m\n i ^ ^ . p k i j - ma x  i=i,. nkij)\ x 100............. (7.3)
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Ten variables were chosen, as given in table 7.1:
Table 7.1 Indices of financial institutional development for selected SADC 
countries.
Botswana Malawi Mauritius Swaziland SA Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
CR3 94 95 95 94 77 85 84 82
Capital
adequacy (%)
16.82 15.1 10.55 7.5 10.09 16.47 13 8.34
Bank credit 11 10 28 20 51 n/a 5 12
Interest spread 4.6 17.2 9.9 7.5 4.9 17.2 15.6 13.05
Share of non­
performing loans
3.34 10.14 6.24 9.6 4.13 8.27 n/a 8.89
Share of banks 
in total loans.
n/a 52 78 94 95 61 34 75
Share of foreign- 
owned banks
86 n/a 3 100 0.6 n/a 46 60
Total value 
traded
5 n/a 10 10 7 n/a n/a 0.9
Stock market 
capitalization
7 n/a 21 13 131 n/a n/a 13
Liquid liabilities 
as share of GDP 
(M3/GDP)
25 22 53 30 45 21 21 39
Financial
market
structure index
43 18 58 35 85 37 26 31
Source: IFS, KPMG Banking Survey-Africa,2001, TIPS data.
The CR3 was included as an indicator of the concentration in the banking sector 
of each country. This variable was calculated from the KPMG Banking survey, 
using data for 2000. The sum of the assets of the 3 largest banks is expressed 
as a percentage of total bank assets. The index equals 100 if there are only three 
banks. Lower values indicate higher levels of competition. In most cases, the 
CR3 was higher than 80%. Only South Africa had a lower value of 77%. The 
ratios for the different countries are shown in figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 -  CR3 ratios for selected SADC countries
0
Botswana Malawi Mauritius Swaziland SA Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
[BCR31
Source: KPMG Banking survey -  Africa, 2001
The average value of capital adequacy ratios for most of the countries exceeded 
the 8 percent proposed by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
(KPMG,2000). Only Swaziland had a smaller ratio (7.5%). ‘Bank credit’ is used 
as an aggregate indicator of development in the banking sector. This variable 
was obtained from the financial development database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & 
Levine (1999). ‘Bank credit’ is defined as: ‘claims on private sector by deposit 
money banks as a share of GDP.’ It measures the total loans extended to the 
private sector by commercial banks as a share of GDP. ‘Liquid liabilities as share 
of GDP’ is a more comprehensive indicator (also called M3 / GDP) and is often 
used in the literature as an indicator of the overall level of financial development. 
Both ratios indicate that South Africa and Mauritius have the highest levels of
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financial sector development of the total sample (see figure 7.2). Both ratios are 
averages over the period 1980-1995.
Figure 7.2 Bank credit and liquid liabilities for selected SADC countries
Botswana Malawi Mauritius Swaziland SA Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
□  Bank credit ■  Liquid liabilites as share of GDP j
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999
Interest rate spreads are defined as the difference between lending rates and 
deposit rates. The values for the individual countries were calculated as the 
average value for the period 1995-1999, using IFS data. Most developing 
countries have high interest rate spreads (as will be shown in Chapter 8). The 
large spreads seem to be related to the degree of bank concentration, the share 
of non-performing loans, and the lack of overall financial development. Malawi 
and Tanzania had the highest average interest rate spreads over this five-year 
period (both equal 17.2%). Malawi also had the highest share of non-performing
248
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
loans, and was also the country with the lowest value for the financial market
index. The ratio of non-performing loans to total advances, was calculated as an
average of the individual values for the banks in the 2001 KMPG survey. There
were no data available for any of the Zambian banks. Figure 7.3 shows the
positive relationship between interest rate spreads and non-performing loans.
The higher the loan portfolio risk (share of non-performing loans to total loans),
the larger the interest rate spread. Somewhat surprisingly, Botswana had the
lowest figures for both indices. Botswana has one of the more advanced financial
structures of the SADC countries, ranking just after SA and Mauritius.
Figure 7.3 Interest rate spreads and ratios of non-performing loans for selected 
SADC countries.
Botswana Malawi Mauritius Swaziland SA Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
O Spread ■  Share of non-perf loans j
Source: IFS, KPMG Banking survey- Africa, 2001.
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Another variable that was included was the share of assets of foreign-owned 
banks in total banking assets. This variable was obtained from the database 
compiled by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999), averaged over 1990-1995. 
This variable is equal to 100 for Swaziland, where all the banks are foreign- 
owned. SA had the lowest value, with only 0.6% of total bank assets being 
foreign-owned in 2000.
The last two variables are indicators of stock market development. Both these 
variables are from the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999) database. Total 
value traded’ is the total value traded on the stock market as a percentage of 
GDP. 'Stock market capitalization’ is also expressed as a share of GDP. South 
Africa has a well-developed stock market, and its stock market capitalization ratio 
is 131 %, much higher than that of any other country in the sample.
The ten variables were calculated as normalized values between 0-100 for each 
of the countries. If the country had the lowest value for an attribute, a value of 0 
was ascribed to that country for that attribute (100 for the highest value in the 
sample). Some values were not available for all the countries, and the average 
was calculated according to equation 7.2.
The last row of table 7.1 shows the summary values of the financial market 
structure index. South Africa has the highest value (85), the only country in the 
sample that can be classified as ‘largely developed’. Mauritius was the only
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country in the ‘somewhat developed' category (with a value of 58). Malawi had 
the lowest level of financial institutional development (a value of 18), classified as 
‘undeveloped’. The remaining five countries were in the ‘minimally developed’ 
category, i.e. Botswana (43), Tanzania (37), Swaziland (35), Zimbabwe (31) and 
Zambia (26).
7.7 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME
The index calculated above indicates that only South Africa has reached a stage 
where the money supply is endogenous according to the Post-Keynesian 
structuralist theory. In the “stages-theory” of Chick, a bank has to pass “stage 
two” before the money supply becomes endogenous. During this stage, the 
banking system begins to create credit independently of saving and bank 
liabilities are used as money. The index calculated above can be used as an 
indicator of the level of financial institutional development in the SADC countries.
The index gives a picture of a country at a specific point in time. Two financial 
deepening indicators used to construct the index were examined to give some 
indication of financial development overtime. Interest rate spreads and M3/GDP 
were looked at between 1980-1999. Two other indicators were also used to 
compare levels of development between 1985 (data permitting) and 1998. Where 
data for 1985 were not available, the earliest data available after that date have 
been used.
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The first indicator used to examine the evolution of financial development was 
the ratio of cash to demand deposits. If this ratio is relatively high, then the 
economy is still functioning as a cash economy and the role of credit is 
unimportant. The ratios for the SADC countries (1985 and 1998) are given in 
figure 7.4. Once again, South Africa and Namibia are the countries with the 
lowest levels. The ratio has decreased in almost all the countries between 1985 
and 1998. The exceptions are Angola, Tanzania and Zambia. All three these 
countries have undeveloped financial systems. Namibia once again had a 
marginal increase, probably due to the short period of measurement (1993 and 
1998). The high value for Mauritius is surprising, probably indicating that levels of 
financial development are not equally distributed across the entire population. 
High levels of financial institutional development might be prevalent in developed 
centres, with the rural population still mainly relying on cash.
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Figure 7.4 Ratio of cash / demand deposits (1985 & 1998)
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The second indicator used to measure financial development over time, was the 
ratio of cash to M2. The values for the years 1985 and 1998 are shown in figure 
7.5. Once again, it is clear that the countries with the lower ratios are the 
countries with higher levels of financial institutional development (as shown 
above), i.e. South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia. For most, the ratio 
fell over the period (indicating increased levels of financial sector development) 
between 1985 and 1998. The exceptions are Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
This is not surprising, as these countries also had the lowest level of financial 
institutional development, as measured by the index above. Namibia increased 
marginally, but since data were unavailable before 1993, the period is probably 
too short to make substantial conclusions.
Two other financial deepening variables, published by World Bank Development 
Indicators were used. Figure 7.6 shows ratios of M3 to GDP for 1985 and 1999. 
Except for the marginal increase in Tanzania, Botswana and Mauritius are the 
only countries where this ratio increased. Though South Africa had a small 
decrease, it remains one of the countries with a high M3/GDP value. Data for the 
period 1980-1999 are given in individual country tables (Appendix 7.2, tables
7.2.1 -7.2.9).
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Figure 7.6 Ratio of M3 / GDP (1985 & 1999)
Botswana Lesotho Mauritius Malawi Swaziland Tanzania South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe
|B1985 ■1999 |
Source: IFS, various years
Figure 7.7 shows interest rate spreads in 1985 and 1999. This is an important 
indicator of financial depth. This variable increased in all the countries in the 
sample (data for 1980-1999 in Appendix 7.2, tables 7.2.1 - 7.2.9). The tables 
(appendix 7.2) also show the ratio of net domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector to GDP as a financial deepening indicator. Mauritius and South Africa 
were the only two countries where this ratio increased between 1980 and 1999. 
The ratio decreased in the rest of the countries and became negative over the 
period in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. This variable included claims on the 
private sector, as well as net claims on the government and parastatals. In some 
of the countries, net claims on the government had a negative value, causing net 
domestic credit to be negative too.
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Figure 7.7. Interest rate spreads (1985 & 1999)
.
Botswana Lesotho Mauritius Malawi Swaziland Tanzania South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe
□  1985 ■  1999
Source: IFS, various years.
7.8 CONCLUSION
The question of whether the money supply in an individual country is 
endogenous or exogenous cannot be answered without a thorough analysis of 
the institutional environment. In this chapter, the approach of Minsky (financial 
instability hypothesis) was combined with the ‘stages theory’ of Chick and Niggle. 
It was argued that the financial instability hypothesis, with its emphasis on 
vulnerability to shocks, is applicable to countries with under-developed financial 
systems. Borrowers in these countries often face credit constraints due to the 
inherent instability in their financial systems and the high liquidity preference of 
the banking system.
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Chick and Niggle argued that countries move through different stages of 
monetary development as their financial systems mature. As economies move 
from one stage to the next, the money supply becomes increasingly endogenous. 
During the first stages the money supply is exogenously determined by the 
monetary authorities. After Chick’s “second stage”, the money supply becomes 
endogenous. As the development of the banking system encourages financial 
innovation, the system becomes increasingly unstable. Credit availability varies 
pro-cyclically with the business cycle. The important contribution of Dow is that 
banks also have a liquidity preference. During a downturn, they have an 
increasing liquidity preference and might decide to ration credit, to limit risk. The 
supply of loans falls below the total demand for credit.
Niggle argued that the money supply only becomes endogenous after stage 3, 
when innovations such as asset and liability management and overdraft facilities 
reduce the central bank’s control over the money supply. From the institutional 
discussion of the individual SADC countries it was clear that most of these 
countries are still struggling with the transition from the second to the third stage 
of their monetary development.
South Africa was the only country that could be clearly classified as ‘largely 
developed’, from the financial institutional index that was calculated for eight of
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the SADC countries. Malawi was the only country that was classified as 
‘undeveloped’.
Despite reform programmes the financial systems remain underdeveloped in 
most countries, with the informal sector still an important source of credit. The 
absence of a secondary bond market renders monetary policy ineffective and 
interest rates sticky. In most countries, the ratios of cash to M2 and cash to 
demand deposits have been lowered over time. In the countries with the lowest 
levels of financial development (Angola, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia) some of 
these indicators have actually worsened. Interest rate spreads have widened in 
all the countries between 1980 and 1999. M3/GDP ratios have also declined in all 
but Botswana and Mauritius (and marginally in Tanzania). Given the 
undeveloped state of the financial institutions in most of the SADC countries, it is 
difficult to envisage an endogenous money supply where the monetary 
authorities simply respond to the credit demands of the economy.
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SADC COUNTRIES: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND LEVELS OF 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Most SADC countries embarked upon liberalisation programmes, as part of 
structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s. The financial 
sectors were also liberalised as part of these programmes. In some of these 
countries, the financial sector was previously entirely state-owned, e.g. Tanzania, 
Mozambique and Angola. The reforms usually entailed increasing real interest 
rates to positive levels, using commercial criteria to allocate credit, strengthening 
bank supervision rules and restructuring previously state-owned banks 
(Mowatt,2001). From the individual discussions below, it is clear that most SADC 
countries still have economies with undeveloped financial markets. Most of them 
have not passed the second stage of Chick’s ‘stages of banking’ model.
a) ANGOLA
An IMF examining the financial development of 38 Sub-Saharan countries in 
1997 found that only two of these countries had “totally undeveloped financial 
systems”. One of these was Angola (IMF,1999:10). A BIS study conducted in
1999 confirmed this: “The Angolan payments system is still in its embryonic 
stage, and the same can be said of the Angolan financial system” (BIS,1999:5).
APPENDIX 7.1
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This becomes clear when the institutional environment of the financial system is 
considered.
Until 1991, there were only two banks in Angola, the Banco Nacional de Angola 
(BNA), which served both as a central bank and a commercial bank, and Banco 
Popular de Angola, a state-owned commercial bank (Mowatt,2001:18). At the 
time of writing, after representative offices of three Portugese banks were 
opened, there were five commercial banks and one investment bank. The 
availability of credit by private institutions was scarce due to a lack of reliable 
facilities to carry out these operations. The ratio of M2 to the broad money supply 
was 7.6% in 1990. This increased to 32.15% in 1993, 22.7% in 1995 and 22.4% 
in 1996. Currency is the most used payment medium in commercial transactions: 
“A minority of the population use banking services, with salaries being paid 
directly to workers in cash and kind" (BIS, 1999:7). Banking services outside 
Luanda are almost non-existent as a result of the ongoing civil war.
There is an inter-bank market, still in the early stages of development. Reserve 
requirements are strictly enforced (set at 35%). If a participating institution has 
insufficient funds after the daily clearing session, then the session is annulled 
and the staging of a new session takes place from which the defaulting institution 
is banned.
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The Banco Nadonal de Angola sets credit limits for financial institutions. The 
central bank also sets maximum interest rates for financial institutions. The bond 
market is underdeveloped. The insurance industry is also state-owned.
Initiatives were being planned for the reduction of credit risk through the 
establishment of a credit risk centre, as well as a centre for complaints regarding 
bills and promissory notes, and the establishment of a register which includes 
information on issuers of cheques without sufficient funds (BIS, 1999).
b) BOTSWANA
Cash (notes and coins) is the most widely used instrument of payment for most 
goods and services. In the rural areas, rudiments of the bartering system are still 
evident, in the form of payments in kind, usually agricultural products and the 
like. The commercial banks’ branch network is virtually non-existent in most of 
the rural areas, especially the remote ones. Table 7.1.1 gives a breakdown of the 
institutions in the banking sector in Botswana in 1997.
Table 7.1.1: Botswana Institutional Framework (September 1997).
CATEGORIES NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS
NUMBER OF 
BRANCHES
NUMBER OF 
ACCOUNTS 
(Thousands).
Central bank 1 1 2.3
Commercial banks 6 50 286
Savings banks 1 0 n.a.
Public credit 
institutions
2 14 n.a.
Post Office 1 112 n.a.
Source: BIS, Payment Systems in SADC, 1999.
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Table 7.1.2: Botswana -  Commercial Banks (2000)
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing
advances/a
dvances
Total assets 
(Pula 
Million)
Number of 
branches
Market share
Barclays bank of 
Botswana
18.8 N/a 3242.5 9 36.3%
Standard Chartered 
Bank of Botswana
16.98 2.65 2393 14 26.8%
First National Bank of 
Botswana
16.82 1.8 2033.5 12 22.7%
Stanbic Bank of 
Botswana
18 0.47 753.8 4 8.4%
Botswana Building 
Society
53.29 5.2 376.7 9 4.2%
ULC (Pty) Ltd. 17.33 6.6 129.1 2 1.4%
Source: KPMG Banking Survey -  Africa, 2001
Capital adequacy ratios are relatively high (compared to the Basle requirement of
8%). The ratios of non-performing advances to total advances are some of the 
lowest in the whole sample for SADC countries, suggesting that banks manage 
their loan book well. It might also indicate a high degree of risk aversion, which 
might lead to credit rationing. There are three large banks (assets exceeding 
2000 million Botswana pulas), all subsidiaries of foreign banks. The largest bank 
(Barclays Bank of Botswana) has only 9 branches.
There is an inter-bank market, but no formal structures regulating interaction 
among the commercial banks. The money market has developed over the past 
years; the main instrument is Bank of Botswana Certificates. This is the principal 
instrument through which interest rate policy is implemented (BIS, 1999:27). The 
Bank of Botswana Certificates range in maturity from one to nine months and are 
traded on a secondary market. The majority of these are held by commercial 
banks. Botswana’s bond market is undeveloped, with only a few bonds being
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available. The Botswana Stock Exchange has been operating since 1995. In
2000 it had 23 listed companies (Mowatt,2001:19).
There are no interest rate ceilings, and all interest rates are market determined. 
Positive real interest rates have existed since 1993. The reserve requirement is 
3,25% of deposit liabilities, and there is also a liquidity asset reserve requirement 
of 10% of deposit liabilities: “Reserve requirements...have been used sparingly in 
Botswana in consideration of the fact that they tend to put banks at a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis other institutions that provide similar services. Also given 
excess liquidity the reserve requirements are unlikely to have much impact” 
(Masalila & Phetwe,2001:11).
Botswana has made considerable progress with the development of its financial 
sector, but it still lags behind developed countries. Significant parts of the vast 
country remain underbanked, with most of the banking services concentrated 
around the bigger centres.
c) LESOTHO
Lesotho’s financial sector consists of the following institutions: 
Table 7.1.3: Lesotho Institutional Framework (1998)
CATEGORIES NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS
NUMBER OF 
BRANCHES
NUMBER OF 
ACCOUNTS 
(Thousands).
Central Bank 1 - -
Commercial banks 3 16 372
Public credit 
institutions
1 8 -
Post Office 1 47 -
Source: BIS, Payment Systems in SADC, 1999.
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Lesotho has a relatively advanced financial sector, probably explained by its 
proximity to South Africa. The Central Bank of Lesotho implements monetary 
policy through policy instruments such as interest rates, reserve requirements 
and open market operations. Credit ceilings are also used. There is an efficient 
inter-bank market, and cheques and credit cards are widely used. The reserve 
requirement was 9,73% in 1996. (This was a dramatic decline from 34,74% in 
1992 and 41,39% in 1993).
d) MALAWI
The financial system in Malawi is underdeveloped and dominated by a few 
institutions offering a limited range of services. The economy is predominantly 
rural-based, and cash is the dominant method of payment. Approximately 75% of 
all business transactions are conducted through cash payments. The ratio of M1 
to the aggregate money supply averaged 53% between 1992 and 1996. Few 
people have bank accounts (BIS, 1999:59). Table 7.1.4 gives some information 
about the commercial banking system in Malawi.
Table 7.1.4: Malawi -  commercial banking sector (20(DO)
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing
advances/ad
vances
Market share Total assets 
(millions)
Number of 
branches
National Bank of 
Malawi
35.32 10.99 46.8% 10822.2 13
Commercial Bank of 
Malawi
15.1 5.87 39.8% 9187.9 19
First Merchant Bank 24.01 4.86 8.5% 1970.5 4
Fincom Bank of 
Malawi
22.12 18.86 4.7% 1099.4 1
Source: KPMG Banking Survey -  Africa, 2001
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Malawi started a programme of structural adjustment in 1988. Before that there 
were only two banks, the National Bank of Malawi and the Commercial Bank of 
Malawi. Both were owned by the state. There was no secondary money market 
and no capital market. Direct control measures were used, such as credit ceilings 
and interest rate controls (Mowatt,2001:21). There are five commercial banks 
(data were available for only four banks), three leasing companies, one building 
society and one savings bank. As can be seen from table 7.1.4, all banks have 
higher capital adequacy ratios than the required 8%. Non-performing loans are a 
problem for two of the banks (ratios exceeding 10%). Malawi has a very 
concentrated banking sector, since two banks control 86% of the market.
Monetary policy has shifted to market related measures. Interest rate controls 
were finally abolished in 1990 and quantitative controls in 1991 
(Mowatt,2001:21). These were replaced by reserve requirements as an indirect 
monetary policy instrument. Treasury bills were already issued in 1984, but 
trading was very low until 1992, when the auctioning of treasury bills was 
introduced. Before 1995, Treasury bill auctions were held only once a month, 
currently they take place once a week. The Bank of Malawi uses targets for both 
inflation and for monetary aggregates. A quarterly growth target is set for reserve 
money: “While more emphasis was initially put on growth in the M2 aggregate, 
recent developments have indicated that M2 can better be influenced by 
monitoring growth in reserve money than the broad measure of money supply” 
(Sato,2001:12).
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Traditional fractional reserve banking is the operative method in Malawi. Banks 
are constrained by capital and reserve requirements. Despite the reforms, the 
financial system remains under-developed, and the informal sector remains an 
important source of credit.
Some new initiatives aimed at providing credit to small and medium enterprises. 
The Malawi Rural Finance company provides specifically loans to small and 
medium enterprises and mainly in the agriculture and transport sectors. Other 
examples are the Malawi Union of Savings Credit Cooperatives Limited 
(MUSCO), Small Enterprise Development Organization of Malawi, Woman World 
Banking, etc. MUSCO is basically a savings institution which concentrates on 
encouraging people to form savings groups. The accumulated savings are then 
used for the benefit of the members in terms of loans granted.
An inter-bank market was established in 1997. This has fostered substantial 
growth in the financial sector, assisting financial institutions in their liquidity 
management task. Reserve requirements, however, still remain important, as the 
inter-bank market is relatively young (only 4 years). When the reserve 
requirement was introduced in 1989, it was set at 20%. It increased to 35% in 
1995 and was only adjusted downward in the second half of 2000 (to 30%) 
(Sato,2001:15).
266
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
The Malawi Stock Exchange was established in 1994, but the first company was 
listed only in 1996. In 2000 there were six listed companies on the Malawi Stock 
Exchange (Mowatt,2001).
e) MAURITIUS
Mauritius has a highly developed financial system with ten commercial banks and 
nine offshore banks. The degree of development can probably be attributed to its 
popularity as an international tourist destination and its importance as an 
investment centre for gaining exposure to Africa. Five commercial banks are 
locally incorporated and five are branches of foreign banks. Treasury bills are 
auctioned weekly on the money market, with a secondary market handling daily 
transactions. Interest rates are set by the commercial banks. The inter-bank 
money market is also relatively active. Cheques, credit cards and debit cards are 
commonly used (BIS, 1999:79). Table 7.1.5 gives some data for six of the 
commercial banks.
Table 7.1.5: Mauritius -  commercial banks (2000)
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing
advances/
Advances
Market share Total assets 
(Millions)
Number of 
branches
The Mauritius 
Commercial Bank
13.02 n/a 53.8% 65714.2 41
State Bank of 
Mauritius Group
21.18 5.9 24.5% 29978.4 51
HSBC Mauritius 12.02 3.5 8.9% 10951.9 11
Barclays Bank 10.55 1.1 5.4% 6651 12
The Delphis Bank 22.05 5.1 4.7% 5771.1 13
Bank of Baroda 20.39 21.87 1.7% 2092.8 6
Habib Bank 64.61 0.01 0.6% 811.6 4
Source: KPMG Banking Survey-Africa, 2001.
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Table 7.1.5 shows that capital adequacy ratios are sufficient. Non-performing 
loans are not a problem, except for the Bank of Baroda. Cash as a percentage of 
M1 was 45,8% for 1998. There is a high number of bank branches in this small 
island economy.
Reserve requirements were reduced to 5.5% in July 1998. This was a part of the 
liberalization of the financial system that started in 1991. This represented a 
move away from instruments such as reserve requirements, quantitative controls 
on bank credit expansion, selective credit controls and interest rate guidelines 
(BIS,1999).
f) MOZAMBIQUE
Table 7.1.6 shows the institutions in the financial sector: 
Table 7.1.6 : Mozambique Institutional Framework (1998)
CATEGORIES NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS
NUMBER OF BRANCHES
Central Bank 1 1
Commercial banks 5 239
Source: BIS, Payment Systems in SADC, 1999.
Mozambique has an underdeveloped financial system, due to the long civil war. 
Cash is the principal mode of payment, acceptance of cheques and other 
payment instruments is still marginal. Total cash as a percentage of the broad 
money supply is more than 65%. In 1992, a modernization program was initiated. 
At that stage there were three commercial banks of which two were state owned.
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They have subsequently been privatised. Under the new program, a number of 
banks are emerging, including commercial banks, credit cooperatives, leasing 
institutions, etc. The Post Office is also expected to resume its role in the 
payments system. No international credit card facilities are available, and visitors 
to the country mainly use travellers cheques.
Under the modernisation program, the development of the money market has 
allowed the government to move towards indirect instruments of monetary 
control as of mid-1999 and away from bank-by-bank credit ceilings. The Bank of 
Mozambique started to issue treasury bills at the end of 1999. Reserve 
requirements were extended to time deposits in May 1999. The aim was to 
enforce the Basle Committee’s minimum capital adequacy ratio in all banks by 
March 2000. Credit ceilings were also removed (IMF,1999).
g) NAMIBIA
Namibia has an advanced financial system, probably as a result of its close ties 
to South Africa for many years. After independence in 1990, the system has 
developed further into a sophisticated system that can be compared to that of a 
developed country. There are five commercial banks with 78 branches, one 
building society and a Post Savings Bank. Apart from the Namibian dollar, the 
South African rand is also accepted as legal tender in Namibia. Namibia forms 
part of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) with Lesotho, South Africa and
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Swaziland as the other members. As a result of the fixed exchange rate policy, 
Namibia cannot engage in any active discretionary monetary policy. Monetary 
policy is subordinated to monetary policy decisions taken by South Africa.
Table 7.1.7 gives some data for four of the five banks, for which data were 
available.
Table 7.1.7 Namibia: commercial banks (2000)
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing 
advances to 
total 
advances
Market share Total assets 
(Namibian $ 
Millions)
Number of 
branches
Standard Bank of 
Namibia
11.25 0.51 36.6% 4251.8 19
First National Bank of 
Namibia
24.1 8.9 25.6% 2976.4 34
Bank Windhoek Ltd 10.63 2.97 20.8% 2415.4 22
Commercial Bank of 
Namibia
15.3 8.54 16.8% 1951.7 10
Source: KMPG Banking Survey-Africa, 2001.
The four banks in the table have relatively well distributed market shares, with 
the biggest bank being Standard Bank of Namibia (a subsidiary of Standard Bank 
South Africa). The ratio of non-performing loans is high for two of the banks 
(exceeding 8%). Capital adequacy ratios are sufficient.
Traditional monetary policy instruments, e.g. discount rates, reserve 
requirements, etc. are only used to a limited degree in Namibia. The bank rate is 
fixed at 25 basis points below South Africa’s repo rate (Kalenga,2001:4).
Reserve requirements are also used in a limited sense. Most commercial banks 
in Namibia are subsidiaries of South African banks, and capital flows would result
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if reserve requirements differ substantially from South African levels. This must 
be avoided in terms of the fixed exchange rate arrangement. The minimum cash 
reserve requirement is 5% of short-term liabilities and 2% of medium-term 
liabilities to the public. There is an efficient inter-bank market.
In rural areas, the population trades mostly with cash. Namibia follows the 
monetary policy of South Africa very closely in order to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate between the Namibian dollar and the SA rand. The Namibian 
dollar, which was first issued in 1993, is pegged to the South African rand at par 
value. This has led to relatively low inflation rates (compared to other SADC 
countries) of less than 10%: “Over the past decade, inflation in Namibia has 
declined from an all time high of 18 per cent in 1992, reaching a low level of 6,2 
per cent in 1998. Although it increased again to 9,3 per cent in 2000, it can be 
argued that the rate has been relatively low and stable” (Kalenga,2001:7).
h) SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa has a very well developed financial system with sophisticated 
financial instruments and a well developed bond market. There are 
approximately 20 million electronic cards in circulation.
Table 7.1.8 shows data for some of the larger banks in the financial sector. South 
Africa has four large banks (after recent consolidation in the sector). These are
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ABSA bank, Standard Bank, Nedcor and the First Rand group (First National 
Bank). South Africa has an efficient banking sector, with sufficient capital 
adequacy ratios and low non-performing loans ratios (except for one small bank, 
VBS Mutual Bank).
Table 7.1.8: South Africa’s banking sector (2000)
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing 
advances to 
total 
advances
Market share Total assets 
(Rand 
Millions)
Number of 
branches
ABSA Group Ltd 10.9 4.9 24.0% 165109 791
Standard Bank 
Investment 
Corporation Ltd
13.4 4.05 22.3% 153426 557
Nedcor Ltd 11.49 4.66 19.4% 133614 405
First Rand Banking 
Group
10.86 3.83 17.6% 121057.2 683
BOE Ltd 10.43 2.99 8.9% 61427 274
Investec Group Ltd 12 2.06 5.6% 39121
African Bank 
Investments Ltd
45.91 0.01 0.75% 5164 1538
Imperial Bank Ltd 13.41 3.36 0.6% 4152.7 5
PSG Investment 
Bank
55 n/a 0.3% 2590.6 -
TEBA Bank Ltd 105.4 n/a 0.1% 1181.5 -
Bank of Taiwan SA n/a n/a 0.02% 144.8 -
VBS Mutual Bank n/a 11.35 0.02% 137.6 4
Source: KPMG Banking Survey-Africa, 2001
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) introduced a new repurchase system in 
March 1998. The aim was to allow the market to play a bigger role in determining 
interest rates. But as the banking sector is highly concentrated, this system failed 
to work as planned. In practice, the participation in the daily repurchase auctions 
was limited to the four big banks. This resulted in inflexible money-market rates 
and an inter-bank market that did not always clear effectively. In August 2001, 
some measures were introduced to increase the effective use of the inter-bank
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market by the commercial banks. Measures introduced included: announcing the 
estimated liquidity requirement after the daily auction, changing daily repurchase 
tenders of a seven-day maturity to weekly tenders, and changing the calculation 
of the vault cash included in the minimum reserve requirement (Casteleijn, 2001).
i) SWAZILAND
Swaziland is also a member of the Common Monetary Area. Swaziland’s 
financial sector comprises of four commercial banks, one building society, and a 
development bank. All commercial banks are subsidiaries of South African 
banks, and have therefore benefited from the technological innovations that have 
taken place in South Africa. These four commercial banks have a network of 30 
branches. The main objective of the development bank is to issue agricultural 
and commercial loans, while the building society is primarily responsible for 
mortgage financing (CBS,2001:3).
Table 7.1.9: Financial Institutions in Swaziland (2000/01)
2000/01
Number of Banks 4
Branch network (banks) 30
Agencies (banks) 9
ATM Networks (banks) 42
Building society 1
Branch Network (Building 
Society)
5
Non-Bank Financial Institutions. 5
Source: Central Bank of Swaziland, 2001.
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Table 7.1.10: Commercial Banks -  Swaziland (2000)
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing 
advances to 
total advances
Market share Total assets 
(LilangeniMillio 
ns)
Number of 
branches
Standard Bank Swaziland 14.66 3.02 46.0% 1121.3 11
First National Bank of 
Swaziland
7.5 16.54 20.6% 502.8 6
Nedbank Swaziland 10.14 9.46 19.8% 482.1 5
Swaziland Development 
and Savings Bank
27 57.96 13.4% 327 8
Source: KPMG Banking Survey -Africa, 2001
The share of non-performing loans is relatively high, especially for the Swaziland 
Development Bank (57.96%). This might lead to credit rationing in the future 
which will impact negatively on the access to finance for small farmers. Standard 
Bank has the highest number of branches and the largest market share.
Swaziland maintains a fixed exchange rate of the Swazi lilangeni to the SA rand. 
This does not permit an independent monetary policy by the Central Bank of 
Swaziland (CBS): “With (effectively) a common currency, the money supply is 
controlled in South Africa. This means that Swaziland has limited ability to 
manage its own money supply, nor to have an independent exchange rate policy 
(as long as the Lilangeni remains at par with the Rand)” (BIS,1999:176).
Interest rates have been kept at stable margins with the South African rates, with 
deposit and lending rates several points below those of South Africa. The 
margins varied between 2% and 6%. During the last decade, these interest rate 
differentials have been reduced. The country has experienced growth in the use 
of current bank accounts, although cash is still the preferred medium of payment
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in many areas, e.g. the payment of salaries and wages to lower income groups. 
There is an inter-bank market. Banks in Swaziland have always relied on the 
inter-bank market to meet shortfalls and are less reliant on borrowing from the 
central bank. The cash reserve requirement is currently 4% of domestic deposits.
Financial markets in Swaziland are small and under-developed. There is not a 
large market for securities, and only small amounts of both treasury bills (E40 
million) and bonds (E30 million) are traded. These have been issued to 
encourage the development of the money market, not as a source of deficit 
financing for the government. The central bank issues its own bills from time to 
time. The Treasury and Central Bank bills are auctioned on a weekly and 
monthly basis. These markets remain shallow. In 1998 the CBS established a 
capital market development unit. The aim of this unit is to develop an appropriate 
regulatory framework for a capital market in Swaziland in order to facilitate the 
creation of an efficient securities market (CBS,2001:11).
j) TANZANIA
For 25 years after independence in the 1960s, Tanzania had only a single state 
owned bank, until a program of financial liberalization was initiated in 1993. Cash 
has been the dominant means of payment, with little usage of cheques or other 
cash-less financial instruments. As the existing payment system is still mainly 
cash based, most transactions and payments are affected outside the banking 
system.
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Table 7.1.11 shows data for 9 commercial banks. Concentration levels are high, 
with the largest bank controlling about 47% of the banking sector. Most of the 
banks have a limited number of branches (usually between one and three). A 
payments modernisation project was launched in August 1996 with the aim of 
moving the economy from cash to cash-less modes of payment. For the year 
ended June 1996, commercial banks’ credit to the economy declined by 50,2% 
compared with the previous year. This was as a result of a 82 billion Tanzanian 
Shillings write-off of non-performing loans (IMF,1999). The data in Table 7.1.11 is 
for 2000, and it seems that most banks have managed to reduce their ratios of 
non-performing loans. The exception is Stanbic Bank, with a ratio of 22.41%.
Table 7.1.11: Tanzania -  Banking sector (2000).
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing 
advances to 
total 
advances
Market share Total assets 
(Shillings 
Millions)
Number of 
branches
Standard Chartered 
Bank
16.47 1.52 47.3% 197540 6
Stanbic Bank 22 22.41 27.7% 115855.6 4
Tanzania Postal Bank 195.77 9.08 10.3% 43173.1 4
Diamond Trust Bank 40.75 3.04 4.3% 17986.5 1
Tanzania Investment 
Bank
n/a 13 4.2% 17729.5 1
Akiba Commercial 
Bank Ltd
35 6.96 2.2% 9489.5 2
Kenya Commercial 
Bank
81.86 1.89 2.2% 9432.6 n/a
International Bank of 
Malaysia
2166.2 n/a 1.3% 5505.7 1
Mufindi Community 
Bank
n/a n/a 0.06% 257.8 1
Source: KPMG Ban king Survey, Africa -  20C)1
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Open market operations are the main instrument of monetary policy in Tanzania. 
The cash reserve requirement is still very important, with the reserve requirement 
currently at 10% of total bank deposits. The monetary transmission mechanism is 
weak, as Tanzania does not have an efficient secondary or inter-bank market. 
There is only a rudimentary inter-bank market. The money market is also not well 
developed. Only one instrument, Treasury Bills is sold, and there are no publicly- 
owned companies.
There is only a rudimentary bond market, with government debt instruments the 
only securities in the market (BIS, 1999). Treasury bills were auctioned for the 
first time in 1993 (Masawe,2001). The use of cheques is increasing slowly, 
because of problems with cheques being backed by insufficient funds and 
clearing taking up to 28 days in more remote parts of the country. Tanzania has a 
newly-created stock exchange, but foreigners are not allowed to invest and the 
market therefore remain very small, with only 2 listed companies in 2000 
(Mowatt,2001:55).
k) ZAMBIA
Until a democratically elected government came to power in 1991 (the first 
multiparty democratic elections in more than 20 years), Zambia was a centrally 
planned economy. The change to a market economy began with the election of 
the new government. In 1998 there were 22 commercial banks with a total of 152
277
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
branches, one Savings Bank, one Cooperative Bank, three building societies, six 
specialized non-bank financial institutions and one Post Office. Cash is still the 
dominant form of payment. The most important non-cash payment instrument is 
the cheque. Credit and debit cards have been introduced recently and are used 
on a small scale. Monetary policy focuses on monetary targets and the reserve 
requirement is an important operative variable. The required reserve ratio was 
reduced drastically in 1995, from 30% to only 3%(IMF,1999:18)
Table 7.1.12: Zambia -  Banking sector (2000).
Capital adequacy
(%)
Market share Total assets 
(Kwacha Millions)
Barclays Bank of 
Zambia
13 37.2% 740296
Standard Chartered 
Bank Zambia
20.12 27.7% 551375
Stanbic Bank Zambia 24.01 16.8% 335697.1
Citibank of Zambia 54.91 15.3% 305343
First Alliance Bank 262.4 1.9% 39636
New Capital Bank Pic 36.97 0.8% 16342.7
Source: KPMG Banking Survey, Africa -  2001
Table 7.1.12 shows data for six of the commercial banks in Zambia. Barclays 
Bank has the biggest market share (37%), followed by Standard Chartered Bank 
(27%) and Stanbic Bank of Zambia (16.8%).
A treasury bill tender system was introduced in 1993. This signified a shift from 
fixed pricing of treasury bills and government bonds, to a market-determined 
pricing system. Another development was the emergence of an inter-bank 
market as part of the liberalisation process.
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The first formal capital market was formed in 1994, in the form of the Lusaka 
stock exchange. Yet, the weak and undeveloped nature of the Zambian financial 
system remains problematic for monetary policy effectiveness. Four of the five 
largest banks are branches of foreign banks. There is also a limited range of 
financial instruments, with treasury bills and Government bonds the main 
instruments. There are only nine companies listed on the stock exchange. 
Commercial banking services are limited and costly. The money and bond 
markets remain undeveloped. The absence of an active secondary bond market 
makes the use of open market operations less effective. The inter-bank market is 
weak and is characterised by very volatile lending rates (Kalyalya,2001).
I) ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe has a relatively advanced financial sector. Table 7.1.13 shows the 
institutions that participate in this sector.
Table 7.1.13: Zimbabwe Institutional Framework (1998).
CATEGORIES NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS
NUMBER OF BRANCHES
Central Bank 1 2
Commercial Banks 7 131
Merchant Banks 9 -
Savings Banks 10 11
Building Societies 5 195
Finance Houses 6 16
Discount Houses 5 5
Post Office Savings Bank 1 181
Source: BIS, Payment Systems in SADC, 1999.
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Table 7.1.14: Zimbabwe Banking System: selected data (2000).
Capital
adequacy
(%)
Non­
performing 
advances to 
total 
advances
Market
share
Total assets 
(Zimbabwe 
$ Millions)
Number of 
branches
Standard Chartered Bank 
Zimbabwe
15.86 1.1 14.6% 25110 49
Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe 19 11.83 13.2% 22837.1 43
Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe
10.18 29.3 10.7% 18405 24
Central Africa Building 
Society
51.72 n/a 10.2% 17582.4 106
ABC Holdings 29.39 n/a 7.4% 12738.4 n/a
Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe 16.67 3.96 6.1% 10600 12
Beverley Building Society 142.07 n/a 4.8% 8349.5 63
Trust Merchant Bank 16.08 1.98 4.5% 7842.7 2
Kingdom Financial Holdings 28.7 3.29 4.4% 7598.2 7
NMBZ Holdings 21.09 7.98 4.2% 7283.8 3
Founders Building Society 96 n/a 3.0% 5173.6 47
First Banking Corporation 16.66 13.96 2.4% 4232.6 12
Merchant Bank of central 
Africa
23.7 2.5 2.4% 4198.1 2
Intermarket Discount House 17.02 n/a 1.6% 2756.5 1
Rapid Discount House 16.82 n/a 1.4% 2567 1
Century Holdings Ltd 17 3.74 1.3% 2320.8 n/a
Interfin Merchant Bank 14 n/a 1.3% 2365.2 1
National Discount House 8.34 n/a 1.3% 2347.6 1
Zimbabwe Building Society 70.5 4.6 1.3% 2389.3 17
First National Building 
Society
67.3 n/a 0.9% 1551.3 4
Global Investments House 44.12 n/a 0.5% 981.6 1
Stanbic Finance Zimbabwe 16.27 0.59 0.5% 950.7 2
Tetrad Securities 299.23 n/a 0.5% 945.4 0
Fincor Finance Corporation 52.14 30.82 0.3% 605.7 2
Source: KPMG Banking Survey-Africa, 2001.
Zimbabwe embarked on a five year Structural Adjustment Program in 1990, 
which also included the liberalization of the financial sector. There has been an 
increase in the number of participants in the financial sector. Given the regulated 
environment before liberalization, the new developments have exposed banks to 
greater competition and increased operational and liquidity risk.
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The cheque is the major paper based instrument used in Zimbabwe. There is a 
bond market and an inter-bank market. Treasury bills are issued by the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe, with maturities ranging from 90 to 180 days. Treasury bills 
are usually auctioned twice a week, but more recently they have been issued in 
response to market liquidity conditions. (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,2001:32).
The Reserve Bank has always intervened to provide liquidity where needed. 
Banks experiencing liquidity problems are always accommodated by the Central 
Bank against acceptable securities. Zimbabwe has a stock exchange, but there 
is a restriction on foreign participation, limiting acquisition to 35% of shares 
traded on the exchange. Zimbabwe has 70 companies that are listed on the 
stock exchange (Mowatt,2001:55).
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APPENDIX 7.2 Financial deepening indicators
Table 7.2.1 Financial depth: Botswana
Botswana Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 3.5 0.7 27.0
1981 1.0 8.2 23.9
1982 1.2 3.9 22.4
1983 1.5 -0.6 23.3
1984 2.0 -7.6 21.5
1985 2.5 -18.5 24.6
1986 2.3 -35.7 21.7
1987 2.5 -43.5 28.8
1988 2.8 -40.1 24.9
1989 2.1 -40.9 29.0
1990 1.8 -46.4 22.1
1991 0.4 -41.1 27.6
1992 1.5 -42.4 28.3
1993 1.4 -40.5 21.0
1994 3.5 -41.5 20.2
1995 4.3 -35.0 19.8
1996 4.1 -33.8 19.5
1997 4.8 -73.4 22.2
1998 4.8 -78.5 27.8
1999 5.2 -69.7 31.2
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
Table 7.2.2 Financial depth: Lesotho
Lesotho Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 N/A 19.3 35.3
1981 5.4 29.3 38.2
1982 5.3 31.4 42.9
1983 6.0 31.0 47.3
1984 7.7 28.7 46.7
1985 9.3 30.9 48.2
1986 3.4 34.5 48.1
1987 4.1 36.0 44.5
1988 4.1 38.7 43.5
1989 5.9 38.3 40.8
1990 7.4 30.1 38.8
1991 7.0 24.9 36.1
1992 7.6 12.8 32.1
1993 7.8 4.8 35.0
1994 5.8 0.1 34.9
1995 3.0 -6.3 33.2
1996 5.0 -11.1 32.8
1997 6.2 -20.8 30.7
1998 9.3 -20.2 36.0
1999 11.6 -0.2 31.1
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
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Table 7.2.3 Financial depth: Malawi
Malawi Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 8.8 35.7 21.6
1981 8.8 41.5 24.4
1982 8.8 43.6 25.0
1983 8.4 44.1 23.2
1984 4.8 37.9 25.1
1985 5.9 38.0 22.5
1986 6.3 39.6 24.9
1987 5.3 35.6 28.6
1988 8.8 23.3 26.2
1989 10.3 22.7 22.8
1990 8.9 20.5 22.0
1991 7.5 20.2 22.6
1992 5.5 31.2 25.2
1993 7.8 25.8 24.6
1994 6.0 30.2 29.2
1995 10.1 14.3 20.8
1996 19.0 9.8 16.9
1997 18.0 10.5 16.2
1998 18.6 8.4 19.4
1999 20.4 8.9 16.4
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
Table 7.2.4 Financial depth: Mauritius
Mauritius Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 #N/A 51.0 45.3
1981 2.9 57.8 40.1
1982 2.2 58.8 43.1
1983 3.0 63.1 43.5
1984 3.0 64.6 44.2
1985 4.4 60.7 50.0
1986 4.8 55.6 54.3
1987 4.8 48.0 57.2
1988 5.0 47.5 62.0
1989 5.1 45.9 61.7
1990 5.4 45.1 63.3
1991 5.4 50.2 68.3
1992 7.1 53.5 70.6
1993 8.2 58.9 72.7
1994 7.9 64.9 73.1
1995 8.6 67.1 79.0
1996 10.0 63.7 76.0
1997 9.8 72.1 79.5
1998 10.6 77.0 77.7
1999 10.7 76.7 81.8
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
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Table 7.2.5 Financial depth: Swaziland
Swaziland Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 5.0 8.1 29.5
1981 4.5 17.1 28.4
1982 6.0 19.7 27.6
1983 5.5 22.0 32.0
1984 5.5 20.7 32.7
1985 6.8 20.9 36.5
1986 6.8 19.1 31.8
1987 7.1 15.5 31.3
1988 5.8 11.3 32.4
1989 5.6 6.5 33.8
1990 5.7 7.7 29.0
1991 5.4 2.3 31.9
1992 6.0 3.4 33.9
1993 6.6 6.1 33.0
1994 7.0 13.6 31.3
1995 7.8 7.1 26.7
1996 7.5 3.5 27.2
1997 7.5 2.6 28.2
1998 7.6 -3.9 28.8
1999 7.5 -3.7 29.8
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Table 7.2.6 Financial depth: Tanzania
Tanzania Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 7.5 N/A N/A
1981 8.0 N/A N/A
1982 8.0 N/A N/A
1983 9.0 N/A N/A
1984 9.0 N/A N/A
1985 7.8 N/A N/A
1986 10.0 N/A N/A
1987 11.8 N/A N/A
1988 12.2 23.7 17.4
1989 14.0 26.4 18.4
1990 N/A 34.6 19.9
1991 N/A 30.0 20.0
1992 N/A 29.3 22.1
1993 N/A 32.5 24.5
1994 N/A 27.1 24.9
1995 18.2 23.0 25.6
1996 20.4 15.7 22.2
1997 18.4 12.4 20.1
1998 15.1 11.9 18.3
1999 14.1 12.8 19.0
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
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Table 7.2.7 Financial depth: South Africa
SA Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 4.0 77.1 50.1
1981 5.8 83.0 49.7
1982 6.3 84.1 50.6
1983 3.0 88.3 50.8
1984 4.0 90.6 50.4
1985 4.5 97.3 50.3
1986 3.4 95.1 44.6
1987 3.8 93.7 43.6
1988 1.8 94.6 44.1
1989 1.7 93.8 44.9
1990 2.1 97.8 44.6
1991 3.0 N/A 46.4
1992 5.1 119.8 41.9
1993 4.7 129.7 38.4
1994 4.5 136.2 40.0
1995 4.4 140.2 39.0
1996 4.6 140.2 41.0
1997 4.6 138.7 43.7
1998 5.3 139.5 45.5
1999 5.8 155.0 45.1
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
Table 7.2.8 Financial depth: Zambia
Zambia Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 2.5 60.8 34.2
1981 3.3 64.9 32.2
1982 3.5 80.9 40.6
1983 6.0 76.1 38.7
1984 6.8 72.1 38.4
1985 3.3 59.7 29.7
1986 9.7 45.0 31.3
1987 8.0 32.7 30.4
1988 6.9 66.4 32.9
1989 6.9 73.2 30.3
1990 9.5 67.8 21.8
1991 N/A 83.3 22.4
1992 6.1 N/A N/A
1993 N/A 35.8 14.1
1994 24.4 52.6 14.8
1995 15.3 64.1 17.2
1996 11.7 58.8 17.6
1997 12.2 45.1 17.0
1998 18.7 65.7 18.1
1999 20.3 59.7 18.6
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
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Table 7.2.9 Financial depth: Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Financial depth: Interest 
rate spread (Unit: lending 
rate minus deposit rate)
Financial depth: Net 
domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (Unit: 
% of GDP)
Financial depth: Liquid 
liabilities (M3) as % of 
GDP
1980 14.0 48.8 47.7
1981 12.7 45.4 41.0
1982 8.5 45.9 41.6
1983 10.3 44.5 33.8
1984 12.7 39.5 37.6
1985 7.1 40.4 39.8
1986 2.7 40.0 38.0
1987 3.4 44.6 43.6
1988 3.3 35.5 36.7
1989 4.1 42.0 42.7
1990 2.9 41.7 41.8
1991 1.3 39.3 34.0
1992 -8.9 43.0 31.6
1993 6.9 47.7 37.1
1994 8.1 43.6 38.4
1995 8.8 52.0 45.0
1996 12.7 48.7 44.7
1997 13.9 62.9 48.1
1998 13.0 60.5 37.2
1999 16.9 45.4 32.8
Source: World Bank Development Indicators
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EXOGENOUS INTEREST RATES
Classical loanable funds and Keynesian liquidity preference theories of 
interest rate determination, AD-AS and IS-LM theories of income 
determination, and any long-run growth model, are all fatally flawed 
(Moore, 2000).
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The core of the endogeneity theory is that the money supply is determined by 
the demand for bank credit. The demand for credit is determined by the ‘state 
of trade’, the level of nominal demand in the economy. The central bank plays 
the role of ‘lender of last resort’ and accommodates demand for additional 
reserves. The central bank sets the official short-term rate. The interest rate is 
exogenous. Banks charge this official rate plus a stable mark-up.
In recent years, an alternative theory of endogenous money has evolved 
claiming that reserves can be quantity constrained. There are several reasons 
for this. Some authors use the argument of ‘liquidity preference’, others refer 
to financial innovation and liability management. These ‘structuralists’ argue 
that the central bank does not pursue a fully accommodating monetary policy. 
Both accommodationists and structuralists agree that banks extend credit and 
‘look for reserves later.’ In the accommodationist world, this is not 
problematic, since the central bank is obliged to ensure system liquidity. In the
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structuralist world, the central bank “does indeed exercise its authority to 
quantity-constrain the reserves it supplies -  it will not necessarily pursue a 
fully accommodative posture through open market operations”
(Pollin,1991:374).
The endogenous money theory has become synonymous with the idea of 
‘endogenous money, exogenous interest rates.’ There is a lively debate on 
the issue of ‘exogenous interest rates.’ The demand for credit has no direct 
influence on the interest rate in this analysis. Increases in the demand for 
credit are accommodated by corresponding increases in the supply of credit 
money. All the central bank can do to stimulate aggregate demand, is to lower 
the interest rate: “The ultimate constraints of credit and real production are 
thus derived from political contrivance, not from scarcity, the ‘first principle’ of 
neoclassical economics” (Trautwein,1997:9). In the ‘accommodationist’ view 
all creditworthy demand for credit is accommodated by the monetary 
authorities, and the interest rate is set at a constant mark-up over the official 
rate.
In the structuralist view, the liquidity preference of banks determines interest 
rates. The bank lending rate is not simply a stable mark-up over the wholesale 
rate. The mark-up reflects lending risks, and varies over the business cycle.
These opposing interpretations will be tested in this chapter. A general 
overview provides the theoretical background, briefly explaining the 
differences between the two schools. The stability and variance of mark-ups
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will be examined. The focus then shifts to the behaviour of interest rate 
spreads over the business cycle. Finally, an econometric model will be 
developed, examining determinants of interest rate spreads at the micro-level 
in selected SADC countries. Individual banking data will be used to explain 
the high interest rate spreads in developing countries.
8.2 THE MARK-UP APPROACH
As explained in Chapter 4, the demand to hold nominal money is a function of 
interest rates, income and wealth. The supply of commodity money may be 
determined independently of demand, i.e. exogenously. But the supply of 
credit money is determined by the quantity of credit demanded and credit 
supplied. The demand for and supply of credit money are thus 
interdependent.
Moore has argued that the failure of modern economists to distinguish 
institutional changes in commodity and credit money has led to incorrect 
monetary policy conclusions: “In a world of banks and insurance companies, 
money markets and stock exchanges, money is quite a different thing from 
what it was before these institutions came into being” (Moore, 1988:4). Banks 
attempt to meet all creditworthy demand for credit. The interest rate they set is 
a stable mark-up over bank rate (set by the central bank). The money supply 
is endogenous; but interest rates are exogenous.
Once banks have acquiesced to an increased demand for credit and 
expanded their asset portfolios and total bank liabilities proportionately,
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it is virtually impossible for the central bank directly to restrict 
quantitatively the growth of any chosen monetary aggregate"
(Moore,1988:38).
Banks first grant loans and look for reserves later. Moore has shown that for 
the United States, total unused business loan commitments are approximately 
one half of the narrowly defined money stock (M1). Given the changing nature 
and developments of the banking system, it is impossible for the central bank 
to exogenously set the quantity of the money stock. Because central banks 
must ensure that confidence in the financial system is maintained, they must 
fulfil their role as supplier of system liquidity. The only instrument left to the 
central bank is to vary short-term interest rates, causing the reallocation of 
asset and debt portfolios: “The Federal Reserve retains the power to set the 
interest rate at which it will provide lender of last resort liquidity. But it has very 
limited ability to constrain quantitatively the amount of reserves provided 
below the demand for them” (Moore, 1988:39).
8.3 THE ‘STRUCTURALIST’ VIEW
In orthodox economic theory, the demand for money is a demand for a ‘stock’ 
of hoards, not a demand for a ‘flow’ of finance. The quantity of hoards is 
viewed as exogenously fixed. When aggregate demand (AD) rises, production 
and income increase, leading to a rise in the demand for money. Given the 
fixed supply of money, interest rates must rise. In the endogenous money 
world, when spending rises, the demand for and the supply of money
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increase. The money supply responds automatically to the rise in the demand 
for credit, and there is no necessity that interest rates increase.
For accommodationists, an increase in the demand for credit does not directly 
influence the interest rate. For structuralists, the money demand function is 
based on Keynes’s finance motive. Firms must finance production before the 
saving necessary to finance the investment has been ’created’. This finance is 
supplied by the banks in meeting the demand for credit, but this in turn affects 
the interest rate.
Structuralists base their theory of interest on the concept of liquidity 
preference. Apart from borrowers, banks also have their own liquidity 
preference: “Liquidity preference is a preference to exchange illiquid items on 
a balance sheet for more liquid items, or even to decrease the size of a 
balance sheet by retiring debt” (Wray, 1990:20). During an economic 
downturn, the value of collateral and prospective returns on investment, fall. 
Given their liquidity preference, banks respond by curtailing new lending, and 
increasing the cost of lending in order to increase the liquidity on their balance 
sheets. The demand for liquidity cannot always be met by a quantity 
adjustment. Instead, the price has to adjust, to bring liquidity preference into 
equality with the supply of liquidity. A rise in money demand may not affect 
the interest rate, but a rise in liquidity preference is likely to do so.
When the central bank raises the bank rate, banks first try to stretch reserves 
through financial innovations, such as asset and liability management. This
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leads to increased leverage ratios for banks. When they cannot stretch 
reserves any further, they raise interest rates. This institutional view of 
banking behaviour and rising interest rates is primarily associated with the 
work of Wray, Chick and Dow.
Moore’s (1988) argument does not include this institutional innovation phase. 
He regards the rate at which banks lend to consumers as a stable mark-up 
over the bank rate. His money supply function stays horizontal at this rate, 
until the central bank changes the bank rate. The institutional approach of 
Wray, Dow, Chick, etc. uses a two-step approach. Banks first try to innovate 
and stretch reserves before raising their rates. In Moore’s approach, the mark­
up is stable. The supply of credit remains horizontal at the new rate from the 
start of the process. Wray believes the lending rate is not exogenously 
determined by the central bank. Banks choose whether they want to raise 
rates or not. Eventually they raise rates when the central bank tightens 
monetary policy.
Moore sees interest rates as determined exogenously by the central bank, 
and criticises the institutional approach outlined above. He argues that costs 
do not increase as banking operations are expanded, and may decrease as 
benefits of scale are achieved. Wray’s idea does not exclude economies of 
scale being reached. He argues that at higher interest rates, banks want to 
increase loans, without increasing reserves. They do this through innovation 
and higher leverage ratios. But as leverage ratios increase, so does risk, and 
therefore the cost of lending. That is why they have to raise their interest
292
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
rates. If a commercial bank grows and more loans are granted to more 
borrowers, with a corresponding increase in reserves, then economies of 
scale can be reached. This is a different argument than the one employed by 
Wray. Wray argued: ”1 believe Moore has overstated the ability of the Fed to 
exogenously set the discount rate, has underestimated its ability to use 
quantity constraints, and has misspecified the money supply 
functional 990:97).
Central banks do not rely primarily on quantity constraints. They rather focus 
on the supply price of reserves, and accommodate all demand at this price. 
Wray says: ”ln contrast to Moore, I argue that the Fed has much more 
discretion regarding the quantity of reserves it will supply during ‘normal’ 
periods. However, like Moore, I believe that when the stability of the financial 
system is threatened, the Fed must abandon quantity constraints’’^ 990:98).
Wray’s step function of the money supply rests on directly on Minsky’s 
visualisation of money demand. The distinction between liquidity preference 
and the demand for money (demand for finance / credit) is essential to his 
approach. Wray (1990) uses Keynes’ argument that liquidity preference 
cannot be met by an expansion of credit. A rise in liquidity preference is not 
the same as an increase in money demand. A rise in liquidity preference 
causes interest rates to rise, even when the central bank accommodates all 
demand for reserves. The liquidity preference of banks together with that of 
the public determine the bond rate of interest. This in turn determines the loan 
rate of interest, and then determines the deposit rate of interest:
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If by ‘credit’ we mean ‘finance’, I have no objection at all to admitting 
the demand for finance as one of the factors influencing the rate of 
interest (Keynes, 1973:209).
If the structuralist view is correct, the money supply should not be viewed as 
horizontal at an exogenously determined interest rate. Money supply is then 
determined by money demand, and money demand is a function of profit 
expectations. Interest rates are largely determined by the willingness of banks 
and other financial institutions to allow their balance sheets to expand. Both 
the money supply and interest rates are endogenously determined.
Commercial banks do not simply add a stable mark-up to the central bank’s 
discount rate. They do try to accommodate all demand for loans at a certain 
interest rate. But after leverage ratios increased significantly, they raise the 
lending rate to compensate for higher risk. Higher money demand does not 
necessarily cause higher interest rates. But higher liquidity preference does 
cause banks to increase their interest rates. The central bank therefore 
influences interest rates, but does not set them exogenously. The controversy 
therefore is centrally about the stability of the mark-up. Interest rate mark-ups 
will be examined and as well as their stability over the business cycle.
8.4 STABLE INTEREST RATE MARK-UPS
Lavoie has described the exogenous interest rate theory as follows: “It simply 
means that there are no natural forces in the economy, meaning no supply
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and demand market mechanism, that should compel interest rates to rise 
when economic activity rises. When the stock of money expands, rates do not 
have to rise, they may also decrease. Central banks can change the 
exogenous rate of interest whenever it pleases them to do so. Indeed, we 
may consider that each level of interest rate corresponds to a particular 
monetary regime or monetary policy. Graphically, each monetary regime may 
be represented by a different horizontal credit-money supply curve”
(Lavoie,1996:279).
Moore argues that the mark-up over some base rate (federal funds rate in the 
US) remains stable. The structural endogeneity theory explains why mark-ups 
vary over the business cycle. As banks extend more credit in a non­
accommodating situation, they are forced to attract deposits with lower 
reserve requirements. These term deposits are less liquid than demand 
deposits. As these are less popular with banking customers, banks have to 
pay higher rates on these deposits, to convince customers to move their 
money into term deposits. The liability side of banks balance sheets consists 
of more term deposits than before. To cover the rising costs on the liability 
side, banks increase the cost of lending on the asset side. This explains how 
the liquidity preference of banks enters as an explanation for rising interest 
rate spreads during a downturn.
The essential point of structuralists examined here, is that the growth of 
liability management exerts upward pressure on interest rates within a given 
institutional structure. “This pressure is due to the higher interest costs liability 
management will impose on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets”
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(Pollin,1991:375). The argument is that banks do not immediately raise rates 
(mark-ups). Due to financial innovation, they can react to increasing risks by 
managing liabilities in such a way that interest rates do not have to rise 
immediately. While there are no market related forces that influence the 
interest rate in the accommodationist view, for structuralists there is an 
interactive process where both the central bank and market forces play a role.
The central bank sets the interest rate (bank rate / discount rate). The liquidity 
preference of both banks and their customers determine the mark-up over the 
reference rate. Lending rates are not a stable mark-up over costs. There is 
some feedback from the market mechanism back to interest rates. The central 
bank uses quantitative constraints, and does not merely set interest rates.
The focus of central banks may be on interest rate setting, but they can also 
influence monetary aggregates: “Accommodationists assert that the central 
bank can only conduct policy by adjusting interest rates, while structuralists 
maintain that quantity-based procedures are also theoretically possible” 
(Palley,1996:593).
The two major ingredients of the structuralist view are: a rising credit-money 
supply curve, and the non-accommodating behviour of commercial banks (as 
a result of their liquidity preference). In the words of Wray (1990:166-7): “The 
money supply curve is upward-sloping relative to interest rates in the absence 
of innovations or norms of behaviour, even though there is no strict quantity 
constraint on bank lending...It is the ‘liquidity preference’ of the banks which 
causes the short term interest to rise.” Stable mark-ups are not a
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characteristic of the structuralist world. The following figure shows that 
structuralists believe liquidity preference causes mark-ups to fluctuate over 
the business cycle.
Figure 8.1 Rising lending rates despite a pegged base rate.
Interest rates
?
In the literature, the mark-up is conventionally defined as the differential 
between some lending rate (i|_) over a base rate (is), such as the federal 
funds rate in the US: 
iL = (1 + m)iB
In the calculations below, the data were obtained from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) data base. The mark-up was calculated as the 
differential between the lending rate and the discount rate. Lending rates are 
described as “...Bank Lending Rates, which usually meet the short- and 
medium-term financing needs of the private sector” (IFS Yearbook, 1993:xv). 
The discount rate or bank rate “refers to the rate at which the monetary 
authorities lend or discount eligible paper for deposit money banks” (ibid). The 
mark-up can also be expressed as a ratio, e.g. ii_/iB.The absolute differential 
was chosen to examine the fluctuations between the lending and bank rates
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over time. The ratio gives a more stable relationship, but does not reflect the 
magnitude of interest rate movements in LDCs.
The relationships between mark-ups, spreads and real GDP growth rates are 
shown in graphs for the individual SADC countries (and the USA and the UK), 
in appendix 8.1. Monthly data were used for both mark-ups and interest rate 
spreads. For most of the countries in the SADC region, the only available data 
were for discount, lending and deposit rates. Data on money market rates, 
treasury bills, etc. were available only for more developed countries. From 
these graphs, no clear conclusions can be made regarding the behaviour of 
mark-ups and spreads over the business cycle. It is clear, however, that mark­
ups and spreads are variable and that both mark-ups and spreads have been 
increasing during the last years of the sample period (1980-2001). To give a 
better picture of average movements overtime, annual data are also shown 
for interest rate mark-ups and spreads.
In order to test the stability of mark-ups more formally, some summary 
statistics are presented below (table 8.1).
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Table 8.1 -  Interest rate mark-ups (sub-periods)
Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Namibia Mozam
Bique
SA Swaziland Tanzania Zimbabwe USA
Cycle 1:
1980:01 -1986:12 
Mean 2.5 n.a. 7.7 2.4 n.a. n.a. 3.3 3.3 8.6 11.5 3.2
Standard deviation 0.7 n.a. 0.86 1.2 n.a. n.a. 0.85 1.2 1.8 4.1 1.4
Standard deviation/ 
of mean 0.3 n.a. 0.1 0.5 n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4
Cycle 2:
1987:01 -1991:12 
Mean 0.9 2.3 8.8 5.2 n.a. n.a. 3.1 2.84 16.3 3.0 3.14
Standard deviation 0.87 1.63 2.74 0.82 n.a. n.a. 0.34 0.49 0.74 1.55 0.56
Standard deviation/ 
mean 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 n.a. n.a. 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.5 0.2
Cycle 3:
1992:01 -2001:12 
Mean 1 1.09 4.3 8.4 2.7 11.34 3.23 3 7.08 1.43 3.37
Standard deviation 0.55 1.46 4.09 1.28 1.22 2.58 0.5 0.08 8.3 9.14 0.25
Standard deviation/ 
mean 0.6 1.30 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.03 1.20 6.30 0.1
Source: IFS -  various years.
Some general conclusions about the stability of mark-ups can be made from 
the above table. In order to test whether mark-ups have become more stable 
over time (as the financial system develops), the whole period was divided 
into 3 sub-periods, shown in table 8.1. Some clear trends can be observed.
In most of the SADC countries, mark-ups became more unstable over the 
period. The stability is tested formally by comparing the standard deviation as 
a ratio to the mean. Zimbabwe is a good example, with this indicator 
increasing to 6.30 in cycle 3. Zimbabwe has been plagued during the 1990s 
by increasing instability (both political and economic). Countries with values of 
0.2 or lower are Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and the USA. Mauritius 
and South Africa are the two countries in the sample with the highest levels of 
financial development. Swaziland is an outlier with an extremely low value of 
0.3, because lending rates are kept at a fixed differential to the South Africa 
bank rate (this can be seen from the graph in Appendix 8.1). The USA has a
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low value of 0.1%. Table 8.2 shows summary statistics for the whole period. 
Once again, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland are the SADC countries 
with lower variances.
Table 8.2 Interest rate mark-ups (1980-2001)
Botswa
na
Lesotho Malawi Mauritius South
Africa
Swaziland Zimbabwe USA
Mean 1.30 2.46 5.85 5.08 3.16 3.07 3.60 3.60
Median 1.30 2.35 6.85 4.55 3.00 3.00 4.60 3.30
Maximum 3.00 7.70 18.30 9.40 8.50 4.50 14.10 6.90
Minimum -0.60 -1.80 -9.00 0.20 -1.10 2.00 -19.20 2.20
Standard
deviation 0.98 1.96 5.81 2.81 2.09 0.58 9.41 1.31
Standard
deviation/
mean
0.75 0.79 0.99 0.48 0.66 0.18 2.61 0.36
Source: IFS -  various years.
It is generally maintained by Post Keynesian authors (Pollin,1991; Vera,2001), 
that mark-ups vary pro-cyclically, as a result of cyclical changes in banks’ risk 
positions. As the economy expands, demand for credit increases. Credit 
availability also increases during expansionary phases, but reserves may not 
be fully accommodating. To reflect the increasing loan/reserve ratio (higher 
risk), mark-ups increase (i.e. move with the cycle).
A recent article on the endogenous nature of the money supply in Spain 
tested the hypothesis of pro-cyclical mark-ups (Vera,2001). Vera examined 
both the stability and the movement of mark-ups: “’Structuralists argue that 
changes in banks’ risk positions impact upon the level of mark-ups. Tests 
aimed at discriminating between the two approaches should directly examine 
the stability of mark-ups over time” (Vera,2001:514).
This hypothesis is tested below by looking at the movements of mark-ups (as 
defined above) over the cycle (approximated by changes in real GDP).
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Figure 8.2 Var estimations -  mark-ups over the business cycle 
Botswana Lesotho
Response of BOTSMARKUP to One S.D. Innovations
BOTSMARKUP BOTSGDP
Response of BOTSGDP to One S.D. Innovations
-  BOTSMARKUP BOTSGDP|
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Response of MALAWIMARKUP to One S.D. Innovations
MALAWIMARKUP MALAWIGDP
Response of MALAWIGDP to One S.D. Innovations
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Mauritius
Response of MAURIMARKUP to One S.D. Innovations
MAURIMARKUP MAURIGDP
Response of MAURIGDP to One S.D. Innovations
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South Africa Swaziland
Response of SAMARKUP to One S.D. Innovations Response of SWAMARKUP to One S.D. Innovations
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In the graphs above, an unrestricted vector autoregression (var) model was 
used to look at the response of the mark-up when there is a shock to real 
GDP. The variables are stationary, real GDP is used and the mark-up moves
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within a band and does not increase overtime. The decisions on the number 
of lags included were determined by the availability of the data. In most cases 
there were 20 data points (or less) as annual data were used for the period 
1980-2000. No more than 5 lags could be used, because of the small sample 
size. In most cases 3 or 4 lags were used. In order to test the robustness of 
the var regressions, the ordering of the two variables was reversed to see if 
this altered the results. In all the cases above, this did not significantly alter 
the results. There were insufficient data for var’s for Mozambique, Namibia 
and Tanzania.
In the graphs above, the solid line in the top graph represents the response of 
the mark-up to a change in the real GDP. In all the graphs, there is a positive 
response of the mark-up to a change in GDP. The response varies and 
corresponds to the standard deviations shown in tables 8.1 and 8.2. The less 
developed countries have larger responses, i.e. Malawi and Zimbabwe. The 
bottom graphs show the inverse, i.e. the response of real GDP to a change in 
the mark-up. This also exhibits a positive trend.
The graphs show that the mark-up responds positively to changes in real 
GDP. It is difficult to derive any conclusions about the timing of the response, 
as annual data were used.
8.5 INTEREST RATE SPREADS
Apart from mark-ups, structuralist authors look at the movement of interest 
rate spreads over the business cycle. Interest rate spreads are important from 
a Post Keynesian viewpoint. Dow (1996:499) expects them to move counter­
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cyclically. During an expansionary phase, banks extend credit readily 
(Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis). As the expansionary phase 
continues, banks extend more and more credit, increasing the risk levels of 
their loan portfolios. As the banks’ perception of risk changes they increase 
interest rate spreads.
Interest rate spreads can be defined in two ways, ex ante and ex post 
spreads. Ex ante spreads are the differential between the rates paid on 
liabilities and the rates charged on assets (lending and deposit rates). The ex 
post spread is the difference between banks’ interest revenues and their 
interest expenses. This is a more comprehensive variable than the ex ante 
spread. The ex post definition will be used in 8.6 below, when a more 
comprehensive model of the determinants of interest rate spreads will be 
developed. To examine the movement of spreads over the business cycle, the 
ex ante definition is appropriate.
Where most structuralists see the mark-up as a pro-cyclical variable, the 
literature seems to suggest that spreads vary counter-cyclically. Dow (1996) 
argues that banks have a higher liquidity preference during periods of tight 
monetary policy. Financial crises occur following periods of rapid credit 
expansion when banks unduly reduce risk premia, encouraged by buoyant 
animal spirits. With the onset of a crisis comes a sharp rise in spreads and a 
sharp drop in borrowing. During a crisis, banks become less liquid as do their 
customers, forcing interest rates up. This might cause banks to raise interest 
rates to discourage borrowing. Raising interest rates, attracts riskier 
borrowers as customers, so-called adverse selection (described in Chapter 5).
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The cost of capital rises and the availability falls during downturns: “Insofar as 
increased perceived risk is incorporated in a risk premium, borrowers may be 
rationed by price. Indeed, the evidence suggests that interest rate spreads 
vary counter-cyclically” (Dow, 1996:499).
In order to look at the levels and stability of interest rate spreads in the SADC 
region, some descriptive statistics are given in table 8.3 below. The data are 
for the period 1980-2001.
Table 8.3 Interest rate spreads.
Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mauritius South
Africa
Swaziland Zimbabwe USA
Mean 2.84 6.94 10.86 6.73 4.18 6.43 8.93 2.3
Median 2.5 6.2 8.8 5.4 4.45 6.7 8.65 2.6
Maximum 5.2 12.2 21.2 11.3 6.3 7.8 24.1 3.2
Minimum 0.4 3 4.8 2.2 1.7 4.5 -8.9 1.3
Standard
deviation
1.43 2.66 5.65 3.03 1.26 0.96 7.01 0.55
Standard
deviation/
mean
0.50 0.38 0.52 0.45 0.30 0.14 0.78 0.23
Source: IFS -  various years.
Spreads are generally higher than those of the USA. Developing countries 
have higher interest rate spreads than developed countries. The negative sign 
for Zimbabwe is surprising, as the lending rate is always expected to exceed 
the deposit rate. However, when monthly data are considered (shown in 
Appendix 8.1), it is clear that Zimbabwe had a lending rate that was lower 
than the deposit rate for every month during 1992, giving an average negative 
spread o f-8.9%. Table 8.4 shows average interest rate spreads and mark­
ups for a number of developing and developed countries. The values shown 
are the averages for the period 1980-1999. The SADC countries are shown in 
bold font.
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Table 8.4 Average interest rate spreads and interest rate mark-ups
Country Spread Markup
Argentina 2.7 3.5
Australia 3.7 2.5
Austria 3.6 3.9
Belgium 5.8 3.6
Botswana 3.2 1.8
Canada 1.6 1.4
Switzerland 1.5 1.9
Congo 8.5 6.5
Colombia 9.9 3.4
Cyprus 2.9 2.3
Germany 5.5 6.1
Spain 3.5 1.5
Finland 2.9 1.9
UK 1.7 1.9
Italy 6.3 3.0
Japan 2.9 2.1
Kenya 6.4 1.2
Lesotho 6.4 2.4
Mauritius 6.0 5.0
Malawi 9.8 5.8
Netherlands 5.3 4.5
Portugal 4.1 4.2
Paraguay 11.7 9.6
Sweden 5.1 5.2
Swaziland 6.3 3.0
Tanzania 12.2 10.4
United States 1.9 3.5
South Africa 4.1 3.1
Venezuela 3.8 -5.5
Zambia 10.0 1.1
Zimbabwe 7.7 4.3
Source: IFS, various years.
From table 8.4 it can be seen that interest rate spreads are generally higher in 
less developed countries than in developed countries. This might place a 
serious constraint on economic growth, as wide spreads contribute to financial 
disintermediation: “The persistence of wide spreads can be a cause for 
concern because such spreads can be symptomatic of a number of serious 
problems, such as: a lack of adequate competition in the region’s banking 
industry; perceived market risk; bank unsoundness; scale diseconomies 
constrained by ‘small’ markets; and/or high fixed and operating costs, due
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both to scale diseconomies and to the existence of regulatory constraints, 
which may distort the financial markets” (Perez & MacKenzie, 1998:7).
According to the structuralist view, interest rate spreads should move counter­
cyclical^ to the business cycle, as risk increases during periods of tight 
monetary policy. The graphs in appendix 8.1 show monthly data for both 
interest rate mark-ups and interest rate spreads for a selection of SADC 
countries. The change in real GDP is shown on an annual basis to facilitate 
comparisons. The USA and UK are also included, as representative of 
developed countries. In all the countries shown (except Namibia and SA), 
interest rate spreads have been increasing during the sample period (1980- 
2001).
In order to test the structuralist claims that interest rate spreads move 
counter-cyclically, a VAR model was again used to examine the response of 
interest rate spreads to a change in real GDP. The approach is similar to the 
analysis of mark-ups. The data used were the series of interest rate spreads 
for the period 1980-2001 for the SADC countries for which data were 
available. The number of lags included depended on the availability of the 
data. Real GDP growth rates were calculated from this dataset as the change 
in real annual GDP, which in most cases also reduced the data points.
Graphs depicting the response of the interest rate spreads are shown below.
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Figure 8.3 Var-estimations: interest rate spreads and real GDP.
Botswana
Response of BOTSSPREAD to One S.D. BOTSGDP Innovation
Lesotho
Response of LESSPREAD to One S.D. LESGDP Innovation
Malawi Mauritius
Response of MALAWISPREAD to One S.D. MALAWIGDP Innovation Response of MAURISPREAD to One S.D. MAURIGDP Innovation
South Africa
Response of SASPREAD to One S.D. SAGDP Innovation
Swaziland
Response of SWASPREAD to One S.D. SWAGDP Innovation
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USA Zimbabwe
Response of USASPREAD to One S.D. USAGDP Innovation Response of ZIMSPREAD to One S.D. ZIMGDP Innovation
In the graphs above, the same approach was used as for the mark-ups, i.e. 
an unrestricted vector autoregression (var) model. The response of the 
interest rate spread over time is examined, when there occurs a shock to real 
GDP. The variables are stationary, as real GDP is used and the spread 
moves within a band. The decisions on the number of lags included were 
determined by the availability of the data. In most cases there were 20 data 
points (or less) as annual data were used for the period 1980-2000. In order 
to test the robustness of the var regressions, the ordering of the two variables 
were reversed to see whether this altered the results. In all the cases above, 
this did not significantly alter the results.
From the graphs above, interest rate spreads appear to respond negatively to 
increases in GDP. The responses are generally related to the mean values 
and standard deviations of interest rate spreads, as shown in table 8.3.
In order to lower interest rate spreads, more information is needed on their 
determinants. If these problems can be redressed, spreads can narrow with 
positive effects on economic growth and improved resource allocation. The
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model below is developed to increase our understanding of the determinants 
of interest rate spreads in the SADC countries.
8.6 DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATE SPREADS
Interest rate spreads are an important indicator of the level of financial 
development. As financial intermediaries, banks play a crucial role in most 
economies. Much research has been conducted on the link between financial 
development and economic growth. Some of the earliest work was done by 
McKinnon and Shaw (1973). Since then a growing body of literature has 
affirmed the importance of financial development for economic growth. One of 
the problems in this research is measuring the level of financial development 
in a country. Different authors use different indicators of financial deepening, 
e.g. narrow money to GDP, domestic credit to GDP, commercial bank 
domestic credit to GDP, etc. (King & Levine, 1993).
Financial intermediation is vitally important for economic growth. In most 
developing countries however, financial disintermediation may be present. 
There are only a few banks, some banks are state owned, quantitative 
restraints are common, etc. These imperfections increase the cost of financial 
intermediation and stifle economic growth. Financial intermediation affects the 
net return to savings and the gross return to investment. The spread between 
these two mirrors bank interest margins, in addition to transaction costs and 
taxes (Demirguc-Kunt&Huizinga, 1999:379). Bank interest spreads can
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therefore be interpreted as an indicator of the efficiency of the banking system 
as well as of the level of financial deepening in an economy.
Regression analysis will be used to examine the underlying determinants of 
interest rate spreads. Data at the microeconomic level will be examined to 
determine what causes interest rate spreads to be so high in developing 
countries. Micro-level banking data were not available for all the SADC 
countries. Nine countries have been included in the analysis: Botswana, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The primary data source for individual banks was the KPMG 
Africa Banking Survey for 2001. Data on country variables were obtained from 
the IFS database. Interest rate spreads can be defined as either ex ante or ex 
post spreads. The ex ante definition was used in the graphs above 
(differential between contractual rates charged on loans and rates paid on 
deposits). Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999:380) explained the ex post 
spread as follows: “The ex post spread is the difference between banks’ 
actual interest revenues and their actual interest expenses. The ex post 
spread differs from the ex ante spread by the amount of loan defaults. The ex 
post spread is a more useful measure because it controls for the fact that 
banks with high-yield, risky credits are likely to face more defaults. An 
additional problem with using the ex ante spread is that data are generally 
available at the aggregate industry level and are put together from a variety of 
sources. Thus they are not completely consistent”. The ex post spread will be 
used in the model below. This variable is reported by all the banks used in the
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survey, and is reported as the ‘net interest margin’ (NIM) on banks’ balance 
sheets.
The net interest margin (NIM) is defined in the KPMG Africa Banking Survey 
(2001:56) as: “The current year’s net interest income divided by average 
interest earning assets.” The net interest margin determines bank profitability 
rates, together with noninterest income, overheads, taxes and loan loss 
provisioning.
In a study on the determinants of bank interest spreads by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1999), the ex post spread is used as an indicator of bank 
efficiency. They find a positive correlation between interest rate spreads and 
bank profitability. Bank profitability is a bank’s before-tax profits (BTP) divided 
by total assets (TA). Profitability can also be measured by the return on equity 
(ROE) as opposed to the return on assets. ROE will also be used in the 
regressions below.
The relationship between bank profitability and ex post interest rate spreads 
can be shown with a straightforward accounting identity:
BTP _ ATP TX
TA TA +  TA .............................................................................................................................( 8 ' 1 ) ’
where before-tax profits (BTP) divided by total assets (TA), is defined as the 
sum of after-tax profits (ATP) divided by TA, and taxes (TX), divided by TA. 
From the bank’s income statement, before-tax profits divided by total assets 
also satisfies the following accounting identity,
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BTP , JTi, N il OE GPL
-------- = NIM  + ...................................... ....................... (8.2),TA TA TA TA v
where NIM is the net interest margin, Nil is non-interest income, OE is
operating expenditure and GPL is general provisions for bad loans. These are
expressed as a ratio of total assets (TA). NII/TA is included, as most banks
also engage in non-lending activities, such as investment banking and
brokerage services. OE/TA shows the operational costs divided by total
assets, and GPL/TA measures provisions for bad debts, divided by total
assets.
Using the same information, the NIM can be expressed as the following 
identity:
BTP N il OE GPL
NIM  = ------------------- + -------+ ...........  ................. (8.3)TA TA TA TA
The net interest margin can be used as a measure of bank ‘efficiency’. This is
a crude indicator of bank efficiency, as a reduction in interest margins does
not necessarily signal an improvement in efficiency. Variation in an accounting
ratio, such as the NIM, may reflect differences in net interest income (the
numerator) or differences in, for example, nonlending assets (a component of
the denominator).
In the data set, the accounting data for the individual banks were obtained 
from the KPMG Banking Survey -  Africa (2001). All the individual banks use 
different auditing firms, but the final data set has been put together by KPMG. 
The NIM is used as a rough index of bank efficiency. The total sample
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includes data on 76 banks in nine different countries. The regression analysis 
uses different groups of determinants. The first group consists of a number of 
bank characteristics, such as loan loss provisions, net profits, overheads, etc. 
The second group contains a number of macroeconomic indicators, such as 
real per capita GDP growth rates, real interest rates, etc. The third group 
contains indicators of the financial structure of an economy such as M2/GDP, 
loans/reserves, bank assets/GDP, stock market capitalisation/GDP and 
market concentration indices (CR3 and HHI).
The regression analysis uses the following equation:
Ijjt = a0 + otjZjjt + pjXjt + yjFjt + Eyt .......................................(8.4)
Where lijt is the dependent variable, the net interest margin (NIM) for bank j in 
country j at time t. Zijt are characteristics of bank j in country i at time t, Xjt are 
characteristics of country j at time t, Fjtare characteristics of the financial 
structure of country j at time t, and eyt is a white-noise error term.
8.7 DATA
The current study uses income statement and balance sheet data that are 
reported in the KPMG Banking Survey -  Africa, 2001. The survey covers a 
total of 14 African countries. The 9 SADC countries included in the survey are 
examined in this chapter. The total data set includes 76 commercial banks 
from these 9 SADC countries.
In general, the SADC countries have relatively high net interest margins, 
compared to developed countries. This is true of most developing economies.
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In their research on net interest margins, Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (1999) 
found that several developed countries (e.g. Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) have a net interest margin of close to 1%. This is the low end of 
the distribution: “Generally, developing countries, and especially Latin 
American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and 
Jamaica, have relatively large spreads”(1999:383).
The accounting identity above (8.3) suggests a useful decomposition of the 
realised interest spread (the NIM) -  into its constituent parts: non-interest 
income, operating expenses, general provision for bad debts and before tax 
profits. Column 2 of table 8.5 shows the net interest margin (NIM) for the nine 
SADC countries. Columns 3-8 break down the net interest margin into its 
components as shown in identity 8.3: non-interest income, operating 
expenses, general provisions for bad debt and net profit.
Table 8.5 -  Bank income statement and balance sheet data for selected
SADC countries (2000).
NIM Non­
interest
income/
Total
Income
Non-
performin
g
advances/
TA
Operating
expenses/
TA
General
provision/
TA
BTP/TA Net
profit/TA
Botswana 8.3 27.4 3.3 3.7 0.9 4.4 2.7
Malawi 16.1 30.5 10.1 8.4 2.0 6.9 4.4
Mauritius 4.5 27.5 6.2 5.4 1.4 2.2 1.9
Namibia 6.7 33.2 5.2 4.6 0.9 4.0 2.5
Swaziland 6.9 28.8 21.7 7.9 1.3 2.1 1.7
South Africa 8.0 39.2 4.1 4.2 1.2 4.0 3.6
Tanzania 9.2 29.8 8.3 7.2 3.8 2.2 1.8
Zambia 15.6 49.9 n/a 10.3 n/a 7.4 4.8
Zimbabwe 19.0 32.6 8.9 7.1 1.7 9.8 7.2
Notes: NIM = net interest margin; TA = total assets and BTP = before-tax profit.
Source: KPMG Banking S urvey- Africa 2001
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Table 8.5 shows that the relatively more advanced SADC countries have 
lower net interest margins, i.e. Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and South 
Africa. These four countries also rank higher in terms of non-performing 
advances as a percentage of total advances and operating expenses as a 
percentage of total assets. Non-performing loans are defined as non­
performing advances (the total of loans and advances in respect of which no 
income is generated, i.e. non-performing debts), divided by total advances. 
Operating expenses are total expenses (before tax) excluding interest 
expense and doubtful debts expense, divided by average total assets.
General provisions are the general debt provision for bad debts on balance 
sheets divided by total advances. These are relatively high in the less 
developed SADC countries, e.g. Malawi and Tanzania. Loan-loss provisioning 
as a share of total advances is a direct measure of differences in credit quality 
across countries (column 6).
Non-interest income as a share of total income reveals the importance of fee- 
based services for banks in different countries (column 3). Most of the SADC 
countries rely heavily on fee-based operations. In Zambia the figure is as high 
as 49.9% of total income. This probably indicates low levels of financial 
intermediation, since half of the commercial banks’ income is made up of non­
interest activities. According to equation 8.2, profit before tax (PBT/TA) should 
be higher if operating expenses and loan loss provisions are lower. It seems 
indeed that Botswana, Namibia and South Africa have relatively high profit 
ratios (above 4%), but Mauritius has a low value (2.2%), while some of the 
less developed countries (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have very high
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profit ratios. This might be because of highly concentrated banking industries 
and high margins (Zambia = 15.6, Malawi = 16.1 and Zimbabwe = 19.0). As a 
residual, net profits as a share of total assets reflect the extent to which the 
net interest margin translates into net-of-tax profitability. This is shown by the 
clear correlation between this variable and the NIM.
In order to compare some of these values with a wider sample of countries, 
data for some less-developed and developed countries are given in table 8.6 
below.
Table 8.6 -  Bank income statement and balance sheet data for selected 
countries, (average values, 1988-95).
Country Net interest margin Loan loss provisions 
(as % of total 
assets)
Net profits (as % of 
total assets)
Argentina 7.3 1.8 2.0
Australia 3.0 0.7 0.6
Brazil 8.9 1.3 1.4
Canada 2.9 0.6 0.6
Colombia 6.0 0.9 2.2
France 2.4 1.0 0.1
Germany 2.0 0.6 0.3
Romania 9.7 3.7 4.3
United Kingdom 2.3 0.7 0.8
Venezuela 7.2 1.0 2.5
United States 3.9 0.7 1.0
Source: Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999.
When the data for the SADC countries (table 8.5) are compared to some
other developed and developing countries (table 8.6), interest rate spreads 
(as measured by the NIM) are much higher than in developed countries. The 
spreads in the SADC countries are comparable to some of the South 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela). Interest 
margins are lower in developed countries (e.g. 2.4 in France and 2.3 in the 
UK). The spreads in the less developed SADC countries, i.e. Malawi, Zambia
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and Zimbabwe, are much higher than in other countries. Their net profit rates 
exceed 4%. The only country in table 8.6 with a comparable net profit rate is 
Romania (4.3%). Romania also has the highest net interest margin, at 9.7%. 
High net interest margins are associated with higher loan-loss provisions, but 
also with higher profit rates.
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show the macroeconomic and institutional variables that 
were used. The data are for 2000, or the most recent year available.
Table 8.7 -  Macroeconomic variables
Country Real GDP per 
capita growth
Real interest 
rates
Savings deposits/ 
total deposits
Loan/
reserve ratio
Botswana 2.76 6.6 78.6 18.7
Malawi 1.54 7.9 62.11 1.5
Mauritius 2.1 14.9 91.63 14.1
Namibia 3.1 10.4 37.83 24.5
Swaziland -0.9 5.0 63.2 10.6
South Africa -0.4 10.4 71.21 32.3
Tanzania 2.2 11.7 69.4 1.7
Zambia 0.2 15.4 76.2 2.5
Zimbabwe -1.7 4.8 76.2 6.3
Source: IFS (various years), TIPS data.
The macroeconomic variables are real per capita GDP growth, 
savings/deposit ratios, loan/reserves ratios and the real interest rate. It is 
expected that there is a negative relationship between real per capita GDP 
growth and interest rate spreads. Financial disintermediation (high spreads) 
stifles economic growth. Theory presumes that higher real interest rates 
would increase the NIM. The savings/deposit ratio was included as an 
indication of the level of development. In most developing countries, savings 
deposits form the majority of total deposits. Namibia was the only country with 
a ratio lower than 60%. It was expected that this would increase the spread 
(as found in Perez & MacKenzie,1998), through both an increase in the cost
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of funding to the banks and an increase in operating expenses in servicing a 
proliferation of small savings accounts. The loan/reserve ratio was also 
included as a financial development indicator.
Table 8.8 -  Institutional variables
Country HHI CR3 M2/GDP Stock
market
capitalisa
tion/GDP
Number of 
banks
Botswana 2647 85.5 29.1 12.7 6
Malawi 3879 95.2 17.4 8.8 4
Mauritius 3642 87.4 80.5 44.0 7
Namibia 2720 83.16 40.1 875.1 4
Swaziland 3123 86.5 27.4 128.1 4
South Africa 1877 65.8 55.6 7.0 13
Tanzania 3172 85.5 19.3 3.0 9
Zambia 2679 81.8 16.9 8.98 6
Zimbabwe 820 38.6 21.8 16.1 25
Source: IFS (various years), TIPS data.
The financial structure/ institutional variables include M2/GDP, stock market 
capitalization/GDP, number of banks and market concentration (CR3 and 
HHI). The stock market capitalisation/GDP measures the extent of stock 
market development. Developing countries tend to have lower M2/GDP and 
capitalisation/GDP ratios. Two concentration ratios were calculated, the CR3 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). The CR3 is the sum of the assets 
of the three largest banks expressed as a percentage of the assets of all the 
banks. The HHI is defined as the sum of the individual market shares squared 
(as shown in Chapter 6). The HHI gives a good indication of the level of 
concentration in the banking sector as well as the distribution of market 
shares. It measures the relative distribution of power, where the CR3 
considers only the three largest banks. Any HHI above 1 800 is considered to 
indicate a high degree of concentration. The SADC countries all have high 
CR3 ratios, as would be expected in an undeveloped financial market where a
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few big banks (some still state-owned) dominate the local market, with little 
competition and high structural barriers. All the countries except SA, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, had CR3 ratios above 80%: Botswana (85.8%), Malawi 
(95,2%), Mauritius (87,4%), Namibia (83,16%), Swaziland (86,5%), and 
Tanzania (85,5%). Zambia had a CR3 of 65,5%, SA 65,8% and Zimbabwe a 
low ratio of 38,6%. This is much higher than in developed countries. The USA 
has a very low CR3 of 16%, whereas France and Germany have ratios of 
around 50% (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga,1999:389). Table 8.9 shows the data 
for the NIM as well as its components, for the 76 individual commercial banks 
included in the sample.
Table 8.9 Bank balance sheet and income statement data for individual SADC
banks.
Net interest 
margin
Non­
interest
income/
total
income
Operating
expenses/
TA
General
provision/
TA
PBT/TA
Barclays bank of Botswana 15 32 3.7 -0.3 6.316114
Botswana Building Society 9.34 10.29 4.87 2.93 4.592514
First National Bank of Botswana 6.15 36.11 3.75 0.55 3.707893
Stanbic Bank of Botswana 5.37 34.17 3.45 0.46 3.966569
Standard Chartered Bank of Botswana 6.36 39.37 4.6 0.58 3.5771
ULC (Pty) Ltd. 7.7 12.65 2.09 0.93 4.492641
Commercial Bank of Malawi 13.27 26.85 8.84 1.22 8.715811
Fincom Bank of Malawi 6.48 31.04 5.61 1.12 2.746953
First Merchant Bank 22.89 30.66 10.36 3.79 7.896473
National Bank of Malawi 21.95 33.35 8.67 1.83 8.183179
Bank of Baroda 3.58 25.4 1.67 n/a 1.103784
Barclays Bank 10.98 36.21 3.98 0.97 1.610284
Habib Bank 1.87 14.71 3.43 0.21 4.324791
HSBC Mauritius 2.9 41.54 2.14 1.02 2.363973
State Bank of Mauritius Group 4.51 29.75 20.96 0.81 2.861394
The Delphis Bank 3.9 26.7 2.6 0.1 1.271855
The Mauritius Commercial Bank 3.83 18.29 3.21 5.31 1.789415
Bank Windhoek Ltd 7.5 25.86 4.65 1.3 3.585327
Commercial Bank of Namibia 5.28 36.38 4.16 1.27 3.151099
First National Bank of Namibia 7.63 34.77 5.4 0.94 5.200914
Standard Bank of Namibia 6.39 35.9 4.13 0.04 3.937156
First National Bank of Swaziland 9.17 38.13 8.87 0.73 1.630867
Nedbank Swaziland 7.12 30.08 7.04 1.61 1.514209
Standard Bank Swaziland 6.78 36.77 6.97 1.53 2.934094
Swaziland Development and Savings 
Bank
4.57 10.3 8.57 n/a 2.171254
ABSA Group Ltd 4.18 3.07 4.47 0.86 1.589253
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African Bank Investments Ltd 24.6 4.98 9.68 3.59 14.88575
Bank of Taiwan SA Ltd 2.91 0.99 2.75 1.36 3.314917
BOE Ltd 4.23 2.76 3.12 0.67 2.036564
FirstRand Banking Group 5.28 3.44 4.2 1.21 1.75826
Imperial Bak Ltd 4.04 1.95 2.33 0.53 1.066776
Investec Group Ltd 1.52 2.01 2.01 0.88 1.766315
Nedcor Ltd 3.28 3.15 3.13 0.8 2.514183
PSG Investment Bank 18.78 6.15 5.75 0.75 8.167992
Standard Bank Investment Corporation 4.37 3.67 4.33 0.83 2.150222
Ltd
TEBA Bank Ltd 14.78 5 1.7 n/a 6.76259
VBS Mutual Bank 7.75 0.32 6.4 1.86 2.47093
Akiba Commercial Bank Ltd 8.6 33.02 8.8 n/a 2.212972
Diamond Trust Bank 9.47 29.62 5.76 4.39 3.654963
International Bank of Malaysia 10.39 9.42 8.31 1.09 1.113392
Kenya Commercial Bank 10.99 27.48 8.61 n/a 2.62918
Mufindi Community Bank 6.44 0.28 0.06 0.04 -0.27153
Stanbic Bank 7.04 38.43 4.44 n/a 2.938744
Standard Chartered Bank 8.17 34.85 5.14 5.49 4.733725
Tanzania Investment Bank 13.18 66.9 12.86 108.41 1.364957
Tanzania Postal Bank 8.68 28.49 10.5 8.35 1.847447
Barclays Bank of Zambia 22.85 43.97 12.12 n/a 7.01206
Citibank of Zambia 5.53 43.47 6.18 n/a 9.917011
First Alliance Bank 26.19 34.33 14.18 n/a 9.602886
New Capital Bank Pic 12.75 86.71 9.72 n/a 3.263231
Stanbic Bank Zambia 10.09 46.25 8.67 n/a 5.236953
Standard Chartered Bank Zambia 16.34 44.55 10.7 n/a 9.358966
ABC Holdings 8.6 56.64 7.01 1.39 3.775199
Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe 22.58 42.88 13.56 3.24 12.4197
Beverley Building Society 23.07 1.36 5.37 n/a 13.63195
Central Africa Building Society 18.64 1.85 4.93 0.02 13.41171
Century Holdings Ltd 18.05 16.8 9.28 0.54 5.579972
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe 10.74 43.52 6.83 1.56 2.117903
Fincor Finance Corporation 26.35 1.4 7.61 5.48 43.05762
First Banking Corporation 18.2 40.1 10.84 1.14 4.76303
First National Building Society 9.18 19.69 3.96 n/a 4.602591
Founders Building Society 19.03 1.1 8.1 0.3 7.789547
Global Investments House 14.96 27.16 4.23 n/a 8.496333
Interfin Merchant Bank 0.94 153.48 2.22 3.7 0.346694
Intermarket Discount House 20.71 n/a 7.15 n/a 5.960457
Kingdom Financial Holdings 17.59 37.09 7.98 0.48 10.55645
Merchant Bank of central Africa 62.32 45.7 9.7 4.1 14.90436
National Discount House 15.5 4.47 6.89 n/a 5.609985
NMBZ Holdings 16.07 60.1 6.34 0.86 12.62802
Rapid Discount House 17.6 0.66 3.41 n/a 6.334242
Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe 18.95 37.95 7.68 -0.23 8.556604
Stanbic Finance Zimbabwe 22.17 0.38 6.98 1.05 13.64258
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe 22 41.4 11.6 2.4 10.7961
Tetrad Securities 29.03 34.56 10.81 n/a 20.8589
Trust Merchant Bank 8.71 78.49 4.02 0.96 5.612863
Zimbabwe Building Society 14.3 4 4.1 n/a 0.313899
Source: KPMG Africa Banking Survey - 200' i
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8.8 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Regression equation (8.4) above was used to estimate the determinants of ex 
post interest rate spreads (net interest margin). The first group of variables 
are bank specific variables from bank balance sheet and income statement 
data. As shown in equation 8.3 above, that the NIM can be decomposed into 
its constituent parts, before-tax profits, non-interest income, operating 
expenditures and general provisioning for bad debts.
In table 8.10 below, the results are shown when each of the variables is 
regressed individually on the NIM.
Table 8.10 -  Bank characteristics 
Dependent variable : Net interest margin
Variable Coefficient Std. Error of 
regression
t-Statistic R-squared Durbin-
Watson
Before-tax 
profits/ TA
0.98 7.08 7.27*** 0.41 1.99
Net profit/ TA 1.36 7.29 6.89*** 0.39 1.90
Noninterest 
income / 
Total Income
-0.06 9.16 -1.37 0.02 1.53
Operating
expenses/
TA
1.19 8.21 4.50*** 0.21 1.59
General 
provisions / 
Total 
advances
1.43 9.62 1.87* 0.06 1.00
Non
performing 
loans / TA
-0.04 9.92 -0.29 0.00 0.97
Return on 
equity
0.17 7.56 6.10*** 0.33 1.97
Return on 
assets
0.35 8.59 3.47*** 0.14 1.63
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Several profit variables were used, i.e. before-tax profits as a ratio of total 
assets, net profit as a ratio of total assets, return on equity and return on
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assets. The first two variables were calculated from the individual income 
statement data while the last two, were reported by the banks. All four 
variables are significant at the 1% level. Before-tax profits/TA has the highest 
t-stat value and will be used in the regressions below. Non-interest income is 
not related to the NIM (insignificant t-stat). Operating expenses as a ratio of 
total assets are positively correlated with the NIM (also significant at the 1% 
level). Higher expenses leads to higher spreads, also indicating high levels of 
inefficiency. Two measures of provisioning for bad debts were used, general 
provisions as a ratio of total advances and non-performing loans as a ratio of 
total advances. General provisions are significant at the 10% level. The 
regression results of the components of the NIM (equation 8.3) are shown 
below:
Table 8.11 -  Regression results
Dependent variable: Net interest margin
Constant 1.31
(0.47)
Before-tax profit (BTP/TA) 0.82
(4.84)***
Non- interest income (NII/TA) 0.002
(0.04)
Operating expenditure (OE/TA) 0.84
(2.78)***
General provision for bad loans 0.10
(GPL/TA) (0.16)
R2 = 0.49
Adjusted R2 = 0.44
Durbin-Watson = 1.71
Number of observations = 55
(t-stats in parentheses)
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
Data on all 76 banks were included. Data on general provision for bad loans 
were only available for 55 banks, the adjusted sample becoming 55.The
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method used was ordinary least squares. Profits are highly significant, as 
shown above (table 8.11). Non-interest income was included in the model, as 
banks also engage in non-lending activities, such as investment banking and 
brokerage services. In some other empirical studies (Demirguc- 
Kunt&Huizinga,1999), this was a meaningful variable, but in the current 
regression analysis it did not give meaningful results, and was not significant. 
The higher the operating expenditure (as a ratio of total assets), the higher the 
NIM. General provisions for bad debts are not significant.
The adjusted coefficient of determination (R2 = 0.49) is not very high. This is 
however not much lower than comparable studies. In a study on interest rate 
spreads in the Eastern Carribean, the reported R-squared was 55 percent.
The explanatory variables were: provision for doubtful debts, economic 
growth, savings deposits/ total deposits, share of commercial bank public 
sector loans and operating expenses as a percentage of average total assets. 
The economic growth variable was not significant and had a negative sign 
(Perez&MacKenzie, 1999:33). In another study on interest rate spreads, using 
data for 80 countries (Demirguc-Kunt&Huizinga,1999), the R-squared was 
0.63.
Interest rate spreads are better explained by adding the macro-economic and 
institutional data described above (Tables 8.6 and 8.7). The macro-economic 
data were regressed individually on the NIM and the results are shown below 
in table 8.12.
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Table 8.12 -  Macro-economic variables
Dependent variable: Net interest margin
Variable Coefficient Std. Error of 
regression
t-Statistic R-squared Durbin-
Watson
Per capita GDP 
growth
-2.16 8.42 -3.96*** 0.17 1.86
Savings/Deposits 0.05 9.25 0.51 0.003 1.55
GDP growth -0.23 9.26 -0.27 0.001 1.53
Loan/ reserve 
ratio
-0.29 8.7 -3.16*“ 0.11 1.73
Real interest rate -0.82 8.69 -3.17*** 0.12 1.77
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
It is not surprising that the GDP growth variable does not give good results. 
GDP growth has the right sign, but a very low t-statistic (-0.27). Because of 
the small open nature of these economies, GDP growth is assumed to be 
negatively related to the interest rate spread. In none of the regressions 
(either in the literature or in the current regressions) was a significant GDP 
growth variable found. The better variable is real per capita GDP growth. This 
is a static model, as the individual banking data were for the year 2000 and 
most of the macro-economic data were also for the same year. In any such 
model there is a time dimension with long lags that are not accounted for. 
Data availability was a problem, as there were only nine countries in the total 
sample. Observations for only three years were available from the KPMG 
dataset. The best choice, given the data limitations, was a cross-sectional 
analysis to try and identify the factors that determine interest rates.
For the variable real per capita GDP growth, data were used for 1999, 
allowing for the fact that interest rate spreads are related to GDP growth in the 
previous year. This variable is highly significant and inversely related to the 
net interest margin (NIM), at the 1% level. The ratio of savings to deposits
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was not significant. The loan/reserve ratio is also an indicator of financial 
deepening and this was inversely related to the NIM. The real interest rate is 
significant, but has a negative sign. This is surprising, as theory presumes 
that high real interest rates produce high interest rate spreads.
When the macro-economic variables are added to the bank variables, the 
following results are obtained:
Table 8.13 -  Regression results
Dependent variable: Net interest margin
Constant 5.33
(2.33)**
Before-tax profit (BTP/TA) 0.73
(5.41)***
Operating expenditure (OE/TA) 0.64
(2.73)***
Real GDP per capita growth -0.96
(-2.14)**
Loan/reserve ratio -0.10
(-1.37)
R2= 0.54
Adjusted R2 = 0.52
Durbin-Watson = 2.08
Number of observations = 76
(t-stats in parentheses)
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
The R-squared value is higher (R2= 0.54), but the t-statistics of the 
loan/reserve variable is not significant. Finally, the institutional variables were 
examined and the results are reported in table 8.14 below.
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Table 8.14 -  Regression results 
Dependent variable: Net interest margin
Variable Coefficient Std. Error of 
regression
t-Statistic R-squared Durbin-
Watson
M2/GDP -0.18 8.31 -4.24*** 0.19 1.85
Stock market 
capitalisation/GDP
-0.009 9.09 -1.68* 0.03 1.61
CR3 -0.19 8.29 -4.28*** 0.19 1.97
HHI -0.003 8.34 -4 0.19 1.87
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
The M2/GDP variable is significant (at the 1% level) and has the correct sign. 
Countries with more developed financial systems have higher ratios of 
M2/GDP, and lower interest rate spreads. The stock market capitalisation to 
GDP ratio was significant at the 10% level and has the correct sign. Both 
concentration ratios (CR3 & HHI) had significant t-values, but the wrong sign. 
Economic theory predicts that the banking sector in less developed countries 
has higher concentration ratios than in developed countries. High 
concentration ratios in the banking sector could be interpreted as low levels of 
competition and inefficient behaviour. The data above do not support this 
notion, since the negative sign implies that high concentration ratios are 
associated with low spreads. Since all the countries had highly concentrated 
banking sectors, this is probably a sampling error.
Table 8 .15- Regression results
Dependent variable: Net interest margin
Constant 4.63
(1.89)*
Before-tax profit (BTP/TA) 0.60
(4.28)***
Operating expenditure (OE/TA) 0.59
(2.75)***
M2/GDP -0.07
(-2.01)**
Return on equity (ROE) 0.07
(2 .59 )
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R2 = 0.58
Adjusted R2 = 0.55 
Durbin-Watson = 2.13
Number of observations = 76___________________________________
(t-stats in parentheses)
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
When an institutional variable (M2/GDP) is added, the regression results are 
improved (R2 = 0.58). The results show that the net interest margin can be 
explained by bank specific factors, such as costs and profit levels, and there 
is also a significant relationship between the level of financial sector 
development (M2/GDP) and the net interest margin. Banks in more advanced 
financial systems have lower spreads. The results of the White test for 
heteroskedasticity were also comforting, with the F-statistic = 0.72 (p=0.666) 
and the Obs*R-squared = 6.07 (p=0.638).
Finally, banks without data on loan-loss provisions were eliminated from the 
total sample. In the above equation no significant relationship was found 
between loan loss provisions and interest rate spreads. In most of the studies 
on interest rate determinants, this was a significant variable. The sample was 
reduced to 52 banks, eliminating banks where loan-loss provisions were not 
available. This meant that no banks from Zambia were included, since none 
had data on loan loss provisions.
Further examination of the data found that better results would be obtained by 
omitting Zimbabwe altogether. There were various reasons for this. Zimbabwe 
has been going through a period of high instability. All the figures were for 
2000 and these figures were severely distorted by the instability in the
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country. There were also data available on 24 banks in Zimbabwe. This 
contributed to the distortion as Zimbabwe contributed to a large portion of the 
available data. This may be the explanation for the wrong signs of the HHI 
variable, shown in table 8.14 above. When Zimbabwe is omitted, the sample 
is reduced to 39 banks. The results are shown below.
Table 8.16 -  Regression results 
Dependent variable: Net interest margin
Constant -9.81
(-2.41)**
Before-tax profit (BTP/TA) 1.70
(8.49)***
Cost/Income ratio 0.14
(3.14)***
General provision for bad loans 0.05
(GPL/TA) (2.17)**
Real interest rate 0.22
(1.75)*
M2/GDP -0.04
(-1.72)*
HHI 0.001
(1.81)*
R2 = 0.82
Adjusted R2 = 0.78
Durbin-Watson = 1.99
Number of observations = 34
(t-stats in parentheses)
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level
This equation gave much better results, with a R-squared value of 0.82. 
M2/GDP is negative and significant, as expected from the hypothesis 
explained above, higher financial development leads to lower interest rate 
spreads. The HHI is now positive and significant. This is probably due to the 
omission of Zimbabwe (which had a perverse effect as the HHI was relatively 
low, because of the high number of banks included). The general provision for 
bad loans/TA is also positive, in accordance with the hypothesis. The cost to
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income ratio is also positive and significant. The macroeconomic variable, real 
interest rates, is now positive and significant. One expects interest rate 
spreads to move with real interest rates.
From the revised sample, some conclusions can be drawn about the 
determinants of interest rate spreads in the SADC countries. Bank 
characteristics have a strong influence on the interest rate spread. Provisions 
for bad debts increase the interest spread, as does the cost-to-income ratio. 
Operating expenditures are also important. Finally, profits (before-tax profits 
as a ratio of total assets) are important determinants of the interest rate 
spread.
Finally, the structure of the financial sector determines the size of interest rate 
spreads. The HHI has a positive and significant relationship with interest 
spreads. Higher levels of competition in the banking sectors of these countries 
will lead to lower interest rate spreads.
8.9 CONCLUSION
The structuralist views of pro-cyclical interest mark-ups and counter-cyclical 
interest spreads were tested in this chapter by looking at data from selected 
SADC countries. An examination of monthly data for both interest rate mark­
ups and spreads did not yield conclusive evidence of pro-cyclical mark-ups or 
counter-cyclical spreads. Using a var model, there seemed to be a positive 
reaction of mark-ups to a change in real GDP. The same model showed that
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interest rate spreads react negatively to a change in real GDP. This provided 
some evidence of liquidity preference causing interest rate mark-ups and 
spreads to vary over the cycle.
The stability of both mark-ups and spreads were also examined for the SADC 
countries. Generally, more developed countries have lower mark-ups, while 
some of the less developed SADC countries had high mark-ups and high 
variances in these mark-ups. Mark-ups became increasingly unstable over the 
period. The only countries where mark-ups became more stable were 
Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland. This seems to confirm the observation 
made in Chapter 7 that there is a relationship between an endogenous money 
supply and the level of financial development in a country.
The worrying factor was the high (and increasing) levels of interest rate 
spreads. In order to address this problem, more information on the 
determinants of these spreads is required. A regression model was developed 
to look at these determinants. Micro-level banking data were used to examine 
why spreads are high in less developed countries. It was found that bank 
interest rate spreads are mainly a function of bank operating costs. Provisions 
for bad debts also contributed to high spreads. The macroeconomic 
environment was also important, with low levels of financial sector 
development leading to high interest rate spreads. Finally, high concentration 
levels in the banking sectors of these countries also contributed significantly 
to higher interest rate spreads. The relationship between interest rate spreads 
and economic growth will be explored in the next chapter.
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APPENDIX 8.1 -  INTEREST RATE MARK-UPS, SPREADS AND REAL GDP 
GROWTH.
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Lesotho: monthly data
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Mozambique: monthly data
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Swaziland: monthly data
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Tanzania: monthly data
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CHAPTER NINE
Perhaps the invisible hand guides the economy in normal times, but the 
invisible hand is susceptible to paralysis. Events, like the Great Depression 
require a different theory, a theory capable of explaining market failure on a 
grand scale (Mankiw & Romer,1993).
9.1 INTRODUCTION
A developed and well-functioning financial sector is a key component of an 
economy, facilitating the exchange of goods and services, mobilizing savings, 
allocating resources, and helping diversify risks. A growing body of literature 
in economics has affirmed the importance of financial development to 
economic growth. The initial research results were those of McKinnon and 
Shaw (1973). Later studies by Levine (King & Levine 1993; Levine & Zervos 
1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine1999) established the link between 
indicators of financial development and economic growth.
This field of research has not been fully explored by Post Keynesian 
economists. Much of the current growth literature focusses on supply side 
measures (e.g. Solow growth models, new Classical real business cycle 
models, etc.). These supply-side models are in fundamental conflict with 
Keynes’s central vision of a demand driven economy that can get stuck at 
less than full employment positions for extended periods of time.
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH
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Research is therefore necessary into the implications of an endogenous 
money supply for economic growth. In a credit money world, where credit 
money is supplied on demand, the links between financial sector development 
and economic growth are vitally important. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the causal relation between monetary change and the change in 
aggregate demand and economic growth for a sample of 49 developed and 
less-developed countries during the period 1980-1999. It will be shown that 
there are sufficiently strong links between selected financial deepening 
indicators, capital growth rates and economic growth rates, to conclude that 
the level of financial development of a country is important for the level of 
economic growth it can expect to attain.
The first part of the chapter deals with some theoretical issues regarding 
growth theories and recent developments in growth models. The second part 
introduces and describes the variables used in the study, and presents some 
summary statistics for groups of countries. The final part presents the findings 
of the econometric model as well as some general conclusions and policy 
implications.
9.2 FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Considerable debate exists in economic literature on the relationships 
between the financial system and economic growth. Historically, economists 
researching this link have concentrated on the role of banks as financial
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intermediaries. Some of the most important empirical findings in this field can 
be attributed to the work of Robert G. King and Ross Levine (1993) who 
showed that the level of financial intermediation is a good predictor of long-run 
rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity 
improvements. More recent research includes the level of stock-market 
development as an added explanatory variable (Levine & Zervos 1998; 
Gelbard and Leite 1999; and Beck and Levine 2002). There is currently a 
debate whether greater stock market liquidity encourages a shift to higher- 
return projects that stimulate productivity growth, or discourages productive 
investments by increasing portfolio risk. This remains a relatively unexplored 
area of growth research.
More traditional growth models have generally ignored the demand side of the 
economy, and the influence of financial development on demand.
Neoclassical models focused primarily on supply-side factors. There is a need 
for more demand-side models.
It is not possible to mention demand-side growth models without reference to 
Keynes. In his earlier writings during the 1930s, Keynes disagreed strongly 
with the neoclassical view that private market forces could be relied on to 
ensure that the economy would reach a position of full employment. He 
emphasized the central importance of fundamental uncertainty in investment 
decisions, and held that governments must manage the level of aggregate 
demand (AD) to ensure that the level of macroeconomic activity was equal to 
the full employment capacity of the economy.
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Keynes argued that since market forces could not be relied upon to 
consistently produce a level of full employment output, it was the responsibility 
of governments to manage the level of aggregate demand in pursuit of full 
employment. He also maintained that most market economies were typically 
demand-constrained due to fallacious concepts of fiscal prudence and 
monetary conservatism.
The recommendations of Keynes’s demand-side management theories 
became official government policy in the market economies during the Post- 
War period. Most economists subscribed to this view as a result of the 
increasing popularity of the so-called neoclassical synthesis. Yet, even though 
the central importance of Keynesian counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal 
policy recommendations became accepted mainstream theory, the emphasis 
on demand-side measures was not retained. Mainstream economics has 
continued to develop theories of economic growth that offer neoclassical 
supply-side explanations, which are irreconcilable with Keynes’s original 
ideas.
Solow’s well known growth model derived a steady-state ‘natural’ output 
growth rate dependent exclusively on supply-side forces, the rate of 
population growth and the rate of labour-augmenting technical progress: “The 
new wrinkle I want to describe is an elementary way of segregating variations 
in output per head due to technical change from those due to changes in the 
availability of capital per head" (Solow,1957:312). In the Solow model,
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increases in the saving rate raise the rate of capital accumulation, the level of 
capital stock per worker, and the level of potential output, but do not alter the 
‘natural’ rate of growth. Changes in the steady-state rate of per capita growth 
are explained exclusively by changes in the rate of technical progress, 
exogenous to the model. The Solow growth models are essentially 
neoclassical, with an implicit acceptance of Say’s Law, and long-run full 
employment is simply assumed.
More recently, new classical real business cycle models have been developed 
that generate business cycles. New classical economists argued 
persuasively that Keynesian economics was theoretically inadequate, and that 
macroeconomics must be built on a firm microeconomic foundation. These 
theories, arguing that Keynesian economics should be replaced with 
macroeconomic theories based on the classical assumptions that markets 
always clear and that economic actors are always rational, evolved in the 
1980s into real business cycle theory. These real business cycle models are 
Walrasian general equilibrium models, and they imply that the invisible hand 
always guides the economy to the efficient allocation of resources (Mankiw & 
Romer, 1993:1).
The new classical view embraces the classical view of the world, where 
agents always maximize, prices adjust to clear markets and markets are 
efficient without interference. This is in sharp contrast to the Keynesian view 
of market failures and cyclical fluctuations. Real business cycle theories are 
derived from the classical view, fluctuations (which are only temporary) are
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caused by large fluctuations in technology, and by individuals altering their 
labour supply through intertemporal substitution. The emphasis therefore 
remains on supply-side factors and it strongly embraces the classical 
dichotomy, where there is no link between monetary and real variables (King 
and Plosser,1984): “The resulting real business cycle approach simply denies 
that there is in fact any significant effect of monetary policy on output; 
observed money-output correlations are said to be the consequence of 
‘reverse causation’, i.e., responses of the money stock to output fluctuations. 
These fluctuations are brought about, to finish the story, by random real 
shocks to technology” (McCallum, 1988:464).
New Keynesian models similarly derive a ‘natural’ growth rate as the centre of 
long-run gravitation. Actual output is assumed eventually to converge to 
potential output. The role of monetary and fiscal policy is simply to stabilise 
the path of actual output around potential output by minimizing fluctuations in 
AD. If actual output is subject to a large negative or positive ‘shock’, monetary 
and fiscal policy may speed up the process of adjustment.
According to Mankiw (a prominent New Keynesian): “Like Keynes, new 
Keynesians begin with the premise that persistent unemployment and 
economic fluctuations are central and continuing problems: recessions and 
depressions represent market-failure on a grand scale. Coming in the wake of 
the new classical revolution, new Keynesians also place a renewed emphasis 
on microeconomic foundations. They are attempting to build macroeconomic 
theories from new developments in the microeconomics of goods, labor, and
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capital markets” (1993:3-4). New Keynesian economists shifted the focus to 
rigidities in nominal wages and prices. Romer (1993) emphasized the 
complementarity between real and nominal rigidities. Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1993) focused on the existence of imperfect markets as a result of imperfect 
information. In this way they could explain how small disturbances can cause 
large fluctuations. King (1993) extended this debate by asking the question of 
how to incorporate expectations into New Keynesian models. His approach is 
a demand-side one: “In this essay, the focus is on aggregate demand, as in 
fact was standard in the old Keynesian tradition. Both the new and old 
Keynesians are trying to answer a question of the 1950s and 1960s: why are 
prices sticky? But the question that needs to be asked is: why are prices 
sticky in certain historical episodes and rapidly adjusting in others?”
(King, 1993:70). The New Keynesian approach with its emphasis on credit 
rationing as a result of imperfect information, is a valuable contribution to the 
Post Keynesian work on endogenous credit money. However, most New 
Keynesian research continues to be focused on supply-side factors such as 
risk averse firms, menu costs and labour markets affected by efficiency 
wages, implicit contracts and insider-outsider theories.
All supply-side growth models are in fundamental conflict with Keynes’s vision 
of an economy that comes to rest at a point less than full employment 
equilibrium for long periods of time. Keynes emphasized the centrality of 
effective demand, caused by the volatility of investment spending due to 
swings in ‘animal spirits’. The latter were the result of the existence of
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fundamental uncertainty, and the resulting inability of firms to predict 
accurately their future level of aggregate demand.
Neoclassical growth models (Solow), gradually evolved into the so-called new 
endogenous growth (NEG) theories. For almost three decades, the work of 
Solow was the accepted growth model (for this contribution he received the 
Nobel Prize in 1987). One of the implications of Solow’s growth model was 
the ‘convergence hypothesis’. According to this theory, technology flows 
between countries will cause growth rates to converge over time. All countries 
with the same capital-labour ratio will grow at the same pace. This assumption 
was challenged by later researchers, and thus the new endogenous growth 
models were bom. In the work of Romer (1994), Solow’s assumption of 
decreasing returns to scale was replaced by a theory of increasing returns to 
scale. Countries can continue to grow at different rates, because growth is 
endogenously caused by the accumulation of physical and human capital, 
knowledge, productivity and specialization.
In NEG theories monetary and fiscal policies impact on aggregate demand, 
and affect not merely the flow of investment spending and the level of output, 
but also the technological change and the growth rate of output. Expansionary 
AD policies are consistent with increases in both the level and the growth rate 
of AS, while restrictive AD policies that create excess supply can reduce the 
growth rate. In NEG theory the accumulate factors of production, physical 
and human capital do not, as in the Solow model, exhaust their contribution to 
production at the margin (decreasing returns to scale). As a result it is
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possible to sustain the growth rate merely through a steady process of 
accumulation. Given the conventional neoclassical hypothesis that saving 
causes investment, anything that affects the saving rate thus affects the long- 
run rate of growth. Effective demand failures are impossible and autonomous 
shortfalls in AD impact on the utilization of resources only in the short-run, due 
to expectational errors or nominal rigidities.
This was acknowledged by Solow himself in his Nobel Lecture: “There was 
one bad by-product of this focus on the description of technology. I think I paid 
too little attention to the problems of effective demand” (Solow, 1988:xiv).
Post Keynesian economists have long maintained that the focus of any 
growth model should be on the demand-side of the economy. Factors that 
determine demand (or rather cause a lack of effective demand) can have real 
and lasting influences on economic growth rates. The principle of effective 
demand as developed by Keynes is the major conceptual distinction between 
Keynesian economics on the one hand and neoclassical economics on the 
other. Keynes viewed capitalism as an open complex system, in which 
investment spending and the level of economic activity are in essence 
indeterminate. Investment spending is the key element driving aggregate 
demand, and its relative autonomy is the proximate source of openness in the 
Keynesian system. While there exists a causal relationship between changes 
in investment and changes in income, this can not be reduced to a 
mechanical multiplier ‘law of motion’ from which the evolution of future income 
can be deduced and predicted. The long run is an inter-temporal sequence of
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short runs, in each of which autonomous demand-side forces determine the 
level of economic activity.
The earlier supply-side Solow models were clearly irreconcilable with 
Keynesian demand-side theory. There has, however, more recently been a 
move to try and find some common ground between new growth theory and 
Post Keynesian economics. Palley (1996) attempted a synthesis between 
Keynesian and new growth approaches. This is a difficult task, as growth in 
the NEG models is determined by a production function in which labour grows 
at a rate of growth determined by the exogenously given supply of labour, 
although capital grows according to investment demand. Effective demand is 
introduced into the model by specifying that changes in effective demand 
growth are caused by deviations of output growth from excess demand 
growth, and by assuming that the investment rate depends on the growth of 
effective demand. Both saving and investment functions play a role in 
determining output and its growth (Palley). This view is not consistent with 
the Post Keynesian notion that saving is the accounting record of investment. 
According to Moore (2002:5), “Increases in volitional saving rather imply a 
reduction in consumption spending, and so in aggregate demand. The result 
is to depress the level of expected future demand, and lead to a fall rather 
than a rise in current investment spending.”
The focus of Post Keynesian growth literature has been mainly on the role of 
technological change. Much research has been devoted to the pursuit of 
finding common ground between new endogenous growth theory and Post
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Keynesian growth models. The negative effect of this focus is that many 
demand-side aspects of the growth process have been neglected by Post 
Keynesians: “While technological change is important, the arguably excessive 
focus of new growth theory should not divert the attention of post-Keynesian 
growth theory from other aspects of the growth process. Many such issues 
come to mind, such as the role of financial factors, which have been swept 
under the rug by new growth theorists arguably because they are relegated to 
the short and medium run aspects of macroeconomics” (Dutt,2001:32).
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the Post Keynesian growth theory, 
by focusing explicitly on the role of financial development in the growth 
process.
9.3 MEASURING FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Post Keynesian monetary theory argues that the money supply is 
endogenous, and credit is supplied to creditworthy borrowers on demand. It 
was shown in earlier chapters that the money supply becomes increasingly 
endogenous as a country’s financial system develops. This endogenous 
money supply is therefore related to advanced levels of financial and 
institutional development. The aim of this chapter is to examine the link 
between the level of financial development and growth.
In order for some units to deficit-spend and others to surplus-spend, financial 
intermediation must guarantee the effective flow of financial resources. This
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requires a well-developed financial sector with competitive bank and non-bank 
financial intermediaries. As Moore (2002:6) explains: “In a credit money 
economy bank loans provide the finance that permits economic units to deficit 
spend. In order for aggregate demand to increase overtime, economic units 
on balance must spend more on currently produced goods and services in the 
present period than their total income in the previous period.” A growing body 
of research has affirmed the importance of financial development in economic 
growth. One question that remains, is how to best measure financial 
development: “Since financial development is not easily measurable, studies 
attempting to link financial deepening with growth, savings and investment 
have chosen a number of proxies; most have used monetary aggregates, with 
mixed results” (Gelbard & Leite, 1999:3).
Some of the monetary aggregates most frequently used are; the ratio of 
narrow to broad money (M1/M2), the ratio of M2 to GDP, the share of private 
sector credit in total credit, and the ratio of private sector credit to GDP. The 
most appropriate financial deepening indicator seems to be the ratio of credit 
to the private sector to GDP (Gelbard & Leite,1999:5). Later studies (e.g. 
Levine & Zervos 1998) included measures of stock exchange liquidity (total 
value of shares traded divided by GDP and the turnover ratio).
Many articles have expanded on the earlier work of King and Levine (1993) by 
adding more comprehensive indicators of financial development. Levine and 
Zervos (1998) have found stock market liquidity - as measured both by the 
value of stock trading relative to the size of the market and by the value of
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trading relative to the size of the economy - is significantly and positively 
correlated with current and future rates of economic growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth. They also find that the level of banking 
development -  as measured by bank loans to private enterprises divided by 
GDP -  enters the growth regressions significantly. They found no evidence of 
any correlation between market size, international integration, and growth.
To improve on the traditional financial deepening indicator M2/GDP, Levine 
and Zervos (1998) constructed a more informative private credit variable. One 
of the problems with M2/GDP is that it does not measure whether the 
monetary liabilities are those of banks, the central bank, or other financial 
intermediaries. Levine and Zervos refined this by using the value of loans 
made by commercial and other deposit-taking banks to the private sector 
divided by GDP. This provides a better indicator of Bank Credit (1998:542).
In a comprehensive study, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999) constructed 
a new comprehensive database on financial development and structure. The 
database forms part of a broader research project that examines the 
determinants of financial structure and its importance for economic 
development. In order to facilitate this research, the authors compiled a 
comprehensive database, including a wide variety of indicators that measure 
the size, activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets. It is an 
improvement on previous research, as it introduces indicators of the size and 
activity of non-bank financial institutions and presents measures of bond and
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primary equity markets. Some of the variables from this dataset are used in 
the regressions below.
Levine, Loayaza and Beck (1999), use panel data techniques to examine the 
relationship between financial development and growth. The authors 
construct a new dataset and improve again on the traditional M2/GDP 
variables, by measuring not only the overall size of the financial sector, but 
also whether commercial banking institutions, or the central bank, conduct the 
intermediation. This approach sheds new light on the question of the influence 
of financial development on growth, by measuring the banking sector more 
comprehensively, and carefully distinguishing who is conducting the 
intermediation and where the funds are flowing.
This chapter draws from each of the above sources. A number of traditional 
measures of financial deepening, e.g. credit/GDP, M3/GDP, were used. 
Indicators of stock market development were also included, using data from 
the sources mentioned above. The following section describes the variables 
and sources.
9.3.1. VARIABLES AND SOURCES
In order to assess the relationship between economic growth and financial 
development, including both the banking sectors and stock markets, data from 
a variety of sources were used. These are described below.
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A. Financial sector development
There is a growing literature that deals with the links between financial sector 
and banking development and economic activity. Measuring financial sector 
development across a broad spectrum of countries has proven difficult, since 
no standardized indicators are readily available. Researchers have been 
forced to rely on broad indicators of financial sector development as proxies 
for banking sector involvement and development. Typically, indicators like the 
ratio M2/GDP have been calculated from IMF data.
The approach below starts with the traditional measures, e.g. credit to GDP, 
M3/GDP, etc. (using IMF sources). These are extended by including other 
financial deepening indicators obtained from the World Bank Development 
Indicators dataset. Some further indicators on the banking sector compiled by 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999) are also included.
1. Financial deepening indicators
All indicators have been normalized by using a scale variable. Most are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. Three variables published by the World 
Bank have been used as indicators of financial depth. The two more 
commonly used variables are Domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector/GDP and Liquid liabilities as % of GDP (M3/GDP).
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Figure 9.1 Domestic credit provided by the banking sector and liquid liabilities 
(both as %GDP)
----- M3GDP —-  CREDITGDP
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Various years.
As seen from figure 9.1, both measures are closely related for the 49
countries in the sample. Both variables are positively related with growth (as
measured by real per capita GDP growth). [Scatter diagrams are shown in the
Appendix (figures 9.1.1 and 9.1.2)]. In order to gain a better understanding of
the distribution of the M3/GDP ratio among the countries in the sample, the
countries were ranked and the results are shown below in figure 9.2.
359
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
Figure 9.2 M3/GDP (%) -  countries ranked by indicator.
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Various years.
It is clear from figure 9.2 that the countries with lower levels of M3/GDP are 
the less developed countries.
Another financial deepening indicator from the World Bank dataset, the ratio 
of bank liquid reserves to bank assets was used. This variable is negatively 
related with growth. The amount of required reserves serves as a tax on 
banking, specifically in less developed countries. A higher ratio is associated 
with lower levels of banking sector development. This relationship is shown in 
figure 9.1.3. in the Appendix.
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The relationship between the financial deepening indicators and growth rates 
across income groups are shown in Appendix 9.2 (Figure 9.2.2). Appendix 3 
lists the countries included in the sample, and their division into the four 
income categories (using WDI categories).
Three other measures of financial deepening (calculated by Beck, Demirguc- 
Kunt & Levine 1999) were used. The first variable measures Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/GDP (‘Dby’), defined as ‘claims of deposit money banks on 
non-financial domestic sectors as share of GDP’. The second one is Bank 
credit/ GDP (‘Priv’), defined as claims of deposit money banks on the private 
sector as share of GDP; and the third one measures the Overall size o f the 
financial system/GDP (‘Oversize’), defined as deposit money bank assets 
and stock market capitalization as share of GDP. All three these variables are 
positively related to real per capita GDP growth (see Appendix 9.1, figures 
9.1.4, 9.1.5. & 9.1.6). The distribution across income groups is shown in 
Figure 9.2.2 (Appendix 9.2).
Table 9.1 -  Summary statistics for financial deepening indicators.
CREDIT/GDP M3/GDP RESERVES/ OVERSIZE 
ASSETS
PRIV DBY
Mean 72.68961 52.49047 12.05941 0.833003 0.392201 0.493634
Median 64.41770 45.02698 10.21372 0.797924 0.285145 0.417111
Maximum 239.3342 171.9069 42.21773 2.394454 1.435538 1.543116
Minimum 9.980305 16.25214 0.037308 0.128969 0.031693 0.052129
Std. Dev. 43.05696 31.74423 11.19145 0.560190 0.293458 0.332667
Skewness 1.271107 1.794211 0.908227 1.040498 1.269022 1.008763
Kurtosis 5.965316 6.980067 2.879664 3.661396 4.752827 3.660895
Jarque-Bera 30.51190 52.64912 6.766056 8.343986 19.02814 9.014383
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.033945 0.015421 0.000074 0.011029
Observations 49 44 49 42 48 48
Notes: Credit/GDP = Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP); M3/GDP = Liquid liabilities (M3) as 
% of GDP; Reserves/assets = Bank liquid reserves to bank assets; Dby = Claims of deposit money banks on non- 
financial domestic sectors as share of GDP; Priv = Bank credit (Claims on private sector by deposit money banks as 
share of GDP); Oversize = Overall size of the financial system/GDP.
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Table 9.1 presents summary statistics of the six financial deepening 
indicators. The summary statistics show substantial variance among the 
countries in terms of financial deepening. Many less developed countries 
have indicators significantly below the median values. Ghana has the lowest 
values for bank credit and claims of deposit money banks on non-financial 
sectors (Dby) and M3 to GDP: 5.2%, 3.1% and 16.2% of GDP respectively. At 
the other side of the spectrum, Switzerland has the highest ratios of Dby 
(154%) and bank credit (143%). This is expected of a country that serves as 
an important financial centre with a very sophisticated banking system, but a 
relatively small GDP. When one considers credit/GDP and M3/GDP, there is 
also substantial variance, with the standard deviation for the former equal to 
43 and the latter 32. In both categories Japan has the highest levels. The 
liquid reserves/assets ratio is an indicator of the level of financial 
development, where lower values indicate higher levels of financial 
deepening. Luxembourg has a value of 0.03%. It is also the country with the 
highest per capita income in the world. Luxembourg also has the largest 
overall size of the financial system as percentage of GDP (239%).
2. Credit distribution
The degree of credit availability in an economy provides an overall indication 
of the level of financial development. A set of variables was calculated to 
show how credit is distributed among various sectors of the economy. Data 
were obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database 
(published by the IMF). The data come from the IMF’s monetary survey and
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include Domestic Credit, Claims on Central Government and Claims on 
the Private Sector. Data from the section ‘Monetary Survey’ were used, as 
this is a consolidation of the monetary authorities’ and deposit money banks’ 
data. For example 'Claims on Central Government’ includes both claims on 
central government by the monetary authorities and claims by deposit money 
banks. This figure is reported as ‘net claims on central government’, which 
equals claims on central government, less central government deposits. It is 
therefore possible that this figure can have a negative value. 'Claims on the 
Private Sector’ is calculated in the same manner. Domestic credit is a more 
comprehensive measure and includes claims on central government, claims 
on local government, claims on non-financial public enterprises, claims on 
private sector and claims on other financial institutions. For some countries, 
only claims on private sector and claims on central government are shown in 
the IFS survey. Domestic credit could therefore have a larger value than the 
sum of its reported parts.
In the IFS database these variables are reported in local currencies. The 
percentage share of government and private sector in total credit were also 
calculated. The division of credit between the public and private sectors 
shows a definite trend across income groups. The average share of 
government credit as a percentage of total credit is as high as 67% for low 
income countries (implying that there are serious crowding-out effects at work 
in less developed countries). For the other three income groups it varies 
between 11% and 27%. Similarly, the private sector receives only one quarter 
of total credit in the lowest income countries (25%). Domestic credit (the most
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comprehensive credit indicator) has an average of 78% (as percentage of 
GDP) for high-income countries and 49% for upper-middle-income countries. 
For the lower-income groups it lies between 25 and 32%. (See appendix, 
figure 9.2.3).
Two other variables, private sector credit as % of GDP and domestic credit 
(more comprehensive measure) as % of GDP, are shown in figure 9.2.5. 
(appendix). The share of private sector credit averages 69% for high-income 
countries, falling to an average of 14% for low-income countries. Domestic 
credit follows the same trend. Both these indicators are positively related to 
real per capita GDP growth rates. The relationship between growth and 
private sector credit (%GDP) is shown as a scatter diagram (figure 9.1.7).
Not only are the levels of financial deepening important for economic growth. 
Changes in financial deepening variables were also examined. The change 
in credit divided by the change in GDP was calculated from data in the IFS 
dataset. The same pattern is observed when change in credit divided by 
change in GDP is shown together with the ratio of credit to GDP, across 
income groups. The change in credit is high (average 194%) for the high 
income groups (see figure 9.2.6). This is also associated with higher real per 
capita GDP growth rates. For the lower income groups, the ratio was around 
40%.
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Figure 9.3 shows how countries rank in terms of private sector credit/GDP. It 
is clear that developed countries usually have the highest ratios of private 
sector credit to GDP.
Figure 9.3 Private sector credit/GDP -  countries ranked by indicator 
Source: IFS, various years
Private sector credit/GDP
There are alternative ways of measuring levels of development in the banking 
sector. One indicator is the ratio of total assets o f bank-like institutions to 
GDP. This variable is also calculated in the database compiled by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). Various groups of financial institutions are 
included in this variable. It includes deposit money banks, which is defined in 
the IFS database as: “...commercial banks and other banks that accept 
transferable deposits, such as demand deposits” (IMF, 2000:xvii). It also
_ _____________
-----------------------------------
hmmMMM
3. Banking sector development
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includes other banklike institutions, which comprise institutions that accept 
deposits, but do not provide transferable deposit facilities, intermediaries that 
finance themselves mainly through issuance of negotiable bonds, 
development banks and offshore units (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt &
Levine, 1999:4). This variable therefore provides a comprehensive view of the 
level of development of all bank-like institutions in an economy.1 
It is desirable to have a measure of the efficiency with which commercial 
banks fulfil their function as financial intermediaries. The Net interest margin 
provides such a measure, representing the accounting value of a bank’s 
overhead costs as share of its total assets. It is calculated by dividing net 
interest revenue by total assets. The data used were the average values over 
1990-95. The average value for the high-income countries is significantly 
lower than those of the other income groups. The net interest margin is a low 
2,6% for the high-income group and varies between 5,7% and 6,4% for the 
other three income groups (figure 9.2.7). There is a wide gap between the 
high-income groups, but other income groups have similar levels of banking 
sector efficiency.
A last variable indicating banking structure and development is the 
concentration ratio. This is defined as the ratio of the three largest banks’ 
assets to total banking assets. A highly concentrated banking sector may be 
associated with lower levels of growth, if the lack of competitive pressure 
reduces the efficiency of banks as financial intermediaries. Savings might not
1 The positive relationship between this variable and real per capita GDP growth is shown in figure 9.1.8 
(appendix).
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be channeled into profitable investment opportunities, if there is little 
competition in the commercial banking sector. This concentration index was 
obtained by averaging data over the period 1990-1995. The CR3 
(concentration ratio of the three largest banks as a percentage of total 
assets), was 84% for the low-income groups. The other three income groups 
also had relatively high CR3 ratios, varying between 60% and 65% (see figure 
9.2.8). This indicates that banking is an industry with increasing returns to 
scale, and is usually dominated in most countries by a few large commercial 
banks. However, the very high CR3 ratio (85%) for low-income countries, 
shows a serious lack of competition in the banking industries of those 
countries.
B. Stock market indicators
Most of the research done on the relationship between financial development 
and growth has focused on traditional indicators of financial deepening (e.g. 
total amount of money and bank assets as % of GDP). Only recently have 
indicators of stock market activity and development been included in these 
models. One of the first articles to include stock market indicators, was that of 
Levine and Zervos (1998). They found that both stock market liquidity and 
banking development positively predict growth: “The results are consistent 
with the views that financial markets provide important services for growth, 
and that stock markets provide different sen/ices from banks” (Levine & 
Zervos, 1998:537). Three indicators of stock market activity were included in 
the present model.
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The first is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. This is equal to 
the value of listed shares divided by GDP. To measure activity or liquidity of 
the stock markets, the ratio of total value traded on the stock market to
GDP is used. This is defined as the total value of shares traded on the stock 
exchange divided by GDP. The last measure is the turnover ratio, an 
indicator of the efficiency of a stock market. It is defined as the ratio of the 
value of total shares traded to market capitalisation. A small but active stock 
market has a high turnover ratio, while a large but less liquid stock market has 
a lower ratio. All three variables were obtained from the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine dataset. All variables are simple 15 year averages for the period 
1980-1995.
Table 9.2 Summary statistics: Stock market and banking sector development
CONC MCAP NETINTER TOR TVT BIA
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
0.668052 
0.700955 
1.000000 
0.182142 
0.216174 
-0.301961 
2.201657
0.298790
0.166367
2.141658
0.007516
0.388243
3.104939
14.02223
0.043167 
0.036043 
0.120351 
0.007214 
0.027052 
1.078237 
3.747162
0.306839
0.241310
I.691111 
0.010449 
0.306698 
2.449193
II.29870
0.098423
0.043971
0.975436
0.001217
0.169982
3.703015
18.64248
0.255971 
0.150421 
1.309558 
0.006656 
0.316001 
2.011829 
6.446142
Jarque-Bera
Probability
1.837135
0.399090
280.0911
0.000000
9.332133
0.009409
158.6404
0.000000
511.7083
0.000000
36.25156
0.000000
Observations 44 42 43 41 41 31
Notes: Conc=CR3 concentration ratio (assets of 3 largest banks), Mcap=Stock market captalisation as a share of 
GDP, Netinter=Net interest margin, Tor=Turnover ratio, Tvt=Total value traded as percentage of GDP, Bia=Total 
assets of bank-like institutions as a percentage of GDP.
Most low income countries included in the sample show low levels of 
efficiency in the banking sector. Congo has only 3 banks which makes the
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CR3 concentration ratio equal to 1. The minimum value (CR3 = 0.18) is the 
United States, a country characterized by strong competition in the banking 
sector. The median value (0.70) shows high average levels of concentration in 
the banking industry for the 44 countries included in the sample. Another 
factor that has to be considered is whether the banks are domestic or foreign 
banks. In the case of Botswana (0.94) and Swaziland (0.94) the main banks 
are merely subsidiaries/ branches of South African banks. The net interest 
margin tells the same story. The country with the lowest margin (i.e. highest 
efficiency) is Luxembourg (0.007) and the one with the highest margin is 
Brazil (0.12).
The stock market indicators once again show the richest per capita income 
countries at the top of the list. Switzerland has both the highest turnover (Tor 
=1.69) and total value traded ratios (Tvt = 0.97), while Luxembourg has the 
highest market capitalisation ratio (mcap = 2.14). Paraguay has the lowest 
market capitalisation and total value traded ratios.
C. Interest rates and inflation
Interest rates are not normally included in the studies on financial 
development and growth. In the more recent article by Levine, Loayza and 
Beck (1999), real interest rates were included in the dataset. However, this 
variable does not appear in any of the regressions. It presumably was not 
significant when combined with the financial deepening indicators.
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The traditional approach is extended here to include various indicators of 
interest rates. In previous chapters it was explained that interest rate spreads 
and mark-ups are important indicators of efficiency and competitiveness in the 
Post Keynesian approach. High interest rate spreads are indicative of 
underdeveloped financial markets and will therefore be negatively related to 
growth. Interest rate spreads are published in the World Bank Development 
Indicators as an indicator of financial depth. The spreads used in this model 
were obtained from the World Bank database. To check for consistency, 
spreads were also calculated by subtracting the deposit rate from the lending 
rate, using IMF data. If inconsistencies were found, the calculated value was 
used. Both nominal and real interest rates were included in the present study.
There is a clear relationship between interest rate spreads, mark-ups and 
nominal interest rates across income groups. Figure 9.2.10 (appendix) shows 
clearly that the average interest rate spread and mark-up both increase 
markedly from the high- to the low-income countries. The spread is as low as 
4% for high-income countries and the markup 2.8% for the same group of 
countries. In figure (9.2.11, appendix), average nominal bank rates and 
inflation rates are shown across income groups. There is a large difference 
between the high-income group and the other three income groups. The high 
average figures for the upper-middle-income group are easily explained when 
the countries included in this income group are considered (see Appendix 3)2.
2 Most of the high inflationary South American countries fall into this income group. The exceptions are 
Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa, with much lower rates.
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Figures 9.1.10, 9.1.11 and 9.1.12 (appendix) show that interest rates spreads, 
nominal interest rates (bank rate) and real interest rates are negatively related 
to per capita growth rates. The real interest rate is negatively related to 
growth, after the outliers have been removed. The average real interest rate 
for the low income groups has a surprisingly low value of 2.9%. The reason 
for this low rate is that many less developed countries had negative average 
real interest rates over the sample period, as they had high and fluctuating 
inflation rates. The following table provides summary statistics for interest rate 
spreads, mark-ups and nominal rates.
Table 9.3 Summary statistics -  Interest rates and inflation
BANKRATE INFLATION MARKUP SPREAD
Mean 19.31095 18.73827 3.833745 5.792441
Median 11.10300 7.495777 3.278558 5.349750
Maximum 269.0000 180.6739 12.60000 12.23400
Minimum 3.262500 1.727667 -5.571166 1.506417
Std. Dev. 37.77298 32.53154 3.196578 2.777753
Skewness 6.081146 3.806181 0.596823 0.464437
Kurtosis 40.62582 17.68966 4.995755 2.453896
Jarque-Bera 3192.399 558.8742 10.36500 2.273693
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.005614 0.320829
Observations 49 49 46 47
Notes: Bankrate=Nominal interest rate, Markup=Lending rate minus bank rate, Spread=Lending rate minus deposit 
rate.
The average nominal bank rate in Argentina was 269% over the sample 
period 1980-1999. This value was excluded to remove the perverse effects of 
such outliers when testing for the relationships with growth. Even with such 
high nominal rates, Argentina had a real average interest rate of 9.5% over 
the period. Hyper-inflation was present over most of the sample period. 
Argentina managed only 0.2% average real per capita growth over the sample 
period. Japan had the lowest bank rate (3.2%) and inflation rate (1.7%). This 
is associated with relatively high real per capita growth rates (average 2.2%
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over the period). Switzerland had the lowest interest rate spread (1.5%), 
confirming its status as an important, international financial centre. Tanzania 
had the highest spread (12.2%), reflecting inefficient financial intermediation. 
Figure 9.4 shows that the countries with the highest spreads are the least 
developed countries in the sample.
Figure 9.4 -  Interest rate spreads -  countries ranked by indicator
14
12
10
Spread
v /
Source: IFS, various years.
D. Channels to growth
Besides examining the relationship between financial development indicators 
and long-run real per capita growth, other factors that contribute to economic 
growth were also included in the present model. Since growth is a dynamic
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process, much information is lost when averaging data over a 20-year period. 
The advantages are however considerable, in eliminating short-run 
fluctuation. In most long-run cross-sectional growth studies of this type, the R2 
is about 50%. Levine and Zervos found R2 values of between 45% and 50%: 
“The growth regression R2 of 0.50 is consistent with other cross-sectional 
growth studies (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin,1995)” (Levine &
Zervos, 1998:546).
The financial deepening indicators are positively related to growth rates over 
the sample period. In the final cross sectional growth regression, these 
financial variables are combined with other macroeconomic variables to 
control for their contribution to economic growth. Most macroeconomic 
variables were obtained from the database compiled by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1999).
Government expenditure as a share o f GDP is an indication of the size of 
government involvement in the economy. It was assumed that greater 
government involvement in the economy was associated with greater 
inefficiencies. But, when this relationship was examined for the entire period 
for the 49 countries, no significant relationship emerges. One significant 
indicator of economic growth is the growth rate o f real per capita capital. 
This variable is calculated as an average over the period 1980-1992, as a 
regression coefficient from an OLS regression. Economic theory has long 
posited a significant positive relationship between capital formation and 
economic growth (e.g. Fisher 1930, Jorgenson 1971). This relationship is
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shown for the 49 countries in the sample in figure 9.1.13 (appendix). The 
simple OLS regression of real per capita capital growth rates on per capita 
growth, gives a R2 value of 0.49. This is a clear indication of the importance of 
capital growth rates for economic growth.
The next indicator of growth used, was the average years o f schooling in 
the total population over 25. Unfortunately this variable was only available for 
1990. No averages were available for the entire period, which reduces the 
significance of this variable. While there was a positive relationship between 
this variable (school90) and real per capita GDP growth, this relationship was 
not significant in the regressions.
An indicator of private saving rates was included. Higher saving rates are 
correlated with higher levels of capital formation and investment and 
economic growth. The variable used is defined as the ratio of gross private 
saving to gross private disposable income, averaged over 1980-1995. Figure 
9.1.15 (appendix) shows that there is a strong positive relationship between 
saving rates and real per capita growth. There is also a strong, significant and 
positive relationship between saving rates and capital growth rates (figure 
9.1.16).
Two other indicators were included to give an indication of risk levels 
associated with investment in a country. These are important in the low- 
income countries (especially Africa) where property rights are not properly 
policed and corruption is rife. The first variable (‘govrep’) is an indicator of 
repudiation o f contracts by governments. This is an indicator of the “risk of
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a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or 
scaling down due to budget cutbacks, indiginization pressure, a change in 
government, or a change in government economic and social priorities” (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999). Scores are allocated on a scale of 0-10, with 
lower scores for higher risks. Data were averaged over the period 1982-1995. 
The final indicator in this category, is the level o f corruption (‘corrupt’). This 
is also measured on a scale 0-10, with 0 an indication of high levels of 
corruption. Both of these indicators are highly intercorrelated (see appendix, 
figure 9.1.17). They are also individually correlated with per capita growth, 
government repudiation showing a stronger positive relationship with growth 
than the corruption index.
Table 9.4 Summary statistics -  growth related variables
GOVEXP GOVREP CAPGROLS PSR_CA CORRUPT SCHOOL90
Mean 16.77288 7.604872 1.170110 0.215173 4.332432 6.441333
Median 15.88134 7.947916 1.709373 0.226387 4.392857 6.250000
Maximum 40.21134 10.00000 6.117996 0.385093 6.000000 12.00000
Minimum 7.381497 3.045455 -6.880267 -0.042803 1.285714 2.310000
Std. Dev. 6.351548 1.935963 2.191922 0.081614 1.342530 2.763308
Skewness 1.175505 -0.528234 -1.219345 -0.923545 -0.217220 0.156508
Kurtosis 5.363271 2.169352 5.651335 4.828063 1.842898 1.829359
Jarque-Bera 21.29857 3.311184 26.49427 12.38152 2.800642 2.753211
Probability 0.000024 0.190979 0.000002 0.002048 0.246518 0.252434
Observations 46 44 49 44 44 45
Notes: Govexp=Government expenditures as a share of GDP, Govrep=Repudiation of contracts by governments, 
Capgrols=Growth rate real per capita capital, Psr_ca=Private savings, Corrupt=index of corruption, 
school90=average years of schooling in total population over 25 in 1990.
When these variables (as defined above) are included, a common picture 
emerges. High rates of capital formation and private saving are associated 
with high per capita growth rates and per capita income. Luxembourg has the 
highest saving ratio (0.38) of the whole sample, and the lowest saving ratio
375
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
(-0.04) is that of Zambia. The corruption score for most of the developed 
countries was high, with Paraguay having the dubious honour of the most 
corrupt (the lowest score of 1.2). The United States had the highest school90 
score, with an average of 12 years schooling for the total population above 
25. The country with the worst score was Zimbabwe, with only 2.31 years of 
education for the average citizen. This is reflected in its poor growth 
performance (real per capita GDP = 0.7%) over the sample period, while the 
US had an average growth rate of real per capita GDP = 2%.
Figure 9.5 shows how countries score on the corruption index. Higher values 
are assigned to lower risk countries.
Figure 9.5 Corruption -  countries ranked by indicator.
Index of corruption
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999
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E. Openness and trade
It is widely acknowledged that openness to trade has important effects on 
economic growth rates. Three variables were used to indicate the openness 
of a country. Two were calculated from the IFS database. The first is the ratio 
of foreign exchange/ imports. The level of foreign exchange is published in 
dollars by the IMF, under the heading ‘international liquidity’. This figure was 
multiplied by the exchange rate, because both imports and exports are 
published in the local currency. The ratio of the balance of payments (Bop) 
to imports was calculated by dividing the Bop (as published by the IMF) by 
imports.
A ‘trade’ variable was also used from the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
dataset, the sum of real exports and imports as a share of real GDP, using the 
average over 1980-95.
Each of these variables is positively related to growth. The higher the ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to imports, the less constrained an economy is in 
its growth path. The same is true for the surplus/deficit of the balance of 
payments. Positive figures on the balance of payments are associated with 
higher growth rates. The ‘trade’ variable (sum of real exports and imports as a 
ratio of real GDP) shows that more openness leads to higher growth rates. A 
number of countries in the sample have ‘trade’ values above 100, e.g. 
Luxembourg with the highest value of 181%. It is significant to note that all 
four countries in the sample with real per capita growth rates exceeding 4% 
the highest per capita growth rates, also have ‘trade’ values of more than
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100%. These are Cyprus (103%), Mauritius (116%), Botswana (113%) and 
Ireland (106%).
9.4 FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH -  
REGRESSION RESULTS.
In this section the variables introduced above are used in a simple OLS 
regression model to test the correlation between per capita growth, indicators 
of financial deepening, and the other ‘channels to growth’. Cross-country 
regressions are used and the variables are averaged over the entire sample 
period, 1980-1999 (data permitting), yielding one observation per country.
This approach, i.e. using growth and explanatory variables averaged over 
long periods, is common in the traditional growth literature. It has been 
criticised by various authors, since it cannot account for the effects of 
common shocks to both dependent and explanatory variables. It also cannot 
account for the potential endogenous co-determination of growth and 
explanatory variables (Levine & Zervos, 1998).
These shortcomings are acknowledged in the present model. But the 
approach followed does eliminate some of the common problems with time 
series data and unit roots. By using average values for all the variables, short- 
run fluctuations and autocorrelations of variables are eliminated. In a recent 
paper by Beck and Levine (2002) on the relationships between stock markets, 
banks and growth, more advanced panel data techniques are used. They 
constructed a panel with data averaged over five-year intervals from 1976-
378
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
1998 to abstract from business cycle relationships, using both this panel 
econometric approach as well as a traditional OLS approach. They found that 
the results were similar, despite the weaknesses of the OLS approach: “As we 
will see, the sizes of the coefficients in the simple OLS regressions are very 
similar to the results we obtain using more sophisticated dynamic panel 
estimators” (2002:11).
To provide a more complete picture of the relationship between financial 
development and growth, single variable regressions are reported for 10-year 
and 5-year sub-periods (where applicable).
9.4.1 FINANCIAL DEEPENING INDICATORS:
The indicator of financial development traditionally used in the literature is 
M3/GDP (King & Levine,1993). The single variable OLS regression results are 
shown in appendix 9.1. Financial development indicators are given in table
9.1.1. M3/GDP is significant at the 5% level. Another financial development 
variable, domestic credit/GDP, was used from the IFS database. This 
variable consists of private sector credit and government credit. Private sector 
credit/GDP is found to be significant in many studies (Beck & Levine,2002). 
Both domestic credit/GDP and private sector credit/GDP were significant. The 
net interest margin was significant at the 1% level.
Table 9.5 reports the results for the different sub-periods, for three financial 
deepening indicators. M3/GDP is significant over the 20-year period, but only 
in some of the sub-periods. Reserves/assets is negative and significant at the
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5% level over the 20-year period, and some of the sub-periods. This variable 
showed the greatest stability over the sub-periods and was therefore chosen 
as the variable indicating financial development. This is a novel approach, as 
most of the other studies examining financial development and growth use 
either M3/GDP, credit/GDP or private sector credit/GDP. Both domestic 
credit/GDP and private sector credit/GDP are significant at the 5% level (table 
9.6). But are not significant in most of the sub-periods.
Table 9.5 -  Financial deepening 
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP growth
Coefficient t-statistic R' Durbin Watson
20 year averages: 
1980-1999
Credit/GDP 0.005 1.15 0.02 2.00
M3/GDP 0.01 2.35 ** 0.11 1.91
Reserves/Assets -0.04 -2.43 ** 0.11 1.99
10 year averages: 
1980-1989
Credit/GDP 0.01 2.08 ** 0.08 1.76
M3/GDP 0.01 1.76 * 0.07 1.84
Reserves/Assets -0.04 -2.122 ** 0.09 1.82
10 year averages: 
1990-1999
Credit/GDP 0.003 0.71 0.01 2.00
M3/GDP 0.01 1.55 0.05 2.17
Reserves/Assets -0.03 -1.41 0.04 2.02
5 year averages: 
1980-1984
Credit/GDP 0.005 0.54 0.006 2.29
M3/GDP 0.01 1.25 0.03 2.24
Reserves/Assets -0.05 -2.44 ** 0.11 2.34
5 year averages: 
1985-1989
Credit/GDP 0.007 0.96 0.01 2.01
M3/GDP 0.01 1.77* 0.07 2.11
Reserves/Assets -0.01 -0.57 0.007 1.99
5 year averages: 
1990-1994
Credit/GDP -0.00 -0.07 0.00 2.41
M3/GDP 0.00 0.87 0.01 2.50
Reserves/Assets -0.01 -0.35 0.002 2.42
5 year averages: 
1995-1999
Credit/GDP 0.00 1.16 0.02 1.46
M3/GDP 0.01 1.64 0.06 1.49
Reserves/Assets -0.04 -1.75* 0.06 1.45
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 9.6 Credit distribution
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP growth
Coefficient t-statistic Durbin Watson
20 year averages: 
1980-1999
Government
credit/GDP -0.01 -1.22 0.03 2.01
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.01 2.26 ** 0.10 2.14
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.01 2.29 ** 0.10 2.03
Change in 
credit/Change in 
GDP 0.001 0.48 0.006 2.20
10 year averages: 
1980-1989
Government
credit/GDP -0.02 -0.79 0.01 1.84
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.018 1.50 0.05 1.87
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.02 2.44 ** 0.15 1.99
Change in 
credit/Change in 
GDP 0.00 0.20 0.001 2.3
10 year averages: 
1990-1999
Government
credit/GDP 0.005 0.45 0.005 2.69
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.004 0.73 0.01 2.477
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.006 1.06 0.03 3.13
Change in 
credit/Change in 
GDP
0.001 0.65 0.01 3.00
5 year averages: 
1980-1984
Government
credit/GDP l O b
 
—k -0.32 0.002 2.45
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.01 0.87 0.01 2.43
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.01 0.60 0.009 2.61
Change in 
credit/Change in 
GDP 0.004 0.69 0.01 2.49
5 year averages: 
1985-1989
Government
credit/GDP -0.01 -0.46 0.005 1.95
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.01 1.38 0.04 1.89
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.02 1.99* 0.10 2.41
Change in
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credit/Change in 
GDP
0.00 0.41 0.004 2.57
5 year averages: 
1990-1994
Government
credit/GDP -0.01 -0.93 0.02 2.40
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.00 0.09 0.00 2.40
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.00 0.20 0.00 2.92
Change in 
credit/Change in 
GDP
0.00 0.05 0.00 3.00
5 year averages: 
1995-1999
Government
credit/GDP 0.002 0.20 0.0009 1.93
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.003 1.49 0.04 1.78
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.005 1.03 0.02 0.03
Change in 
credit/Change in 
GDP
0.002 1.16 0.03 1.98
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
9.4.2. INTEREST RATES.
Data on the bank rate, real interest rate, interest rate spread and markup, 
were calculated for the 10-year and 5-year sub-periods. All four variables 
were significant over the 20-year period, with the interest rate spread 
significant at the 1% level. During the 1980s, only bank rate is significant, 
while both bank rate and spreads are significant during the 1990s. For the 5- 
year periods, all the variables are significant in the 1995-1999 period. This 
might be due to data availability. Data on the first 10-year period (1980-1999) 
were incomplete, while the quality and availability of data improved in the 
following period (1990-1999).
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Table 9.7 Interest rates, spreads and markups
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP growth
Coefficient t-statistic R* Durbin Watson
20 year averages: 
1980-1999
Bank rate -0.05 -2.41 ** 0.11 2.10
Real interest rate -0.13 -2.01 * 0.08 2.53
Spread -0.22 -3.03 *** 0.17 1.62
Markup -0.14 -1.85* 0.07 2.10
10 year averages: 
1980-1989
Bank rate -0.04 -1.71 * 0.06 1.56
Real interest rate -0.06 -0.77 0.01 2.11
Spread -0.18 -1.35 0.05 1.71
Markup -0.004 -0.12 0.00 1.56
10 year averages: 
1990-1999
Bank rate -0.06 -2.53 ** 0.13 2.12
Real interest rate -0.09 -1.14 0.03 2.51
Spread -0.24 -3.48 *** 0.22 1.83
Markup -0.00 -0.11 0.00 2.46
5 year averages: 
1980-1984
Bank rate -0.04 -0.95 0.02 1.61
Real interest rate -0.14 -1.60 0.07 1.84
Spread -0.28 -1.89* 0.09 1.76
Markup -0.01 -0.25 0.001 1.08
5 year averages: 
1985-1989
Bank rate -0.04 -1.83 * 0.07 1.65
Real interest rate -0.20 -2.35 ** 0.13 2.63
Spread -0.02 -0.18 0.00 2.05
Markup -0.006 -0.05 0.00 1.57
5 year averages: 
1990-1994
Bank rate -0.08 -1.87 * 0.08 2.64
Real interest rate 0.09 0.89 0.01 2.85
Spread -0.19 -1.68 * 0.06 2.70
Markup 0.11 1.26 0.03 2.50
5 year averages: 
1995-1999
Bank rate -0.03 -1.75* 0.06 1.66
Real interest rate -0.21 -3.99 *** 0.26 2.07
Spread -0.07 -2.39 ** 0.11 1.44
Markup -0.08 -2.13 ** 0.10 1.81
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
9.4.3. TRADE AND OPENNESS
Table 9.8 shows data for the sub-periods for the trade variables. Foreign 
exchange/imports is the only variable that is significant over the 20-year
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period, and was also significant in most of the sub-periods. Although the other 
two variables were significant in some of the sub-periods, they were not 
included in further regressions.
Table 9.8 Trade and openness
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP growth
Coefficient t-statistic R* Durbin Watson
20 year averages: 
1980-1999
Foreign
exchange/imports 1.34 2.20 ** 0.09 1.97
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 1.71 1.44 0.04 1.57
Current
account/imports -1.07 -1.52 0.04 2.14
10 year averages: 
1980-1989
Foreign
exchange/imports 0.99 1.10 0.02 1.79
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 1.45 0.84 0.01 1.79
Current
account/imports -0.05 -0.05 0.00 1.99
10 year averages: 
1990-1999
Foreign
exchange/imports 1.35 1.99* 0.08 1.90
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 2.18 1.89* 0.08 1.92
Current
account/imports -0.90 -1.23 0.03 2.09
5 year averages: 
1980-1984
Foreign
exchange/imports -0.01 -0.007 0.00 2.15
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 0.52 0.27 0.001 2.17
Current
account/imports -0.29 -0.22 0.001 2.32
5 year averages: 
1985-1989
Foreign
exchange/imports 1.53 1.75* 0.64 2.05
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 3.18 1.78 * 0.07 2.12
Current
account/imports -2.12 -2.22 ** 0.09 2.22
5 year averages: 
1990-1994
Foreign
exchange/imports 1.59 2.54 ** 0.12 2.29
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 2.65 2.04 ** 0.09 2.19
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Current
account/imports -0.85 -1.02 0.02 2.44
5 year averages: 
1995-1999
Foreign
exchange/imports 0.49 0.52 0.00 1.57
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 2.63 2.22 ** 0.10 1.46
Current
account/imports -0.33 -0.39 0.00 1.53
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
9.4.4. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH -  REGRESSION 
MODEL
The basic regression used takes the following form:
GROWTH, = a + pFINANCE + y [CHANNELS TO GROWTH] + si, 
where the dependent variable GROWTH, equals real per capita GDP growth. 
FINANCE equals either one of the financial deepening indicators and 
CHANNELS TO GROWTH represents a combination of the other variables 
associated with economic growth, as discussed above. Table 9.9 below 
shows the regression output.
The variable chosen to represent financial deepening (or repression) was the 
ratio of reserves to assets (as explained above). This variable was always 
significant, even when other factors were included to control for their influence 
on growth. Regression results are reported in table 9.9.
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Table 9.9 Financial Deepening and Growth, Cross-Country Regressions, OLS
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth
Regressors (D (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 2.03 1.13 0.65 0.462 0.77
(6.64)*** (2.44) (1.42) (1.245) (1.80)*
Ratio of reserves -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04
to assets (-2.43)** (-2.71)*** (-3.58)*** (-2.46)** (-2.84)***
Trade 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.008
(2.64)** (2.92)*** (2.30) (2.14)**
Ratio of foreign 1.65 1.10 1.12
reserves to (3.13)*** (2.53)** (2.57)**
imports
Growth rate of 0.36 0.40
real per capita (4.90)*** (4.85)***
capital
Real interest rate -0.04
(-1.38)
R2 0.11 0.23 0.39 0.62 0.65
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.20 0.34 0.58 0.61
Durbin-Watson 1.99 1.82 1.58 2.00 2.07
stat
Number of 49 47 45 45 43
countries
(t-stats in parentheses)
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
The financial development (repression) variable (reserves/assets) explains 
11 % of real per capita GDP growth (R2 = 0.11). The next variable was ‘trade’ 
which also has a strong positive relationship with growth. This variable was 
defined above as the sum of real exports and imports divided by real GDP. 
Another variable indicating openness to trade was introduced, the ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to imports. This variable was also significantly 
related to growth, which confirms the theoretical point made above that 
countries are constrained by levels of foreign exchange in their participation in 
trade. As shown above in the basic growth regression equation, only one of 
the financial deepening indicators is included, because they are all correlated 
(as shown by the scatter diagrams in Appendix 1). All the financial deepening
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indicators used, have positive correlations with real per capita GDP growth. 
The only negative relationship was that between the ratio of bank liquid 
reserves to bank assets. This is an indicator of financial repression, not 
commonly used in the traditional growth regressions (which usually rely on 
some measure of M3 or bank credit to GDP). It confirms that countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems have higher liquid reserves to assets ratios. 
As the money supply becomes endogenous and the central bank fulfills it role 
as lender of last resort, the need for banks to hold high levels of reserves 
diminishes. This variable therefore shows that an underdeveloped financial 
system serves as a form of a ‘tax’ which negatively affects financial 
intermediation. The real interest rate was also included as an explanatory 
variable and enters the regression with the correct sign, but the t-statistic was 
not significant. The final R2 value is 0.65 which shows that real per capita 
GDP growth is well explained by the variables included in the model.
9.5 FINANCIAL DEEPENING AND GROWTH IN SELECTED SADC 
COUNTRIES
This thesis has examined the nature of the money supply process in the 
countries of the SADC region. It was argued in earlier chapters that the 
financial structure is related to the way the money supply is determined within 
a country. The more developed the financial system (as measured by a range 
of indicators), the more likely it is that the money supply is determined 
endogenously. This link was examined in detail in earlier chapters.
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The current chapter attempted to link these indicators of financial 
development (and money supply determination) to levels of growth. In the 
econometric model above it was shown that financial development is 
significantly positively related to economic growth. Other variables affecting 
growth were also included. In this sample of 49 countries, 9 countries were 
from the SADC region. Most fall into the lower income categories, with the 
exception of Mauritius and South Africa. These two countries exhibited 
consistently higher levels of financial development, measured by a variety of 
indicators.
Empirical studies have repeatedly illustrated that deeper, broader, and better 
functioning financial markets are associated with higher rates of economic 
growth. Studies dealing specifically with African countries are limited, but 
results from existing empirical work support the view that financial 
development is associated with economic growth (Ndikumana,2002; Gelbard 
and Leite,1999).
Gelbard and Leite (1999) made an important contribution to the literature on 
finance and growth in Africa. Using Sub-Sahara African countries, they 
constructed an index of financial development for 38 countries, and combined 
a variety of indicators to construct this index: “A thorough assessment of a 
financial system should consider at least six areas: (a) the market structure 
and competitiveness of the system; (b) the availability of financial products; (c) 
the degree of financial liberalisation; (d) the institutional environment under 
which a system operates; (e) the degree of integration with foreign financial
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markets (financial openness); and (f) the degree of sophistication of 
instruments of monetary policy” (1999:8). According to their results, the 
countries with the most developed financial systems in 1997 were South 
Africa, Mauritius, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Namibia.
Gelbard and Leite (1999) use this financial development index in a simple 
OLS model to test whether it is related to per capita GDP growth. They found 
that, when combined with several other contributors to growth, the financial 
development index was positively and significantly related to country growth 
rates. The indicators compiled by Gelbard and Leite are highly informative for 
cross-country variations in the overall level of financial development, and on 
differences in certain institutional features.
In the model developed in this chapter, financial development was also 
significantly correlated with growth. This model included 9 SADC countries. It 
is not statistically possible to extend this approach (using long-run averages) 
for these 9 countries (insufficient observations). But it can be concluded from 
the model that the general conclusions are applicable to the 9 SADC 
countries included in the sample.
The SADC countries included in the model (with the exception of South 
Africa), showed lower levels of financial development for almost all variables. 
Per capita income was lower for 4 of these 9 countries in 1990s than in the 
1980s. These statistics illustrate what has become known as Africa’s ‘growth 
tragedy’. Table 9.10 shows average levels of financial development and real
389
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
per capita growth for the 1980s and 1990s. The countries in bold letters had 
lower ratios of both M3 to GDP and Bank credit to GDP, in the 1990s than 
they had in the 1980s. The exceptions were Mauritius, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (comparative figures for Tanzania were not available). Botswana 
and Mauritius are the two success stories of the SADC region. Both countries 
had average per capita growth rates above 4% (only 2 other countries out of 
the 49 included had average growth rates exceeding 4%, i.e. Ireland and 
Cyprus). As seen in Table 9.10, Botswana experienced a decline in average 
per capita growth rates over the 1990s, but the average figure for the whole 
period was still high (>4%).
Table 9.10 Financial deepening and per capita growth (averages by decade), 
1980-1999.
Country Bank credit as % M3 as % of GDP Real GDP per
of GDP capita growth (%
_________________________________________________ _______________
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s
Botswana -17.4* -50.2* 24.7 24.0 6.7 2.1
Lesotho 31.8 1.4 43.5 34.1 1.7 1.9
Mauritius 55.3 62.9 50.1 74.2 4.8 4.0
Malawi 36.2 18.0 24.4 21.3 -1.3 1.2
Swaziland 16.1 3.9 31.6 30.0 2.8 0.2
Tanzania - 22.9 - 21.7 - 0.4
South Africa 89.8 131.8 47.9 42.6 -0.9 -0.7
Zambia 63.2 59.3 33.9 18.0 -1.9 -2.3
Zimbabwe 42.7 48.5 40.3 39.1 0.7 0.7
'Note: ‘Claims on Central Government’ includes both Claims on Central Government by the monetary authorities and 
claims by deposit money banks. This figure is reported as ‘net claims on central government’, which equals claims on 
central government, less central government deposits. It is therefore possible that this figure can have a negative 
value.
Source: IFS & World Bank Development Indicators.
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Ndikumana (2002:10) found that for the whole Sub-Saharan Africa region, 
aggregate indicators of financial development have on average either 
stagnated or declined. The same is true for the 9 countries included here from 
the SADC region. For the SADC countries, the average size of the financial 
system (as measured by M3 to GDP), was lower in the 1990s compared to 
the 1980s. The ratio of M3 to GDP for the 9 countries averaged 37% for the 
1980s, and fell to 34% for the 1990s.
The data highlights the predominant role of the South African financial 
system. The average bank credit to GDP ratio for the 9 SADC countries over 
the whole sample period (1980-1999) was 35% when South Africa is included 
(with a value of 110%), and 26% when it was excluded. The difference is even 
more spectacular when one considers the overall size of the financial system 
(as measured by the sum of deposit money bank assets and stock market 
capitalisation as share of GDP). When South Africa is included (with a value 
of 187%) the average is 67%, but falls dramatically to 37% when South Africa 
is excluded. It is primarily through the supply of credit that financial 
intermediation stimulates real economic activity. Credit supplied upon demand 
(i.e. an endogenous money supply) facilitates economic relations and 
stimulates economic growth. The decline in credit supply in the SADC 
countries has been a contributing factor to the poor economic performance of 
the region over the past two decades.
Although South Africa has a highly developed financial sector, this was not 
sufficient to ensure high growth rates over the period. South Africa performed
391
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
dismally over the 20 years (1980-1999), with an average annual real per 
capita growth rate of -0.81%. Only 3 countries (Zambia, Venezuela and 
Madagascar) performed worse out of the 49 countries. But this low growth 
rate for South Africa must be attributable to other factors. South Africa had 
negative annual real per capita growth rates throughout the 1980s and up to 
1994, mainly as a result of international sanctions and isolation, debt 
repayment commitments and an adverse political environment.
It was seen from the regression results above that financial development is 
one contributor to growth. Other institutional and structural factors also have 
to be considered (as shown by Gelbard & Leite (1999)). The diversity in 
financial development across countries is also illustrated in high concentration 
indices for the banking sector. The average CR3 ratio calculated for the 9 
SADC countries in the sample, is a very high 89% (increasing to 91% if South 
Africa is excluded). This shows that there is scope for more competition in the 
banking sector, which could lead to more efficient financial intermediation.
This is also reflected in the average interest rate spread, which is 7%. South 
Africa and Botswana are the only two SADC countries with average spreads 
lower than 5%. Both Tanzania and Zambia have average spreads higher than 
10% for the period. These results are also found by Gelbard and Leite 
(1999:15) in their study of 39 Sub-Sahara African countries: “At mid-1997, 
only five countries (Botswana, Gabon, Niger, South Africa and Togo) had 
interest spreads below 6 percent, and no country had spreads below 4 
percent. In another 13 countries, the spread was between 6 percent and 10 
percent. The large spreads appear to be directly related to the degree of bank
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concentration, the share of nonperforming loans, and the lack of openness of 
the financial system”.
Another important aspect of factors affecting growth is a country’s the 
openness to trade. Most of the countries in the SADC region are small, open 
economies. The average value for the ‘trade’ variable (the sum of real exports 
and imports as a share of real GDP), is 103%. When one looks at the foreign 
exchange constraint, these countries cannot grow as fast as they would like. 
The average value of foreign exchange divided by imports, is 36%. This 
means that countries have relatively low levels of foreign exchange to imports. 
This is reflected in both the current account (divided by imports) and the 
balance of payments (divided by imports). Both indicators have negative 
average values for the sample of 9 SADC countries. The average value for 
the current account deficit is -0.24 and for the BoP -0.10.
When the institutional environment is considered, these countries are 
characterised by high levels of corruption. The average value for the SADC 
countries is 3.2 (with corruption measured on a scale of 0 (high level of 
corruption) to 10 (low level). South Africa (value of 5.3) is the only country in 
the sample with a value higher than 3.8 (Zambia having the worst value of 
2 .2).
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9.6 CONCLUSION
There is an important link between the level of financial development and 
growth. This is important for growth literature in general, since most traditional 
models focused on the supply side. Post Keynesian economists are primarily 
concerned with demand-side factors. But, Post Keynesians have not 
traditionally focused on the links between demand factors and economic 
growth. The role of the financial sector in the growth process has not been 
fully explored.
49 countries were examined to test for common relationships between 
financial development and growth. It was found, using an OLS regression 
model, that there is a positive and significant correlation between financial 
development and growth. Other indicators of financial structure, openness to 
trade and institutional aspects were also included. Combined with the financial 
deepening indicators, they explained 92% of growth for the 49 countries, 
averaged over the period 1980-1999.
This approach was then extended to the SADC countries. The sample of 49 
countries included 9 countries from the SADC region. It was shown that 
average levels of financial deepening declined over this period. The ratio of 
M3 to GDP was lower in the 1990s that in the 1980s. This lack of financial 
development is one explanation why African countries (and SADC) had such 
dismal growth records. An improvement in financial intermediation, and
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greater availability of credit (more endogenous money supply) to prospective 
borrowers will lead to higher growth rates.
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A. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: 
Table 9.1.1 Single variable regressions 
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth
APPENDIX 9.1
Variable Coefficient t-statistic R' Durbin-Watson
Credit/GDP 0.005 1.15 0.02 2.00
M3/GDP 0.01 2.35 ** 0.11 1.91
Reserves/Assets -0.04 -2.43 ** 0.11 1.99
Oversize/GDP 0.40 1.03 0.02 1.98
Bank credit/GDP 1.02 1.36 0.03 2.05
Bank assets/GDP 1.03 1.56 0.12 2.06
Domestic
credit/GDP 0.01 2.29 ** 0.10 2.03
Net interest margin -29.81 -3.76 *** 0.25 2.07
Government
credit/GDP -0.01 -1.22 0.03 2.01
Private sector 
credit/GDP 0.01 2.26 ** 0.10 2.14
Change in 
credit/change GDP 0.001 0.48 0.006 2.20
Concentration ratio -0.99 -0.89 0.01 1.93
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Figure 9.1.1. Growth and M3 as %GDP
M3GDP vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various years.
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Figure 9.1.2. Growth and domestic credit provided by the banking sector
(%GDP)
CREDITGDP vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various years.
Figure 9.1.3. Growth and bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio
RESERVESASSETS vs. GDPPCGROWTH 
50 ---------------------------------------------------------
40
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GDPPCGROWTH
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various years
Figure 9.1.4. Growth and claims of deposit money banks on non-financial 
domestic sectors (%GDP)
DBY vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Levin, Loayza, Beck dataset (1999)
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PRIV vs. GDPPCGROWTH
Figure 9.1.5. Growth and claims of deposit money banks on private sector
(%GDP)
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Levin, Loayza, Beck dataset (1999)
Figure 9.1.6. Growth and the Overall size of the financial system
OVERSIZE vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Levin, Loayza, Beck dataset (1999) 
Figure 9.1.7. Growth and Private credit (% GDP)
PRCREDITGDP vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: IFS, various years.
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Figure 9.1.8. Growth and the total assets of banklike institutions (%GDP)
BIA vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999) 
Figure 9.1.9 Growth and the net interest margin
NETINTER vs. GDPPCGROWTH
zh-
LU
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999)
B. STOCK MARKET INDICATORS, INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION 
Table 9.1.2 Single variable regressions
Dependent variable: real per capita GDP growth
Variable Coefficient t-statistic R* Durbin-Watson
Market
capitalisation/GDP 0.51 0.92 0.02 2.01
Total value 
traded/GDP -0.44 -0.34 0.002 2.03
Turnover ratio/GDP -0.19 -0.26 0.001 2.00
Bank rate -0.05 -2.41 ** 0.11 2.10
Real interest rate -0.13 -2.01 * 0.08 2.53
Spread -0.22 -3.03 *** 0.17 1.62
Markup -0.14 -1.85* 0.07 2.10
Inflation -0.01 -2.54 ** 0.12 1.97
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 9.1.10 Growth and nominal interest rates
BANKRATE vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: IFS, various years
Figure 9.1.11 Growth and interest rate spreads
SPREAD vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: World Bank Development Indicators and IFS, various years. 
Figure 9.1.12 Growth and real interest rates
REALINTERESTB vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various years.
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C. GROWTH RELATED VARIABLES AND OPENNESS TO TRADE
Table 9.1.3 -  Single variable regressions
Dependent varia ble: real per capita GDP growth
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Durbin-Watson
Government
expenditure/GDP 0.01 0.29 0.001 2.13
Growth of real per 
capita capital 0.48 6.76 *** 0.49 2.48
Average years of 
schooling (1990) 0.09 1.22 0.03 2.07
Private savings rates 9.85 4.11 *** 0.28 1.72
Repudiation of 
government contracts 0.40 3.82 *** 0.25 2.04
Levels of corruption. 0.35 2.12 ** 0.09 2.11
Foreign
exchange/imports 1.34 2.20 ** 0.09 1.97
Balance of 
Payments/Imports 1.71 1.44 0.04 1.57
(Exports + 
Imports )/GDP 0.01 2.36 0.11 1.87
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Figure 9.1.13 Growth and real per capita capital growth rates
CAPGROLS vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999)
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Figure 9.1.14 Growth and average years of schooling (1990)
SCHOOL9Q vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999) 
Figure 9.1.15 Growth and private saving rates
PSR_CA vs. GDPPCGROWTH
GDPPCGROWTH
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999) 
Figure 9.1.16 Saving rates and capital growth rates
CAPGROLS vs. PSR_CA
PSR_CA
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999)
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Figure 9.1.17 Correlation between government repudiation of contracts and 
levels of corruption
CORRUPT vs. GOVREP
GOVREP
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999)
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Figure 9.2.1. Per capita growth rates across income groups
Per capita growth rates across Income Groups
APPENDIX 9.2.
■ * ? 'w', K'- • *■
Real per capita GDP growth rate Real per capita GNP growth rate
[□H igh M Upper-middle□  Lower-middle QLow [
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999.
Figure 9.2.2. Financial deepening across income groups
Financial Deepening across Income Groups
120 ----------------— ......................................................................................... ................................................... .....................................---------------------------------
Financial depth: Domestic credit provided by banking sector (Unit: % of Financial depth: Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP
GDP)
[□H igh ■  Upper-middle □  Lower-middle□  Low |
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various years.
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Financial deepening indicators across income groups
Figure 9.2.3. Financial deepening across income groups
Claims of deposit money banks on nonfinancial Bank credit - Claims on private sector by deposit Overall size of the financial system (Deposit money 
domestic sectors as share of GDP money banks as share of GDP bank assets and stock market capitalization as
share of GDP).
[□H igh ■  Upper-middle□  Lower-middle□  Low |
Source: Levin, Loayza & Beck (1999).
Figure 9.2.4. Credit shares across income groups
Credit shares across Income Groups
m —
I a
government share of credit private sector share Domestic credit:gdp
| □  High ■  Upper-middle □  Lower-middle □  Low |
Source: IFS, various years.
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Figure 9.2.5. Credit distribution across income groups
Credit distribution across Income Groups
Domestic credit:gdp Private sector credit:gdp
□  High M Upper-middle □  Lower-middle □  Low |
Source: IFS, various years
Figure 9.2.6. Credit and changes in credit
Credit and changes in ere dit
■
..
................. ............
r~Li—i
150
100
Private sector credit:gdp Change in credit:change in GDP
□  High ■  Upper-middle □  Lower-middle □  Low
Source: IFS, various years.
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Figure 9.2.7 Net interest margin across income groups
Net interest margin
| □  Net interest margin |
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999.
Figure 9.2.8 Concentration ratio (CR3) across income groups
Concentration
------------
j
- *
;
-
High Upper-middle Lower-middle Low
[□  Concentration]
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999.
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Figure 9.2.9. Stock market development across income groups and total 
assets of banklike institutions as % of GDP
Stock market development across Incom e Groups & Total assets o f bankilke institutions
0.2
0.1
Stock market capitalization as share Total value traded on the stock Turnover ratio (Market capitalization Total assets of banklike institutions 
of GDP market as share of GDP divided by total value traded as share of GDP
□  High U Upper-middle □  Lower-middle D Low
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999. 
Figure 9.2.10. Interest rates -  spread and mark-up
Interest rates - spread and m arkup
Spread Markup
□  High BUpper-middle □  Lower-middle DLow
Source: IFS various years.
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Figure 9.2.11. Nominal interest rates and inflation rates across income groups
Nominal Bank Rate and Inflation Rate
60 -------- ~ -------------------------------------------- ------- --------------r —
□  High MUpper-middle □  Lower-middle DLow
Source: IFS, various years; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999.
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APPENDIX 9.3 LIST OF COUNTRIES AND INCOME GROUPS
50 Countries were selected from the World Bank database, 25 developed and 
25 less-developed countries. However, the data from Zaire were so 
incomplete that it was finally excluded, leaving the 49 countries listed below. 
The income groups and classifications are those published in the World Bank 
Development Indicators.
Income group 1 = High-income countries 
Income group 2 = Upper-middle-income countries 
Income group 3 = Lower-middle-income countries
Income group 4 = Low-income countries.
Country Income Group
Argentina 2
Australia 1
Austria 1
Belgium 1
Botswana 3
Brazil 2
Canada 1
Chile 2
Colombia 3
Congo 4
Cyprus 1
Denmark 1
Egypt 3
Fiji 3
Finland 1
France 1
Germany 1
Ghana 4
Greece 1
Iceland 1
India 4
Ireland 1
Italy 1
Japan 1
Kenya 4
Lesotho 4
Luxembourg 1
Madagaskar 4
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Mexico
Mauritius
Malawi
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Paraguay
Portugal
Seychelles
South Africa
Spain
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Turkey
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
2
2
4
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
3
1
1
2
4
4
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION 
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis was to examine the endogeneity of credit money in LDCs. 
The focus was on the money supply process in developing countries, specifically 
twelve countries from the SADC region. After examining the theoretical basis of 
endogenous money in detail, aspects of the financial system in each of these 
countries were examined. Some general conclusions can be made from the 
individual country studies.
10.2 THE ROLE OF MONEY
The classical economists considered money as neutral. Money did not affect the 
productive (real) side of the economy. Policy prescriptions were limited to the role 
of the State in facilitating economic exchange. Keynes managed to escape from 
the orthodox view of money and recognised that money could also be seen as a 
store of value as well as a medium of exchange. His conversion was a gradual 
process. In his famous work, the General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936), he still treated money as exogenous. It is only in his Post-General
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Theory works (and to a degree in his earlier Treatise on Money (1935)) that he 
began to treat money as endogenous.
The work of Keynes initiated a line of research that is still active today. Since the 
time of Keynes, monetary policy has gained prominence. During the Post World 
War II years Keynesian monetary theory became the reigning orthodoxy of the 
time. The Neoclassical synthesis forced monetary policy to play second violin to 
fiscal policy. This was drastically changed by Milton Friedman, with his emphasis 
on the central role of money. Friedman revived the classical idea of exogenous 
money. The long-run neutrality of money became a central aspect of the 
Monetarist school. Other schools of thought following in the wake of Monetarism, 
also subscribed to the idea of exogenous money. New Classical economists 
developed this idea to the extreme, in their policy ineffectiveness proposition, 
which became known as the super-neutrality of money. New Keynesians, 
reviving the original ideas of Keynes argued that money plays a powerful role in 
the economy and can affect levels of production and output. The money supply 
was assumed to be under the control of the central bank.
Post Keynesians gave new meaning to the non-neutrality of money. They view 
the economy as essentially demand driven. In a modern credit-driven world the 
money supply adjusts to the demand for finance. The money supply is 
endogenous and central banks do not control the nominal quantity of money.
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As shown in Chapter 3, Post Keynesians are a diverse group of economists, who 
are not all in agreement as to what endogenous money means. The Post 
Keynesian school can be broadly divided into four groups, the 
‘accommodationists’, ‘structuralists’, ‘circuitists’ and 'institutionalists’. All agree 
that the money supply is endogenous, but disagree about the degree of 
endogeneity. Accommodationists argue that the money supply is always fully 
endogenous. The money supply curve is horizontal in money-interest space. 
Where the orthodox exogenous money approach does not incorporate the 
market for bank loans, accommodationists argue that banks can create credit in 
a modern economy. This approach is associated with the work of Kaldor, Lavoie, 
Moore and Rochon.
The structuralists agree, but add financial innovations of modern banks, such as 
asset and liability management and securitization. Banks have a choice about 
the composition of their assets and liabilities. They maintain that accommodation 
is only partial and that the loan supply curve can be positively sloped during 
certain periods. This view is associated with Palley, Dymski, Pollin, Wray etc. 
Wray followed Minsky that the money supply was a step function. During 'normal 
times’ the money supply curve is horizontal, but it can become positively sloped 
or even vertical, during crises, e.g. during a credit crunch. Circuitists emphasize 
the flow of money in the monetary circuit, with banks taking centre stage in the
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money creation process. This school includes authors like Rochon, Graziani and 
Parguez.
Institutionalist Post Keynesians argue that the nature of the money supply 
depends on the level of institutional development of the financial system. In a 
rudimentary financial system, the money supply is assumed to be fully controlled 
by the central bank. As the financial system develops and banks become 
competitive and innovative, money can be created by ‘the stroke of a pen’. The 
proponents of this view are Niggle, Chick and Dow.
In this thesis the Institutionalist view was used to examine the money supply 
process in the SADC countries. The institutional framework of each country was 
discussed, to determine whether they have reached the stage where credit 
money is supplied on demand. It was shown that South Africa is the only country 
in the SADC region with a fully developed system where credit can be supplied 
on demand. But it was also shown that this option is only available to a minority 
of South Africans who have access to formal credit markets.
10.3 MONEY AND CREDIT - DEMAND AND SUPPLY
According to the accommodationist Post Keynesians there is no such thing as an 
independent demand for money curve. The orthodox view where a money 
demand curve intersects a vertical money supply to determine the equilibrium
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quantity of money, is not applicable to a credit money economy. Demand and 
supply functions are not identifiable, since they are interdependent. In the 
endogenous view there is no independent supply of money function that exists 
independently of the demand for money. There can be no excess money supply 
as all money supplied is always demanded. This view has become synonymous 
with the idea o f ‘convenience lending’. Any increase in the supply of money 
creates its own demand in the form of an increase in convenience lending of fiat 
money to the banking system. Loans therefore create deposits.
Accommodationist Post Keynesians have been criticized for lacking a money 
demand theory. This thesis argued that the demand for money is an important 
aspect in the developing country context. In order to ascertain whether credit is 
supplied on demand, more information is needed on the nature of the demand for 
money. Post Keynesians maintain that it is the supply of credit money that 
creates its own demand through ‘convenience lending’ of wealth holders.
The hypothesis tested in this thesis was that the demand for money in 
developing countries stems mainly from the transactions motive. Most of the 
SADC countries have undeveloped credit markets and remain cash based 
economies. They have high ratios of cash / demand deposits and cash / M2. In 
such economies credit is not supplied on demand.
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Another important aspect of the demand for credit in Post Keynesian work, is the 
notion that firms are the dominant borrowers. Firms have access to credit lines 
and overdraft facilities. As capital markets develop, firms can choose whether 
they want to finance production by retained earnings, bank funds or by raising 
funds on capital markets. It was shown in Chapter 4, that in the UK households 
have replaced firms as the dominant borrowers.
To test whether the financing needs of firms explain changes in private sector 
credit, econometric tests were performed. Data on the components of firms’ 
demand for credit were only available for South Africa. It was found that the non­
government wage bill, changes in inventories and interest rates 
explain changes in private sector credit well. Firms had the larger share of private 
sector credit in South Africa. In the other SADC countries, except for Namibia 
and Botswana, firms also had the larger share. Households generally had low 
shares in private sector credit (10% in Zambia). It was argued that in these 
countries with undeveloped capital markets, both firms and households are bank 
dependent. Firms may have access to formal credit, but most households do not 
have a credit history and are largely dependent on informal credit markets for 
finance. The demand for credit is not the same as in developed countries where 
firms have access to credit lines or can access funds through capital markets.
It was shown in Chapter 5 that both firms and households in developing countries 
are subject to credit rationing. Credit rationing is essentially a New Keynesian
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concept. It was argued that credit rationing is fully compatible with the concept of 
endogenous money. The accommodationist Post Keynesians emphasize the fact 
that credit is supplied on demand to creditworthy borrowers. New Keynesians 
argue that in equilibrium loan markets may be characterized by credit rationing. 
Concepts such as ‘adverse selection’ and ‘asymmetric information’ are especially 
important in developing economies. Because of adverse selection, banks ration 
the total supply of credit rather than raising interest rates. If credit rationing is 
present, credit is not supplied on demand. The supply of credit is restricted on 
non-price grounds.
One way of testing the endogenous supply of credit money is to examine the 
relationship between changes in the money supply and changes in private sector 
credit over time. This was done for the SADC countries. Chapter 5 showed that 
in five of the 10 countries examined, there was some evidence of the money 
supply being credit driven. South Africa was the only country with a highly 
significant positive relationship between changes in M2 and private sector credit. 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland and Zambia also had positive relationships, but 
they were much weaker than in South Africa. In the five other countries, 
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, there was no correlation 
between changes in the money supply and changes in private sector credit. 
Regressions were run using both quarterly and annual data. There were fewer 
countries with significant relationships when annual data were used. Lesotho, 
Mauritius and South Africa were the only countries where the money supply (M2)
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and private sector credit were significantly and positively related. South Africa 
had the strongest correlation, when both quarterly and annual data were used. 
The conclusion is that in the majority of the SADC countries the money supply is 
not credit driven. South Africa is the only country where the money supply is 
credit driven, as shown by the high correlation between changes in the money 
supply and private sector credit.
Central to the theory of credit accommodation, is the existence of credit lines and 
overdraft facilities. Demand for credit is accommodated by central banks in 
developed countries. Data on the use of credit lines and overdrafts were only 
available for South Africa. It was shown that credit card and overdraft utilisation 
ratios correspond to levels found in developed countries. The credit card 
utilisation ratio varied between 30% and 40% between 1993 and 2000. The 
overdraft utilisation ratio fluctuated around 50%. Research on overdraft utilisation 
ratios in the USA also found ratios averaging 50%. This means that the central 
bank cannot restrict the growth of the money supply as banks have to 
accommodate all credit demand as borrowers draw down funds. The central 
bank has to supply reserves as ultimate supplier of system liquidity.
It was also shown in Chapter 5 that although SA has an overdraft utilisation ratio 
comparable to that of developed countries, it has a large informal sector where 
credit rationing exists. Only borrowers with access to credit card facilities (3.1% 
of the SA population), or owners of real estate, have access to the main sources
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of household credit: mortgage finance and credit card finance. Data from the 
individual banks in SA showed that Black South Africans who use banking 
services mainly have savings accounts or ATM cards. These facilities do not 
qualify for overdrafts and such borrowers do not have automatic access to credit. 
It was also argued that the large informal micro-finance market in South Africa is 
evidence of an excess demand for credit. Many borrowers are credit rationed and 
pay higher interest rates in informal credit markets. Banks are unwilling to bear 
the risk, even at higher interest rates.
It was argued in Chapter 6 that the two most important monetary transmission 
channels for developing countries are the exchange rate and credit channels.
The existence of the credit channel is closely linked to the phenomenon of credit 
rationing. In developing countries the traditional interest rate and money 
channels of monetary transmission are less important. Most of the SADC central 
banks focus on the interest rate channel as the primary channel of monetary 
transmission. This focus is misplaced, as there are a variety of factors that cause 
this channel to lose some of its potency. These include direct controls and 
reserve requirements, government intervention in credit markets, high 
concentration levels in the banking sector, undeveloped stock exchanges and 
capital markets.
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10.4 INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
The institutionalist ideas of Minsky, Niggle, Chick and Dow were used in Chapter 
7 to examine the nature of the money supply process. These authors argue that 
the money supply becomes increasingly endogenous as an economy develops.
In the early stages of financial development, the money supply is exogenous. An 
endogenous money supply can only be present in a country with an independent 
central bank and competitive commercial banks that use techniques such as 
asset and liability management and securitisation. In the description of the 
institutional frameworks of the individual countries, it was shown that most SADC 
countries have highly concentrated and undeveloped banking sectors.
Niggle argued that the final stages of financial development, characterised by a 
fully endogenous money supply, were only reached in the US during the 1970s 
and 1980s. This argument was used to show that most of the SADC countries, 
with the exception of South Africa, have not yet reached the stage where the 
money supply is fully endogenous. To facilitate comparison of different levels of 
financial development, a financial institutional development index was 
constructed. Variables such as concentration in the banking sector, bank 
credit/GDP, interest rate spreads, stock market capitalization/GDP, M3/GDP, etc. 
were used to construct the index. The results confirmed the conclusions of the 
previous chapters. Only South Africa’s financial institutional environment could 
be classified as a ‘largely developed’. Mauritius was classified as ‘somewhat
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developed’, while Botswana, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia were 
classified as ‘minimally developed’. Malawi had the lowest index value and was 
classified as ‘undeveloped’.
The financial development index provided an indicator, which could be used to 
compare individual countries. It was interpreted as an indicator of the degree of 
money endogeneity. South Africa was the only country where the money supply 
was fully endogenous. While this does not mean that the money supply is fully 
exogenous in the other countries, it does indicate that credit is not necessarily 
supplied on demand. To examine whether these indicators have improved over 
time, several variables were considered. It was found that the ratio of cash to 
demand deposits has decreased in most of the countries. The ratio of cash to M2 
also showed a downward trend between 1985 and 1998, in the majority of SADC 
countries. The ratio of M3 to GDP and interest rate spreads, paint a darker 
picture. In the majority of countries there was a reduction in the M3 to GDP ratio 
and interest rate spreads increased in all the countries, between the 1980s and 
the 1990s.
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10.5 EXOGENOUS INTEREST RATES
Post Keynesian monetary theory has become synonymous with the notion of 
‘endogenous money, exogenous interest rates’. When spending rises, the 
demand for and the supply of money increase. The money supply responds 
automatically to the rise in the demand for credit, and there is no necessity for 
interest rates to increase. This is the accommodationist Post Keynesian view.
Structuralist Post Keynesians argue that banks set lending rates, but that the 
mark-up over the base rate is not constant. The mark-up varies over the 
business cycle to reflect changes in liquidity preference of banks. Many Post 
Keynesian authors (Dow, Wray, Chick, etc.) developed theories where the 
liquidity preference of banks enters the picture. When the demand for credit 
increases, banks first try to innovate and stretch reserves before raising rates. 
Banks can choose whether they want to raise rates or not. Banks will allow the 
debt / equity ratio to increase with the business cycle, but at some stage they will 
be concerned with the risk level of their loan portfolio and will react by increasing 
lending rates. This increases the mark-up over the base rate. A var model was 
used in Chapter 8 to test this hypothesis. Data on interest rate mark-ups were 
used together with changes in GDP to see whether mark-ups vary procyclically. 
The var models seemed to indicate a positive response in mark-ups when there 
was a shock to GDP. The data range was limited (20 observations) and no clear 
conclusions could be made about the variation of mark-ups. It was found that
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mark-ups became increasingly unstable in most of the SADC countries between 
1980 and 2001.
Interest rate spreads were also examined using a var model. Structuralist Post 
Keynesians expect interest rate spreads to vary counter-cyclically. Once again, 
there was some evidence of counter-cyclical spreads, but nothing conclusive.
The general observation was that interest rate spreads are much higher in 
developing countries than in developed countries. A banking model was 
developed to examine the determinants of interest rate spreads at the micro­
level.
Data were used for a total of 76 banks in nine SADC countries. Using a simple 
OLS cross-sectional model, it was shown that interest rate spreads are positively 
related to variables such as operating expenses / total assets, general provisions 
for non-performing loans / total assets, return on equity and before tax profits. 
Macro-economic and institutional variables such as M2 / GDP, the loan / reserve 
ratio and per capita GDP growth also showed significant and positive correlations 
with interest rate spreads. These variables were combined to explain high 
interest rate spreads in developing countries.
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10.6 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
In Chapter 9, an econometric model was used to examine the links between 
financial development and growth. It was shown earlier in the thesis that the 
degree of endogeneity of the money supply can be linked to the level of financial 
institutional development. The money supply becomes increasingly endogenous 
as financial systems develop. South Africa is the only country that has reached 
this stage, as indicated by the financial institutional development index calculated 
in Chapter 7. This was combined with the findings of Chapter 8 where it was 
shown that interest rate spreads are higher in developing countries than in 
developed countries.
To be able to make conclusive observations, 49 developed and developing 
countries were included in the sample in Chapter 9. This included nine SADC 
countries. Data for the 20-year period 1980-1999 were used. Many indicators of 
financial development were included in the model. Significant and positive 
relationships were found between M3 / GDP and real per capita growth rates. 
Real per capita GDP was also significantly and positively related to Domestic 
credit / GDP, the Net interest margin and Private sector credit / GDP. The ratio 
Reserves to Assets had a significant, but negative relationship to real per capita 
GDP. Most previous studies on the links between financial development and 
growth, chose a financial development indicator such as M3 / GDP or domestic 
credit / GDP. All these variables were also examined for the 5-year and 10-year
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sub-periods. The ratio of Reserves to Assets was found to be stable over most of 
the individual sub-periods. It has a negative relationship with economic growth 
and can be interpreted as an indicator of financial repression. This variable was 
the financial variable chosen for the regression analysis, as the effect of financial 
repression on growth is especially important in the developing country context.
A number of stock market indicators, interest rates and inflation rates were also 
examined. Bank rates, real interest rates, interest rate spreads, mark-ups and 
inflation were all significantly and negatively related to real per capita GDP. None 
of the stock market indicators were significant. Growth related variables that were 
significant and positively related to real per capita GDP, included growth of real 
per capita capital, private saving rates, repudiation of government contracts, 
levels of corruption and the ratio of foreign exchange / imports. The financial 
repression indicator (ratio of reserves / assets) explained 11% of real per capita 
GDP. When combined with macro-economic and other growth related variables, 
the final model has a R2 = 0.65. It was shown that financial development 
indicators are important explanatory variables for real per capita growth.
The implications for development are clear. The less developed the financial 
institutional structure, the lower economic growth will be. To increase real per 
capita economic growth rates, countries have to ensure that the financial system 
evolves into a well developed financial system where credit is supplied on
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demand and both households and firms have access to formal credit markets. 
The banking sector has to become more competitive to ensure low interest rate 
spreads. High interest rate spreads lead to lower economic growth, as the cost of 
financial intermediation negatively affects economic growth rates. Banks should 
also be free from government intervention, quantitative constraints and high 
statutory reserve requirements. As the financial system develops, the money 
supply becomes increasingly endogenous and this stimulates economic growth.
10.7 FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis aimed to examine the nature of the money supply process in selected 
developing countries. The theory of endogenous money was tested for the SADC 
countries. It was seen from theory that an endogenous money supply responds 
automatically to the credit needs of the economy. Money supply creates its own 
demand.
In the case of the SADC countries it was found that this is not necessarily true. 
South Africa was the only SADC country in the study where the money supply 
was fully endogenous. In five out often countries examined, there was no 
correlation between money growth rates (M2) and changes in private sector 
credit. But these countries often had large fluctuations in M2.
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The question that arises from this is what determines the volume of bank 
intermediation in LDCs if it is not credit driven? Is the supply of credit money 
driven by the financing needs of governments? This remains an important area 
for future research.
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